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FOREWORD
By JUDGE ROBERT H. MCWILLIAMS
Two years ago the University of Denver College of Law em-
barked on a most ambitious program of making an annual survey
of the opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. Since the court is headquartered in Denver, it was
appropriate that, out of the eleven ABA-approved law schools in
the six states included within the Tenth Circuit, the University
of Denver should take the initiative. The decision to make such
a survey was apparently prompted by a desire to provide a schol-
arly endeavor for the Denver Law Journal and its contributors,
and to provide a useful aid to the practitioner who desires a quick
insight into the work of the Tenth Circuit during the preceding
year. We are certain that these desired goals have in each in-
stance been attained.
As for the Court, we are indeed satisfied with the work prod-
uct contained in the first two annual surveys. The selection of the
cases to be reviewed has been excellent. And in view of the very
considerable number of opinions filed by us each year, selectivity
is very important. In the calendar year of 1976 we filed 479 written
opinions, including 311 signed opinions and 168 per curiam opin-
ions. It is at once obvious that no survey could include a critique
of that number of opinions, nor should it. Many of our opinions
announce no new law, but simply apply long-established legal
principles to slightly different fact situations. Neither reporter
systems nor law journals need be concerned with such cases. A
law journal should be concerned with the unusual and the unique.
In this regard we believe the student editors of the Journal have
exercised good judgment in selecting which cases should come
under their close scrutiny.
Of course at the heart of any successful survey of this type is
the scholarship and objectivity of the reviewer. As might be well
imagined, the members of the Tenth Circuit look forward to the
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annual survey with great interest, and perhaps a slight degree of
trepidation! As concerns the latter, any shortcomings in our opin-
ions have been duly noted, as they should be, but in a professional
manner. And in our view the overall scholarship of the two pre-
ceding annual surveys has been uniformly good, which is no mean
feat, when considering the great volume of cases being consid-
ered.
So, we salute the Denver Law Journal on the two preceding
annual surveys of our opinions, and we eagerly look forward to the
third survey. Indeed, we trust that this will become a continuing
thing. It is good for all concerned. To assist in achieving that goal,
we pledge our continued cooperation.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In the last term, the Tenth Circuit decided several cases
which were primarily concerned with questions of administrative
law. Questions raised in these cases related to, among other
things, access to agency information, allowance of benefits, and
issuance of certificates and permits under statutory provisions
and agency regulations implementing these statutes. In general,
the decisions reached by the court were justified on the basis of
traditional administrative law theories. The court continued to
defer to the determinations made by administrative agencies on
questions subject to agency discretion where the court found the
evidence sufficient to support the determination, thus narrowing
the scope of judicial review. However, the court also continued to
maintain its role as final arbiter on questions of statutory inter-
pretation and other questions of law. The decisions by the court
were generally consistent with its prior decisions and also with the
decisions of other circuits.
What is perhaps most significant about the cases heard by
the court is not the final theories under which the cases were
decided, but the types of questions which are being raised under
various federal statutes before the various agencies. Although the
court's decisions covered a broad range of topics, the heaviest
concentration of cases occurred in the areas of equal employment
opportunity, social security administration, regulation of natural
gas, and access to administrative information; it is in these areas
that the court made its most significant contribution to the body
of case law in the Tenth Circuit.
I. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l was the subject of
review in Campbell v. United States Civil Service Commission'
and Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB. 3 In both cases, the scope
of one of the exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the
FOIA4 was involved. In each case, the Tenth Circuit concluded
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
2 539 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).
1 The FOIA provides that each governmental agency shall make available to the
public information specified in the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Certain
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that the requested materials were exempt based on principles
adopted by other circuits for determining the scope of an exemp-
tion.
In Campbell, employees of the Environmental Research Lab-
oratory in Boulder, Colorado, sought disclosure of a report con-
taining two parts and three appendices' compiled as the result of
a routine investigation of the laboratory's personnel manage-
ment. After the Civil Service Commission denied disclosure of the
entire report on the grounds that each component was protected
from disclosure by an exemption,' the employees brought an ac-
tion in the district court pursuant to the FOIA to compel disclo-
sure.7 When the district court ordered disclosure of only Part I
and Appendix III to the report the plaintiffs appealed" the deci-
sion to the Tenth Circuit. By the time the Tenth Circuit reviewed
the case, the only question for determination was whether Ap-
pendices I and II were exempt from disclosure.'
The Tenth Circuit first analyzed the question under exemp-
tion six of the FOIA, which provides an exemption from disclo-
sure for "personnel and medical files and similar files," the dis-
types of information, however, fall within one of nine exemptions from disclosure. Id. The
relevant exemptions, for this Overview, provide that disclosure requirements do not apply
to matters that are included in either (1) "personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy," or (2) "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would . . . interfere with enforcement
proceedings .... " Id. § 552(b)(6), (7)(A).
The two parts contained appraisals and evaluations of personnel. Appendix I listed
employees erroneously classified in the Service; Appendix II named employees who had
been promoted contrary to Commission regulations; and Appendix III included a statisti-
cal analysis of the responses of laboratory employees to certain questionnaires. 539 F.2d
at 60.
6 Id.
The FOIA authorizes the district court of the complainant's residence to enjoin an
agency from withholding records and to order production of records improperly withheld.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
539 F.2d at 60.
Following the ruling of the district court, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled that Civil Service Commission personnel management evaluation reports
were not exempt from disclosure. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In
Vaughn, however, the question of disclosure of appendices, similar to Appendices I and II
of the laboratory report, was not addressed; the plaintiffs in that case did not appeal a
decision of the district court exempting such appendices from disclosure. After the deci-
sion in Vaughn, the Civil Service Commission released both parts of the report as well as
Appendix III. Campbell v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 539 F.2d at 61.
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closure of which would "constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy."' 0 Based upon the decisions of other
courts," the Tenth Circuit quickly concluded that both append-
ices fell within the "similar files" clause of the exemption.'"
Hence, the court was left with only one issue to determine:
whether or not disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy."
The court noted that Congress had recommended the balanc-
ing of an individual's right of privacy against the public's right
to government information.'3 The court then identified three fac-
tors which had been considered in prior cases" applying this bal-
ancing test:
1. Would disclosure result in an invasion of privacy and, if so, how
serious?
2. The extent or value of the public interest purpose or objective
of the individuals seeking disclosure.
3. Whether the information is available from other sources.'5
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 4 supra.
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 371-82 (1976) (case summaries
of honor code violations are "similar files" within the meaning of exemption 6); Wine
Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 502 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974)
(list of names and addresses of wine producers held to be similar files); Robles v. EPA,
484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) (files on homes with high radiation levels discovered in EPA
study held to be similar files). It is not clear that the Robles court actually concluded that
the files in question were "similar files." While the court found the argument to that effect
persuasive, it precluded exemption from disclosure because disclosure would not have
resulted in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
"1 Based on Rose, the court claimed that since the appendices included "personnel
information, it cannot be effectively argued that these are not 'similar files."' 539 F.2d at
61. In addition, the court construed both Wine Hobby and Robles to give a "broader
interpretation to the term [similar files] than we are required to give here." Id.
" The legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act with respect to exemption
6 provides: "The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' pro-
vides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the
preservation of the public's right to Governmental information by excluding those kinds
of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [19661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2428.
The Supreme Court has concluded with respect to exemption 6 that, "Congress
sought to construct an exemption that would require a balancing of the individual's right
of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act
'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."' Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
" See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73,
77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gettman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11 539 F.2d at 61.
1977
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Under the FOIA and cases interpreting the Act, the burden lies
with the Government to shift the balance in favor of non-
disclosure to establish the exemption."
In Campbell, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district
court had not abused its discretion in finding the balance in favor
of non-disclosure with respect to Appendices I and II. The court
reasoned that (1) a serious potential invasion of privacy would
result if information regarding an individual's job classification
and salary were made publicly available," and that (2) the public
interest is best served by "disclosure of general agency perform-
ance rather than by specific revelation of individual problems."'"
Hence, the information contained in the Appendices was deemed
to be too specific to warrant general public availability at the
expense of individual privacy. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
exemption of the Appendices from disclosure, even though the
general policy of the FOIA favors disclosure. 9
The scope of exemption 7(A)2" of the FOIA was considered in
Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB.2 ' Pursuant to a charge of
unfair labor practices by the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
International Union, the NLRB filed a complaint against the
company; Climax then requested that the NLRB make available
affidavits and statements obtained from company employees re-
lative to the charges made in the complaint. 2 The NLRB denied
the request based on the fact that the affidavits were investiga-
tory records compiled for law enforcement proceedings, the pro-
duction of which would interfere with the proceedings, and that
the affidavits were therefore exempt from disclosure by exemp-
tion 7(A) of the Act.3 In a suit brought by Climax to compel
' The agency seeking the exemption has the burden of establishing the exemption.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States
Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gettman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
674 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" 539 F.2d at 62.
Id.
, The exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information
Act "do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective
of the Act." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 4 supra.
2 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).




disclosure, the district court concluded that the affidavits were
exempt.2
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Climax argued that the
NLRB had failed to meet the burden necessary to establish the
exemption. Specifically, Climax denied that the NLRB had es-
tablished that "disclosure would interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings ... ."5 The Tenth Circuit rejected Climax's argument
and adopted the contention of the NLRB: "[D]isclosure of em-
ployee statements in any unfair labor practices case would inter-
fere with enforcement proceedings." 6 The court justified its posi-
tion by reasoning that the relationship between an employer and
an employee is sensitive, and that a "labor case is peculiarly
susceptible to employer retaliation, coercion, or influence to the
point that there is no need for an express showing of interference
in each case to justify giving effect to the exemption contained
in Section 7(A) . . . ."I The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that doc-
uments obtained in NLRB enforcement proceedings are abso-
lutely protected from disclosure while the proceedings are pend-
ing is consistent with the decisions of the First and Second Cir-
cuits.28
II. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Three Tenth Circuit cases considered the retroactivity of the
1972 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 In
" Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. Colo. 1975).
25 539 F.2d at 64.
I d.
27 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1976); Title Guaranty Co. v.
NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976). The court in Title Guaranty found it "unnecessary to
make the broad determination that any investigative information obtained in connection
with a pending enforcement proceeding is per se nondisclosable." 534 F.2d at 491. The
court did note, however, that disclosure of statements and affidavits of employees ob-
tained by the NLRB in connection with law enforcement proceedings could well result in
interference with the enforcement proceeding. Id. Without requiring the NLRB to estab-
lish that such interference would occur, the court held that the exemption did apply to
such information. Relying on the Title Guaranty decision, the First Circuit in Goodfriend
W. Corp. rejected the district court's conclusion that the exemption applied to employee
affidavits obtained in NLRB enforcement proceedings. Instead, the court adopted the
Title Guaranty holding that "all statements of employees obtained in connection with
unfair labor practice proceedings pending before the NLRB are exempt from disclosure
under § 552(b)(7)(A)." 535 F.2d at 146.
" Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
1977
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each of the cases,39 although the effective date of the amendment
was March 24, 1972, the court concluded that the amendment
should be given retroactive effect. In a subsequent, unrelated
case, the United States Supreme Court also gave the amendment
retroactive effect.3' With the advantage of hindsight, the Tenth
Circuit's decision on this question seems unassailable.
2
In Weahkee v. Powell,33 a former employee of the EEOC
brought an action against agency officials, alleging unlawful dis-
crimination against himself and others as American Indians.
34
Prior to this suit, both the EEOC and the United States Civil
Service Commission rendered administrative determinations
adverse to Weahkee.3 1 The district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the theory that the complaint
did not point out any specific objections to the administrative
record. The district court did not, however, hold that the admin-
istrative decision was supported by the record. The Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that the failure "to examine the administrative
record and determine whether the administrative record contains
substantial evidence supporting agency action" was error.36
By disposing of the case in this manner, the Tenth Circuit
was able to avoid the determination of whether federal employees
are entitled to a trial de novo in district court as other Title VII
claimants are, a question on which the circuits were then split. 7
. EEOC v. Duval, 528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 535 F.2d
1213 (10th Cir. 1976); Weahkee v. Powell, 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
' International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins &
Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1977). The issue of retroactivity had evaded review in
two Supreme Court decisions during the 1975 Term. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238 n.10 (1976); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 824 n.4 (1976).
32 At the time the Tenth Circuit decided these cases, supra note 2, there was a split
in the circuits on whether the amendment should be given retroactive effect with the
Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits favoring retroactivity. Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 820 (1976); Koger v. Ball,
497 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1974); Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Sixth
Circuit had opposed retroactivity. Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1974),
vacated, 426 U.S. 432 (1976).
33 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. 11 1972).
31 The plaintiff had also presented the trial court with claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1982, and 1985 (1970), but these claims did not affect the administrative law ques-
tions. 532 F.2d at 730.
31 532 F.2d at 729. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
11 Four courts of appeals had held that federal employees had a right to a trial de novo
VOL. 54
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Supreme Court subsequently held, in Chandler v.
Roudebush,38 that federal employees also have a right to a trial
de novo in the district court. Under Chandler, the district court
cannot substitute a review of the administrative record in lieu of
a trial de novo.
On the contrary, the options which Congress considered were en-
tirely straightforward. It faced a choice between record review of
agency action based on traditional appellate standards and trial de
novo of Title VII claims. The Senate committee selected trial de
novo as the proper means for resolving the claims of federal employ-
ees. The Senate broadened the category of claims entitled to trial
de novo to include those of private-sector employees, and the Sen-
ate's decision to treat private-sector and federal-sector employees
alike in this respect was ratified by the Congress as a whole.
The respondents' contention that administrative dispositions of
federal employee discrimination complaints would . . . furnish an
adequate basis for "substantial evidence" review cannot overcome
the import of the statutory language and the legislative history.3
Following Chandler, the 1975 Tenth Circuit decision of Salone v.
United States,0 which held that federal employees did not have
a right to a trial de novo, was vacated.4 Therefore, in light of the
above decisions, on remand Weahkee must be given a trial de
novo by the district court, as opposed to the more limited review
of the administrative record.42
The appellant, Weahkee, also claimed that the district
court's refusal to review the administrative record was a denial
of due process. This claim was based upon the Administrative
Procedure Act.43 The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the
under section 717(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. 111972). Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d
1226 (6th Cir. 1976); Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
919 (1976); Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sperling v. United
States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976). Three courts of
appeals had held that federal employees had no right to a trial de novo. Haire v. Calloway,
526 F.2d 246 (1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1976); Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nor., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); Salone
v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
' 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
Id. at 861-63 (footnote omitted).
*0 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 917 (1976). See also 53 DEN. L.J.
29 (1976).
" 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
:2 532 F.2d at 729.
'1 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 701-706 (1970).
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APA was inapplicable by reasoning that the 1972 amendment
provided the exclusive administrative procedure for federal em-
ployee discrimination charges. The same conclusion was subse-
quently reached by the Supreme Court in Brown v. General Serv-
ices Administration."
In EEOC v. Duval,45 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Commis-
sion's authority to file suits in district court during the same
ninety-day period during which the charging party can file suit.46
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the EEOC's right
to file suit does not terminate upon the expiration of the 180-day
period following the filing of the charge and during which the
EEOC can conduct an investigation and attempt conciliation. 7
During this initial 180 days, the charging party cannot initiate a
Title VII suit.'8 This period is designed to provide the EEOC an
opportunity to investigate the charge and to attempt conciliation.
Of course, in practice, neither goal is completed within the 180-
day period because of the serious backlog in charges pending
before the Commission. 9
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion, which allows the EEOC to
file an action after the 180-day period, was not accompanied by
much helpful discussion. The court simply noted that other cir-
cuits had reached the same result. Among the considerations
" 425 U.S. 820 (1976). In his opinion for the Court in Brown, Justice Stewart stated:
[T]he congressional intent in 1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive
administrative and judicial scheme for redress of federal employment dis-
crimination. We need not, however, rest our decision upon this inference
alone. For the structure of the 1972 amendment itself fully confirms the
conclusion that Congress intended it to be exclusive and pre-emptive.
Id. at 829 (emphasis supplied).
' 528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
11 528 F.2d at 947. Accord, EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976).
11 The charging party is not barred from initiating other available legal actions, such
as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), by the fact that he or she has filed a Title VII claim and the
fact that the charging party has filed a Title VII charge does not toll the statute of
limitations on other claims. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers
Local 790 v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
The charging party is precluded from filing a Title VII suit in district court during
this initial 180 days in order to afford the EEOC time to effect a voluntary conciliation
agreement with the employer free of the interference of a pending law suit. 528 F.2d at
948. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 461.
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which led other circuits to reach this conclusion was the fact that
Title VII expressly limits the employee's right to file suit to a
ninety-day period while no similar express limitation is imposed
upon the EEOC.50 Moreover, at the time of the enactment of the
1972 amendment, which authorized the EEOC to file actions in
district court, Congress was aware that the EEOC was not able
to complete most of its investigations and conciliation procedures
within 180 days. With this knowledge, courts have been unwilling
to attribute to Congress an intent to limit the EEOC enforcement
powers to the initial 180 days because such a construction would
largely defeat the remedial purpose of the amendment. 51
The more difficult question confronting the Tenth Circuit
was whether the charging party had the exclusive authority to
initiate suit during the ninety-day period following receipt of the
"right-to-sue" letter. 5 In Duval, the EEOC filed a complaint be-
fore this ninety-day period had elapsed and before the charging
party had acted. The charging party subsequently sought to in-
tervene. The corporate defendant obtained a dismissal on the
ground that the charging party alone could initiate legal action
during this ninety-day period. The district court viewed the
EEOC's suit as "'duplicitous.' ",53
This issue of multiple actions was previously raised in Crump
v. Wagner Electric Corp.," a case before the Missouri federal
district court. In Crump, the charging party filed an action four-
teen days after the EEOC filed its action. The district court dis-
missed the charging party's suit without prejudice to interven-
tion, which is specifically provided for by Title VII, 55 in the
EEOC's suit. The approach taken in Crump was approved by the
Tenth Circuit in Duval and the dismissal was, therefore, re-
versed."5
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. H 1972). See EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
11 EEOC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 505 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 824 (1975).
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
5' 528 F.2d at 947. Accord, EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71, 75 (8th Cir.
1974).
369 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
528 F.2d at 948-49.
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When confronted with a similar situation,57 the Ninth Circuit
subsequently concluded that multiple actions could be avoided
by consolidation under Rule 42(a), 8 rather than by dismissal with
leave to intervene. When simplicity and the avoidance of possible
confusion are considered, the Ninth Circuit's solution appears
preferable if both the EEOC and the charging party have actually
filed separate suits. However, where one or the other has filed
first, intervention would seem to be the preferable manner for
joining the fray by the remaining litigant since this is expressly
provided for by statute.
The principal issue decided by a divided panel in EEOC v.
Wilson & Co."9 was whether a case was "pending" before the
EEOC when the 1972 amendment to Title VII became effective.
60
In October of 1970 and January of 1971, the charging party, Ber-
nal, filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. In November of
1971, the Commission's Albuquerque office forwarded the file to
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Later Bernal requested a
"right-to-sue" letter which was given to him on January 27, 1972.
Prior to the 1972 amendment, a charging party was given
thirty days to bring his or her private action." The main issue in
Wilson involved the interpretation of a Commission regulation
which required the agency to suspend further action upon the
issuance of a "right-to-sue" letter unless the Commission deter-
mines that it is in the "public interest" to continue or the Com-
mission is requested to continue by the charging party. 2 Neither
of these two contingencies occurred in Wilson and, thereafter,
upon lapse of the thirty-day period during which the charging
party could have filed suit, but did not, the district court con-
cluded that the "suspension" was, in effect, a "termination."
This resulted in the further determination that the case was,
therefore, not "pending" before the Commission on the effective
57 EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1976).
58 "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
" 535 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1976). Judge McWilliams wrote for himself and Judge
Doyle while Judge Barrett filed a vituperative dissent.
6 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
" The trial court relied upon 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a(d) (1971). 535 F.2d at 1215. This
regulation is no longer in force.
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date of the 1972 amendment which gave the Commission the
right to sue. 3 This issue was raised by the lower court sua sponte
and, because of this, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for
further development of the record on the question of whether the
charge was pending before the Commission on March 24, 1972.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit suggested, in rather strong lan-
guage, that, in its opinion, the charge was still pending on that
date."
Judge Barrett, as noted in his dissenting opinion, would have
affirmed the district court's holding for reasons in addition to
those advanced by the trial court. First, the charging party had
not filed his charge with the appropriate state agency before sub-
mitting his charge to the EEOC.5 Second, the Commission did
not file suit until six months after conciliation had failed and
"[tihis 'lapse' constitutes further and utter jurisdictional fail-
ure, even under the 'liberalized' 1972 amendments."" Third,
Judge Barrett concluded that the Commission had not filed suit
in conformance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) as it appeared prior
to the 1972 amendment. The panel majority, however, was unper-
suaded by his arguments.
In EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co. 7 the issue before the court
concerned the timeliness of a complainant's motion for interven-
tion in an EEOC action filed within ninety days after the com-
plainant received a "right-to-sue" letter. 8 Navajo argued that the
ninety-day period within which a complainant could bring suit or
intervene began to run when he received notice that conciliation
efforts had failed. The court held, instead, that the ninety-day
period began to run from the date of receipt of a "right-to-sue"
63 By its express terms the 1972 amendment applies to charges pending before the
Commission on the date of its enactment. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 103, 113. See
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Meyers,
Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).
" 535 F.2d at 1215-16.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1970).
535 F.2d at 1217.
,7 No. 75-1542 (10th Cir., June 16, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. 111972); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1975). The complain-
ant filed a charge with the EEOC on August 18, 1971, and on July 25, 1973, the EEOC
informed him that conciliation efforts had failed, and that, if he desired to bring suit, he
should request a "right-to-sue" letter, which he did. On December 3, 1974, the EEOC
instituted this action, which was based, in part, upon the complainant's charge. On
December 13, 1974, the EEOC issued a "right-to-sue" letter.
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letter, and that therefore the application to intervene was
timely. 9 The Tenth Circuit was advised that the EEOC had dis-
continued the "two-letter" procedure after the controversy in this
case began, so the issue in this case is of marginal significance. 0
III. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970
In two cases the Tenth Circuit reviewed and upheld adminis-
trative orders issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.71 Both the legal construction accorded certain
safety regulations and the constitutionality of those regulations
were reviewed in Clarkson Construction Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission.7" Clarkson Construction
Company sought review of a Commission order73 affirming the
citation and civil penalty imposed against Clarkson as a result of
its violation of a certain safety regulation. The applicable safety
regulation required that trucks on certain worksites be equipped
with an audible backup warning signal or, in the alternative, that
trucks without such a device be permitted to back up only after
the driver received assurance from a lookout that it was safe to
do so." In this case, a truck, owned by one of Clarkson's subcon-
" For cases upholding the two-letter procedure and further holding that the 90-day
period begins to run from the date of receipt of the "right-to-sue" letter, see Williams v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976), and Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
71 No. 75-1542 at 6.
7, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
72 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976).
13 [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEAITH DEC. (CCH) 19,071.
74 29 C.F.R. § 1926.601(b)(4) (1976). This section reads: "No employer shall use any
motor vehicle equipment having an obstructed view to the rear unless: (i) The vehicle
has a reverse signal alarm audible above the surrounding noise level or: (ii) The vehicle
is backed up only when an observer signals that it is safe to do so." Covered employers
must comply with these regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970). These regulations are issued
under the authority of 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). Escalating civil penalties, and ultimately
a criminal penalty, may be imposed for violation of these regulations in proportion to the
willfulness and danger of the violation and whether or not a violation causes death. 29
U.S.C. § 666 (1970). Clarkson was cited for a "serious violation" in which case the Com-
mission could have assessed a penalty of up to $1,000. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1970). Clarkson
was actually assessed only $500. [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
19,071. A "serious violation" is
deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability
that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which
exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or pro-
cesses which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment
unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable
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tractors and operated by the subcontractor's employee, while
being operated in violation of this safety regulation, struck and
killed a workman.
Clarkson challenged the safety regulation on constitutional
grounds alleging that (1) the enforcement procedures were penal
in nature, rather than remedial or regulatory; (2) the enforcement
procedures violated the fifth amendment; (3) the regulatory
scheme denied Clarkson its right to a public trial in accordance
with the sixth amendment which requires, inter alia, the right to
a jury and the right to confront witnesses; and (4) if this regula-
tory scheme were truly civil, it denied Clarkson's seventh amend-
ment rights. The Tenth Circuit apparently viewed Clarkson's
arguments as unfounded and dismissed each of them rather sum-
marily.75
The primary question in this case, the consideration of which
divided the panel, with Judges Doyle and Hill forming the major-
ity and Judge Seth dissenting, was the appropriate construction
of section 1926.601(b)(4) of 29 C.F.R. According to this regula-
tion, "[n]o employer shall use any motor vehicle" in the pro-
scribed manner. More specifically, the court was concerned with
the meaning to be ascribed to the word "use." In other words, was
the statutory scheme intended to incorporate the common law
conception of an employer-employee relationship, as Judge Seth
contended, or the more flexible conception of vicarious liability
and responsibility, as urged by Judges Doyle and Hill. According
to Judge Seth's dissenting opinion, Clarkson would not be
deemed responsible for the operation of the truck in violation of
the regulation because the truck was owned by a subcontractor
and driven by an employee of the subcontractor. Therefore, the
subcontractor, not Clarkson, had a greater amount of direct con-
trol over the driver and, under the traditional common law view,
the driver was not to be considered an employee of the prime
contractor.7"
Although the majority opinion included a lengthy explana-
diligence, know of the presence of the violation.
29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970).
7' 531 F.2d at 455-56. Accord, Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir.
1976). See Note, Due Process and Employee Safety: Conflict in OSHA Enforcement
Procedures, 84 YALE L.J. 1380 (1975).
11 531 F.2d at 459.
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tion justifying the expanded definition of the employment rela-
tionship, the true basis of the decision seemed to be founded in
equity. In the words of Judge Doyle: "We are unable to overlook
the fact that the truck driver who ran over and killed the em-
ployee was serving the objects and purposes of Clarkson.""
To justify legally its decision, the court reasoned that admin-
istrative interpretations of the remedial scope of legislation are
entitled to great weight." In addition, both the Secretary of Labor
and the Commission had interpreted the regulation in the same
manner and, in a case where two specialized administrative bod-
ies are in agreement, a court should be hesitant to impose its own
inconsistent interpretation. Furthermore, in view of the legisla-
tion's remedial purpose of offering protection to workers from
industrial injury, a federal court should not feel bound, when
construing federal statutes, to adhere to the states' common law
conceptions which provide different bases of liability depending
upon how the relationship is defined.80
Against this background, the majority of the court was un-
willing to accept Clarkson's contention that the regulation in
issue should be construed in such a manner as to equate the term
"using" with "operating." Clarkson argued that it, as the prime
contractor, was not "operating" the subcontractor's truck and,
therefore, Clarkson was not the responsible employer within the
meaning of the regulation because it was not "using" the truck.
The majority concluded, however, that, in practical terms, Clark-
son was "using" the truck since the truck was, at the time of the
accident, being operated in furtherance of Clarkson's project. The
court, also, considered the prime contractor to be in a better
position to require the installation of the safety devices or, if
7 Id. at 457.
The majority cited for this proposition Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court
subsequently narrowed the broadest reaches of the rule calling for such difference in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). In Gilbert the Court held that adminis-
trative regulations are less persuasive where they are not expressly authorized and where
they are issued many years after the legislation which they seek to implement and, espe-
cially, where they follow prior inconsistent administrative interpretations of the same
statute. 96 S. Ct. at 410-12.
n 531 F.2d at 457 (citing Budd Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
513 F.2d 201, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1975)).
1" 531 F.2d at 458.
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necessary, to provide the necessary lookouts for those trucks not
equipped with safety devices." This opinion was, in fact, con-
firmed by Clarkson's post-accident conduct which ordered all
trucks to be equipped with the warning devices.2
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Clarkson clearly indicates a
preference for that construction of a regulation which will place
the responsibility for dangerous conditions on the party most cap-
able of guaranteeing worker safety throughout the entire work-
site. For the same reason, i.e., protection of workers, the court
refused to relieve Clarkson of liability even though the accident
occurred on a road immediately adjacent to the worksite, as op-
posed to on the "off-highway jobsite," as required by the literal
terms of the regulation.83 The court refused to apply the regula-
tion literally where, as here, the employees were walking in the
actual construction site, or nearby road shoulder, and the truck
was being used to further the project at the worksite.5 4
In Stockwell Manufacturing Co. v. Usery, the petitioner
sought review of an order of the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission alleging that certain of its constitutional
rights had been violated by the issuance of an administrative
citation. The respondent moved to dismiss the proceeding for lack
of jurisdiction because Stockwell never sought review of the Com-
mission's decision and order.
Stockwell had been cited for nonserious occupational safety
violations. The company contested the citation," and a hearing
was held before an administrative law judge, who affirmed some
of the violations and vacated all proposed penalties. No member
I d.
" Id. at 454. The Fifth Circuit concluded, in Southeast Contractors, Inc. v. Dunlop,
512 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975), that a contractor should not be held responsible for the
conduct of its subcontractor, and therefore, would have reached the same result as Judge
Seth. The Fifth Circuit's decision was per curiam, however, and simply adopted the
dissenting view expressed by Chairman Moran of the Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission in the administrative decision. Id. See [1973-1974] OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 17,787. Chairman Moran dissented from the Commis-
sion's decision for the same reason in the Clarkson case. [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 19,071.
93 29 C.F.R. § 1926.601(a) (1976).
" 531 F.2d at 459.
- 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1976).
8- 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 666(c) (1970).
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of the Commission directed a review of the decision, and Stock-
well did not petition for review. The report of the administrative
law judge then became the final decision of the Commission. 7
The Tenth Circuit declined to consider the Commission's
allegation that Stockwell had failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies,8" finding a more serious jurisdictional defect in Stock-
well's failure to raise the constitutional issues before the adminis-
trative law judge or the Commission." Section 660(a) of 29 U.S.C.
provides that, on judicial review, the court of appeals shall not
consider any objection not urged before the Commission unless
"extraordinary circumstances" excuse the failure. Although
Stockwell contended that the constitutional violations before the
court for review were such "extraordinary circumstances," the
court held that since the alleged constitutional violations were
known to Stockwell at the time of the administrative hearing, its
failure to raise them at that time barred appellate review. 0 The
court went on to add that its review of the record revealed sub-
stantial evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission.
IV. BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT
In 1969, Congress enacted legislation which provides pay-
ments to coal miners who become totally disabled from pneumo-
coniosis, commonly known as black lung disease, and also to
surviving dependents of coal miners whose death is attributable
to the disease.9 The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
was initially responsible for promulgating regulations to aid in
the determination of whether a miner is totally disabled or
whether his death is due to the disease.2 Since proof of death or
total disability due to pneumoconiosis93 is complicated, Congress
established several presumptions to aid potential claimants in
.7 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970).
" See Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51
IND. L.J. 817 (1976).
" 536 F.2d at 1309.
" Id. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.66 (1970) sets forth the duties of a hearing judge in the conduct
of a hearing. These duties include the duty "to adjudicate all issues."
" 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
12 Id. § 921. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare administers claims
under the Act filed prior to December 31, 1973.
" Pneumoconiosis is defined as a "chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of
employment in a coal mine." 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
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meeting their burden." The pertinent regulations reflect this pol-
icy and establish the same or similar presumptions."5
The applicability of two9" of the regulatory presumptions was
at issue in Felthager v. Weinberger.7 The claimant was the widow
of a coal miner who was killed in an accident while employed as
an assistant foreman at a coal mine, a position he had held for
fifteen years." At the time of his death, the miner was suffering
from a severe respiratory impairment." The claimant sought to
establish, by presumption, that the miner's death was due to
pneumoconiosis because he was totally disabled at the time of his
death from the respiratory ailment.'00 The Secretary determined
that the miner was not totally disabled from the ailment, there-
fore precluding the presumption that death was due to pneumo-
coniosis, and accordingly, denied benefits.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit examined the criteria of total
disability established both by statute and by regulation.'0 ' It
Id. § 921(c).
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414, .418, .454, .458, .490 (1976).
" 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414(b), .454 (1976). The first of these two presumptions provides:
(1) Even though the existence of pneumoconiosis is not established . . .
[by medical evidence], if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a
totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary ailment . . . , it may be
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary . . . , that a miner is
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or that a miner was totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis at the time of his death.
20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b). Section 410.454(b) raises the same presumption relative to the
finding that the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis. Both presumptions can be
rebutted by evidence showing that the miner is not, or did not, suffer from pneumocon-
iosis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414(b)(2), .454(b)(2) (1976).
g7 529 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1976).
" While working at his job, the decedent became so exhausted from shortness of
breath that he had to sit down. He sat on the shuttle car tracks in the mine and was
subsequently run over by a shuttle car. He died a few hours later. The immediate cause
of death was listed as a compound fracture of the left leg, fractured pelvis, and pulmonary
edema. 529 F.2d at 132.
:' The Tenth Circuit stated: "There is no doubt the deceased miner suffered from
severe respiratory impairment. ... Id.
'® 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b). See note 96 supra.
"' The statute provides:
The term "total disability" has the meaning given it by regulations of
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, except that such regula-
tions shall provide that a miner shall be considered totally disabled when
pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requir-
ing the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine
or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a
substantial period of time.
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noted that a person could be employed in a mine and yet be
totally disabled from a respiratory ailment if his employment was
characterized by sporadic work or poor performance." 2 The dece-
dent, however, was employed in a job he had held for over a
decade; although he worked with great difficulty, there was no
evidence of sporadic work or poor performance. 03 Also, his job was
not considered to be a "make-work" position offering only mar-
ginal earnings.0 4 Based on the facts in the record, the court felt
that "the fact he [the decedent] was doing his usual work in the
mines at the time of his death, if not conclusive, is at least sub-
stantial evidence in support of the Secretary's finding the de-
ceased was not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.' 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits.' 0
V. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
In Grider v. United States'°7 and Sturgell v. Weinberger,'5
claimants of disability benefits under the Social Security Act' 9
appealed the denial of benefits by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. The issue in both cases was whether the
claimants had established sufficient evidence that they were
"disabled" as defined by the Act. To be disabled, a claimant
30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (Supp. IV 1974). The regulations defining total disability from pneumo-
coniosis promulgated by the Secretary are nearly identical. 20 C.F.R. § 410.412(b) (1976).
"02 "Under the statutory definition, the mere fact of employment does not preclude a
finding of total disability." 529 F.2d at 133.
103 Sporadic work or poor performance were factors that had been instrumental in
findings of total disability. In Dellosa v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
the widow of a coal miner sought black lung disease benefits because her husband, who
was killed in an explosion in a mine, was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Although
the decedent was working at the time of his death, his work had been sporadic for several
years. In addition, the decedent was not able "to adequately perform his mine work." Id.
at 1126. On these considerations, the district court remanded the case to the Secretary
for further findings in light of such factors. Id. The same questions were addressed in
Farmer v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1975), in which the court concluded that
the deceased miner's employment was not so poor or so sporadic that he was totally
disabled.
I0 A miner employed at his death may, also, be found to be totally disabled if the
miner is working at some make-work job not comparable to his usual coal mine work. See
Lawson v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Va. 1975); Rowe v. Weinberger, 400 F.
Supp. 981 (W.D. Va. 1975).
IN 529 F.2d at 135.
IN0 Id.
"" No. 75-1903 (10th Cir., June 2, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
00 No. 75-1933 (10th Cir., July 21, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
101 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1970 & Supp. 11 1972).
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must, inter alia, be unable to perform, and engage in, substantial
gainful activity as the result of a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which is expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months."10 Although the claimants
in both Grider and Sturgell introduced evidence of their disabil-
ity, in both cases the Secretary concluded that the claimants'
burden had not been met."' The Tenth Circuit affirmed both
decisions after finding that the decisions of the Secretary were
supported by substantial evidence. '2
Similarly, a claimant's failure to meet his burden of proof
caused the denial of benefits in Anderson v. Weinberger."' To
qualify as disabled, a claimant must also show that his impair-
ment is of "such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy . . . ."I" Prior to his
disability, the claimant in Anderson had held numerous jobs,
although none on a routine basis."' In the administrative hearing,
the claimant asserted that he had unsuccessfully attempted to
return to his prior activities."' The administrative law judge con-
cluded, however, that the claimant could successfully engage in
work of the general type he had previously performed and that
the claimant was not disabled in terms of the Social Security
"' The Act defines the term disability as "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. ... 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
' Both claimants introduced, as evidence, medical reports of disability and testified
personally as to their pain and disability. The claimant in Grider, however, failed to
establish her disability under the Act "by the required medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techinques .... " No. 75-1903 at 5. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
found in SturgeU that "there was sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to conclude
that appellant failed to meet statutory prerequisites." No. 75-1933 at 4.
"1 According to the Social Security Act, the standard of review for agency decisions
requires that "[tihe findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive .... " 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). This standard is inter-
preted in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
,, No. 76-1270 (10th Cir., Aug. 12, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1970) (emphasis added).
S The claimant lost sight in one eye during a scuffle following an assault. No. 76-
1270 at 2. Prior to the injury, he had been employed as a carpenter, truck driver, construc-
tion foreman, and common laborer. Id.
"' Id. at 3.
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Act." 7 Again, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision after find-
ing substantial evidence to support the determination of the ad-
ministrative law judge.1
8
As in Anderson, the severity of an impairment was also the
dispositive question in Kirk v. Weinberger."9 Unlike the situation
in Anderson, however, the claimant in Kirk was able to establish
that she was unable to perform the work in which she had been
engaged immediately prior to her disability.'20 She failed to prove,
however, that she was unable to work in occupations in which she
had previous experience and training.'2 ' Hence, she did not meet
the statutory burden placed on claimants and was, therefore, not
considered to be disabled. Again, the Tenth Circuit found that
the decision of the administrative law judge was supported by
substantial evidence and affirmed.'
22
The importance of Kirk is the burden of proof required by the
Tenth Circuit to establish statutory disability. The Tenth Circuit
stated:
[Ilf a claimant has any training or experience in a field of employ-
ment other than the one in which she was working prior to disability,
she must not only show her physical disability to continue at her
former occupation, but also that she is physically unable to perform
the other work for which she is qualified.' "
By this statement, the court has clarified the standard it will
require for proving disability in claims for disability benefits
under the Social Security Act.
124
17 The Tenth Circuit noted the administrative law judge's conclusion that "Anderson
was able to perform substantial gainful activity of a light or sedentary nature." Id. In fact,
the claimant conceded that he could probably work in a gas station or drive a pick up
truck. Id. at 4. Thus, the claimant did not establish that he was unable to return to the
general type of work he had been performing prior to his disability.
"' Id. at 3, 4. See note 112 supra.
"' No. 75-1652 (10th Cir., Apr. 27, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 2.
" Id. at 3.
"2 Id. at 6.
121 Id. at 4.
12 In several prior cases, the Tenth Circuit stated that a claimant need only establish
his inability to perform his usual vocation. See, e.g., Gardner v. Brian, 369 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1966); Kirby v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1966). Once this fact was established,
the burden shifted to the Secretary to show that suitable employment opportunities in
the immediate geographical area were available to the claimant. Failure by the Secretary
to meet this burden would thus entitle the claimant to disability benefits.
In Kirk, the court concluded that the claimant must not only prove his disability to
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VI. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Blackett,'2 " the
railway filed suit in district court to set aside an award of addi-
tional wages in favor of a railroad employee, pursuant to the
Railway Labor Act.'20 Although the district court denied the rail-
road's claim that the National Railroad Adjustment Board' 7
lacked jurisdiction to make the award, the court substantially
reduced the amount of the award.'28 As a result, the decision of
the district court was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The dispositive issue on appeal was the reviewability of the
amount of the award made by the National Railroad Adjustment
Board.' 9 The Tenth Circuit considered two factors in deciding the
question. First, the court noted that although the Railway Labor
Act empowers district courts to set aside awards of the Board, the
reviewable aspects of board action are limited only to "lack of
jurisdiction, the Board's acting outside the law or the presence of
fraud or corruption on the Board.' 30 Second, the court inferred,
continue in his usual vocation but, also, must establish his disability to perform any other
kind of work for which he might be qualified. It is only after both facts are established
that the burden shifts to the Secretary either to identify suitable employment opportuni-
ties or, upon failure to identify such opportunities, to award the claimant disability bene-
fits. Thus, the holding in Kirk expands the claimant's burden.
"2 538 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
" Id. The Board is empowered to hear and decide numerous disputes, including
disputes between an employee and a carrier concerning rates of pay. Id. § 153(i).
'2 538 F.2d at 292.
" The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a person suffering legal wrong or
adversely affected by agency action is entitled to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
Such review is not available, however, where either a statute precludes judicial review or
the agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. Id. § 701(a). See Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
11 538 F.2d at 293. The Railway Labor Act limits the scope of review of judicial
decisions and, therefore, provides its own standard of review. See note 129 supra. The Act
states:
The [district] court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the
division [of the National Railroad Adjustment Board], or to set it aside, in
whole or in part, or it may remand the proceeding to the division for such
further action as it may direct. On such review, the findings and order of the
division shall be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of the
division may be set aside . . .for failure of the division to comply with the
requirements of this chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or confine
itself, to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud
or corruption by a member of the division making the order.
45 U.S.C. § 153(g) (1970).
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from both the design and history of the Act, an intent to preclude
judicial review of matters relating to the amount of an award.' 3 '
Consistent with a prior decision on the same question,'32 the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the "district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to thus modify the award,"'1' and, therefore, reversed the
decision.'
34
VII. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In Morton v. Dow,' 35 the Tenth Circuit upheld the authority
of the Federal Aviation Administrator under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958131 to revoke, by emergency order, the petitioner's cer-
tificate of airworthiness. In so holding, the court relied upon (1)
the well-established principle that an agency may take emer-
gency action if the public health, safety, or welfare is endan-
gered' 37 and (2) the Administrator's statutory revocation author-
ity.' 38 The determination of the administrative law judge that the
evidence was sufficient to support revocation' 39 was upheld on the
basis of a finding that the petitioner's aircraft did not conform to
its type certificate.' 0
Although the petitioner also alleged that the statutory provi-
sions providing for review only after the revocation order had been
entered were violative of due process, the court summarily dis-
missed the allegation noting: "Congress recognized that the deci-
,' 538 F.2d at 293.
132 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 370 F.2d 833 (10th Cir.
1966).
" 538 F.2d at 294.
"3 Id. at 295.
"s 525 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1975).
'' 72 Stat. 731 (codified in scattered sections of 14, 15, 16, 31, 40, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
,31 See, e.g., Air East, Inc. v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975) (public safety outweighs licensee's right to pre-revocation
hearing).
lu 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) provides that the Administrator may
suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, any airworthiness certificate, if he determines that
safety in air commerce and the public interest so require.
'1' The administrative law judge held that the Board lacked the authority to investi-
gate and determine that an emergency existed and, thereby, limited his review to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence. 525 F.2d at 1306.
140 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970) requires that an aircraft be in safe operating condition and
conform to its type certificate. Morton had used an identification number and type certifi-
cate which he had obtained from parts salvaged from another aircraft. The plane which
he built from the salvaged parts was not the same type of aircraft as evidenced by the
type certificate. 525 F.2d at 1304-05.
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sion must be determined quickly by persons with expertise in
aviation matters."' 4 '
VIII. COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
In KAKE-TV & Radio, Inc. v. United States,' the petitioner
sought judicial review of the FCC's certification of a cable-TV
franchise. The court considered three basic administrative law
issues under the Communications Act of 1934:11 (1) the scope of
FCC certification proceedings; (2) the necessity of a formal hear-
ing; and (3) the scope of FCC discretion.
KAKE sought review of orders which were granted pursuant
to Aircapital Cablevision, Inc.'s application for certification to
commence cable-TV service in Wichita, Kansas. Aircapital had
been granted a cable-TV franchise by the city of Wichita, pur-
suant to a city ordinance, and the city had advised the FCC that
the franchise was valid." 4 When considering Aircapital's applica-
tion for certification, the FCC applied a presumption that the
franchise was also valid for FCC purposes. In contrast, KAKE
contended that the validity of the franchise should be decided
anew by the Commission, instead of resorting to this presump-
tion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision not to
decide the validity question on the grounds that "[iut is not the
function of the F.C.C. to provide a forum to litigate such an issue,
and, furthermore, the Commission is not a tribunal equipped to
do so.' ' 5 The matter of a defect in the franchise, the court con-
cluded, "can be decided in the Kansas courts between the proper
parties.""'
" 525 F.2d at 1306. See also Air East, Inc. v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d
1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
In addition, the petitioner challenged the admission of certain evidence by the admin-
istrative law judge. The court, however, merely relied upon the standard proposition that
"agencies are not bound by the strict rules of evidence governing jury trials" and upheld
the validity of the admissions. 525 F.2d at 1307.
142 537 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 808 (1977).
"1 48 Stat. 1064 (as amended and codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 46, 47
U.S.C.).
", Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held that cities in Kansas did not have
authority to franchise cable-TV and voided the ordinance. But, the Kansas legislature
then passed an act validating cable-TV franchises theretofore granted. 537 F.2d at 1122.
Id. at 1123.
HA Id. KAKE had pressed legal proceedings in the state courts; however, during the
1977
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The court also affirmed the procedures of the FCC relative
to the certification order. Although the Commission had not held
hearings on Aircapital's application, it had received documents,
statements of position, objections, and other data both support-
ing and opposing the granting of the certificate of compliance.'47
Not only did the court find that there is no statutory requirement
for a formal hearing on cable-TV applications,'48 but it found that
the FCC's bases for decision were sufficiently disclosed to permit
effective court review.'
49
The question of whether Aircapital was in "substantial com-
pliance" with FCC regulations was considered to be solely within
the discretion of the Commission.'"
IX. NATURAL GAS ACT
In the three cases which confronted the Tenth Circuit con-
cerning the Natural Gas Act'"' and the Federal Power Commis-
sion, the court decided the issues by resorting to fundamental
administrative law principles concerning the scope of judicial re-
view.
In Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. FPC,151 the peti-
tioner, after filing for a rate increase, sought review of the Com-
pendency of the FCC proceedings, the Kansas Supreme Court decided that KAKE did
not have sufficient interest in the franchise to enable it to litigate the question and
dismissed the state action. In actuality, KAKE did not have a forum to contest the
validity of the franchise.
",7 Such procedures are in accordance with 47 C.F.R. § 76.27 (1976) which provides
procedures for submission of written objections and replies thereto in certification pro-
ceedings. 47 C.F.R. § 76.7 (1976) provides procedures for submission of written data on
petitions for special relief, but empowers the Commission to request oral argument or
hearing or decide on the pleadings.
1" 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) provides for hearings only when a substantial and mate-
rial question of fact is presented or the Commission is unable to find that public conveni-
ence and necessity would be served by granting an application.
" 537 F.2d at 1122. The court detailed the order of the Commission in order to
demonstrate its conclusion that the Commission adequately disclosed the bases of its
decision, thereby meeting the requirements of Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
1"* 537 F.2d at 1122-23. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(b) (1976) provides the method for determin-
ing a franchise fee. KAKE alleged that the franchise fee to the City was too high to comply
with this regulation. Despite the fact that the court viewed this matter as being within
the discretion of the Commission, it noted that the record showed that the interested
parties planned a downward revision and later review. 537 F.2d at 1123.
Is' 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1970).
152 534 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1976).
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mission's determinations which changed several elements of the
ratemaking process. 5 3 The basic issue was whether the FPC's
decision to depart from the Mcf mile method, proposed by
Kansas-Nebraska, for allocating transmission costs had a ra-
tional basis, particularly since there had been no change in peti-
tioner's circumstances. Kansas-Nebraska also questioned the va-
lidity of the FPC's closing the case on the adjustment of zone
boundaries for cost allocation, in view of the Commission's state-
ment that further hearings were necessary.
54
When considering the argument that the FPC's decision
lacked a rational basis, the Tenth Circuit applied both SEC v.
Chenery Corp. 'S55 standard of review of agency action and the
presumption of agency correctness,5 M and quickly disposed of the
issue. In addition, the court concluded that "[t]he theories used
by the FPC in arriving at the end result are peculiarly within its
discretion"'57 and a departure from the Mcf method was within
the agency's regulatory authority.' Because the Commission had
determined that "'Kansas-Nebraska's method of applying mile-
ages to its allocation of costs results in unreasonable differences
in rates charged to customers' "' the FPC's actions were, indeed,
justified by a change of conditions.
' The FPC issued two opinions "which changed cost allocations in the two zones;
used a different formula for allocating transmission costs; changed the classification of
gathering costs; changed rate design, and excluded some of the capitalization for rate of
return computations." Id. at 229.
"I, The FPC determined that " 'based on the data contained in the record, it would
be most difficult to draw a zone line that would be meaningful and reasonable in this
case.' " 534 F.2d at 230. However, the idea of completing the record was rejected, because
it would have had the effect of prolonging the case for some four years.
'n 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Chenery established the principle that:
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds
are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administra-
tive action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis.
Id. at 196. See also Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960).
"' In Amoco Prod. Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1973), the court held that
"[tihe FPC's interpretation is entitled to great weight, since a presumption of validity
attaches to a Commission's exercise of its expertise." Id. at 921.
1*, 534 F.2d at 230.
Im Id. See also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945), which held
that the Commission had wide latitude in determining allocation formulas.
"1 534 F.2d at 231. Kansas-Nebraska's rate structure formula had been considered
by the Commission in 1961.
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Although the FPC's orders resulted in a refund by petitioner,
the court upheld the orders by reasoning that:
It is apparent that the Commission cannot dispose of all the prob-
lems before it in any one case. As before any administrative body
many issues are decided on a case by case basis, on how the issue
arises, and how the record is developed . . . . [Tibere comes a
point where the record must be closed and the case be decided.8 0
Kansas-Nebraska also alleged that the FPC action had re-
sulted in undercollection in one zone. Although noting that
"[u]nfortunately this is not an unusual happening," the court
held that "the company took the risk that an undercollection as
to one segment might occur."' 6
The Tenth Circuit, in Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,12 clearly ex-
pressed its view that agency decisions on matters of law are sub-
ject to judicial review. In Skelly, Skelly and Lone Star Gas had
entered into a twenty-year contract, which, by amendment, pro-
vided that if the gas pressure from the properties involved should
drop below the point where delivery would be impossible, the
agreement would terminate. Subsequently, after a continuing
pressure drop in the wells, the parties agreed that the contract
had expired,6 3 and entered into a second contract. When Skelly's
application for a rate increase under the second contract was
10 Id. The FPC indicated that the staff method of allocation would be '"adopted
subject to a complete record being developed' in another case." Id. The court interpreted
this statement to mean that the staff's formula would not necessarily be applicable in
future cases.
I Id. at 232. The procedure set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970) provides that when
proposed rate changes go into effect, at the expiration of the suspension period, "the
Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company ... to refund any amounts
ordered by the Commission." Thus, the statute does not provide for any resulting under-
collection. See also FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145, 153 (1962),
wherein the Supreme Court recognized that such an adjustment policy was consistent
with the policy of the Natural Gas Act.
The court found no merit in the petitioner's objection to the FPC determination that
field gathering costs should be treated, for ratemaking, as 100% commodity costs, rather
than as "demand" and "commodity costs." Similarly, the court found no basis for an
objection to the adjustment of Kansas-Nebraska's rate of return on capitalization, inas-
much as "[tJhis is at most a difference in policy or theory, and the FPC determination
was well within its discretion." 534 F.2d at 232 (citing Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424
F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969)).
,62 532 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1976).
10 Id. at 178. After the expiration of the base contract, Lone Star agreed to install
the compression equipment itself and to buy the gas under a new arrangement based upon
compression by the purchaser. Id. at 179.
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denied by the Commission on the basis that it was not a
"replacement contract" because the original contract did not
expire "by its own terms,"" 4 Skelly sought judicial review of this
denial.
In the court's opinion, the question of whether the original
contract expired by its own terms, was governed by "ordinary
contract law, a Williston-Corbin problem," and not subject to the
Natural Gas Act. 65 Moreover, the court found that the record
disclosed no evidence or claim that the parties themselves
brought the pressure clause into operation, but rather the evi-
dence revealed that the clause became operative through objec-
tive, measurable events, which were not within the parties' con-
trol. '6 Since the question was one of law and the determination
of the Commission was, therefore, not entitled to judicial defer-
ence, the court was able to find that the pressure clause was a
"typical condition under the Corbin definition" and therefore did
expire by its own terms.6 7
In McCulloch Interstate Gas Corp. v. FPC,165 McCulloch
sought judicial review of two FPC orders which allegedly would
have permitted "the sale and delivery of gas by Phillips
[Petroleum Company] to Panhandle [Eastern Pipe Line Com-
pany] 'in direct competition with other volumes of natural gas
produced and sold to McCulloch Interstate by other producers of
"I Id. at 178. The replacement contract policy was established in several FPC opin-
ions: Opinion No. 639, 48 F.P.C. 1299 (1972); Opinion No. 699, 51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974); and
Opinion No. 699-H, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974). This policy required that "where a new contract
is executed with respect to an existing interstate sales [sic] where the previous sales
contract has expired by its own terms . . . such gas will be eligible for the R-389-B [base
national] rate." 51 F.P.C. at 2275.
"1 532 F.2d at 179. The court cited several cases supportive of the proposition that
the Natural Gas Act does not alter ordinary contractual relationships between parties.
See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956). In
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 282 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1960), the court had previously
indicated that a decision by the FPC is not entitled to judicial deference when such a
decision is based upon contract law rather than the Commission's special expertise.
"I Because the court found that Skelly and Lone Star had not subjectively agreed to
terminate the contract, the court was able to distinguish Mobile Oil Corp., 49 F.P.C. 239
(1973), wherein the parties had agreed to add additional acreage and the base contract
had no provision for termination.
"1 532 F.2d at 180. The court carefully limited its decision to the question of termina-
tion, refusing to decide how that determination might relate to other issues raised or other
factors.
1" 536 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1976).
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natural gas in the same fields,' ""9 resulting in McCulloch buffer-
ing "' a diminution in its required supplies of natural gas.' "I"7
McCulloch intervened in the proceedings before the FPC
when Phillips sought the FPC's authorization to sell uncommit-
ted gas to Panhandle at the mill compressor station owned by
Panhandle and operated by Phillips. To accomplish the sale,
Phillips proposed to construct approximately thirty-five miles of
pipeline to connect Phillips' wells to the mill station.
The FPC ruled that the proposed pipeline was not within its
jurisdiction because, it concluded, the facilities were gathering
facilities of an independent producer which are not subject to the
requirements of the Natural Gas Act. The FPC, therefore, did not
consider the merits of Phillips' application. When McCulloch's
petition for rehearing was denied, it did not seek judicial review
of the decision.'
7'
In the subsequent FPC hearing, wherein Phillips was granted
a temporary certificate for the sale of gas, the jurisdictional issue
was not considered, inasmuch as the FPC felt that McCulloch's
failure to seek judicial review "effectively forecloses further con-
sideration thereof.' Thereafter, without a hearing, the FPC en-
tered an order granting Phillips a permanent certificate. Again,
when McCulloch's application for rehearing was denied, judicial
review was not sought. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
that "[t]he controlling issue is whether FPC should have exer-
cised jurisdiction over the pipelines . . . .It declined to do so
because they were exempt gathering facilities. Agency decisions
on jurisdiction are subject to court review."'' 3
In spite of the court's recognition of the reviewability of juris-
dictional issues, it found that the procedures for judicial review
prescribed explicitly in the Natural Gas Act were exclusive.
7
Because "[tihe mode of challenging an agency's jurisdictional
"' Id. at 911.
170 Id.
'"' 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1970) sets forth the procedures for judicial review of FPC deter-
minations.
"1 536 F.2d at 912.
'1 Id. at 912-13 (citing Utah Copper Co. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 129 F.2d 358
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 687 (1942)).
"' 536 F.2d at 913.
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decision is by direct attack"'' 5 and "[a] party may not collater-
ally attack the validity of a prior agency order in a subsequent
proceeding,"'' 6 McCulloch was estopped from seeking judicial
review of the jurisdictional issue by his failure to seek court re-
view after the denial of his petition for rehearing. The court also
found that McCulloch's failure to seek court review was disposi-
tive of McCulloch's contention that it was under no compulsion
to seek review until a final disposition was made on Phillips'
certification.' 7 Additionally, the court upheld the informal pro-
ceedings in which the FPC granted Phillips a permanent certifi-
cate on the grounds that the pertinent facts were not contested
and "[nlo evidentiary hearing is required when the proceeding
involves only a question of law."' 7
X. MINERAL LEASING AcT
The petitioners in Hunter v. Morton,"' appealed from deci-
sions and rulings of the Department of Interior which denied
them coal prospecting permits in Utah. The petitioners had pro-
perly filed three applications for such permits, pursuant to the
Mineral Leasing Act'80 and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der. 18 The manager for the Utah State Land Office of the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) rejected one application in its en-
tirety. In a second decision, the manager rejected the other appli-
cations as to part of the acreage and conditioned the issuance of
any permits as to the remaining acreage on the applicants' meet-
ing certain conditions.8 2
The applicants did not attempt to meet the conditions im-
173 Id.
- Id. The principle that a party may not collaterally attack the validity of a prior
agency order in a subsequent proceeding has been often applied to administrative cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Callanan Road
Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507 (1953); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific
Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
These cases also justify the court's contention that "[a]n agency's determination of facts
underlying its conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking must be given effect in subsequent
litigation." 536 F.2d at 913.
1 536 F.2d at 913.
'7 Id. See also Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
," 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976).
30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
"' 43 C.F.R. §§ 3510, 3511 (1976).
529 F.2d at 647.
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posed on that acreage which was not rejected and did not appeal
the manager's decision not to issue permits on such acreage. An
appeal was perfected, however, from the decisions of the manager
insofar as those decisions rejected their applications."s: Before
final action in the appellate process was taken, the Secretary of
the Interior promulgated Order Number 2952 which suspended
the issuance of all such coal prospecting permits until further
notice and rejected all pending applications. 4 Accordingly, the
appeals were rejected and the permit applications were denied."5
The petitioners raised three important questions in an ap-
peal to the Tenth Circuit after the district court rejected petition-
ers' claims to any coal permits.' 6 First, petitioners argued that
they had not received proper notice of "the choices presented in
the administrative appeals when part of the application was re-
jected and part was not."'87 Although the decision stated that the
applicants had a right to appeal such a determination and identi-
fied the procedure to follow,'" the court noted that the decision
left "much to be desired in the way of clarity in the notice of right
to appeal" that portion of the decision conditioning the issuance
of a permit.'8' The court dismissed the argument, however, be-
cause the decision was "sufficient to advise the applicant to take
some action as to the acreage not rejected if he wants to move
toward a perfected application.""'
Secondly, the petitioners argued that they had acquired an
interest or a right by their applications to the extent they were
not rejected, and that rejection of their pending applications pur-
suant to the Secretary's order was erroneous."' Citing ample pre-
"3 Id. at 647-48.
' 38 Fed. Reg. 4,682 (1973).
529 F.2d at 647.
The applicants brought an action in district court seeking a "decree that petition-
ers owned the permits, for mandamus to direct their formal issuance, and to enjoin the
Secretary from advancing claims adverse to applicants' 'ownership."' Id.
", Id. at 648.
t The decisions contained the following clause:
Thirty days from receipt of this decision are allowed in which to meet the
requirements above indicated or appeal to the Director, Bureau of Land
Management. If no action is taken, the case will be closed on the records of
this office, as to the available lands, without further notice.
Id. at 647.





cedent, the court dismissed this argument on the basis that the
applicants acquired no property rights by simply filing their
offer. " Accordingly, the court found that there had been no
wrongful rejection of the applications pursuant to the Order.
In their third argument, petitioners claimed that the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act9 3 was not followed in the issuance and
application of Order 2952."1 The court rejected this argument and
held that such action was an exercise of discretion (by the Secre-
tary of Interior) over public land administration and was there-
fore exempted from the standard rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 95
XI. ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN ESTATES
The same factual setting presented the Tenth Circuit with
two separate questions during the last term.'" Two attorneys had
presented a claim of $8,250 against the estate of an Otoe Indian
for legal services rendered to the decedent during his life.'97 The
"I The provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act give the Secretary discretion to issue
coal prospecting permits: "Where prospecting or exploratory work is necessary to deter-
mine the existence or workability of coal deposits in any unclaimed, undeveloped area,
the Secretary of Interior may issue . . . prospecting permits. ... 30 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1970). The Tenth Circuit concluded that, because the Secretary has discretion to issue
prospecting permits after application, such applications do not create a property right.
This conclusion is consistent with decisions establishing that an application for an oil and
gas lease does not create a vested property right if the issuance of such a lease is also
discretionary with the Secretary. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Hannifin
v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1971); Thor-Westcliffe Dev., Inc. v. Udall, 314 F.2d
257 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951 (1963). See also Woods Petroleum Corp., GFS
(Min) 73 (1973); E.L. Lockhardt, GFS (Min) 74 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 551 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
529 F.2d at 647.
"9 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). This section of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act sets forth procedures to be followed by an agency when promulgating rules and
regulations. The provisions of the section, however, do not apply to the extent that rule-
making is "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." Id. § 553(a)(2). The Tenth Circuit, in Morton, found
that the issuance of Order No. 2952 constituted an exercise of discretion by the Secretary
in administering federal property and "comes well within the exceptions to the application
of the Administrative Procedure Act in that it is a general application of policy and
concerns federal property." 529 F.2d at 649.
it Hill v. Morton, 525 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Hill I]; Hill v.
Morton, No. 76-1164 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication) [hereinafter
cited as Hill II].
" Determination of Heirs and Approval of Wills, Except as to Members of the Five
Civilized Tribes and Osage Indians, 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.200-4.297 (1976).
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Secretary of the Interior determined the reasonable value of the
services to be $1,500 and awarded the claimants that amount., "
The attorneys sought judicial review of the Secretary's deter-
mination in the District Court for the Western District of Okla-
homa. In a two sentence judgment, the district court concluded
that the Secretary's determination was arbitrary and capricious
and ordered the Secretary to pay the full amount of the claim.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment and re-
manded the matter for further proceedings9" because the district
court had not met its "affirmative duty upon. . . reviewing ad-
ministrative action to engage in substantial inquiry of the rele-
vant facts as developed in the administrative record and then to
define, specifically, those facts which it deems supportive of the
agency decision if that is the court's resolution of the matter." 0'
Since the district court had merely stated that the action was
arbitrary and capricious, without further explanation, the Tenth
Circuit did not have an adequate basis for appellate review.10
On remand, the district court, again, held the Secretary's
determination to be arbitrary and capricious. 03 The court rea-
soned that the evidence presented by the attorneys as to the time
spent in representing the decedent, and the rate of compensation
therefor, was binding on the Secretary in the determination of
fees.204 When this decision was appealed, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the Secretary correctly viewed the rate of compensa-
", Hill II, No. 76-1164 at 2.
" Hill 1, 525 F.2d at 327.
Id. at 328.
I0 d.
In reaching this decision, the court relied on both Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d
1389 (10th Cir. 1974), and Heber Valley Milk Co. v. Butz, 503 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1974). In
essence, Hill I somewhat expanded the holding of these cases. Both Nickol and Heber
Valley involved a district court's granting of summary judgment. The court, in each case,
concluded that summary judgment is inappropriate where the question for review is
whether an administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Comment,
The Propriety of Summary Judgment in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 52
DEN. L.J. 46 (1975). Even though Hill I differed procedurally from Nickol and Heber
Valley since the district court did not consider summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit felt
that the "minor dissimilarity is without real significance in this case in view of the
proceedings in the district court which were, for all practical purposes, summary in na-
ture." 525 F.2d at 328. Hill 's extension of the Nickol rule appears to be limited in scope,
however, since it is dependent upon the nature of the review proceedings in the trial court.
I Hill II, No. 76-1164 at 2.
m Id. at 5.
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tion and hours spent in representation as only two of many factors
to be considered in determining the reasonable value of attorneys'
services. 0 5 After reviewing all of the relevant factors, the court
concluded that the Secretary's allowance of only $1,500 for serv-
ices rendered did not constitute an arbitrary disregard of the
evidence so as to render the action capricious. 0 Accordingly, the
court upheld the Secretary's determination.
Carleton L. Ekberg
Kristine A. Hoeltgen
2 Id. Among other factors considered by the court were the "novelty and difficulty
of the issues involved, the amount involved and the results obtained, and the experience,
reputation, and skill of the lawyers performing the services." Id.
'm Id. at 9. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that the reviewing court shall
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law
. .. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).

ANTITRUST*
The Tenth Circuit decided several interesting antitrust cases
this term involving questions of territorial restrictions, tying ar-
rangements,' proof of market power and relevant market, proof
of resultant damages, and the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.'
In World of Sleep, Inc. v. Stearns & Foster Co.,3 the Tenth
Circuit applied the rule "that an essential element for [private]
recovery under the antitrust laws is that the claimant be injured
or damaged, and a violation of the Act without resultant injury
is not enough." 4 Stearns began selling bed products to Denver-
based World of Sleep in 1965 under an informal business relation-
ship, with neither party committed to a formal agreement.
Stearns had a policy, with some exceptions, of selling to only one
dealer in a given locality. In 1968 World of Sleep expanded and
opened a sister store in Atlanta, Georgia. Steams refused to sell
merchandise to the Atlanta World of Sleep store, citing its loyalty
to a local department store. The World of Sleep store in Denver
began transshipping Stearns' products to its Atlanta store, and,
upon learning of this, Stearns terminated all sales to World of
Sleep. World of Sleep instituted a civil antitrust action alleging
that Stearns violated the Sherman Act5 by imposing territorial
restrictions on the resale of Stearns' products. World of Sleep
requested a directed verdict on the issue of liability and asked
that the jury determine only the amount of damages. The trial
court refused this motion; the jury returned a verdict for Steams
finding no antitrust violation.
* In Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court overruled the per se rule of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967). The impact of this decision should be considered on the analyses of World
of Sleep v. Stearns & Foster Co. and Randy's Studebaker Sales v. Nissan Motor Corp.
infra-Ed.
Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976). The case involved a novel, but unsuccessful, attempt to classify the Shell trade-
mark and Shell gasoline as separate products in an illegal tying arrangement. For a more
extended analysis of this decision, see the Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights Overview
infra.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1970) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as the Fran-
chise Act].
525 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 43.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Sherman Act].
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World of Sleep argued on appeal that United States v. Ar-
nold, Schwinn & Co.' should have been controlling on the issue
of whether there had been a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Discussing the holding in Schwinn, the Tenth Circuit stated:
In Schwinn, it was held that where a manufacturer, such as Steams
in the instant case, sells his product to a distributor, such as World
of Sleep, and in connection with such sale, "firmly and resolutely"
subjects the distributor to territorial restrictions upon resale,
whether by "explicit agreement or silent combination or under-
standing with his vendee," a per se violation of the Sherman Act
results.'
The Tenth Circuit held that Steams' discontinuance of sales be-
cause of World of Sleep's transshipping did not necessarily estab-
lish that Stearns had previously imposed territorial restrictions
on the resale of its products; therefore, the issue of liability had
properly gone to the jury.'
The theory of damages proposed by World of Sleep was
firmly rejected by the Tenth Circuit. World of Sleep argued that
when Stearns terminated sales it became necessary to increase
the advertising of its other lines of bedding. The court found that
no direct relationship could be established between Steams' al-
leged territorial restrictions and the increased advertising expen-
ses, especially since World of Sleep's sales and net worth had also
increased yearly. The court noted that the proximate damage
problem alone could have justified the trial court's decision to
deny the motion for a directed verdict
In E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 10 E.J. Delaney
388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn, a bicycle manufacturer assigned territories to each
of its 22 distributors and instructed the distributors to sell only to franchised accounts in
their own territories.
1 525 F.2d at 44 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967)).
1 The trial court had instructed the jury on what constituted a per se violation of the
Sherman Act in accordance with the Schwinn holding. 525 F.2d at 44. Given the admitted
policy of Steams to sell to only one dealer in a locality, the warnings given to World of
Sleep concerning transshipping, and the ultimate discontinuance of all sales to World of
Sleep, query what would constitute a per se violation sufficient to warrant a directed
verdict.
1 525 F.2d at 43. Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages
in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231 (1961).
The court's damages analysis is more convincing than its attempt to distinguish Schwinn
from the present case.
10 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
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Corporation, an advertising-promotional firm, alleged that Bonne
Bell, a manufacturer of cosmetics exclusively endorsed by the
United States Ski Team," had violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act'" by conspiring to prevent the distribution of
"skier's paks" containing cosmetics.'3 At trial, the jury awarded
damages to Bonne Bell.'4 The Tenth Circuit found on appeal that
the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that section 1 had
been violated, but held that a prima facie showing of a section 2
violation had not been made. Because the jury had returned a
general verdict, the case was reversed and remanded for a new
trial.'5
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the facts supporting the allega-
tion of a section 1 violation: Bonne Bell had initiated a "total
involvement" program in the ski cosmetic market; by 1970,
Bonne Bell believed it had a "hold" on that market; Bonne Bell
was opposed to all competition within that market; and although
the USSA was initially enthusiastic about Delaney's proposal,
after Bonne Bell's objections were raised the USSA refused the
proposal." The court held that, although Bonne Bell's exclusive
" Bonne Bell entered into a contract with the United States Ski Association [USSA]
in which the United States Ski Team [Ski Team] exclusively endorsed Bonne Bell's
cosmetic products, with Bonne Bell designated the official cosmetic of the Ski Team.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " Id. (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) provides in part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ... Id. (emphasis added).
1 E.J. Delaney Corporation [Delaney] was organized to bring advertising from na-
tional advertisers to the market in ski resort areas. Delaney began distributing its advertis-
ers' products in a "skier's pak" which included cosmetics and toiletries; a set fee was paid
to Delaney by each supplier for every "pak" sold. In 1970, the USSA was contacted by
Delaney, and initial approval, subject to final approval by the USSA auditors, was given
to a plan which provided that each "pak" sell for one dollar and that 40% of the total
receipts be given to the Ski Team.
11 The trial court trebled the damages and awarded attorneys' fees as authorized
under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
11 525 F.2d at 301. See Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Village Theater, Inc., 228
F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1955).
IS 525 F.2d at 301. Bonne Bell's objections were premised on the concept that the
distribution of the "paks" and the advertisement of the Ski Team's receipt of net proceeds
would be suggestive of USSA's endorsement and not in accord with the exclusive endorse-
ment contract.
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endorsement contract with USSA was not illegal per se, 17 the jury
could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that Bonne
Bell utilized the endorsement contract in an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade violative of section 1.
The trial court had proceeded on the theory that the jury
could find a section 2 violation based upon a finding of "a danger-
ous probability of monopolization . . . even absent specific proof
of Bonne Bell's market power."'" The Tenth Circuit disagreed,
stating:
[ln the absence of any showing by the plaintiff as to where the area
of competition existed, or what clout the defendant corporation had
therein, it was error for the trial judge to submit the §2 issue to the
jury. No facts were before it upon which to base a verdict, and no
facts from which inferences could properly be drawn."
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of the section 2 claim
by reviewing the cases setting forth the established liberal rule for
accepting minimal proof of damage in an antitrust case, quoting
the United States Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc. :20 "[The] burden of proving the fact of dam-
age . . .is satisfied by proof of some damage flowing from the
unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes
only to the amount and not the fact of damage."
12'
Despite this language in Zenith and an admission by the
court that Delaney had "incurred some sales and distribution
losses, ' 22 the Tenth Circuit was able to distinguish the present
issue from that discussed in Zenith:
The critical problem here does not involve a question of proof
of damage made at trial or how the damages may be proved. Rather,
it is a basic matter of proof of a cause of action, or, more particu-
larly, proof of a prima facie case to go to the jury.Y
17 Id.
" Id. at 300. Attempting to monopolize is a violation of section 2. The "attempt"
clause has produced interpretation problems for the lower federal courts not found in
section 2's monopolization and conspiracy prohibitions. For an excellent discussion of the
exact problem presented in this case, see Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sher-
man Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1451 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1451].
" 525 F.2d at 306.
395 U.S. 100 (1969) (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 114 n.9.




In so formulating the issue, the Tenth Circuit required two
elements of proof to establish a prima facie case for attempted
monopolization violative of section 2: (1) proof of specific intent
to monopolize; and (2) proof of market power or market position
(with a definition of the relevant market).4 The Supreme Court
has long required proof of specific intent to monopolize,25 but has
not yet expressly recognized the necessity of proving a defen-
dant's market power. The Tenth Circuit joined a growing num-
ber of lower federal courts which now require proof of market
power in a section 2 claim for attempted monopolization. 7
The Tenth Circuit commented on the lack of evidence con-
cerning Bonne Bell's market power:
z' Id. at 305-06.
E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
26 For a discussion of the need for clarification by the Supreme Court, see 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1451. The author suggests:
Given the premise that attempt to monopolize should include a broad cate-
gory of single-firm coercive activity, the focus should be on economic rather
than market power. Any and all forms of economic power are relevant here,
for the concept of attempt does not necessarily require a degree of market
power in the field where monopolization is sought. . . . Relevant considera-
tions might include: a deep pocket, either defendant's or a parent corpora-
tion's; control over demand, distribution or supply; a dominant position in
a separate market; reciprocal arrangements with a sibling in a conglomerate
family; or patents, copyrights or exclusive contract rights. All are capable of
giving a defendant firm sufficient leverage to implement a predatory scheme,
and all are analytically independent of market power in the area of competi-
tion in which injury is inflicted.
Id. at 1474 (footnotes omitted).
The Tenth Circuit noted that Delaney had established that:
Bonne Bell had the economic power to become the official cosmetic of the
U.S. Ski Team; that it had the economic power to pay the USSA over
$180,000.00 in minimum retainers . . . [and] that it believed that it had
the economic power to develop a "hold" on the skiers' cosmetic market in
the United States ....
525 F.2d at 306-07 (emphasis added). However these facts were found insufficient to
establish defendant's requisite market power.
" The court cited cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
as supporting the view that proof of market power is necessary to establish a prima facie
claim for attempt to monopolize. 525 F.2d at 305. The Third Circuit, in Coleman Motor
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975), has also adopted this requirement.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be split in its view as to whether market power is important
in attempt cases. Compare Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (relevant market held irrelevant) with Cornwell Quality Tools
Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971) ("sufficient market power to come danger-
ously close" to monopolization was an element of proof in an attempt claim).
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The record, as to this element, shows only that there were at the
time some five million skiers in the country who were affluent and
youthful; that the market was sought after, and that there were
unique marketing problems. This was all that was shown as to the
market as such. There was no evidence offered as to the corporate
defendant's sales volume in the "skier's cosmetic market" nor the
sales volume therein of anyone else. There was no evidence as to the
total sales in the market. There was no evidence as to the corporate
defendant's power as to pricing or as to any other party's power.n
This lack of evidence was a fatal defect in the establishment of a
prima facie case against Bonne Bell for attempted monopoliza-
tion.2
Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp.0 in-
volved allegations by an automobile dealer in Salt Lake City
[Randy's] against the distribution of Datsun vehicles [Nissan]
for violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 3' and for
violations of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.32 Randy's al-
leged that Nissan refused to renew the franchise because Randy's
would not follow Nissan's resale price maintenance policies.
Randy's also argued that Nissan deliberately attempted to drive
Randy's out of business by supplying an insufficient number of
Datsun vehicles. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Randy's
under the Franchise Act, but found in favor of Nissan on the
Sherman Act claims.
In upholding the jury verdict, the Tenth Circuit noted that
"[tihe Franchise Act gives to an automobile dealer a federal
cause of action against an automobile manufacturer who fails to
act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms
or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not
renewing the franchise. '33 The Franchise Act defines "good faith"
as the duty of the dealer and manufacturer "to act in a fair and
equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion
" 525 F.2d at 306 (emphasis in original).
2 The trial judge's instruction on relevant market was held to be a correct statement
of the law. However, since there was no evidence on relevant market, the issue should not
have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 308.
533 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1976).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
' The act is also popularly known as the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act.
11 533 F.2d at 514 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970)).
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or intimidation from the other party. ' 34 The Franchise Act also
provides "[tihat recommendation, endorsement, exposition,
persuasion, urging or argument shall not be" considered lack of
good faith.35 Noting that the line between normal recommenda-
tion and coercion may indeed be thin, the Tenth Circuit exam-
ined the cases interpreting good faith under the Franchise Act
and found that Nissan's actions constituted bad faith. The court
cited a Second Circuit case 3 and held that coercion and subse-
quent termination for failure to adhere to a manufacturer's sug-
gested resale price constituted bad faith. The court cited Junikki
Imports, Inc. v. Toyota Motors37 for the proposition that bad faith
also exists when a manufacturer supplies an insufficient number
of cars in an attempt to drive a dealer out of business. With the
aid of these holdings the Tenth Circuit found "Nissan used the
nonrenewal weapon to coerce the dealer into a program of retail
price fixing. '38 Sufficient evidence was present to show that Nis-
san curtailed the supply of automobiles in order to bring about
price maintenance and suppression of competition. Additionally,
Nissan tried to force Randy's to make major capital improve-
ments, which could be deemed an effort to force Randy's to raise
its prices to meet expenses .3 The court held that projection of lost
profits over a ten-year period for loss of the franchise was not too
speculative for jury determination."
Nissan objected to the use of questionnaires submitted into
evidence by Randy's to show how the customers felt about the
quality of Randy's service. The court noted the recent tendency
to admit surveys of this kind if properly conducted4' and held that
the surveys "were properly admitted to reflect the then existing
state of mind of the customers as to the quality of Randy's service
generally." 2
533 F.2d at 514 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1970)).
15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1970).
3, Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
37 335 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
533 F.2d at 516.
31 Id.
,o Id. at 518-19. See Note, The Elusive Measure of Damages for Wrongful Termina-
tion of Automobile Dealership Franchises, 74 YALE L.J. 354 (1964).
" 533 F.2d at 520.
42 Id.
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In Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 3 the Tenth
Circuit upheld a jury verdict against Olson Farms, an egg distrib-
utor. The plaintiffs, fourteen egg producers some of whom were
also distributors, charged Olson Farms with conspiring with other
distributors to fix and depress the prices paid to producers. Plain-
tiffs also alleged that Olson Farms conspired with others to fix the
wholesale price for eggs. The jury was presented with a special
verdict form which set forth the three causes of action under the
Sherman Act: (1)a restraint of trade violation of section 1; (2) a
conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2; and (3) an
attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2.11
On appeal, Olson Farms first argued that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant submission of the case to the jury,
suggesting that the only possible evidence showing price fixing
was the existence of price parallelism between the prices paid by
Olson Farms to egg producers and the prices paid by its named
coconspirators. The court agreed that price parallelism alone
would not establish a conspiracy to fix prices.45 However, price
parallelism becomes significant when it is accompanied by evi-
dence of behavior to fix prices." There was sufficient evidence of
a course of conduct to fix prices to submit the issue to the jury.
Olson Farms also argued that there was insufficient evidence
to establish the relevant geographical market. The court noted
there was a difference of opinion as to what constituted the rele-
vant geographic market47 and held that in this case it was best
for the trial judge to submit the issue to the jury. 8 The Tenth
43 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976).
,1 The jury found defendant violated all three claims. Damages were awarded to four
of the plaintiffs under claim (1). The remaining ten plaintiffs were awarded damages
under claim (2). No damages were awarded under claim (3). The plaintiffs also originally
alleged violations of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 13-13c,
12a (1970) and the antitrust laws of Utah. However, these claims were withdrawn prior
to trial.
, 541 F.2d at 245.
,' Id. The court pointed to numerous telephone calls and meetings between Olson
Farms and the coconspirators, and to intracompany correspondence which permitted the
inference that Olson Farms was acting in concert with others to depress the prices paid
to the egg producers.
11 Id. Olson Farms urged inclusion of Southern California in the market because from
time to time it served as a source of eggs when there was a shortage in Utah. Plaintiffs
argued that Utah and the southern part of Idaho constituted the geographic market.
1 It is interesting to note the ease with which the court was able to handle the
problem of relevant geographic market given the problems encountered in Delaney. How-
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Circuit also rejected Olson Farms' contention that there was no
damage to the egg producers. 9 The voluminous record from the
two month trial was such as to allow the jury to find and infer
that plaintiffs suffered legal injury. 0
Mark Wolfe
ever, the court seemed to imply that, during the two month jury trial in Olson Farms,
much evidence had been introduced by the parties concerning the relevant geographic
market, in stark contrast to what the court characterized as a total lack thereof in
Delaney.
4 The court held:
[Piroof of economic damage to their "business or property" is a necessary
precondition to their recovery of treble damages under the Clayton Act. ...
We think there was sufficient evidence of the fact that the plaintiffs did
sustain some damage since there was ample statistical data and expert testi-
mony describing depressed producer prices and the necessary concomi-
tant-lost profits. As to the quantum of damage, the plaintiffs were under
no burden to establish it with mathematical precision so long as the extent
of such damage was not left to jury speculation.
541 F.2d at 246 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
1 The opinion also resolves an apparent inconsistency in the verdicts returned by the




This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey is devoted to those
decisions involving bankruptcy, banking, government contracts,
debtor-creditor, and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) ren-
dered by the Tenth Circuit during the 1975-76 survey period.
Discussion of each case is limited in length and is not intended
to be exhaustive. It is the author's desire that this section serve
as a research tool for the practicing lawyer, and it is written with
this intent.
Few of the decisions in the survey period presented major
developments or changes in the law. However, a large number are
noteworthy because of either the isolated application of the law
or the facts of the case. In addition, a case comment concerning
banking law follows this overview.'
I. BANKRUPTCY
A. Scope of Rule 401(a)
On October 1, 1973, Rule 401(a) of the Bankruptcy Court
became effective. 2 This rule provides that the filing of a petition
for bankruptcy shall operate as an automatic injunction prohibit-
ing either legal actions or the enforcement of judgments founded
on unsecured provable debts.' Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Phillips Food
Corp.,' dealt with the operation of Rule 401(a) in a situation
where both service of a garnishee summons and adjudication of
the debtor's bankruptcy occurred prior to the effective date of the
rule.
Zestee had obtained a judgment in excess of $60,000 against
Phillips. Subsequently, on November 24, 1972, a petition was
The comment discusses Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221 (10th
Cir. 1976), and Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
Rule 401(a) provides:
Stay of Actions-The filing of a petition shall operate as a stay of the com-
mencement or continuation of any action against the bankrupt, or the en-
forcement of any judgment against him, if the action or judgment is founded
on an unsecured provable debt other than one not dischargable under clause
(1), (5), (6), or (7) or § 17a of the Act.
Bankruptcy R. 401(a), 11 U.S.C. App. R. 401(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
Id.
536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976).
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filed in involuntary bankruptcy against Phillips. On December
12, 1972, Zestee caused a garnishment summons to be served on
a party indebted to Phillips. Phillips was adjudicated a bankrupt
six days later.'
The garnishee sought adjudication as to whether the trustee
of the bankrupt's estate or Zestee was entitled to the funds owed.
However, the case remained dormant until 1975, at which time
the trustee moved to dismiss the garnishee summons. The motion
was granted and Zestee appealed, asserting that Rule 401(a)
could not affect an adjudication of bankruptcy occurring prior to
its effective date.'
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Doyle, held that Rule 401(a)
applied to all bankruptcy proceedings and legal actions not com-
pleted as of the effective date: "The Rule declares that the stay
is in effect during the continuation of any action of the enforce-
ment of any judgment. The . . . submission of the garnishee
summons is part of the enforcement efforts of Zestee. By the
specific terms of the rule the automatic stay takes effect. ' ' 7 Since
Phillips was adjudicated bankrupt, Rule 401(b) applied to make
the stay continuous.
Two other reasons were advanced for upholding dismissal of
the garnishment summons. First, the court noted that, notwith-
standing the automatic stay provided in Rule 401(a), the bank-
ruptcy court had expressly enjoined the garnishment on Novem-
ber 5, 1973.1 Further, the court determined that the garnishment
summons could not be effective since title to the assets affected
Id. at 335.
Id.
7 Id. See note 2 supra.
' Rule 401(b) provides:
Duration of Stay-Except as it may be deemed annulled under subdivision
(c) or may be terminated, annulled, or modified by the bankruptcy court
under subdivision (d) or (c) of this rule, the stay shall continue until the
bankruptcy case is dismissed or the bankrupt is denied a discharge or waives
or otherwise loses his right thereto.
Bankruptcy R. 401(b), 11 U.S.C. App. R. 401(b) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis
added).
1 536 F.2d at 335. Under Rule 401(e) the bankruptcy court has the authority to
expressly grant appropriate injunctive relief. Bankruptcy R. 401(e), 11 U.S.C. App. R.




had legally passed to the trustee under section 70(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act" as of the date the petition was filed."
Zestee is a reminder that proceedings in bankruptcy are sub-
ject to both present and future regulations until the proceedings
are terminated. Therefore, it is imperative that all parties to a
bankruptcy proceeding note with a watchful eye all changes in
the rules and evaluate the effect of those changes throughout the
proceedings.
B. Post-Petition Interest
Ordinarily, unsecured creditors are not entitled to recover
interest accruing on a debt after the filing of a petition for bank-
ruptcy. In Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.
First National City Bank (In re King Resources Co.) 3 the Tenth
Circuit grappled with the rights of a senior creditor to recover
post-petition interest under a subordination agreement with
other creditors.
As a condition to a loan, Continental required King Re-
sources to provide for the subordination of certain outstanding
debentures. King Resources subsequently underwent Chapter X
reorganization. Continental asserted the right to post-petition
interest out of the shares of the subordinated creditors, basing its
claim on general subordination provisions contained in inden-
tures dealing with the subordinated debt. The trustee denied
recovery of the post-petition interest. 4
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's disallowance of
post-petition interest.' 5 Following the rules established in In re
Kingsboro Mortgage Corp.' and In re Times Sales Finance
" 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
" 536 F.2d at 336. Zestee argued that service of the garnishee summons resulted in
the creation of a preferential transfer and that the trustee had failed to file suit to set aside
the transfer within the two year statute of limitations. Id. See Bankruptcy Act § 11(e), 11
U.S.C. § 29(e) (1970). The court found that even if it were assumed that service of a
garnishee summons was capable of transferring property, there was no preferential trans-
fer here; the summons was served after the petition was filed and therefore the property
had vested in the trustee. 536 F.2d at 336.
11 Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re King
Resources Co.), 528 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1976).
*3 528 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1976).
* Id. at 791.
' Id. at 792.
514 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Corp.,' the court held that a subordinate agreement will not give
a senior unsecured creditor the right to post-petition interest ab-
sent explicit language in the agreement to that effect. 8
C. "Fiduciary Capacity" under Section 17a(4)
Allen v. Romero (In re Romero)"5 represents a possible expan-
sion of the concept of fiduciary capacity under section 17a(4) of
the Bankruptcy Act. 0 Allen hired Romero, a licensed contractor
in New Mexico, to build three four-plexes at a stated price. Allen
then advanced funds to Romero with the understanding that
these funds would be used to pay subcontractors, materialmen,
and laborers as payments became due, thus avoiding the imposi-
tion of liens on the properties. Romero did not use these funds as
agreed and liens were filed on the structures. The bankruptcy
court found that Romero owed a sum in excess of $54,00021 to
Allen, and further concluded that this debt was non-
dischargeable under sections 17a(2) and (4) of the Act.
2
The Tenth Circuit affirmed this judgment on the basis of
section 17a(4) .23 Noting that section 17a(4) required the existence
of a fiduciary relationship and further noting that this fiduciary
capacity was limited to "technical" and not implied trusts, the
court held that the provisions of the New Mexico contractor's
licensing statute created the necessary relationship. 4 The statute
17 491 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1974).
" 528 F.2d at 792. Cf. Allen v. Romero (In re Romero), 535 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1976)
(which reaffirms that post-petition interest is always recoverable on a non-dischargeable
debt).
" 535 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(4) (1970). Subsection (a)(4) makes non-dischargeable those debts
that "were created by [the bankrupt's] fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defal-
cation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." Id.
2 Although the judgment of the bankruptcy court against the bankrupt was affirmed
on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reduced the award from $54,708.30 to $53,143.43. This
reduction was ordered due to a finding by the Tenth Circuit that the amount in question
was either an error in mathematical computation or an improper award for mental suffer-
ing.
22 535 F.2d at 621. Bankruptcy Act §§ 17(a)(2), (4), 11 U.S.C. 535(a)(2), (4) (1970).
" 535 F.2d at 621. The Tenth Circuit selected 17(a)(4) as the appropriate provision,
although the court might have been able to affirm the judgment on section 17(a)(2) which
makes non-dischargeable "liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations .... " See note 14 supra.
24 535 F.2d at 621-22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-35-1 to -67 (1953) provides for the
licensing of persons involved in the construction industry.
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provided that a license was subject to revocation or suspension in
the event that the licensee wrongfully diverted such advances."
The implication arising from this case is that section 17a(4)
may be applied to all licensed practices if the terms of the license
provide some duty or condition which can be construed as creat-
ing a statutory obligation on the licensee. Accordingly, the terms
and conditions of any license should be carefully considered dur-
ing investigation of any section 17a(4) claims.
D. Comity in the Bankruptcy Court
HT v. Lam (In re The Colorado Corp.)26 involved a contested
provisional disallowance of certain alleged creditors prior to the
election of a trustee.27 Appellants, IT and Venture Fund,2" had
been declared in liquidation by courts in Luxembourg and the
Netherlands Antilles prior to this proceeding. Liquidators ap-
pointed in the foreign proceeding filed substantial claims against
the Colorado Corporation, the bankrupt. The Tenth Circuit
found that the bankruptcy court's disallowance was an abuse of
discretion based on an erroneous denial of comity. 21
The appellees argued that the foreign court orders appointing
the liquidators should not be recognized in American courts and
therefore the liquidators had no authority to represent IT and
Venture Fund in the proceedings. This argument was based on
the assertion that Canadian courts had not given comity to Colo-
rado bankruptcy court orders and the claim that Canadian citi-
zens had procured the foreign decrees involved. The Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that reciprocity has been a consideration in granting
or withholding comity but held that "[d]enying comity to the
Netherlands Antilles order because of lack of reciprocity in Can-
ada is such a misdirected use of the reciprocity consideration as
2 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-35-26 (1953) provides for the revocation or suspension of a
license on the grounds of diversion of funds received for the prosecution or completion of
a contract. The Tenth Circuit viewed this section as imposing "a fiduciary duty on con-
tractors who have been advanced money pursuant to construction contracts." 535 F.2d at
6 2 1 .-21 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Because their claims were provisionally disallowed, petitioners were not allowed to
vote in the election of a trustee in bankruptcy. Id. at 466.
" IT and Venture Fund were part of Robert Vesco's 10S operation. The Colorado
Corporation was part of the John King empire. Id. at 464.
" Id. at 469.
1977
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to constitute an abuse of discretion.""0 Comity is withheld when
recognition of the foreign law would prejudice the forum's citi-
zens. Allowing foreign creditors to vote for a trustee who is subject
to American law could not prejudice American citizens.3
The court went on to hold that the filing of a claim is prima
facie evidence of the claim and its validity." Therefore, the bur-
den of proof rests upon the party seeking provisional disallowance
of the claim, which burden was not carried in this case.3
E. Preferential Transfers
Boyd v. First National Bank (In re J & J Sales, Inc.)34 empha-
sizes the need to affirmatively prove some aspect of insolvency
before a transaction may be voided as preferential or fraudulent
under the Bankruptcy Act. 5 The trustee petitioned for a turn-
over order claiming that the bank illegally transferred $8,012.98
from the account of a bankrupt corporation and applied it toward
the personal indebtedness of individual stockholder officers. The
bankruptcy judge and the district court denied the petition and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. and Mrs. Tilley were the sole stockholders and officers
of J & J Sales, Inc., the bankrupt. Over a considerable period of
time the bank had been in the practice of making personal loans
to the Tilleys of funds needed to operate the business. The Tilleys
would loan these funds to the bankrupt and periodically repay
themselves when money was available. On October 25, 1972, a
large check was deposited in the business account and, on Mrs.
Tilley's direction, $8,012.98 of the proceeds was applied by the
bank to satisfy an outstanding loan of the Tilleys' that had been
in default. J & J Sales filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition
about five weeks later.
The Tenth Circuit found that a turn-over order could not be
3" Id. at 468.
31 Id.
312 Id. at 467, 469.
Appellants also objected to the claims on the grounds that iT and Venture Fund
no longer had any legal existence, and therefore the liquidators had no right to press claims
on their behalf in the United States. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, holding
that the orders of the court in Luxemburg were sufficient to grant the liquidators authority
to pursue the claims. Id. at 469.
" No. 74-1364 (10th Cir., Oct. 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
31 Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107 (1970).
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based on the preference theory" because there was no evidence
that the transfer was made while the bankrupt was insolvent. An
essential element of a preference is that the transfer was made by
the debtor while insolvent and within four months of filing the
petition. 7 The burden of proving insolvency on the date of the
transfer rests with the trustee. 8
Nor would the evidence support an order based on the fraud-
ulent transfer theory.3" There was no evidence that the debtor
was, or would be, rendered insolvent by the transfer 0 or that the
property remaining in the debtor after the transfer was unreason-
ably small capital.4 Similarly, there was no proof that the trans-
fer was intended to hinder or defeat creditors42 or that the transfer




First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Sand Springs State Bank"
dealt with the jurisdictional parameters of the bankruptcy court.
Two creditors contested title to certain assets of the bankrupt.
The trustee conceded that one of the two was entitled to the
assets, and that the determination of the dispute would not affect
the bankrupt's estate. Under these circumstances the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to resolve
the dispute,4 5 because the determination did not materially affect
the administration of the estate."6
Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), (b), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)(1), (b) (1970).
'7 Bankruptcy Act § 60(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970). See Moran Bros., Inc. v.
Yinger, 323 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1963) for an explanation of section 60.
38 Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390-91 (10th Cir.), appeal
dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1955).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2), (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2), (3) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(a), (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a), (3) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(b), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(b) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(c) (1970).
528 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 353-54. Although the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the parties on
appeal, the court raised this issue on its own motion. Id. at 353.
" See generally Bankruptcy Act §§ 1, 2, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11 (1970). Under the facts
of this case the resolution of the conflict between the creditors had no effect upon the
remaining overall debts of the bankrupt and the distribution of assets to the creditors.
Obviously, it had a direct effect on determining which creditor was entitled to receive the
secured assets, and therefore full payment, in contrast to the general creditors' shares of
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Booker v. Booker (In re Booker)47 serves as a reminder that a
property settlement is dischargeable in bankruptcy whereas an
alimony judgment is not.8 Since the court order in question was
ambiguous the court construed the order from its terms, conclud-
ing that it was intended as a property settlement and was there-
fore dischargeable.
4
In Adams Chevrolet Co. v. Bollinger (In re Bollinger),50 the
bankrupt bought a car, falsely claiming that a trade-in car was
unencumbered. The court found the debt to be nondischargeable
under section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act" notwithstanding
lack of ill-will of the bankrupt. 52 The court noted that the require-
ment that a conversion be "willful" and "malicious" was satisfied
by the performance of an intentional act, absent just cause or
excuse, which necessarily produces harm.
53
II. BANKS AND BANKING
In Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors," the Tenth Circuit
refused to interfere in a federal decision to create a federally-
chartered bank pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act,
55
even though the Colorado banking authorities had reviewed and
denied an identical application for a state bank. This case is the
subject of a comment immediately following this Overview.
United Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 5 is nota-
ble because of its construction of language contained in a banker's
blanket bond. The bond covered losses that occurred while funds
the remaining assets. It would appear that if one creditor's claim against the bankrupt
materially differed from the other's as to priority or amount, then the bankruptcy court
might have had jurisdiction.
, No. 75-1733 (10th Cir., May 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
, Under 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970), alimony judgments are nondischargeable in
bankruptcy.
" In construing the ambiguous order, the court considered the presence of indemnifi-
cation, acceleration, and lien provisions to enforce the debt as some evidence that the
order was a property settlement and not an alimony judgment.
No. 76-1221 (10th Cir., July 28, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1970). See note 16 supra.
" No. 76-1221 at 4-5.
" Id. See McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916); Bennett v. W.T. Grant Co.,
481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
" 535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1850 (1970).
' 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976).
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were in transit, prior to "delivery at destination."57 The court
determined that the purpose of the blanket bond was to provide
coverage in the event of loss while funds were in transit but not
in the custody of an insured carrier.58 In light of this purpose and
the language of the bond, the court held that the bond covered
the loss of a cash letter which was delivered to an employee of the
recipient bank at a bus station and stolen from the employee
while in the bank's outdoor mall, but prior to entering the build-
ing.5
9
Finally, in Colorado ex rel. State Banking Board v. First
National Bank, 0 the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and
held that electronic banking facilities were "branch banks"
within the meaning of the federal laws prohibiting branch bank-
ing.' The district court had held that the use of these facilities
to receive deposits was branch banking under state and federal
laws, but that use for withdrawal and transfer of funds was not.,2
Since the district court decision, other circuits had con-
cluded that electronic banking facilities were branch banks when
used for these other purposes as well. 3 The Tenth Circuit adopted
the rules of these cases, concluding that although the technology
and services differed somewhat from the statutory definition, the
intent and purpose of the Act 4 mandated the inclusion of these
5 The exact language of the bond placed in dispute provided for insurance coverage
[wihile the Property is in transit anywhere in the custody of any of the
Employees or partners of the Insured or of any other person or persons acting
as messenger, except while in the mail or with a carrier for hire other than
an armored motor vehicle company for the purpose of transportation, such
transit to begin immediately upon receipt of such Property by the transport-
ing Employee or partner or such other person, and to end immediately upon
delivery thereof at destination.
529 F.2d at 493 (emphasis omitted).
:A Id. at 494.
I d. at 494-95.
' 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
62 In reaching this construction, the district court had relied heavily on the use of the
definitional terms of "checks paid" and "money lent" in 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970). Colorado
ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 983-85 (D. Colo. 1975).
This restrictive view of the terms has since been criticized. 11 TuImA L.J. 85 (1975).
" Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 184 (1976).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the overriding purpose of 12 U.S.C. § 36 was to place
national and state banks on a level of "competitive equality" regarding branch banking.
1977
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services and facilities within the definition of branch banking."
M. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Burgess Construction Co. v. M. Morrin & Son Co.6" involved
a suit by a subcontractor against a government contractor for an
alleged breach of an implied obligation under the subcontract.6"
Morrin, the subcontractor, agreed to perform concrete work for
Burgess according to a contractual schedule dependent upon Bur-
gess providing access to the sites on certain dates. Various delays
prevented access on the specified dates, and as a result the work
was not completed on time. Both parties brought separate suits
under the contract which were consolidated for trial. Morrin as-
serted that Burgess was contractually bound to provide access on
the specified dates and, therefore, had breached this express and
implied covenant.
The Tenth Circuit construed the contract as not including an
express covenant to provide access." However, the court noted
that an implied covenant not to hinder or delay access might
nonetheless exist in the absence of a contractual clause contem-
plating and excusing the delay. The court held that a contractual
provision allowing extensions of time for the subcontractor's per-
formance in the event of delay demonstrated some evidence of the
intent of the parties to allow delay. Therefore, no implied obliga-
tion existed."'
540 F.2d at 499-500. The Colorado law on branch banking, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6-101(1)
(1973), would prohibit state banks from maintaining banking machines under similar
circumstances. Accordingly, prohibition of federal use of these machines served to pre-
serve this equality in Colorado. 540 F.2d at 500. A question arises whether the same
reasoning would have been applied had Colorado state authorities permitted the use of
these machines, or had merely not yet made a determination.
0 540 F.2d at 499-500. The Tenth Circuit found the proper construction of 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(f) (1970) to be that the statute provided examples, but not limitations, of what
constituted branch banking. In any event, the withdrawal of funds and the transfer of
funds from one account to another were traditional banking functions "well within the
prohibition of the statute." 540 F.2d at 500.
- 526 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 176 (1976).
" The subcontractor's action was based on the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1970),
which allows suits on government contractors' bonds to be brought in federal district
courts. 526 F.2d at 110 n.1. See generally 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1970).
11 526 F.2d at 113. Reading the contract as a whole the court concluded that the
parties did not intend that Burgess be absolutely required to provide access on the speci-
fied dates. Id.
" On this theory, the Tenth Circuit harmonized the cases of George A. Fuller Co. v.




A. U.C.C.C.70 and the Truth in Lending Act 7'
In Hinkle v. Rock Springs National Bank, 2 the Tenth Circuit
reaffirmed the rule that a bank and a credit seller who fail to
disclose the necessary financing information as required by the
Truth in Lending Act are jointly liable for the statutory penalty.73
Since the lack of disclosure violated both U.C.C.C. and Truth in
Lending Act requirements, it was argued that penalties under
both statutes could be recovered. The Tenth Circuit rejected this
argument because Wyoming credit transactions had been de-
clared exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act following the state's adoption of the U.C.C.C. 4 The
exemption, however, only served to replace the federal require-
ments with the almost identical requirements of the U.C.C.C.75
and did not affect concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.7' The
court concluded that the federal courts had subject matter juris-
diction, but there could only be one cause of action and one
recovery for a non-disclosure."
B. Effect of U. C. C.C. on Negotiable Instruments
Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.78 presented questions con-
cerning the effect of U.C.C.C. remedial provisions9 on the U.C.C.
definition of negotiability. 0 The plaintiffs had bought homes
329 U.S. 64 (1946), concluding that an implied obligation only exists in the absence of a
contract clause contemplating the delay. 526 F.2d at 114.
In addition, the court noted that even if there were an implied obligation it would
not be breached by good faith delay: "Breach of an implied promise not to hinder or delay
the other party's performance is not established merely by proving there was delay. The
delay must be unnecessary, unreasonable or due to defendant's fault." Id. at 115. Morrin
had successfully objected to the introduction of any evidence of good or bad faith at the
time of trial, but other evidence indicated that Burgess had acted in good faith and that
the delays were not unreasonable. Id.
,0 Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
71 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1681s (1970).
72 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1976).
71 Id. at 297. Both were creditors under the act and responsible for the disclosures.
Id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(s), 226.6(d) (1976).
1, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1968). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (1976).
,5 538 F.2d at 298. U.C.C.C. § 2-301(2); Wyo. STAT. § 40-2-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
7' See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1976).
'7 538 F.2d at 298.
78 535 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1976).
7' U.C.C.C. § 5-202.
- U.C.C. § 3-104(l).
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from the defendant, signing negotiable notes to cover the mort-
gage debt, in violation of the U.C.C.C. 81 The trial court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims for refund of the finance charge and for the
statutory penalty; the Tenth Circuit reversed.2
The principal issue on appeal was whether the U.C.C.C. pro-
vision prohibiting the use of negotiable instruments in consumer
transactions made the notes nonnegotiable. The Tenth Circuit
read U.C.C.C. section 2-403 as plainly indicating the intent not
to render the notes nonnegotiable. 3 This conclusion followed from
the fact that under section 2-403 a holder could not be a holder
in due course if he took the instrument with notice that it was
issued in violation of the section. This was the sanction imposed
on the use of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions;
therefore, the notes in question remained negotiable.84
It was also argued that the prepayment and rebate provisions
of the U.C.C.C.85 rendered the sum of the note uncertain and,
therefore, nonnegotiable." The court found that the note itself
did not allude to anything creating uncertainty but was simply
an unencumbered promise to pay a definite sum. 7 The court
stated: "Even if a holder in due course were subject to the prepay-
ment rebate provision, it could operate only as a defense; it would
not render the original instrument non-negotiable..""
A final point covered by the court involved plaintiffs' right
to bring a class action. The trial court denied the right because
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a class action was a superior
method for conducting the litigation. The Tenth Circuit disa-
greed, finding that a single suit where one party was awarded
damages and where the court ordered one negotiable instrument
changed into a nonnegotiable one would not solve the problems
of the other members of the class. 0 Here the class was large but
91 U.C.C.C. § 2-403 prohibits the seller from taking a negotiable instrument other
than a check as evidence of the buyer's obligation.
12 535 F.2d at 585, 589.
11 Id. at 586.
I d.
U.C.C.C. §§ 2-209, 210.
U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 106.
'7 535 F.2d at 588.
' Id. at 587 (emphasis in original).
'5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
535 F.2d at 589.
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not unmanageable and if all the parties were before the court
"complete justice" could be accomplished in one action." Fur-
thermore, it was error for the district court to refuse to certify the
class action on the ground that the damages would be prohibi-
tively high.2
C. Brief Mention
In Surveillance Corp. v. Sentry Insurance,3 a mortgagee had
the right under the mortgage to collect attorney's fees in the event
of default and foreclosure. However, at the time of foreclosure this
sum was not presented as part of the claim. The foreclosure pro-
duced more funds than expected, and the mortgagee filed a sepa-
rate claim for attorney's fees. The court held that the mortgagee's
claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.11 The court noted
that the mortgagee was in error when it claimed that the two
actions were divisible: one for debt and one for contractual obliga-
tion to pay attorney's fees. Both claims gave rise to a single in-
debtedness, and therefore the enforcement of one barred an ac-
tion for the other.95
In United States v. Immordino,6 the Tenth Circuit reaf-
firmed the general rule that joint guarantors of an indebtedness
are entitled to demand proportionate contribution from each
other in payment of the debt. 7 However, in Immordino this right
was waived by a written clause in a Small Business Administra-
tion (S.B.A.) guaranty form that allowed the S.B.A. to settle
claims against such guarantor without affecting liability of the
others. 8
V. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Forward Contracts
Following the trend in the Fifth Circuit,99 the Tenth Circuit,
"1 Id.
92 Id.
,3 538 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 300.
Id.
I 534 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976).
'? Id. at 1381.
" Id. at 1382.
" E.g., Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975); Hohen-
berg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in Bradford v. Plains Cotton Cooperative Association,0 held that
forward contracts' 0' for the sale of cotton were enforceable even
though "unconscionable" at the time of performance. In 1973 the
Association made numerous forward contracts, at the then cur-
rent price, with numerous cotton growers in Oklahoma. However,
at the time for delivery the market price of cotton had more than
doubled and the growers brought suit to invalidate the contracts.
The trial court found the contracts invalid.' Reversing, the
Tenth Circuit held that the great increase in price had nothing
to do with unconscionability: "The test is the character of the
contract at the time of its making."'0 3 Nothing showed unfairness
at the time of execution. The Association's expertise in the cotton
market did not result in an inequality of bargaining power that
would make the contracts unconscionable. The Association had
immediately sold seventy-five percent of the cotton it purchased
under each contract; therefore, its "expertise" was not used to
predict the price increase.104
B. Proceeds of Security
In McConnico v. Alliance Business Investment Co. (In re
Rose Homes, Inc.), 105 the trustee in bankruptcy sought return of
certain bank funds taken by Alliance after the bankrupt's insol-
vency and within four months of the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings.'10 Alliance claimed these funds as proceeds of secu-
rity held in a bank account;0 7 the trustee, however, contended
that it was instead an invalid security interest in an account. 08
Alliance had loaned money to the bankrupt, Rose Homes,
Inc., on the condition that the loan amount be placed in an in-
come trust account controlled by Alliance.0 9 These monies were
'0 539 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
"I A forward contract is a contract whereby a grower agrees to sell crops grown on
designated acreage during a certain crop year for delivery after harvesting. Id. at 1251.
Id.
" Id. at 1255. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1.
539 F.2d at 1255.
'05 No. 75-1178 (10th Cir., Nov. 19, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
I" The trustee asserted that there had been a preferential transfer in violation of
section 60(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
'" See U.C.C. § 9-306.
,09 U.C.C. § 9-104(k).
' The loan agreement required Rose to deposit all its corporate receipts in the in-
come trust account. Furthermore, Rose executed a security agreement and financing
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transferred to the bankrupt's checking account as needed and
constituted the sole source of funds for that account. After the
bankrupt became insolvent, it transferred $19,450 to Alliance
from the checking account as payment on the loan.
The issue was whether a secured party loses its security inter-
est in identifiable proceeds if the proceeds are deposited in the
debtor's checking account. The Tenth Circuit, reversing the
bankruptcy and district courts, held that the funds were covered
proceeds of the security trust account, and therefore were not
preferential transfers."0 The court noted that the fact that the
entire bank account was proceeds did not mean that the bank
account itself was security. Rather, it merely made identification
of the proceeds simpler.
Thus, one way of insuring that cash proceeds of a loan will
remain identifiable "proceeds" under the U.C.C. is to require a
debtor to establish special accounts to hold these funds separate
from others."' This will not create a prohibited security interest
in a bank account, but would tie the funds to the original source
for identification.
Percival Construction Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers,
Inc. ' involved the right to proceeds from an auction sale of con-
struction equipment. The P&A Construction Company (P&A)
"leased" heavy equipment from the Percival Construction Com-
pany (Percival) under an agreement that included an option to
purchase at a stated price and provided that ninety-three percent
of all monthly payments were to be applied toward the purchase
price." 3 After obtaining possession of the equipment P&A bor-
rowed from the Stock Yards Bank (Bank), giving security inter-
ests in all its accounts receivable and certain listed equipment as
statement covering all of its current and after-acquired inventory, equipment, accounts
receivable, contract rights, and general intangibles. Proceeds were specifically covered in
the agreement and financing statement, and the parties agreed that the security interests
created were properly perfected. No. 75-1178 at 2.
. Id. at 5-6.
"I U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) covers cash proceeds of security so long as they are identifia-
ble.
112 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976).
"I Percival did not file a financing statement covering the equipment. 387 F. Supp.
at 884.
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collateral."' Included by mistake in the list of equipment in-
tended as collateral were two backhoes covered by the P&A-
Percival lease.
P&A became financially distressed and, in conjunction with
the Bank and Percival, arranged to have Miller & Miller Auc-
tioneers, Inc. (Miller) sell the equipment involved. During this
same period the United States filed two liens against P&A for
unpaid taxes. When the equipment was sold, Percival, the Bank,
and the United States each demanded a portion of the proceeds
from Miller, but because the claims exceeded the sale price no
disbursements were made. Percival brought a diversity action
against Miller for the proceeds. Miller counterclaimed and inter-
pleaded the other claimants and deposited into the court the
gross proceeds of the sale, less expenses and commissions.
The trial court found that the P&A-Percival lease was ac-
tually a conditional sale with the reservation of an unperfected
security interest by Percival and, recognizing the Bank's priority,
granted a partial summary judgment against Percival in favor of
the Bank."' Verdicts were directed in favor of Miller, the Bank,
and the United States; Percival and the United States appealed
to the Tenth Circuit."
' 6
Percival first argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the interpleader action because Miller had not deposited
into the court the entire sum in his possession as required by
federal statute."7 Miller's counterclaim, however, was not based
on the statute but on Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure."'8 The Tenth Circuit found that the entire sum requirement
did not apply to actions under the Rule"9 and that Miller had
acted properly under the Rule. Compliance with the statutory
requirements for jurisdiction was not required because the court
" The bank perfected its security interests by filing financing statements. 532 F.2d
at 169.
,, 387 F. Supp. at 887. See also 532 F.2d at 170.
" 532 F.2d at 170.
117 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
I, 532 F.2d at 170.
"' In interpleader actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 22 the amount that must be deposited
is left to the court's discretion. 532 F.2d at 171. See also Emmco Ins. Co. v. Frankford




had already assumed jurisdiction based on diversity.' 0
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's determination
that the P&A-Percival lease was actually a sale with the reserva-
tion of a security interest in Percival.'"' The U.C.C. definition of
a security interest provides that while the inclusion of an option
to purchase in a lease does not necessarily make the lease one
intended for security, when the agreement provides that the les-
see may purchase at the end of the term for little or no considera-
tion then the lease is intended as security.' 2 The determinative
factors are the consideration necessary to exercise the purchase
option and the percentage the consideration bears to the list price
of the items leased.'
2 3
Percival also argued that it was error to grant a directed
verdict in favor of the Bank because they had entered into an
informal subordination agreement regarding the Bank's interest
in the proceeds from the sale. The Tenth Circuit held that the
motion was properly granted because the agreement was based
upon a. mutual mistake that went to the essence of the contract
and, under Oklahoma law, was therefore unenforceable.'
24
On appeal the United States challenged the trial court's find-
ing that the Bank had a perfected security interest, as accounts
receivable, in the proceeds from the sale of equipment that was
not listed as collateral on the security agreements between the
Bank and P&A.' 25 The Bank argued that it had a perfected
"2 532 F.2d at 171.
2 Id. at 171-72.
,2 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
22 532 F.2d at 171. The leading case on this issue, Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic
Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969), held that if the percentage is less than
25% it shows the parties' intention to make the lease serve as security. In the instant case
the purchase option price was 10.6% of the list price. Furthermore, 93% of the "rent"
payments were applied toward the purchase price. 532 F.2d at 174. See also In re Royer's
Bakery, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963). There is an indication that a lease
is intended to create a security interest if under the terms of the agreement the only
sensible alternative at the end of the term is to exercise the option. 532 F.2d at 172.
24 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 53, 62-64 (West 1972); Watkins v. Grady County
Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 438 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1968). The mutual mistake was that
Percival owned the equipment. 532 F.2d at 172. The court used the same analysis to
uphold a directed verdict against Percival and in favor of Miller on the issue of an agree-
ment regarding disbursement of the sale proceeds. Id. at 173.
' The government conceded that the Bank had a prior perfected security interest in
the P&A equipment specifically identified in the financing statement, i.e., the two back-
hoes. 532 F.2d at 173.
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security interest in all of P&A's accounts receivable which in-
cluded the auction sale proceeds because P&A had a right to
payment for the goods sold by Miller as auctioneer. The Tenth
Circuit applied Oklahoma law and determined that Miller was
acting as P&A's agent. Since payment had been made to the
agent, P&A had no further right to receive payment from the
buyer and, therefore, the proceeds were not an account receiva-
ble. For this reason the directed verdict in favor of the Bank was
reversed.2 6
C. Commercially Reasonable Sale of Collateral
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Division
of the Rucker Co. 127was an interpleader action' 8 in which Mrs.
Bailey, the holder of a subordinate security interest in an oil rig,
claimed that the Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. (Liberty)
had sold the rig in a commercially unreasonable manner.'29
Liberty had no previous experience with selling oil rigs and
therefore made inquiries regarding the method by which such
sales were usually conducted. Liberty was advised that ordinarily
the rig was moved to a convenient location, cleaned, painted, and
sold by a professional auctioneer. Generally, interested persons
were notified and advertisements placed in trade journals and
newspapers. 
30
Liberty did not follow any of this advice but rather had a
bank attorney who had no experience with oil drilling equipment
conduct the auction. The rig was not cleaned, painted, or moved
to a convenient site. Furthermore, the sale was conducted during
a snowstorm.' 3' The rig had been appraised at $60,000 to $80,000
but the final sale price was $42,000.32 In this state of affairs the
Tenth Circuit found that the trial court's ruling that the sale was
commercially unreasonable was supported by the evidence.' 33
Gilbert Porter
, Id. at 173-74.
'!? 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
,2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
I" Liberty had a prior security interest in the rig which belonged to Tarus, an oil
drilling company. Tarus agreed that Liberty should sell the rig and apply the proceeds
toward the debt owed to Liberty. Liberty, however, had notice of Mrs. Bailey's interest.
540 F.2d at 1377.
"3 Id.
"I Id. at 1377, 1382.
,"2 Id. at 1377.
11 Id. at 1382.
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NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS AND THE BANK HOLDING
COMPANY ACT
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d
1221 (10th Cir. 1976)
INTRODUCTION
Within the last two years, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit has decided two major cases involving
applications for a national bank charter where the proposed bank
was to be part of a bank holding company: Bank of Boulder v.
Board of Governors' and Bank of Commerce v. Smith.2 These
cases and the Tenth Circuit's understanding of Whitney National
Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,I the National Bank
Act,4 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 19561 are the subject
of this Comment.
I. SUMMARY OF FACTS
A. Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors'
Bank of Boulder arose out of the efforts of Westland Banks,
Inc., a bank holding company (Westland), to establish a subsidi-
ary bank in the vicinity of the Bank of Boulder. The Bank of
Boulder was a state bank which opened for business only a year
before in the spring of 1972. Westland filed an application with
the state banking authorities to move its subsidiary state bank
to the new Boulder location.7 After a public hearing in which the
Bank of Boulder appeared as a protesting witness, the Colorado
State Banking Board voted to deny Westland's request.' The
state board found that the proposed service area of Westland's
subsidiary overlapped the primary service area of the Bank of
Boulder and held that to grant Westland's application "would
1 535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
379 U.S. 411 (1965).
'12 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1970).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1970).
535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
The procedures for application for a Colorado state banking charter are outlined in
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-3-109, -110 (1973).
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1222 (10th Cir. 1976).
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result in the creation of two weak and unprofitable banks in the
Boulder area." 9
The state board's decision was made October 26, 1973. On
November 5, 1973, before the final order was entered, Westland
applied to the United States Comptroller of Currency (Comptrol-
ler) for a nationally chartered bank in the identical location. 0 The
Comptroller granted preliminary approval of the proposed na-
tional bank conditioned upon the approval by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve Board (Board of Governors) of
Westland's acquisition of the controlling shares of the new bank."
The Board of Governors approved Westland's application to ac-
quire the controlling shares.
The Bank of Boulder appealed the Board of Governors' deci-
sion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
which upheld the Board of Governors' decision approving West-
land's application. 3 Thus, a bank holding company was denied
a banking charter in a state procedure but was granted a charter
under the same circumstances in a federal procedure. 4
I Id. at 1223.
10 Id.
1 In order to acquire a national bank charter, associations must follow the procedures
of formation outlined in the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1970), and apply to
the Comptroller who may grant the charter application pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27
(1970). The Comptroller's regulations provide that he may condition his final approval
upon the fulfillment of conditions specified by him which in this situation is the approval
of Westland's acquisition of the controlling shares of the new bank by the Board of
Governors. 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) (1976). The Comptroller conditions his final approval on the
Board's approval of the application to acquire the controlling shares because the Bank
Holding Company Act provides that it is
unlawful, except with prior approval of the Board, ... (3) for any bank
holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any
voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will di-
rectly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting
shares of such bank ....
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1970).
" Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 1225. Any party aggrieved by an order of the Board may appeal the Board's
decision to a federal court of appeals. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970). A party who would become
a competitor of the applicant has the right as an aggrieved party to obtain judicial review
as provided in section 1848. 12 U.S.C. § 1850 (1970).
11 For a comprehensive discussion of competitive equality between national and state
banks, see Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB.
749 (1966). This apparent inequality will not be discussed in this Comment. However,
such a decision may have an effect on the dual banking system which provides for national
and state banks to exist side by side essentially in competition since both have the power
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The Tenth Circuit held that in charter application cases in-
volving bank holding companies, the decision of the Comptroller
is not subject to independent court review, and the only review
is that of the Board of Governors' decision. 5 The court noted the
discretionary authority of the Board to hold hearings and, follow-
ing the authority of other circuits, held that there is no constitu-
tional or statutory right for a protesting bank to have a hearing
before the Board." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
granting of the national charter to Westland, holding that the
findings of the Board were supported by substantial evidence.
7
B. Bank of Commerce v. Smith"
Bank of Commerce was decided nearly a year before Bank of
Boulder. '" In Bank of Commerce, a protesting state bank sought
judicial review of the Comptroller's actions in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming. The protesting bank
asserted that political influence had prompted the Comptroller to
grant approval for a national charter to a proposed subsidiary of
a bank holding company.20 The district court determined that it
to grant charters. Congress has chosen to maintain a "competitive equality" between state
and national banks by refusing to exercise its power to preempt the field. The Bank
Holding Company Act contains several provisions calculated to preserve the position of
the states. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970) provides that the state supervisory authority should
be consulted about an application for acquisition and section 1846 provides that states
may exercise powers and jurisdiction over bank holding companies.
15 Since both agencies consider the same factors and since it is the
"exclusive function of the Board to act in such cases," Whitney Bank, the
decision of the Comptroller is not subject to independent review. Instead
review of the proceedings under the Bank Holding Company Act is limited
to the actions of the Board of Governors.
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 1224-25. If the application for approval to acquire shares is disapproved by
the Comptroller, the Board must hold hearings. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970). However,
where the Comptroller does not disapprove, the Board in its discretion may allow oral
argument or hold hearings for the purpose of taking evidence. Bank of Commerce v. Board
of Governors, 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975). Commercial Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v.
Board of Governors, 451 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1971), held that where the Comptroller rec-
ommends approval of the application, it is established that a protestant has no constitu-
tional right to a hearing before the Board. Northwest Bancorporation v. Board of Gover-
nors, 303 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1962) held that there is no statutory right to a hearing.
" "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive." 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970).
IN 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
10 Bank of Commerce was decided in March 1975 and Bank of Boulder was decided
in June 1976.
" 513 F.2d at 169.
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lacked jurisdiction to review the actions of the Comptroller in
bank holding company situations and the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed.2' Relying on Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans & Trust Co., 2 the Tenth Circuit held that there is no
independent court review of the Comptroller's decision in bank
holding company applications; that review of the proceedings
under the Bank Holding Company Act is limited to the Board of
Governors' decisions; and that only the court of appeals may
review those decisions.?
In both Bank of Commerce and Bank of Boulder, the Tenth
Circuit held that review of the Comptroller's actions is different
when an independent bank is applying for a national charter than
when a bank holding company is involved .2  The Tenth Circuit
arrived at this conclusion on the basis of Whitney Bank and the
requirement under the Bank Holding Company Act that the
Board must grant approval of the acquisition of shares of a new
bank by a bank holding company.2 5 An examination of the perti-
2, Id. at 168-69.
379 U.S. 411 (1965).
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 1976); Bank
of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 169 (10th Cir. 1975).
The Overview of the Commercial Law section of the Second Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey reviews Bank of Commerce and two other cases involving bank holding companies:
American Bank v. Smith, 503 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1974), and Bank of Commerce v. Board
of Governors, 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975). 53 DEN. L.J. 55-56 (1975). Bank of Commerce
v. Board of Governors is a companion case to Bank of Commerce v. Smith which is
discussed in the text.
" In Bank of Commerce, the court said:
The standard of review of the Comptroller's action upon an application of
an independent bank is set forth in Camp, Comptroller v. Pitts . . . . How-
ever, it is obvious that this issue is not reached because of the dual approval
required here of the new bank as a subsidiary of a holding company, and by
reason of the Supreme Court's decision as to the proper sequence in the much
cited case of Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans.
513 F.2d at 169 (citations omitted).
In Bank of Boulder, the court discussed its decision in Bank of Commerce saying,
"This court first noted that the case of Camp, Comptroller v. Pitts outlined the applicable
standard of review of the Comptroller's action upon application for charter by an indepen-
dent bank. But we recognized the different role of the Comptroller in proceedings involv-
ing the Bank Holding Company Act." 535 F.2d at 1224 (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court in Camp v. Pitts held: "The appropriate standard
for review was, accordingly, whether the Comptroller's adjudication was 'arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' as specified in 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) [the Administrative Procedure Act]." 411 U.S. 138, 142.
" See note 24 supra. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) provides that the Board must approve the
acquisition of shares of a new bank by a bank holding company.
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nent provisions of the National Bank Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act in light of the facts of Whitney Bank indicates that
the Tenth Circuit's decision represents an unwarranted extension
of bank holding company procedures to applications for a na-
tional charter.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The National Bank Act" governs application procedures to
establish an independent bank and to establish a subsidiary of a
bank holding company. The applicant first files a charter appli-
cation with the Comptroller. 7 If the Comptroller determines that
the association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of
banking, he grants a certificate to commence business.28 The
Comptroller may condition final approval on fulfillment of condi-
tions specified by him. 29 Judicial review of the Comptroller's deci-
sion is available in the federal district court."
Another step in the procedure is added when the applicant
is to be controlled by a bank holding company. The Bank Holding
Company Act 3' makes it unlawful for a holding company to form,
acquire, merge, or consolidate with another bank without the
prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board. 2 The holding com-
pany must submit an application for approval to acquire the
controlling shares of the new bank to the Board of Governors. 3
Therefore, the Comptroller may condition his final approval of
the charter application upon the approval by the Board of Gover-
nors of the holding company's application to acquire controlling
interest in the newly chartered subsidiary. 34 The Bank Holding
Company Act provides that review of the Board's decision may
be had in the federal court of appeals.
3
1
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1970).
2 Id. § 21.
2 Id. 88 26-27.
12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) (1976).
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973). See note 24 supra.
31 12 U.S.C. 88 1841-1850 (1970).
2 Id. § 1842(a).
- 12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (1976).
12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) provides: "If preliminary approval is granted, the Comptroller
may, if he determines that such action is necessary or desirable for the protection of public
interest, at any time withdraw such approval or provide that final approval shall be
subject to the fulfillment of conditions specified by him."
12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970).
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The distinction between the charter application and the ap-
plication to acquire the controlling shares of the new bank is
extremely important. Bank holding companies have to file both
a charter application and an application to acquire controlling
shares, while an independent bank only has to file a charter appli-
cation. The Tenth Circuit did not distinguish the two kinds of
applications stating that: "It is apparent that this two-track ap-
proach by appellant is derived from the fact that separate agen-
cies and statutes are involved, but the arguments are foreclosed
by the Supreme Court's opinion in the Whitney Bank case herein-
after referred to."
'36
The.Bank Holding Company Act was apparently intended to
supplement the already existing National Bank Act. The Bank
Holding Company Act deals with only the holding company's
application for acquisition of controlling interest and not the
charter application itself.37 The Board of Governors is required to
forward a copy of the application for acquisition to the Comptrol-
ler for his recommendation.3 If the Comptroller disapproves the
application, the Board must hold a hearing;3 9 otherwise, the
Board is not required to conduct a hearing." The Comptroller is
a consultant with regard to the application for acquisition,
whereas he is the decision maker in the charter application.4
These procedures are so distinct that even the identity of the
applicant parties may differ; in Bank of Commerce, the individ-
ual organizers of the proposed subsidiary filed the charter appli-
cation with the Comptroller, and the bank holding company, a
Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 168 (10th Cir. 1975).
3' This conclusion is reached because the Bank Holding Company Act does not cover
charter application procedures and the National Bank Act clearly outlines the procedure
for charter applications.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970).
31 Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.3(c) (1976).
, See note 39 supra.
" This section is a compromise between the position that the Comptroller should
have the authority to veto the application to acquire shares and the position that the
Comptroller should have only an informal consulting role which would not necessarily be
heeded. The compromise provides for input from the Comptroller whereby he recommends
approval or denial of the application, but retains the final decisionmaking authority to
approve the application to acquire shares with the Board. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [19561 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2482, 2490.
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separate entity, filed the application for acquisition with the
Board of Governors.
42
In the Bank Holding Company Act, Congress intended to
regulate the growth of bank holding companies in order to dis-
courage monopolies and to confine holding company activities to
the management and control of banks.43 It does not appear that
this Act was intended to remove bank holding companies from
the purview of the National Bank Act; instead, it was designed
to regulate the one aspect of bank holding companies which dis-
tinguishes them from independent banks: that these subsidiary
banks are part of a bank holding company and thus are able by
this affiliation to exercise greater influence in the banking mar-
ket.44 Thus, an applicant for a national bank charter files his
application with the Comptroller under the National Bank Act
whether the bank is to be an independent bank or a subsidiary
of a bank holding company. A bank holding company must take
the additional step of filing under the Bank Holding Company
Act with the Board of Governors for approval of acquisition.
It is this dual function of the Comptroller and the two rele-
vant statutory provisions that are the basis of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's apparent misunderstanding of these application proce-
dures. The Tenth Circuit has held that some aspects of the Na-
tional Bank Act apply to bank holding company applications and
others do not; specifically, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the
charter application is made to the Comptroller as prescribed in
the National Bank Act but held that review of the Comptroller
in bank holding company applications is precluded by the Bank
Holding Company Act.45
III. Whitney National Bank v. Bank of
New Orleans & Trust Co.
46
In light of the statutory background, Whitney Bank should
be distinguished on its facts from the Tenth Circuit cases. In
1 Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir.
1975).
13 S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2482.
I /d.
'5 Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 168-69 (10th Cir. 1975); Bank of Boulder
v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
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Whitney Bank, the protesting banks were challenging the acqui-
sition of a new national bank in the adjoining county by a holding
company created for the purpose of circumventing the laws of
Louisiana prohibiting branch banking. 7 Whitney National Bank
of New Orleans (Whitney-New Orleans) wanted to establish an-
other national bank in an adjoining parish.48 Louisiana law pro-
hibits the opening of branch offices by banks in other than their
home parish. 9 State branch banking laws are applicable to na-
tional banks by 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1970).10 In order to avoid the
branch banking laws, Whitney-New Orleans organized a bank
holding company. "The net result of the maneuver would be that
the original stockholders of the old Whitney-New Orleans would
own the holding company which in turn would own and operate
both banks, i.e., the new Whitney-New Orleans and Whitney-
Jefferson."'" The Board of Governors approved the plan May 3,
1962.52 Louisiana subsequently passed a law, effective July 10,
1962, prohibiting the opening of subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies within the state. 3 The protesting banks sought judicial
review of the Board's decision in the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit on June 30, 1962, as provided in 12 U.S.C. § 1848.
That case was pending when this Supreme Court case was de-
cided. 4
In this suit taken up to the Supreme Court, the protesting
banks were attacking the authority of the Comptroller to issue a
certificate. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1846, reserved to the states final authority to prohibit the open-
ing of subsidiaries within their borders and, even though Loui-
siana adopted such a law after the Board's approval, the Comp-
troller should be enjoined from issuing the certificate. The
Board's approval was not final because the decision was being
reviewed in the court of appeals. On appeal from the district
court, the court of appeals upheld the district court decision,





5Z Id. at 416.
Id. at 414 & n.4.
Id. at 413 & n.2.
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concluding that the proposed Jefferson Parish bank would be but
a branch of Whitney-New Orleans which was prohibited by the
Act. The Supreme Court held:
We have concluded that the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia had no jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the holding company
proposal; that appropriate disposition of the controversy cannot be
made without further consideration of the case by the Federal Re-
serve Board, where original exclusive jurisdiction rests; and that
since the application for review of its decision is now pending in the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reasonable time should be
allowed for that court to act."
The Supreme Court made the distinction that its decision
was a response to a complaint attacking the propriety of the
holding company arrangement itself, not an attack on the Comp-
troller's decision to create a new national bank:
We think it clear that the thrust of respondents' complaint goes
to the organization of Whitney-Jefferson by the holding company
rather than merely the issuance of authority to Whitney-Jefferson
to do business. Respondents' chief contention is that Whitney-
Jefferson would be but a branch bank of Whitney-New Orleans. But
this would not follow simply by virtue of the issuance of authority
for the opening of the new bank. Such a situation would occur, if at
all, when the Board approved the holding company plan including
the organization of Whitney-Jefferson as its subsidiary. Thus, it is
the plan of organization by the holding company which lies at the
heart of respondents' argument ...
The respondents also argue that the operation of Whitney-
Jefferson is barred by a valid state law prohibiting any subsidiary
of a bank holding company from opening for business "whether or
not, a charter, permit, license or certificate to open for business has
already been issued." Here, as with their first argument, respon-
dents' quarrel is in actuality not merely with the opening of the
bank, but rather with its opening as a subsidiary of Whitney Hold-
ing Corporation. m
Id. at 414-15. The Court went on to say:
Again, the Board could not approve a holding company arrangement involv-
ing the organization and opening of a new bank if the opening of the bank,
by reason of its ownership by a bank holding company, would be prohibited
by a valid state law.
We therefore conclude that respondents' complaint tenders issues cog-
nizable by the Federal Reserve Board, and we turn to the question of whether
such objections must first be raised there.
Id. at 418-19.
1' Id. at 417-18.
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The Supreme Court explored the legislative history of the Bank
Holding Company Act in order to buttress its conclusion that the
Board is the sole means by which the organization of a new bank
may be tested. It is this author's opinion that the Court was
referring to questions pertaining to the holding company arrange-
ment itself, but not to the issuance of a certificate to do business,
i.e., to the application for acquisition of the controlling shares
made to the Board, but not to the application for a national
charter made to the Comptroller. For instance, the Court said:
That action by Congress [to provide review in the court of appeals]
was designed to permit an agency, expert in banking matters, to
explore and pass on the ramifications of a proposed bank holding
company arrangement. To permit a district court to make the initial
determination of a plan's propriety would substantially decrease the
effectiveness of the statutory design.7
There would be no reason for Congress to change the procedure
for reviewing the actions of the Comptroller simply because a
bank holding company was making the application for a charter.
The Bank Holding Company Act provisions deal only with the
intricacies of bank holding company arrangements which are to
be reviewed by a board of experts and thereafter subject to judi-
cial review in the court of appeals.
Thus, Whitney Bank was limited to a controversy concerning
the propriety of the bank holding company's application for
acquisition. Controversies concerning the Comptroller's actions
in response to a charter application by an independent bank or
by a bank holding company were not reached by Whitney Bank.
The Tenth Circuit has, therefore, extended the Whitney Bank
decision by holding that it is the "exclusive function of the Board
to act" in all cases involving bank holding companies, not merely
those instances where the acquisition arrangement is challenged
as was the situation in Whitney Bank. 5
In Bank of Commerce, the protesting banks challenged the
propriety of the actions of the Comptroller in granting the charter
because of alleged political influence.59 Similarly, in Bank of
7 Id. at 420.
5' Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1976) (quot-
ing Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 419 (1965)).
(1965)).
11 513 F.2d at 169.
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Boulder, the actions of the Comptroller in deciding to grant a
charter were challenged by the Bank of Boulder.'" Yet, the Tenth
Circuit held that Whitney Bank controlled in both cases even
though the issue was the Comptroller's actions in response to the
charter application and not a question of the organization of the
holding company or its acquisition of the subsidiary bank which
by statute is limited to the Board.
Whitney Bank was distinguished by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia in 1973 in First National
Bank of Homestead v. Watson."' In Homestead, the protesting
banks challenged the Comptroller's approval of a bank holding
company charter application in the district court on the basis of
his failure to comply with the provisions of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).62 The court distinguished
Whitney Bank on its facts by pointing out that the issues in
Whitney Bank were clearly those reserved to the Board and that
plaintiffs were in reality challenging a decision of the Board by
collaterally attacking the Comptroller.13 In contrast to Whitney
Bank, the complaint in Homestead was clearly against the ac-
tions of the Comptroller. 4 The court held that the actions of the
Comptroller are independently reviewable even when bank hold-
ing companies are involved if the complaint concerns the Comp-
troller's granting of the charter and not the Board's approval of
the application for acquisition. 5 Homestead thus rejected the
contention that Whitney Bank precluded district court review of
the Comptroller in bank holding company cases and distin-
guished between claims against the Board as in Whitney Bank
and claims against the Comptroller.
In Bank of Commerce, the Tenth Circuit considered the deci-
sion in Homestead but said that "the considerations there were
entirely different as the only issue was the claim under the
NEPA."6 Yet, the issue in Homestead was also whether the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction to hear complaints made against the
535 F.2d at 1223.
363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
363 F. Supp. at 471.
I d.
" Id. at 468-71.
" 513 F.2d at 169.
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Comptroller in bank holding company cases or whether all com-
plaints made with respect to bank holding company charter ap-
plications must be resolved by the Board and reviewable only in
the court of appeals." It seems that the issue of whether the
Comptroller followed the proper procedure as prescribed by
NEPA in making his decision to grant a charter in Homestead is
parallel to the issue of whether the Comptroller was persuaded by
political considerations as alleged in Bank of Commerce.6" Both
complaints are solely with the propriety of the Comptroller's ac-
tions in response to charter applications by bank holding compa-
nies.
The Tenth Circuit should have distinguished the claims
against the Board from the claims against the Comptroller as the
court did in Homestead. Instead, in Bank of Commerce, where
the principal claim challenged the Comptroller's considerations
in granting preliminary approval of the bank charter, the Tenth
Circuit held that Whitney Bank controlled:
There the Court held that the proper place to challenge the organi-
zation of a new holding company owned bank was in the proceedings
before the Board of Governors. . . .The Court considered the prob-
lems which would be caused by a challenge of the Comptroller's
action as an independent matter, and the duplication which would
result. The Supreme Court thus decided that the opposition must
". .. first attack the arrangement before the Board." 6
Yet, in Whitney Bank, the Court was talking about the duplica-
tion which would result if the protesting banks collaterally at-
tacked the Board's determination in the district court by a suit
against the Comptroller, not whether there was a suit against the
Comptroller for his own actions.7" Whitney Bank did not reach
the issue of a claim solely against the Comptroller. Likewise, in
Bank of Boulder, the court relied on Whitney Bank even though
the claim was against the Comptroller and not against the Board.
The protesting banks brought before the Board the case against
the Comptroller and got review of the decision in the court of
appeals because they were foreclosed from bringing the issue be-
fore the district court against the Comptroller directly based on
7 363 F. Supp. at 471.
Id. at 472; 513 F.2d at 169.
513 F.2d at 169.
379 U.S. at 421-22.
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the Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Bank of Commerce. Never-
theless, the court reconfirmed its stand with respect to distin-
guishing between claims against the Comptroller and claims
against the Board saying:
Since both agencies consider the same factors and since it is the
"exclusive function of the Board to act in such cases," Whitney
Bank, the decision of the Comptroller is not subject to independent
review. Instead, review of the proceedings under the Bank Holding
Company Act is limited to the actions of the Board of Governors.7'
IV. EFFECT OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
Based on the Tenth Circuit decisions, protestant banks have
two very different procedures to follow in order to challenge a
national charter application filed by an independent bank as op-
posed to one filed by a bank holding company: approval of chart-
ers for independent banks is challenged by review of the Comp-
troller's decision in federal district court; approval of charters
involving bank holding companies are reviewed in the court of
appeals based on the Board's decision.
There are several problems which arise from this situation.
One problem lies in the confusion that has arisen over these con-
flicting procedures.72 Another, more severe, problem is that in
bank holding company cases the decision of the Comptroller to
approve the charter is not reviewable. The Comptroller grants
preliminary approval of the charter application, conditions it
upon approval by a separate agency of a separate application for
acquisition, and then grants final approval of the charter applica-
tion. The only reviewable decision is the narrow one of whether
the bank holding company conformed to the provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act. Neither the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act nor the National Bank Act gives the Board the author-
ity to review the decision of the Comptroller; the statutes only
provide the Board with the authority to review the acquisition
arrangement.73 Therefore, it is possible that no review of the
11 535 F.2d at 1224.
72 See note 77 infra.
7' 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970) discusses the role of the Comptroller with regard to the
application filed with the Board by the bank holding company to acquire the controlling
shares of the bank. No other section of the Bank Holding Company Act discusses the
Board's authority to review the Comptroller's decision on the charter application.
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Comptroller's decision to grant a charter will be available in bank
holding company cases.
The results of the two cases in the Tenth Circuit demonstrate
these problems. In Bank of Commerce v. Board of Governors,"
the protesting bank filed its application for a state charter with
the state authorities a few months before the applicant bank filed
its application with the Comptroller. The Comptroller granted
preliminary approval to the applicant before the protesting state
bank received its approval.7 5 The protesting state bank wanted to
attack the actions of the Comptroller, but was precluded from
doing so." The protesting state bank also failed to appear before
the Board and, therefore, was foreclosed from protest or review
in that forum as well.77 There, the state bank was not challenging
the Board's approval of the acquisition plan but the charter ap-
proval of the Comptroller. The result was that the protesting
bank was deprived of access to a forum empowered to grant relief.
In Bank of Boulder, the protesting bank did not try to chal-
lenge the Comptroller's actions directly in the district court in
light of the Bank of Commerce decision. Bank of Boulder ap-
peared before the Board, but was denied relief without a hear-
ing.79 It then appealed the Board's decision to the court of appeals




The most significant problem apparently created by the de-
cisions of the Tenth Circuit is that the decisions of the Comptrol-
ler in response to charter applications by bank holding companies
are not reviewable. In the future, the application to the Comptrol-
ler for a charter and the application to acquire shares made to the
74 513 F.2d 164, 165 (10th Cir. 1975). This is a companion case to Bank of Commerce
v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975), and the facts are the same.
513 F.2d at 165.
7 Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 169 (10th Cir. 1975).
Bank of Commerce v. Board of Governors, 513 F.2d 164, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1975),
held that since the protesting banks failed to assert their claims against the Comptroller
before the Board, they were barred from getting review in the court of appeals. Yet, the
reason protesting banks did not attack the application before the Board was that their
claim was against the Comptroller, not against the Board.
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Board should perhaps be more clearly differentiated so there is
less confusion in interpreting the relation of the National Bank
Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. Another approach
would be to distinguish Whitney Bank on its facts and recognize
that, although the language in Whitney Bank appeared broad, it
was limited to the narrow situation of an issue solely cognizable
by the Board. And last, perhaps the Bank Holding Company Act
itself could more clearly define the relationship of bank holding
companies to the Comptroller with respect to the charter applica-
tions and the extent to which the National Bank Act reaches





Constitutional law has assumed a new, personalized dimen-
sion for American citizens in recent years as litigants increasingly
have availed themselves of federal statutes designed to provide
remedies for infringements of constitutionally based guarantees.,
This trend toward vindicating civil rights in the courts reflects
the evolving socio-legal consciousness of the country and its con-
current emphasis on the protection of individual liberties. It is
not surprising then that approximately half of the cases consid-
ered herein are statutory claims for the enforcement of civil
rights. These cases are discussed in sections II and III below.
While there is a growing tendency to assert equal protection
claims by means of statutorily based actions, the Tenth Circuit
also had occasion to decide several claims of a more traditionally
"constitutional" nature. The decisions reviewed in section I all
deal in some way or another with due process claims based di-
rectly on the fifth or fourteenth amendments.' Finally, cases
which consider the application of constitutional principles to
"specially situated"3 groups of litigants are discussed in section
IV.
I. DIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Due Process-Obscenity Trials: United States v. Friedman'
In 1970 Friedman was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970)
with transporting an obscene book' in interstate commerce for the
purpose of sale and distribution. Three years later the defendant
appealed his conviction and the case was remanded to the trial
court.' Retried under constitutional guidelines newly articulated
See note 46 infra.
The issue of state immunity from suit in federal court under the eleventh amend-
ment was raised in Green v. Utah, 539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this
case and the eleventh amendment claim raised therein, see the Securities Overview infra.
See note 130 infra.
528 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1976).
The dominant theme of the book, The Animal Lovers, was sexual relations between
human beings and animals.
, United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1973). See 52 DEN. L.J. 81, 81
n.4 (1975).
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by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California,7
Friedman was reconvicted and again appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Friedman claimed that, since the offense charged occurred
before the Supreme Court decision in Miller, he should have been
retried under the standard existing prior to that decision.8 ,
The Tenth Circuit rejected the appeal on two grounds. First,
the court held that Friedman had in effect been convicted by two
juries-one utilizing the old obscenity standard, and another
employing the Miller test. Therefore, the court reasoned, this
defendant had been accorded more than the requisite due pro-
cess.' Second, the court questioned whether Friedman had ever
been entitled to be tried under the old standard since the test
enunciated there had been formulated by a mere plurality of the
Court. The Tenth Circuit noted that plurality opinions are not
binding on lower courts. 0 The court concluded that Friedman
therefore never had a right to expect that he would be tried under
7 413 U.S. 15 (1973). On June 21, 1973 the Supreme Court decided four cases in
addition to Miller, all dealing with the issue of obscenity: Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973). Led by Miller, these cases established a new standard by which to judge obscenity.
See note 8 infra.
The pre-Miller standard that Friedman urged the court to apply developed out of
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth held that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id. at 485. Nine years later in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), the Court "clarified" its position by attempting to
articulate a definition of obscenity. A plurality opinion held that for something to be
obscene:
[Ilt must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.
383 U.S. at 418.
In Miller the Court specifically rejected this test, and adopted the following formula-
tion:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
528 F.2d at 788.




the old standard. Noting that the book in question "would be
considered obscene under any standard. . . even those of ancient
Sodom and Gomorrah,"" the court affirmed the conviction.
B. Due Process-Property Rights
1. "Welfare" benefits: Ryan v. Shea
2
This class action, 3 brought on behalf of certain recipients of
Colorado Aid to the Needy Disabled (AND), challenged on due
process grounds the constitutionality of procedures whereby wel-
fare benefits were terminated. Under an act passed by Congress
in 1972 and later amended," state AND recipients who were re-
ceiving benefits in December 1973, and who had comenced receiv-
ing such benefits before June 1, 1973, would presumptively be
eligible for benefits under an analogous federal program that was
designed to replace the individual state programs beginning Jan-
uary 1, 1974.'1 Plaintiffs were individuals who were receiving state
AND benefits in December 1973, but who had not commenced
receiving these benefits by June 1, 1973. Realizing that limiting
presumptive eligibility in this manner might result in overly
harsh consequences, Congress amended the law to provide that
pending individual eligibility determinations, recipients in plain-
tiffs' class would continue to receive presumptive benefits for up
to one year after the effective date of the federal program.'"
The program became effective and plaintiffs began receiving
presumptive benefits. Later, an eligibility determination was
made upon the basis of a "paper review" of records maintained
under the state AND program. 7 If ineligibility was established by
1 528 F.2d at 789 (citing United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975), where
the Sixth Circuit similarly held that a film was obscene under both the Memoirs and
Miller test).
1 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975).
'" For a discussion of the class action elements of this law suit see Federal Practice
and Procedure Overview infra.
' Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. I, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C. §
1381 (Supp. II 1972), as amended by Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 9, 87 Stat.
957, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (Supp. IV 1974). Both the Act and its amendment became effective
January 1, 1974.
"3 The federal program was Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and
Disabled (SSI).
' Act of Mar. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 1, 88 Stat. 52.
* This review was conducted without plaintiffs being given notice or an opportunity
to be heard. 525 F.2d at 271.
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this review, benefits were summarily terminated. Then and only
then were individuals who had been terminated given the oppor-
tunity to have a full hearing on the question of eligibility. The
question raised was whether plaintiffs were constitutionally enti-
tled to a hearing before their presumptive benefits could be termi-
nated.
The court, reaching the merits,'8 determined that the con-
trolling issue was whether plaintiffs' interest in the presumptive
payments fell within the protection of the rule announced in
Goldberg v. Kelly. "9 There the Supreme Court held that under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, state welfare
benefits could not be terminated before the recipient had been
accorded an "adequate" evidentiary hearing. 20 The interest that
a recipient had in his benefits was, therefore, held to merit proce-
dural safeguards under the due process clause. Defendants
argued that plaintiffs' interest in presumptive benefits was not as
great as that of a recipient whose individual eligibility had al-
ready been established.2' After examining the legislative history
and applicable administrative procedures in depth, the court re-
jected defendants' argument and held that the constitutional in-
terest involved was substantially similar to the one discussed in
Goldberg. 2 2 Noting that the majority of federal courts which have
considered this issue have reached the same conclusion, 23 the
Tenth Circuit affirmmed the district court's order granting plain-
tiffs a permanent injunction against the administrators of the SSI
program.
2. Athletics: Albach v. Odle 
4
The central issue in this case was whether participation in
interscholastic public high school athletics is a constitutionally
protected civil right. Appellant Albach attacked certain rules
11 For a discussion of the jurisdictional questions raised by this case, see Federal
Practice and Procedure Overview infra.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 261.
525 F.2d at 272-74.
' Id. at 274.
Id. See, e.g., Buckles v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Brown v.
Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1974) (citing unpublished opinions), aff'd per
curiam, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
24 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
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adopted by the New Mexico Activities Association. Under these
rules Albach was automatically barred from interscholastic com-
petition for one year. 5 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal on the ground that the case failed to raise a
substantial federal question. In doing so, the court found control-
ling its earlier decision in Oklahoma High School Athletic Asso-
ciation v. Bray.26 There, the Tenth Circuit had held that a contro-
versy between a public school and a state athletic association over
the question of whether the school might compete in interscholas-
tic athletics did not present a justiciable federal question.
The court in Albach conceded that under certain circum-
stances public high school athletic regulations might have to
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Such might be the case where
a regulation operated to deprive a student of a specific right guar-
anteed by the constitution.27 However, the court refused to hold
that mere participation amounted to a constitutionally protected
property interest. 8 The court ruled that since no specific consti-
21 The pertinent rule barred from competition "any student who transferred from his
home district to a boarding school or from a boarding school to his home district." Id. at
984.
" 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963). Accord, Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic
Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1973).
27 See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (alienage discrimina-
tion); Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1968) (racial discrimination); Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
(invasion of marital privacy); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258
(D. Neb. 1972) (sex discrimination).
' The court considered and rejected the argument that Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1974), in some way overruled Bray. In Goss the Supreme Court held that under Ohio law
a student had a property interest in his public education sufficient to require a due process
hearing before he could be suspended. 419 U.S. at 574. In Goss the Court spoke in terms
of the "educational process." Id. at 576. The Tenth Circuit, seizing upon the phrase, read
Goss as protecting only against a deprivation of the whole "educational process." Athletic
participation was characterized as only one of the innumerable components, not in itself
protected, which made up such a process. 531 F.2d at 985.
The position taken by the court in Albach was recently cited with approval by the
federal district court in Colorado Seminary [University of Denver] v. NCAA, 417 F.
Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976). There the university, a member of the NCAA, refused to
abide by an NCAA ruling which declared certain students ineligible to play hockey. The
NCAA thereupon placed all university teams on probation. The university contended that
it had been denied due process. Attempting to distinguish Bray, the university argued that
the relationship between a college athlete and his institution was fundamentally different
than the one between a public high school and its student athletes. The court noted that
while withdrawal of a previously granted collegiate scholarship might invoke due process
protections, no such deprivation had been shown. Id. Further, in accord with Bray, the
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tutional right was at stake, "supervision and regulation of high
school athletic programs remain within the discretion of appro-
priate state boards, and are not within federal cognizance under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .... 29
C. Due Process-Procedural Rights: United States v. Marines
3
At the trial level, Marines 3' pled guilty to a charge of posses-
sion of marijuana and was sentenced to one year imprisonment.
On appeal of his sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed and Mar-
ines petitioned for rehearing. On rehearing Marines raised two
constitutional issues: (1) whether disposition of his appeal pur-
suant to Rules 8(d) and 9(d), Rules of Court for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, 32 denied him his fifth amendment right to due process; and
district court rejected the contention that participation in college athletic programs, be-
cause of its relationship to later employment in professional athletics, was sufficient to
give plaintiffs a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Id. See also Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975).
However, not all courts agree with this position. At least as far as college athletics
are concerned, one federal district court has specifically held that before athletes can be
suspended from a team they must be afforded a due process hearing. Behagen v. Intercol-
legiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972). That
same court had stated that "the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate basketball
...is a property right entitled to due process guarantees because it may . . . lead to a
very remunerative career in professional basketball and, because . . . it is an important
part of the student athlete's educational experience." Regents of Univ. Minn. v. NCAA,
No. 4-76-Civ.-468 at 7 (D. Minn., filed Dec. 2, 1976) (order granting temporary injunc-
tion). See McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Hunt v. NCAA, No.
G-76-370-CA (W.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 1976). Compare the language in Goss, 419 U.S. at 576
("educational process") with the court's formulation in Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. 4-
76-Civ.-468 at 7 ("educational experience"). Therefore, it would seem that while partici-
pation in public high school athletics does not in itself rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected right, there is some question as to whether that is the case when participation
in collegiate athletics is at issue.
" 531 F.2d at 985.
- 535 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 The criminal law aspects of Marines are discussed in the Criminal Law Overview
infra.
S10TH Cm. R. 8 provides:
(c) The appellant shall have 15 days from the date of receipt of the motion
to dismiss or affirm within which to file a response opposing the motion,
addressing the merits. Such response, together with three copies and proof
of service, shall be filed with the clerk. Upon the filing of such response, or
the expiration of the time allowed therefor, the record on appeal, together
with the motion and response, shall be distributed by the clerk to the court
for its consideration. The time for filing briefs shall be tolled pending the
disposition of the motion to dismiss or affirm.
(d) After consideration of the papers distributed pursuant to the foregoing
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(2) whether designating the opinion which affirmed Marines' con-
viction as "not for routine publication," pursuant to Circuit Rule
17,33 violated his rights under the fifth and sixth amendments, as
well as denying him equal access to the courts.
The court summarily dismissed the latter claim, stating that
the court was "aware of no constitutional right to have an opinion
published. Counsel for Marines is apparently laboring under a
misapprehension that opinions designated 'not for routine publi-
cation' may not be cited."'" Of somewhat more interest, however,
was Marines' final claim-that assignment of his appeal to a
court calendar providing for summary review based on written
memoranda and without oral argument violated his due process
rights under the fifth amendment.3 5 The court met this objection
paragraph, or on its own motion after notice to the parties, the court will
enter an appropriate order.
Whenever the court, after reviewing an appeal, concludes that manifest
error requires reversal or vacation of a judgment or order of the district court,
or remand for additional proceedings, the court may enter an appropriate
order after notice to the parties.
10TH Cm. R. 9(d) provides:
Calendar D cases shall consist of those cases in which a motion to affirm
or dismiss has been filed pursuant to Rule 8(a) of these Rules and those in
which notice has been given pursuant to Rule 8(d) of these Rules that the
court is considering summary action on its own motion.
(1) Within 15 days after receiving notice that the court is considering sum-
mary action pursuant to Rule 8(d) on its own motion, the appellant may file
in quadruplicate and serve on all parties to the appeal a memorandum
addressing the merits, opposing such summary action.
(2) The appellee may simultaneously file in quadruplicate and serve on all
parties to the appeal a memorandum addressing the merits supporting sum-
mary action.
(3) The same procedure and form as the preceding two paragraphs will be
followed in those cases where manifest error is noted by the court pursuant
to Rule 8(d), except that the appellee may oppose and the appellant may
support summary action.
10rH CIR. R. 17 provides in pertinent part:
(c) The court or a panel thereof will determine when an opinion shall be
published and will direct the clerk accordingly. The direction will appear on
the face of the opinion. Unpublished opinions, although unreported and not
uniformly available to all of the parties, can nevertheless be cited, if rele-
vant, in proceedings before this or any other court. Counsel citing same shall
serve a copy of the unpublished opinion upon opposing counsel.
31 535 F.2d at 555.
1 The court commented that the most noteworthy consequence of assignment to the
"summary calendar" D related to briefing. Full briefing is allowed under any other court
calendar, whereas parties whose cases are assigned to calendar D may only submit memo-
randa which must be filed within 15 days after receipt of notice that the case has been
1977
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by reciting the well-established rule that dispensing with oral
arguments does not violate due process.36 Therefore, the petition
was denied since it failed to allege that the defendant had been
prejudiced by any time strictures which the rule placed on his
attorney.37
D. Due Process-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: United
States v. Hansen Niederhauser Co.38
The primary constitutional question presented by this case
was whether, based upon the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, a corporate officer could refuse to comply with
an administrative summons requesting him to produce corporate
records. Additionally, the court considered whether appellant
Niederhauser was denied due process of law when the district
court held him in contempt for refusing to produce the records in
question.
Niederhauser had been issued a summons by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), 31 which was seeking corporate records to
determine tax liability. In reply, Niederhauser stated that he did
not know where the records were, and that even if he did, he
would refuse to produce them. On appeal of the contempt order,
the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the principle that neither a corpora-
tion nor a corporate officer could assert a privilege against self-
assigned to that calendar. However, these memoranda are not limited with respect to
either length or content. 535 F.2d at 555-56.
1 Id. at 556 (citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. WJR, The Good Will Sta-
tion, Inc., 337 U.S. 265 (1949); United States v. Smith, 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)). See also George W.B. Bryson & Co. v. Norton Lilly & Co.,
502 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Local 42, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & F.I. & A. Workers,
476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 466 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973).
" Had Marines asserted prejudice due to any time limitations arbitrarily placed on
his attorney, he might have been able to state a sixth amendment claim based on denial
of effective assistance of counsel. See Fields v. Payton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967);
Garland v. Cox, 311 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Va. 1970). However, no such claim was made
here.
522 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1975).
" The court noted that the validity of such a summons has consistently been upheld
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1039. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971);
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Similarly, in the recent case of Elliot v. Bratton, No. 75-
1713 (10th Cir., April 16, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit upheld,
against a fourth and fifth amendment-based attack, the validity of an IRS summons
ordering the production of bank records.
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incrimination relative to corporate records."° The privilege
against self-incrimination has historically been considered a per-
sonal privilege, applicable only to an individual's words or per-
sonal papers." The other circuits considering this question have
reached the same conclusion.'"
Niederhauser's due process argument was based on his al-
leged inability to produce the records. He reasoned that the court
could not hold him in contempt for failing to perform an impossi-
ble act.43 The IRS had offered to make a showing at the contempt
hearing of the existence of the requested documents. However,
the district court elected to proceed without this evidence. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that to satisfy the requirements
of due process there had to be at least "some showing regarding
the existence of the records."" The case was remanded for the
required evidentiary hearing.
I1. STATUTORY CLAIMS: STATE ACTION
AND 42 U.S.C. § 19830
A. Essential Elements- Generally
In recent years section 1983 has become a frequently used
weapon in the arsenal of civil rights plaintiffs who have litigated
their constitutional claims in the federal courts.' 6 During the pe-
522 F.2d at 1039 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
' See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (collecting cases).
,7 See, e.g., Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968); Hair Indus., Ltd.
v. United States, 340 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
,1 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) announced the frequently cited rule
that one charged with contempt for failing to comply with a court order makes a complete
defense by proving that he is unable to comply. However, if the one so charged is responsi-
ble for the unavailability of documents in question, he cannot invoke the general rule in
his own behalf. Id. at 330-31.
522 F.2d at 1040.
,5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Although enacted by Congress more than a century ago, section 1983 was infre-
quently invoked until relatively recent times. From 1871 to 1920 claims under section 1983
were raised in only 21 reported cases. 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABR & N. DORSEN, PoLmCAL
AND CIVL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1447 (3d ed. 1967). Then, in Monroe v. Pape, 365
1977
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riod covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit had occasion to
dismiss two appeals by cursorily reviewing the necessary ele-
ments of a section 1983 claim. These cases state the minimum
requirements for a section 1983 action.
In Ward v. Baca47 appellant Ward brought a section 1983
action alleging that a United States marshal had acted to deprive
him of his constitutional rights to counsel, bail, and a prompt
arraignment. The Tenth Circuit, reviewing the district court's
dismissal, held: "It is axiomatic that for an action brought pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be valid, two elements are necessary:
1) constitutional rights must be violated and 2) the constitutional
deprivation must be caused by actions of those acting under color
of state law.""' The sole defendant in Ward was a federal officer
acting under federal law. Therefore, the second essential element
was not present and the trial court's order accordingly was af-
firmed.
In Block v. Schaefer" the question of state action was again
at issue. Appellee Schaefer had reperfected a prior lien upon
Block's truck and had sold the truck to satisfy the lien. Block
brought a section 1983 action alleging that she had been deprived
of her property without due process of law. Without reaching the
question of whether Block's due process rights had been violated,
the court affirmed the district court's order for summary judg-
ment in favor of Schaefer on the ground that no state action was
involved. The court noted that before an individual can be
deemed an agent for purposes of fulfilling the state action require-
U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court held that a claim under section 1983 was stated when
plaintiffs alleged that Chicago police officers wrongfully broke into their home. Since that
time section 1983 has seen continued growth in its importance as a basis for litigation. In
1960, approximately 300 "civil rights" actions were filed, while in fiscal 1972 approxi-
mately 8,000 such actions were brought. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3573, at 487 (1975). See Kates, Liability of Public Entities
Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972); McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Protections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 250 (1974); Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School
Context, 46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971); Note, Civil Rights Act Section 1983: Abuses by Law
Enforcement Officers, 36 IND. L.J. 317 (1961); Note, Developing Governmental Liability
Under 42 US.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201 (1971); Note, Constitutional Torts: Section
1983 Redress for the Deprived Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1973).
No. 75-1818 (10th Cir., June 24, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 2.
" No. 75-1836 (10th Cir., July 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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ment under section 1983, the party must have the authority to act
officially for the state.50 The Tenth Circuit held that Schaefer had
been advancing only his own private interest, and had in no way
been representing the state.'
The four cases discussed below present somewhat more deli-
cate variations on the questions raised in Ward and Block. They
demonstrate that while the essential elements of a cause of action
under the provision may appear obvious, subtle and ofttimes
complex questions arise when the stated requirements are applied
to differing fact situations.
B. School Annexation: Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 53 v. Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 5252
School District No. 53 (Crooked Oak) brought a section 1983
action against adjoining School District No. 52 (Midwest), chal-
lenging the validity of a 1971 deannexation election. The election,
held valid in two Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions,53 resulted
in the transfer of certain territory in Crooked Oak to Midwest.
Crooked Oak asserted that it had an affirmative constitutional
obligation to protect its integrated school system, and that the
transfer had dismantled that system and had created a segre-
gated one. Examining the facts, 4 the court of appeals ruled that
the system was integrated both before and after the transfer, and
could be operated as such on a continuing basis. The mere fact
that certain "college preparatory" courses had to be eliminated
10 Id. at 5. While the requirement for state action in a section 1983 case has generated
a large body of law, the particular standard used by the court in Block is known as the
"badge of authority" test. It developed from Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) where
the Court said: "Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some
capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." 365 U.S. at
171-72 (emphasis added). See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. Mai"a, & E. CooPaa, supra note 46, §
3573, at 491.
" No. 75-1836 at 5.
' 532 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 Austin v. State Bd. of Educ., 497 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1972) (directing Oklahoma school
officials to implement the deannexation); Haller v. Austin, 487 P.2d 1360 (Okla. 1971)
(approving the election procedures used).
' Rejecting the contention, the court noted that prior to the transfer Crooked Oak
had a black enrollment of approximately 20%. After the deannexation this figure increased
to approximately 42%. Numerically, Midwest had received 1,361 students of whom 70
were black. 532 F.2d at 732.
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from the curriculum in Crooked Oak did not raise the problem
to a constitutional level. However, the outcome might have been
different had it been shown that students who desired these
courses had been denied transfers to other districts where such
courses were available.55
Ruling that no constitutional right had been infringed, the
Tenth Circuit went on to hold that the transfer had not resulted
from any state action. The court found that the election had been
brought about solely by the efforts of codefendants-appellants
Austin and Parker, who were private parties. They alone had
circulated petitions calling for the election. The court acknowl-
edged the principle that one need not be a state officer to act
"under color of law" if one willfully participates in a joint activity
with the state or its agent." Yet here the state had not fostered
the election. Indeed, county officials had fought (and lost) court
battles in attempts to invalidate the elections." Under these
facts, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Midwest.
C. Election Filing Fees: Gallagher v. Evans"
Appellants, who were candidates for various state offices in
a 1972 New Mexico election, brought suit under section 1983
seeking restitution of primary election filing fees which they had
paid under protest. The issue presented to the court was the
constitutionality of a New Mexico statute"9 requiring certain can-
Id. at 733. The only analogous case seems to be Hart v. Community School Bd.,
383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). There, the district court was faced with the task of desegregating
an identifiably black school. Judge Weinstein held that such a school's curriculum "must
be arranged so that pupils transferring into the school have at least as good an education
as they would have been afforded without the change." Id. at 757. The Tenth Circuit has
skirted the issue of decreased quality in education addressed in Hart by implying the
possibility of transferring students interested in taking courses now unavailable at
Crooked Oak.
" 532 F.2d at 733.
' See Austin v. State Bd. of Educ., 497 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1972); Haller v. Austin, 487
P.2d 1360 (Okla. 1971).
- 536 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1976).
1969 N.M. Laws, ch. 240, § 176 (repealed 1973) (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-8-26 (Supp. 1975). The current version sets an across-the-board fee of $50 for all
candidates, except those for county offices, who pay $5. The repealed provision proved a
fertile source of litigation. See, e.g., Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972);




didates to pay filing fees determined by a percentage of the salary
of the particular position sought. In 1972 a federal district court
had held part of that statute unconstitutional as applied to candi-
dates for the United States Senate 0 In Gallagher, the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily on that decision, holding that "[t]he con-
struction of a constitutional provision must be uniform. . . . All
the candidates should be treated the same."'" Thus, the court
ruled that treating other candidates differently from United
States Senatorial candidates would in itself amount to a denial
of equal protection."2
D. Teacher Firings: Mogle v. Sevier County School District
63
Mogel brought this civil rights action when the school at
which he had been employed refused to renew his contract. The
trial court granted summary judgment against Mogle on the
' Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972). The court struck down the
provision as violative of equal protection. Under the contested provision, the filing fee
required of a United States senatorial candidate was $2,550. Id. at 730.
" 536 F.2d at 902. While the result in Gallagher is arguably correct, the analysis is
questionable. The court here was dealing with a statutory provision. The "uniform appli-
cation" argument advanced in the majority opinion, while not often employed, relates in
theory to constitutional provisions. See 1 T. CooLEY, CONSTIrTTONAL LImrrATIONS 123-24
(8th ed. 1927). The mere fact that the statute had previously been found unconstitutional
as applied does not necessarily require the law to be voided in all subsequent cases.
Further, the court held that the 1972 federal district court decision in Fiorina constituted
a "change in conditions" justifying the outcome reached in Gallagher. 536 F.2d at 902.
The court implied that because of this "change" the statute, which might have been valid
at one time, was now invalid. Id. While the doctrine of "changed conditions" has at times
been invoked when economic and social realities have shifted, no case cited by the Tenth
Circuit in Gallagher supports the extension of the doctrine to the point where a prior
decision of a court in a different case could serve as a changed condition justifying a later
holding. "Changed conditions" such as these are more correctly called "precedents."
62 The court was therefore able to ignore whether the filing fee requirement was
reasonable. This issue, as the concurring opinion points out, may not have been so easy
to decide given the rather unusual history of New Mexico election practices. Judge Bar-
rett, quoting a prior New Mexico election case, wrote:
New Mexico political history and legislative attempts to regulate elec-
tions are fascinating subjects. Three percent filing fees have been tried but
found wanting. The modest expenditure was not sufficient to preclude the
filing of "stooge" candidates. In New Mexico parlance, a "stooge candidate"
is one who is filed by, or whose filing is caused or procured by a candidate
or his adherents with a view to dividing the vote which would presumably
be garnered by his opponent. Such efforts often developed along ethnic lines.
536 F.2d at 902-03 (Barrett, J., concurring)(quoting State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 495
P.2d 1379, 1382 (N.M. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 935 (1974) (upholding the validity of
the percentage fee system)).
-3 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976).
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ground that no substantial federal question was raised. On appeal
the Tenth Circuit held that a substantial federal question was
presented, but that on the facts summary judgment was nonethe-
less proper. Hence, the judgment was affirmed.
Mogle had accepted a position as counselor at North Sevier
High School in Utah for the 1969-70 school year. At the time,
Mogle lived outside of the school district. Upon being hired, he
was told that at some time he should move closer to the school.
However, this was not stated as a condition precedent to his
employment. Mogle did not move, and when contracts were being
negotiated for the 1972-73 school year he was notified that his
contract would not be renewed unless he were living in the North
Sevier area by the first day of school. Despite a good faith effort,
Mogle was unable to find housing. The school, requiring teachers
to be residents of the school district in which they taught, refused
to renew the contract. After mediation efforts proved fruitless this
action was brought."
Two constitutional issues were raised. First, Mogle asserted
that imposing a residency requirement on only one class of em-
ployees denied him equal protection. Second, he argued that the
residency requirement violated his right to due process by creat-
ing a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption that he could not
satisfactorily perform his job unless he was a resident of the
school district.
Discussing the equal protection claim, the court first consid-
ered what standard of review was to be applied to the residency
requirement. The court reasoned that strict scrutiny was inappro-
priate and the "continuing residency" requirements should be
subjected to the less demanding standards of the traditional ra-
tional relationship test. 5 The court's decision in this regard was
" The action was brought under not only section 1983 but also 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1970), which provides in pertinent part that an action will lie against
two or more persons in any State or Territory [who] conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
law ....
The conspiracy element of this provision was not reached by the court in Mogle as the
case was decided on the issues of whether Mogle had been deprived of either equal protec-
tion or due process of law.
Recent Supreme Court holdings differentiate between requirements of "continuing
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based primarily upon the Supreme Court's holding in McCarthy
v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission."5 There, in a per cur-
iam opinion, the Court applied a rational relationship test and
upheld a municipal regulation requiring city employees to reside
within city limits.
Having decided upon the appropriate standard of review, the
court in Mogle found the residency requirement did not violate
the equal protection clause. The court noted the justifications
advanced for the policy and held that they were "not wholly
unsubstantial."" With this holding the Tenth Circuit went a long
way towards suggesting that almost any continuing residency re-
quirement for public employment will withstand an equal protec-
tion attack."
Turning to Mogle's due process claim," the court took pains
to distinguish the facts here from the two leading cases on the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, Cleveland Board of Educa-
residency" (where to keep a job an individual must reside in a defined locale) and "dura-
tional residency" requirements (where one must reside in a defined area for a certain
length of time before being able to do an act or receive a benefit). McCarthy v. Philadel-
phia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam). See Detroit Police Officer's
Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972), dismissing for want of substantial federal
question 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971). Only measures involving "durational
requirements," affecting the fundamental right to interstate travel, have been held subject
to strict scrutiny. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). One circuit
court under facts almost identical to those in Mogle has gone so far as to flatly declare
that cases involving the right to intrastate travel do not require the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Warwell v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
540 F.2d at 484. School superintendents, in affidavits, sought to justify the policy
on the grounds that counselors above all other school employees should be readily accessi-
ble to students, parents, community and school officials; that certain services were not
being provided students because the counselor lived outside the attendance area; that it
was difficult for students and parents to become personally acquainted with the coun-
selor under such conditions; that because of "folkways and mores" it was more difficult
for a counselor living outside the district to become acquainted with the community where
his students lived; and that career opportunities were not as readily discoverable by one
living outside the school district. Id. at 485-86.
0 See note 65 supra.
" After Mogle had been filed, the Tenth Circuit decided Weathers v. West Yuma
School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976). There, the court held that a non-tenured
teacher did not have a property or liberty interest in his employment protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. After Weathers was decided Mogle
dropped some of his due process claims, but the court still chose to note the irrebuttable
presumption argument-perhaps because it had never been addressed in this context. See
540 F.2d at 483 n.4.
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tion v. LaFleur7" and Vlandis v. Kline.7 The court noted that in
LaFleur and Vlandis the presumptions involved were
"unwarranted and a denial of due process" whereas in Mogle it
had not been shown that the residency requirement involved a
presumption against the plaintiff "on any particular point. ' '1 2
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the recent Supreme Court case of
Weinberger v. Salfi3 for the proposition that the doctrine con-
cerning irrebuttable presumptions should not be applied when it
would clash with a formal policy developed through the legisla-
tive process.7' Evidently the court thought that even an informal,
unwritten school board policy should be able to include
"reasonable" conclusive presumptions regarding residency.
E. Access to the Courts: Silver v. Cormier75
This case presented a novel claim under section 1983. The
gravamen of the complaint was that Cormier, acting under color
of state law, had deprived Silver of his due process right of free
access to the courts. Silver had sold land to the Denver Urban
Renewal Authority (DURA), which had announced its intention
to demolish a building located upon the property. Contrary to
this announcement, however, DURA resold the property for a
substantial profit. When Silver informed DURA that he was
going to bring suit based on these facts, Cormier threatened to
withhold from Silver a $10,000 going-out-of-business allowance to
which Silver was statutorily entitled. Due to these threats, Silver
delayed in enforcing his right to the monies due. Finally, he
brought suit under section 1983. In addressing the constitutional
claim, the court stated:
Access to the courts of the United States is a constitutional right
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
70 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school board requirement that all pregnant teachers take
forced maternity leave by fourth month held unconstitutional).
" 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (irrebuttable presumption that college student who had main-
tained out-of-state address at any time during previous year was out-of-state resident for
tuition purposes held unconstitutional).
72 540 F.2d at 485.
422 U.S. 749 (1976).
7, 540 F.2d at 485. However, the evidence in Mogle would suggest that the presump-
tion established there was not the result of a thorough legislative process, but rather was
an ad hoc informal determination made by a single individual-the school superintend-
ent. Id. at 484.
'5 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976).
VOL. 54
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
amendments. This right of access to the courts cannot be infringed
upon or burdened. A public official's threats to a citizen to withhold
monies due and owing, should legal proceedings on an independent
matter be instituted, burdens or chills constitutional rights of access
to the courts. 6
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: TITLE Vii
AND RELATED CLAIMS7"
During the period covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit
considered a number of cases involving charges of racial discrimi-
16 529 F.2d at 163. The only cases which the Tenth Circuit cited as authority for its
holding were criminal cases which had never previously been extended into the civil area.
These criminal cases generally rest upon the principle that "prison officials may not un-
reasonably hamper inmates in gaining access to the courts." Evans v. Mosley, 455 F.2d
1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1972). See Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973); Harbolt
v. Alldredge, 464 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); Sigafus v.
Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966); Hatfield
v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961). However, in Silver, the Tenth Circuit took a
giant step in extending this rationale into the civil area. Such an extension is unprece-
dented, for the criminal cases are all linked by the fact that plaintiffs were inmates under
virtually total control of prison officials. In Silver, the plaintiff was a sophisticated, unin-
carcerated businessman, free to communicate with lawyers, and to bring as many law suits
as he desired.
There are some "free access" cases in the area of civil litigation. Yet they deal literally
with free access. The landmark case of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), allowed
indigent divorce litigants to file their case without paying the regular court fees. Some
courts interpreted Boddie to presage an evolving rule favorable to indigents wishing to
press civil claims. See, e.g., Bacon v. Graham, 348 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ariz. 1972); O'Brien
v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972). However, in United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973), the Supreme Court made it clear that Boddie was to be narrowly con-
strued and applied only in the few situations where (1) only a court could resolve the
conflict involved; and (2) where the issue in dispute was found to be "fundamental." Id.
at 444-45. Thus, neither Boddie and its progeny, nor the line of criminal cases in the free
access area seems to support Silver.
" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), was specifically
drafted to provide a remedy for those who had suffered the effects of discrimination in
employment. However, Title VII is not an exclusive remedy. Facts which give rise to a
claim under Title VII may also state a cause of action under other statutory provisions
relating to the protection of civil rights, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). But see text accom-
panying note 100 infra. Plaintiffs frequently base claims on these other statutory provi-
sions in addition to Title VII because the scope of remedies available under Title VII is
narrower than that available under other civil rights statutes. Under Title VII, the general
rule is that neither punitive nor consequential damages may be awarded. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Howard
v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Yet under other civil rights
statutes, punitive or consequential damages may be awarded. See, e.g., Sabol v. Snyder,
524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975) (punitive damages awarded in section 1981 claim); McCrary
v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) aff'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
(damages for embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish granted in section 1981
claim).
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nation, primarily in employment practices. Approximately one-
third of these suits,78 however, was concerned mainly with narrow
procedural questions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.11 Of the remaining cases, five are of particular interest and
are discussed below.
80
A. Hiring: Sabol v. Snyder"'
Plaintiff Sabol, a black practical and registered nurse, ap-
plied for an open position with the Kansas State Board of Educa-
tion. Despite the fact that plaintiff was the only qualified 2 indi-
vidual to submit a timely application, a less qualified white male
who had submitted a late application was offered the job. There-
upon Sabol brought this suit charging racial discrimination in
employment. At the trial level plaintiff was sucessful on her sec-
tion 1981 claim.8 3 On appeal, appellant Snyder's primary conten-
tion was that in light of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,"' a
Supreme Court decision handed down after Sabol had been
argued, plaintiff had failed to state a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation.
"' These cases, dealing principally with the question of time limits within which Title
VII plaintiffs must file suit, are discussed in the Administrative Law Overview supra.
n 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
14 In addition to those cases discussed in the text, the Tenth Circuit disposed of three
further actions solely on evidentiary grounds: Love v. Philco-Ford Corp., No. 75-1138 (10th
Cir., Aug. 20, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication); Buckley v. Coyle Public School Sys.,
No. 75-1143 (10th Cir., Feb. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication); Collins v. Martin
Marietta Corp., No. 75-1447 (10th Cir., Jan. 21, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
Stanley v. Continental Oil Co., 536 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1976), was dismissed because
of failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant Stanley to prosecute. Stanley had alleged a
violation under Title VII. Continental moved for summary judgment and submitted sup-
porting affidavits. Stanley did not file counter-affidavits as required by court order and
FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The trial court's dismisal was sustained on appeal.
81 524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 In addition to testimony concerning plaintiff's work experience and educational
background, workshop evaluations of plaintiff were admitted into evidence over defen-
dant's objection. These records were admitted under the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, and their admission as such was upheld on appeal. 524 F.2d at 1012.
93 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and no other.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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McDonnell specified the elements needed to establish a
prima facie case in a Title VII action.Y A plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifi-
cations."
The Tenth Circuit concentrated on the last two elements since
the first two were obviously met. Stretching the logic in
McDonnell, the court found that the acceptance of an application
after the announced cutoff date amounted to a rejection of Sabol
even though cutoff dates were not strictly enforced. This
"rejection," coupled with the subsequent hiring of the white male
applicant, satisfied the court that the last two elements of the
McDonnell test had been met. 7 The Tenth Circuit rejected as a
sham appellant's business judgment defense that the white male
was better qualified, and affirmed the trial court judgment grant-
ing Sabol not only actual, but also punitive damages and attor-
ney's fees. 8
B. Hiring and Promotion: Chicano Police Officer's Association
v. Stover"9
The Chicano Police Officer's Association and some of its
members brought this civil rights action 0 alleging discrimination
in both the hiring and promotion procedures used by the Albu-
querque, New Mexico Police Department. The complaint alleged
that the Department utilized discriminatory procedures based
upon criteria not substantially related to job performance, with
" The Tenth Circuit applied the McDonnell-Douglas Title VII standard to Sabol's
section 1981 claim noting that it had previously been so applied. 524 F.2d at 1012. How-
ever, this technique can no longer be used. See text accompanying note 100 infra.
, 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted).
', 524 F.2d at 1012. The Tenth Circuit could have avoided this step in the analysis,
holding that prior rejection was not required in all cases, by relying on a footnote in
McDonnell, where the Court noted that "[tihe facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802
n.13.
524 F.2d at 1012-13.
U 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
* Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 (1970).
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the result that a disproportionate number of Spanish-speaking
and Spanish-surnamed Americans were excluded from employ-
ment and promotions. On appeal, the Association contended that
the trial court had erred in ruling that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing, and that they had not made a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in promotion procedures.
After holding that the plaintiffs had standing,9 the Tenth
Circuit addressed the question of Whether a prima facie case had
been established. The court cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,92 a
leading Title VII case,93 for the proposition that a plaintiff can
make a prima facie case of discrimination by merely showing that
the challenged procedures have a discriminatory result. 4 In light
of Griggs, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the Association should
have been allowed to introduce evidence of promotion test results
from prior years, and the trial court's refusal to admit such evi-
dence was error. 5 Further, as to test results which were admitted
into evidence but which the trial court held insufficient to make
out a prima facie case, the Tenth Circuit held that the size of the
group tested was large enough to provide meaningful statistical
data.96
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit
judgment97 and remanded for consideration in light of
Washington v. Davis." In Washington, unsuccessful black appli-
cants for employment as police officers alleged that the use of a
"1 The Tenth Circuit held that because approximately 70% of the Chicano officers in
the Department were members of the Association, the group had the requisite "direct
stake" in the outcome. 526 F.2d at 436. In ruling that the individual members of the
Association had standing, the court likened the officers' position to that of the plaintiffs
in Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969), where it
was held that the secondary effects of discrimination on patients gave them standing to
challenge staff hiring procedures. 526 F.2d at 436-37. See also Lee v. Macon County Bd.
of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S.
215 (1967).
22 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11 The Tenth Circuit adopted the view that "the measure of a claim under the Civil
Rights Act is in essence that applied in a suit under Title VII .... " 526 F.2d at 438
(citing Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), and Sabol v. Snyder,
524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975)). But see text accompanying note 100 infra.
', 526 F.2d at 438.
" Id. at 439.
"Id.
'7 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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particular written personnel test resulted in racial discrimina-
tion. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment." The Court held that
the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of racial dis-
crimination is not identical to standards applicable under Title
VII.' 00 The decision emphasized that when Title VII is not in-
volved,'01 challenges to facially neutral practices which have a
discriminatory impact will not succeed absent some showing of
intent to discriminate.''
C. Promotions-Sex Discrimination: Olson v. Philco-Ford 0 3
This case involved a charge of sex discrimination in promo-
tion procedures in violation of Title VII.' 0 Olson, a female em-
ployee, applied along with three male employees for a position at
a higher job classification within her company. One of the male
applicants was selected, and Olson brought suit. The trial court
dismissed at the end of plaintiff's evidence. Appealing to the
Tenth Circuit, Olson asserted that she had made out a prima
facie case of discrimination and that dismissal was, therefore,
error.
The Tenth Circuit found that Olson and the male employees
selected for promotion were equally qualified. Backing away from
the "prima facie case" standard argued by Olson, the court
phrased the question as whether the "selection of a qualified man
over a qualified woman, standing alone, makes out a prima facie
case of sex discrimination."''05 The court's statement of the issue
implied the result-such a selection is not an act of discrimina-
tion.
" A claim also was stated under a District of Columbia Code provision. Id. at 233.
'® Id. at 239. But see Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
,0 The Court noted that in Title VII litigation discriminatory purpose need not be
proven. 426 U.S. at 246-47. The Court declared that "[wie are not disposed to adopt this
more rigorous standard [of Title VII] for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this." Id. at 247-48.
102 Id. at 239-40, 246.
103 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976).
,0' The section relied upon was 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ..
' 531 F.2d at 478.
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Important in the above quote are the words "standing
alone." Olson had presented certain statistical evidence, but the
court found that it did not bear on promotions. While the court
noted that statistics can be useful in uncovering discrimination,
they must be "closely related to the specific issues presented."''0
Olson's statistics went solely to the issue of the number of women
holding positions at a grade equivalent to, or higher than, the one
for which she had applied. Given these circumstances, the court
limited the language of its recent decision in Rich v. Martin
Marietta, 07 under which Olson theoretically could have stated a
case.'18 In Rich there had been a substantial showing of the differ-
ences in promotions between minority and non-minority employ-
ees, whereas Olson had failed in this regard.
D. Firing
1. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.'5
Taylor, a black, was hired in 1968 to work at Safeway's frozen
food warehouse in Denver. Three weeks later he was fired, osten-
sibly because of inadequate job performance. Taylor subse-
quently brought a class action"0 on behalf of virtually all black
Safeway employees in Colorado, alleging discriminatory employ-
ment practices in violation of both section 1981 and 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1970). After narrowing the class and dismissing the section
1981 action for failure to exhaust Title VII remedies, the trial
court ruled on the merits that Taylor had stated an actionable
charge of discrimination based on his firing. Taylor was awarded
back pay and attorney's fees on his individual claim, but the
court found no merit in the class action. On appeal, Taylor
argued inter alia that (1) his class claim had stated a prima facie
case of discrimination; (2) that trial court had abused its discre-
IN Id. at 477 (quoting Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 272 (10th Cir.
1975)).
,o 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
lOI Rich held that "[o]nce a plaintiff has shown that he is qualified, he need only
show a discriminatory impact and that he was among the class of employees who could
have been considered for promotion." Id. at 348. Therefore, if promotion of a qualified
male over a qualified female can be said to possibly establish a "discriminatory impact,"
Olson would have stated a case. 531 F.2d at 478. The court found, however, that under
the facts of the case, Olson had suffered no "discriminatory impact."
524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
,o The considerable importance of this case vis-a-vis class action requirements is
discussed in the Federal Pratice and Precedure Overview infra.
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tion in determining the amount of the awards for back pay and
attorney's fees; and (3) failure to exhaust Title VII remedies did
not bar the section 1981 claim.
a. Prima facie case
Taylor had alleged that three of Safeway's practices violated
Title VII. The court noted that should any one of these practices
either presently discriminate against blacks, or, while neutral on
its face, maintain the vestiges of past discrimination, a violation
could be found."' First, Taylor asserted that an employee referal
system used to fill job openings perpetuated past discrimination.
The court held that this was true only when an employer both
primarily relies on this method, and when the use of such a sys-
tem results in a pattern of discrimination. Here, the court found
that while the referral system accounted for fifty percent of ware-
house hirings, there was no statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion."'
Secondly, Taylor argued that a company rule prohibiting
interdepartmental transfers worked to discriminate against
blacks by locking them into manual labor jobs. The court rea-
soned that unless Taylor showed an actual pattern of discrimi-
nation resulting from this policy (which applied equally to all
employees), no violation could be found. Again, examining the
statistics, the court determined that there was no showing of
past discrimination."'
Finally, Taylor asserted that a company hiring policy which
gave preference to applicants with warehouse work experience
discriminated against blacks because they were less likely to have
su'ch experience. Other jurisdictions have previously held that
work-experience requirements may violate Title VII."4 However,
the Tenth Circuit held that when there is no evidence of a dis-
criminatory effect from such a requirement, no violation is estab-
524 F.2d at 271.
,, Id. at 272. Blacks make up 4.1% of the Denver metropolitan area population. Of
the employees hired at Safeway's Denver warehouse during the relevant time period,
blacks accounted for an average of 18% per year. Id.
"I Blacks constituted 4.27% of warehouse employees, whereas they comprised only
2.01% of the total number of employees. The court found the difference statistically
insignificant. Id.
" E.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
1977
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lished."15 Since no discriminatory effect was shown, no case was
proven.
b. Remedies-back pay and attorney's fees
The trial court determined that Taylor's own firing was ra-
cially motivated and, therefore, awarded $3,256 in back pay and
$3,000 for attorney's fees. The back pay period commenced some
time after the firing, and ended eight months later when Taylor
became a fulltime college student. Taylor contended that enter-
ing school should not have rendered him ineligible for back pay.
The court, noting that an award of back pay is discretionary,",
stated that once Taylor returned to school he was not "ready,
willing and available for work," and, therefore, he was not enti-
tled to back pay."'
As for Taylor's argument that the award for attorney's fees
was inadequate, the Tenth Circuit noted that prior awards in
Title VII litigation had been as small as $12 per hour. Taylor's
award amounted to $17 per hour and was therefore not an abuse
of discretion."18 The court nevertheless pointed out that the award
was "modest," and suggested that the trial court reevaluate the
amount."9
524 F.2d at 272.
11 Id. at 267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 422
U.S. 405 (1975). Taylor also asked for reinstatement. However, the court ruled that rein-
statement was a discretionary remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), which in the
trial court's discretion could be (and was) refused. 524 F.2d at 268.
" 524 F.2d at 267. This holding reflects the rule that an act of the discriminatee can
sometimes cut off the applicable back pay period. However, it is unclear as to what acts
so operate. See Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegland Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D.
Utah 1971). The case relied on by the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal
Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), indicates that if a wrongfully dis-
charged employee later enrolls full time in college, a back pay award should terminate
only if the individual cannot show that while in school he was "ready, willing and avail-
able" for work. Id. at 443-44. Therefore, what was a factual question under Metal Lathers
has been transformed into a rule of law by the Tenth Circuit.
"I As authority for its position, the Tenth Circuit cited, inter alia, Barela v. United
Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149, 155-56 (10th Cir. 1972). 524 F.2d at 268. The court's reliance
on Barela is misplaced. There, the court upheld a $25 per hour fee, which if applied in
Taylor would have resulted in an award more than 50% higher.
"1 524 F.2d at 268. See also Carreathers v. Alexander, No. C-5082 (D. Colo., Sept.
29, 1976) (order awarding attorney's fees).
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c. Exhaustion of Title VII remedies and section 1981
The trial court ruled that no claim could be raised under
section 1981 until all Title VII remedies were exhausted. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a claim under section 1981
was completely independent from a Title VII action and could be
brought concurrently.'20 The court thus adopted what was, even
at the time of the trial court decision, the majority rule.'' The
Supreme Court finally laid to rest what was left of this question
with its decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,'
holding that an "aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of
other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his
search for relief."'
' 23
2. Smith v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.
2 4
This case raised the question of whether racial or other class-
based "discriminatory animus" must be alleged and proven be-
fore an individual may recover under section 1985(2).121 While
plaintiff-appellant Smith had attempted to allege a conspiracy
aimed at hindering the enforcement of his rights, he did not allege
or prove that such a conspiracy was racially motivated. The
Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Griffin v. Breckenridge,2 1 which
1" 524 F.2d at 274.
121 Id.
12 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
'" Id. at 459.
124 536 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1976).
,25 The section provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United
States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending
therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his
person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to
influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror
in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account
of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or
of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire
for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any
manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to
deny to an citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his
property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any
person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
1- 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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interpreted section 1985(3)'1 on the same issue.' 5 The court fol-
lowed the rule that a claim under section 1985(2) requires the
same "discriminatory animus" as one under section 1985(3).111
Therefore, the trial court's dismissal was affirmed.




1. Kehrli v. Spinkle'
3'
Colonel Kehrli sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court, challenging his conviction by general court-martial
on several charges of marijuana use, transfer, and possession.
32
The petition was denied, and on appeal Kehrli advanced several
constitutional claims.'1 First, he argued that Article 134 was im-
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
In Griffin the Supreme Court held that although section 1985(3) was meant to
reach private conspiracies, it was not intended to "apply to all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others," but only those motivated by "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus ... " 403 U.S. at 101-
02. "Animus" is distinguished from "scienter," or "specific intent." As Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court in Griffin, noted: "The motivation aspect of § 1985(3) focuses not
on scienter but on invidious discriminatory animus." Id. at 102 n.10.
.9 536 F.2d at 1323.
"' Prisoners, mental patients, and military personnel are groups generally associated
with diminished constitutional protection. See N. DoRSEN, P. BENDER, and B. NEUBORNE,
EMERSON, HABER & DoRsEN's POLrTCAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1320-433
(4th ed. 1976). While this survey does not have occasion to examine a decision concerning
the constitutional rights of mental patients, the Tenth Circuit did recently decide the case
of Strano v. Giron, No. 75-1598 (10th Cir., July 14, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication),
which held that neither equal protection nor due process guarantees are violated by
different treatment of voluntary, as opposed to involuntary, hospital patients.
Also included in this section is a case involving Indian affairs. While Indians are not
traditionally linked with the above groups, they are however accorded special judicial
treatment because of their particular status. See text accompanying notes 155-57 infra.
131 524 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976).
"' Kehrli had been convicted under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970). It provides:
[AiII disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this
chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or
summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense,
and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
" In addition to the constitutional issues discussed in the text, Kehrli raised a ques-
tion as to the proper scope of judicial review in court-martial cases. Relying on Burns v.
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permissibly vague and overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional
on its face. However, this argument was fatally undermined when
the two circuit court decisions upon which it rested were over-
ruled by the Supreme Court while Kehrli's appeal was pending.'34
Kehrli further contended that the conviction and sentence vio-
lated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, his right
of privacy, and the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
Kehrli's equal protection argument was based on the fact
that Article 134 is supplemented by a provision which makes it
"a violation of this article [134] wrongfully to possess or use
marijuana or a habit forming narcotic drug."' 35 Kehrli argued
that to place marijuana in the same class as habit-forming nar-
cotics violates equal protection. The Tenth Circuit held that since
the maximum penalty for marijuana use or possession differed
from that for violations involving habit-forming drugs, the classi-
fication did not violate equal protection.
The court summarily dismissed Kehrli's privacy and eighth
amendment claims. Kehrli had argued that since marijuana pro-
duces only mild, harmless effects, government regulation con-
cerning it violated his constitutional right to privacy. The court
held that on balance, the military's interest in regulating mari-
juana use among service personnel in combat zones, and on or
near military installations, outweighed any right to privacy which
Kehrli might otherwise possess.'36 In regard to his eighth amend-
ment argument, Kehrli urged that his sentence of three years at
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the Tenth Circuit stated that the scope of review in military
cases was narrower than in civil habeas corpus proceedings, and that the courts' function
was to "determine whether the military gave fair consideration to each of the petitioner's
constitutional claims." 524 F.2d at 331 (quoting King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732 (10th Cir.
1970)). Additionally, Kehrli urged that off-duty marijuana use could not be prosecuted
under Article 134. The court, citing no cases, found to the contrary. Id. at 332-33. See
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); United States v. Rose, 19 C.M.A. 3, 41
C.M.R. 3 (1969). But see Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Redmond v. Warner,
355 F. Supp. 812 (D. Hawaii 1973). Finally, rejecting Kehrli's claim that he had been
denied sufficient access to counsel, the court found that his case had been given "full
consideration," and that there had been no showing of actual prejudice resulting from any
alleged defects. 524 F.2d at 333.
'" Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974), reversing 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), reversing 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
' U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 213(b) (rev. ed. 1969).
' ' 524 F.2d at 332.
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hard labor plus a $15,000 fine was excessive and constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. The court stated that while severe, it
was within the "authorized maximum sentence.' 37 Thus, the
eighth amendment claim was held to have no merit.
13
1
2. Moore v. Schlesinger"'
Appellant Moore, an Air Force Captain, was relieved of his
teaching duties at the Air Force Academy in 1973 and reassigned
to overseas duty. Thereupon, Moore resigned his commission and
brought this suit alleging, inter alia, that his transfer had been
punishment for writing letters to various Congressmen concern-
ing certain Academy policies. Moore contended that the Air Force
action in reassigning him violated his first amendment right to
freedom of expression. Damages were sought.40
The court recognized the principle that "citizens in uniform
may not be stripped of basic rights because they have doffed their
civilian clothes."'' However, the court held that military inter-
ests had to be balanced against individual interests, and that the
court had jurisdiction to review a case like Moore's only when the
military action was so restrictive of a serviceman's fundamental
rights as to "deny them altogether and thus constitute an abuse
of the broad discretion granted to military officers . . ,. . Not-
ing the longstanding policy of judicial non-interference in the
military duty assignment area,4 3 the court found no abuse of
discretion. Since there was no jurisdiction, the case was dis-
missed.
137 Id.
"' Cases are legion which hold that, regardless of severity of length, penalties within
legislatively set bounds are constitutional. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 407 F.2d 356
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 966 (1969); Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121 (10th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964); Lindsey v. United
States, 332 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1964).
No. 74-1882 (10th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
Originally Moore also sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, manda-
mus, a writ of habeas corpus, and an order reinstating him at the Academy. However, the
court held that only the damage claim survived and that all other claims were mooted by
his voluntary act of resignation. Id. at 4-5.
"' Id. at 5 (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
181, 188 (1962)).





1. Marchesani v. McCune'
Marchesani was a federal prisoner who had been classified in
the records of the Bureau of Prisons as a "special offender."' 45 On
appeal from the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, Marches-
ani alleged that classifying him as such, absent a prior hearing,
violated his right to procedural due process. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the prisoner's classifica-
tion was based upon the nature of his previous convictions,
whereas in the cases relied upon by Marchesani the classification
rested upon "unsupported allegations in presentence reports."' 46
Analyzing the due process claim, the court noted the wide
latitude that the government has traditionally been afforded in
the conduct of its internal affairs, especially within the context
of prison management.'47 Given this principle, the Tenth Circuit
held that actions taken by prison officials, affecting what would
normally be constituted a right in a non-prison environment,
violate due process only when such actions constitute a clear
abuse of an official's discretionary powers.'48 Finding no such
abuse of discretion, the court dismissed the petition.
2. Clark v. Leach'49
Appellant Clark, a prisoner, originally brought suit in state
court alleging that the prison's refusal to provide surgery for a
cataract constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment. The New Mexico Supreme Court af-
firmed a lower court decision which held that while prisoners are
entitled to adequate medical care, the operation was "elective
531 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
"Special Offenders" require "greater case management supervision" than usual
offenders. 531 F.2d at 461. The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1970) as placing a duty
upon prison officials to classify inmates. 531 F.2d at 461.
"I Id. at 460. Marchesani had relied on Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346
(D. Conn. 1974), and Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973).
"1 531 F.2d at 461. The court cited with approval Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974), where Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for the majority: "[l]awful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Id. at 822 (citations omit-
ted).
531 F.2d at 462.
No. 76-1022 (10th Cir., Aug. 25, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
1977
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
surgery." Failure to provide such surgery did not constitute viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. 50
Clark did not petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
but instituted this action based on the same facts in federal
court. '' The Tenth Circuit held that the principle of res judicata
applied to suits brought under section 1983 where there had al-
ready been a prior state court adjudication on the same constitu-
tional claim. 5 ' The court held that the eighth amendment claim,
and a due process claim which the court found was included
within the eighth amendment claim, had already been fully liti-
gated at the state level.'53 Hence Clark was barred from reassert-
ing these claims in federal court.
C. Indian Affairs:'54 Potts v. Bruce'
This case arose when the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) took
action to withdraw approval of the Tribal Business Committee of
the Prairie Band of the Pottawatomi Indians, and their Tribal
Constitution. The BIA acted after the committee, torn by an
internal dispute, reached a stalemate and was unable to conduct
tribal business. A BIA-sponsored resolution was adopted whereby
approval of the constitution and the committee was withdrawn,
and a new group was formed to draft another constitution. Mem-
bers of the defunct committee sued, alleging that their rights
under the first and fifth amendments had been violated by the
BIA.
The Tenth Circuit held that an individual tribal member
had a vested right "in any particular law or in the Tribal Consti-
tution."'56 Thus such laws could always be changed, providing
that the means used were permissible. Finding that the contro-
versy was completely intratribal, the Tenth Circuit applied the
1 Id. at 2. Cf. Prins v. Bennett, No. 75-1616 (10th Cir., March 8, 1976) (Not for
Routine Publication) (failure of unlicensed prison physician to examine inmate held nei-
ther abuse of discretion nor violation of prisoner's eighth amendment rights).
'5' The federal action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
52 No. 76-1022 at 3.
"' Id. at 3-4.
"5 See the case comment following this overview for a discussion of Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the Indian Civil Rights Act).
533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
'5 533 F.2d at 529.
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general rule that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide
such disputes. '57
David H. Miller
SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS IN TRIBAL ORDINANCES
AND THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039
(10th Cir. 1976)
By RUTH CASAREZ-ANDERSEN,* LESLIE M. LAWSON** AND
DAVID H. MILLER***
INTRODUCTION
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo' is one of the few decisions
to date which has set out to define the substantive limits of a right
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act 2 (ICRA). At issue was
"I Id. at 530 (collecting cases). This rule, however, is not absolute, and when intratri-
bal disputes act to deprive tribal members of certain enumerated rights guaranteed by
either federal law or the Constitution, an action will lie. See the case comment following
this overview.
* Clinical Education Supervisor and Instructor of Law, University of Denver College
of Law; B.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; J.D., 1973, University of Denver.
** Attorney, Feiger & Lawson; B.A., 1969, University of Wyoming; J.D., 1972, Uni-
versity of Wyoming.
*** B.A., 1973, Duke University; J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1070 (1977).
2 In 1924 Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act which extended United States
citizenship to all American-born Indians. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1970). Since that time
Indians have been invested by law with all of the constitutional rights enjoyed by other
citizens in their dealings with state and federal governments. Until 1968, however, the
relationship between individual Indians and their tribal governments was generally held
to be outside of federal judicial cognizance. See note 16 infra and accompanying text. The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970)), was the first piece of legislation by which Congress inter-
jected substantive constitutional principles into intratribal relationships. See note 15 infra
and accompanying text. Section 202 of the Act conferred specific constitutional rights on
Indians in their dealings with tribal governments. The equal protection clause of the Act
appears in subsection (8):
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
1977
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whether the equal protection clause of the Act was violated by a
tribal ordinance3 which denied Pueblo membership to children
born of marriages between female Pueblo members and male
nonmembers, but granted membership to children born of mar-
riages between male Pueblo members and female nonmembers.'
In answering this question, the Tenth Circuit struck down
the ordinance and articulated a novel test which may be broadly
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue war-
rants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensa-
tion;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy
and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unu-
sual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense
any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six
months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprison-
ment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) (emphasis added) [the ICRA equal protection clause is herein-
after referred to in text and footnotes as § 1302(8)].
1 Appellants also alleged that the ordinance violated their due process rights under
the ICRA. 540 F.2d at 1040. However, the court did not address this issue.
' The ordinance, enacted December 15, 1939 by the Council of Pueblo of Santa Clara,
New Mexico, reads:
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
2. All children born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
under any circumstances.
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1041 n.2 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
429 U.S. 1070 (1977). Appellants challenged subparagraphs 2 and 3.
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applicable to similar issues that may arise under the Act.' This
comment will define and analyze the parameters of that test in
part II, and in part III will take a critical look at its application
to the present case. Initially, however, it is necessary to examine
some important jurisdictional issues raised by the case.
I. IMMUNITY AND JURISDICTION UNDER THE ICRA
The Martinez litigation was initiated when female members
of the Pueblo brought a class action' challenging the Pueblo's
1939 membership ordinance on the ground that it discriminated
against them. These women had married men who were not mem-
bers of the Pueblo. In particular, appellant Martinez had married
a full-blooded Navajo in 1941, and since that time the couple had
lived continuously on the Santa Clara Pueblo with their children.
Beginning in 1946, Mrs. Martinez attempted to enroll her chil-
dren in the Pueblo. She continued in this effort until the time of
the suit. Despite her use of all available tribal procedures, her
children were consistently denied enrollment.'
The Pueblo advanced two grounds as to why the court lacked
jurisdiction. First, the tribe argued that the ICRA did not provide
a jurisdictional basis for the action. Second, it urged that sover-
eign immunity barred the suit. The court dealt briefly with these
objections, dismissing both within a single paragraph. Relying
heavily on one of its earlier decisions, Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
United States,' the court held that a statute which gives district
courts jurisdiction over actions brought to protect civil rights
granted by Congress' provided a jurisdictional basis for suits
brought under the ICRA.10 Noting further that the ICRA was
designed by Congress to protect individual Indians from tribal
See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
Appellants' children, who were disenfranchised, were also members of the class.
The courts have generally required plaintiffs to exhaust their tribal remedies before
beginning litigation. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976);
McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700
(8th Cir. 1973); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction in civil
suits brought "[tlo recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
"* 540 F.2d at 1042. For the trial court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue raised
in Martinez, see Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975) (decided
without benefit of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Dry Creek Lodge).
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abuses, the court found clear Congressional intent to allow "civil
rights" suits against a tribe."
While this jurisdictional analysis represents the current
trend, 12 it is of rather recent vintage. Before enactment of the
ICRA, Congress traditionally took a cautious approach when
dealing with Indian civil rights. There are, of course, many trea-
ties and statutes relating to Indians, 4 but the ICRA stands vir-
tually alone in affecting fundamental intratribal relationships.'
Prior to the passage of the ICRA, the courts likewise exercised
restraint. Courts were reluctant to impose traditional constitu-
tional standards on social structure they knew little about.'
When federal courts were asked to assume jurisdiction under
the newly enacted ICRA, their response was mixed. Some courts
refrained from taking jurisdiction, 7 while others were not so reti-
* 540 F.2d at 1042.
* See notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text.
11 For a discussion of pre-ICRA aspects of tribal sovereign immunity, see Note, The
Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1343, 1346-53 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Indian Bill of Rights].
" See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 485-608 (1971) for a list of all
federal statutes and treaties relating to Indian affairs from 1789-1938.
'" There are limited exceptions to this principle. For example, The Major Crimes Act,
23 Stat. 385 (1885), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970), gave jurisdiction to United
States territorial courts to hear serious criminal cases involving Indian victims and defen-
dants. The Act and its amendments, however, are not so much intrusions into intratribal
relationships as definitions of tribal authority.
The Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1970)) might, on its face, be interpreted as affecting intratribal political
rights. The Act set out procedures by which tribes could organize and adopt constitutions.
Cases interpreting this Act emphasize, however, that its purpose was to restore self-control
to the tribes and not to define individual political rights. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton, 499 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). See
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).
" The landmark case of Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), firmly established at
an early date the principle that Indian tribes were not subject to the same constitutional
restrictions as were federal and state governments. Starting with Mayes, this concept of
tribal sovereignty-that Indian tribes could do what they pleased, as they pleased, unless
Congress had expressly indicated otherwise-continued to be observed by the overwhelm-
ing majority of courts until passage of the ICRA. See Burnett, An Historical Analysis of
the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 557, 559-74 (1972).
"7 The much-cited case of Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971), pro-
vides a typical example of early judicial self-restraint under the ICRA. In Groundhog
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the original appointment and subsequent election of
a tribal chief violated section 1302(8). The court held that the allegations merely evi-
denced an internal dispute over which the court did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 682-83.
In Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971), the court applied
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cent. In Dodge v. Nakai,'5 decided less than a year after enact-
ment of the ICRA, it was held that when a plaintiff asserts a right
"purportedly guaranteed" by the ICRA a federal court has juris-
diction to hear the case.'9 The first court of appeals case to adopt
this expansive view was Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe.20 There,
the sole question was whether the district court had jurisdiction
to decide if a provision of a tribal constitution conflicted with the
ICRA and the United States Constitution. The court stated: "To
hold there to be a lack of jurisdiction. . . would, in effect, destroy
the efficacy of the Indian Bill of Rights [ICRA]."2 '
In Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States,2 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the broad rule of Nakai and Luxon,'23 supporting its
decision with an impressive array of cases.24 The court's exclusive
reliance on Dry Creek reaffirms its acceptance of the broadest
statement of the jurisdictional rule. In essence, the court has held
that there is federal jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff alleges that
his rights under the ICRA have been infringed.
2 5
the methodology of Groundhog and held the allegations "insufficient to bring into play
the Indian Bill of Rights." Id. at 282. And in Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D.
1973), the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a claim that plaintiff Indian had
been denied due process when his tribal court refused his request for a jury trial. Citing
Groundhog, the court held that the ICRA was not meant to substitute a federal forum for
tribal courts. Id. at 622.
" 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
" Id. at 25. For further discussion of this case see Tenth Circuit Survey, 53 DEN. L.J.
158-61 (1976).
- 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 700.
22 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 933. Several other cases had already employed this logic. See, e.g., Crowe v.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1234 (4th Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1973).
21 In stating its rule, the court cited over 15 cases. 515 F.2d at 933 n.6. However,
almost half of the court of appeals' decisions relied on were tribal election cases which
had been decided under a narrower rule than the one stated in either Nakai or Luxon. In
the election cases, the courts articulated a special rule for situations in which tribes had
adopted procedures analogous to those found in Anglo-American culture. For example, in
Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held that it had jurisdiction
solely because plaintiffs alleged that a tribal apportionment scheme violated the one-man,
one-vote principle incorporated into tribal practices. See also Brown v. United States, 486
F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973). The
rationale behind these cases seems to be that to accept jurisdiction where tribes have
adopted Anglo-American practices would not force an alien culture upon the Indians. See
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1976). Yet in neither
Dry Creek nor Martinez had the tribe incorporated any Anglo-American practices.
21 However, allegations must be sufficient to state a claim under the relevant law. See
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II. ICRA EQUAL PROTECTION
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis in Martinez by examin-
ing the legislative history of the ICRA. The court noted that
Congress had been presented with conflicting testimony as to how
the Act would affect tribal sovereignty." While acknowledging
that Congress had intended to recognize the cultural autonomy
and integrity of the Indian tribes, the court also emphasized Con-
gressional "intent to extend broad constitutional protections to
individual Indians."27 Faced with this conflict the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the legislative history dictated the use of a balanc-
ing test:
About the only way to resolve this conflict is to recognize the
necessity to evaluate and weigh both of these interests. Thus the
scope, extent and importance of the tribal interest is to be taken
into account. The individual right to fair treatment under the law
is likewise to be weighed against the tribal interest by considering
the clearness of the guarantee together with the magnitude of the
interest generally and as applied to the particular facts.2"
The court then proceeded to examine prior cases which had
presented related questions involving section 1302(8). First, the
court distinguished a well-established line of cases holding that
tribes may set a minimum blood quantum requirement for tribal
membership without violating the equal protection clause of the
Potts v. Bruce, 533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976) (allegations
insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
540 F.2d at 1044.
Id. See generally Burnett, supra note 16, at 577-89. The court noted that the Act,
as originally drafted, "would have made tribal governments fully subject to all constitu-
tional restraints and requirements." 540 F.2d at 1044. Congress rejected that version,
however, because of the difficulties which would have resulted from attempting to recon-
cile certain culturally based tribal practices with basic constitutional principles, e.g.,
blood quantum requirements for tribal membership and voting, and the existence of tribal
theocracies. Id. The version which Congress ultimately adopted selectively incorporated
specific constitutional guarantees. Id. See Burnett, supra note 16, at 589-92.
1 540 F.2d at 1045 (footnote omitted). This standard is similar to the "sliding scale"
approach to equal protection articulated by Justice Marshall in Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970): "[Cloncentration must be placed upon the character of the classifi-
cation in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state
interests in support of the classification." Id. at 520-21 (dissenting opinion). See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).




ICRA. 9 These cases were found to be inapposite:
The fact that the blood quantum requirement has been sus-
tained furnishes little basis for upholding the discrimination in the
case at bar because [in the blood quantum cases] there is some
semblance of [a] basis for the classification. This is in terms of
ancestral lines and in maintaining the integrity of the membership.30
Turning to other cases wherein plaintiffs had relied upon
section 1302(8), the Tenth Circuit found that "[ilnvariably the
courts look to the Fourteenth Amendment. . . as a guide." '3' The
court ended its discussion of the precedents by acknowledging
decisions which had stressed the importance of recognizing tribal
traditions and cultural values.32 Thus, by the court's analysis,
both the legislative and the case history of the ICRA indicated
that a court should adopt a balancing test, administered in the
context of constitutional equal protection,33 to determine the va-
lidity of tribal laws challenged under section 1302(8) .31
The court was undoubtedly correct in refusing to apply a
See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); Slattery v. Arapahoe
Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
540 F.2d at 1046.
31 Id.
32 Id. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); Means
v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
" The court characterized the fourteenth amendment equal protection standard as a
"persuasive guide." 540 F.2d at 1047. The Tenth Circuit's standard is thus a combination
of two tests-a balancing test intermingled with traditional fourteenth amendment analy-
sis. Application of this standard would seem to require that the court first define what
individual interests were at stake in the litigation. Next the court would look to the
established mode of fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis which would nor-
mally apply when such an interest was involved. If, for example, the traditional approach
when dealing with a particular interest would require a mere "rational relationship"
between the tribal interest and the tribal action at issue, the court would consider the
factors to be balanced and determine whether the tribal interest merely outweighed the
private interest, since any preponderance of tribal interest over individual interest would
provide a rational basis for upholding the tribal action.
However, if under traditional fourteenth amendment analysis the private interest at
stake required strict judicial scrutiny of the challenged tribal action, a tribe would have
to show, on balance, that its interests so outweighed the individual interest as to satisfy
this stricter application of the balancing test. Seen in this light, the Tenth Circuit's
statement that it will use fourteenth amendment standards as a "persuasive guide" in the
application of its balancing test relates to the degree to which tribal interests will have to
predominate over individual interests on application of the court's balancing test. See
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
1 In the remaining discussion, the phrase "tribal law" will be used to denote any
tribal action subject to scrutiny under section 1302(8).
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purely constitutional standard of equal protection. The language
of the Act-prohibiting a tribe from denying "the equal protec-
tion of its laws" 35-contrasts with the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of the protection of the laws. This in itself seems to
support the application of a different standard in cases arising
under the ICRA. 31 Further, earlier cases interpreting section
1302(8) pointed out persuasive legislative history which indicated
that "in some respects the equal protection requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment should not be embraced in the Indian
Bill of Rights.
3 7
While it is true that many cases have looked to the four-
teenth amendment as a guide in interpreting the ICRA, it is not
true that the courts "invariably" do So.3 In fact, courts have been
singularly unsuccessful in formulating anything approaching a
broadly acceptable model of equal protection under the Act. 39
Typically, judicial theories as to the meaning of ICRA equal pro-
tection have varied with the type of classification made, or nature
of the rights affected, by tribal laws.40 Martinez is thus unusual
in its statement of a general approach that may be applicable to
a broad variety of factual settings.4'
u 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (emphasis added).
See Comment, Equal Protection Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 627, 632 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
17 Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Wounded Head
v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975); White Eagle v. One
Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
u See, e.g., Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.S.D. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975).
E.g., in Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
applied a balancing test in light of strict scrutiny equal protection because a tribal resi-
dency requirement affected fundamental rights. Yet in Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d
700 (9th Cir. 1973), the court held that a blood quantum requirement, affecting what could
be characterized as fundamental rights, would be valid if uniformly applied.
,0 Should tribes adopt Anglo-American practices they will generally find their laws
subject to constitutional equal protection analysis. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.
1973).
1 Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976), employed a
balancing test much like the one used in Martinez. In Howlett, however, the court specifi-
cally held that it was not formulating a general rule. Id. at 238-39.
One author has suggested a bifurcated model. Under this analysis a court would
merely require equal application of tribal laws which were found to be culturally based
and consistent with tribal standards of equality. Conversely, if a law had no cultural basis,
fourteenth amendment equal protection standards would apply. Equal Protection, supra
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The Supreme Court has declined to adopt a single model of
constitutional equal protection'" -a position which is consistent
with the approach suggested by the Tenth Circuit in Martinez.
3
The legislative history of the ICRA, and specifically section
1302(8), seems to mandate a flexible judicial response." Use of a
balancing test superimposed upon traditional constitutional
analysis would enable the courts to weigh more sensitively the
competing interests which will generally be present in these
cases.' 5 Yet, while the Tenth Circuit purported to engage in this
technique, an examination of the decision demonstrates that the
court did not adhere very strictly to its own formula.
note 36, at 633-34. This scheme, however, might allow a tribe to go to extreme lengths in
effectuating culturally based classifications. The courts' inability to reach certain tribal
action under this model could easily frustrate Congress' intent in enacting section 1302(8).
See Indian Bill of Rights, supra note 13, at 1362. While the author observes that British
courts have applied a standard similar to the one suggested in dealing with certain African
tribal cultures, Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 634, the analogy is inappropriate, for
British courts have no equivalent to the ICRA to influence their decisions. Further, the
legislative history of section 1302(8), and its incorporation of constitutional terms of art,
evidence congressional intent to extend greater protection to American Indians than is
contemplated by British statutes which give courts the power to invalidate African tribal
laws that are "repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience." Id. at 634 n.54.
See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1976).
,2 "Old equal protection" and "new equal protection" have been joined in recent
years by "newer equal protection." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). The "sliding-scale" approach sug-
gested by Justice Marshall, see note 28 supra, has never been supported by a majority of
the Court. See Note, Equal Protection: Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN.
L.J. 687, 715-19 (1976).
" The approach suggested in Martinez would not result in the application of one
identifiable "test" in all ICRA equal protection cases. Rather the courts would utilize a
flexible balancing test applied in the light of constitutional principles. See notes 28 and
31 supra and accompanying text.
" Cf. Indian Bill of Rights, supra note 13, at 1360-68 (outlining the different types of
problems to which courts will have to respond).
," While such an elastic standard might arguably be subject to judicial abuse, cases
decided under the ICRA strongly suggest that the courts will zealously safeguard tribal
prerogatives and will refrain from intervention in intratribal matters unless absolutely
necessary. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976) (upholding
a tribal residency requirement in the face of a balancing test requiring a compelling tribal
interest). Cf., e.g., Potts v. Bruce, 533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002
(1976) (no jurisdiction although plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations); but see Equal
Protection, supra note 36, at 629 (suggesting that the Tenth Circuit decision in Martinez
did not give enough weight to tribal interests).
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III. MEASURING THE ORDINANCE AGAINST THE ICRA
In defining the elements in Martinez which were to go into
its balancing test, the Tenth Circuit minimized the importance
of tribal interests in the ordinance. In brief, the court found that
the ordinance was not logically related to the cultural survival of
the Pueblo.4" Nor did tribal history support the Pueblo's argu-
ment that the ordinance embodied traditional patrilineal, patri-
local, or patricultural tribal values. 7 Rather the court concluded
that the ordinance was adopted in 1939 merely as an economic
and pragmatic response to an unprecedented increase in mixed
marriages which threatened to swell the Pueblo population and
deplete per capita resources. 8 While acknowledging the import-
ance of tribal power to define its own membership, the Tenth
Circuit characterized this particular ordinance as an arbitrary
solution to what was essentially a tribal economic problem and
not a matter of tribal integrity."9 In contrast, the court empha-
sized the individual's interest in tribal membership. This interest
was found to include "living in a particular cultural setting in
close relationship with fellow members, inheriting tribal rights,
and enjoying federal and other incidental benefits." 50 Moreover,
,1 The court is correct in the sense that the ordinance is not related to maintaining a
tribal blood quantum requirement. 540 F.2d at 1046. A hypothetical dramatically demon-
strates this: If a full-blooded Santa Claran female member (F') married a male non-
member (M') whose mother had been full-blooded Santa Claran but whose father was only
half-blood Santa Claran, all on his mother's side, the offspring of F' and MI, although of
more than 3/4 Santa Clara blood, would not be eligible for Pueblo membership under the
challenged ordinance. On the other hand, if a female nonmember with no Santa Clara
blood (F') married a male Pueblo member (MI) whose mother had no Santa Clara blood
but whose father was half-blooded Santa Claran, all on his father's side, all of their
offspring, although of only 1/4 Santa Clara blood, would qualify for Pueblo membership.
Repeating the above pattern through nine generations, the descendents of F' and M' would
still possess more than 3/4 Santa Clara blood yet would be ineligible for membership;
while descendants of F2 and M1, possessing less than 1/2000 Santa Clara blood, would
qualify for membership.
" 540 F.2d at 1047. The court noted that, before enactment of the ordinance, prob-
lems such as the one raised in Martinez were dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Id.
0 Id. The district court accorded more weight to the Pueblo's "economic" interest in
the ordinance, noting that "[t]he ability of the Pueblo to control the use and distribution
of its resources enhances its ability to maintain its cultural autonomy." Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 16 (D.N.M. 1975) (upholding the ordinance).
' 540 F.2d at 1048.
Id. at 1047 (footnote omitted). The district court specified three types of tribal
rights associated with membership: (1) political rights-to vote, to hold office, and to raise
matters before the Pueblo Council; (2) rights to Pueblo resources-land, water, hunting,
and fishing rights; and (3) residential rights-to live on the Pueblo. 402 F. Supp. at 14.
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those who faced exclusion under the terms of the ordinance were
not cultural outsiders to the Pueblo. They were "culturally, for
all practical purposes, Santa Clara Indians."
5'
Having indentified the interests at stake, the court applied
its balancing test in light of an equal protection standard calling
for strict scrutiny of the classification involved. The court clearly
adopted as its "persuasive guide '52 the essentials of an equal
protection analysis based on strict scrutiny. First, the court
placed upon the tribe the burden of justifying the ordinance; 53
this burden was not met. 5' Second, the court noted that the tribe
could have solved its problem in a manner less restrictive to the
rights of the affected individuals. 5 Finally, the court used the
familiar rhetoric of strict scrutiny analysis, holding that the tribal
interest in the ordinance was not "compelling.""
The Tenth Circuit is not the first court to approach section
1302(8) in this manner. In Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai
Tribes57 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a tribal residency
requirement violated ICRA equal protection. The court first as-
sumed that the challenged provision abridged certain fundamen-
tal rights protected by the Act." The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the trial court had been correct in subjecting the provision
to the compelling interest test. 9 Balancing the tribal interest at
stake against the plaintiffs' interest, the court upheld the provi-
sion, noting that "compelling interests justify the imposition of
[the] . . . residency requirement . . .,,0
1, 540 F.2d at 1048 (quoting Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18
(D.N.M. 1975)). This finding related only to the Martinez children. The ties of the other
class members to the Pueblo were not discussed.
52 See note 33 supra.
-" 540 F.2d at 1047. Once a court decides that governmental action should be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny, the Government has the burden of justifying its classifications.
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
1, 540 F.2d at 1047.
Is Id. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
" 540 F.2d at 1047. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
57 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
At issue were the right to travel and the right to seek office. Id. at 235.
' Id. at 242.
o Id. at 244. Application of strict scrutiny has usually signalled doom for the chal-
lenged governmental action. See Note, The Mandate for a New Equal Protection Model,
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In Howlett the court used strict scrutiny as its guide where
facts indicated that plaintiffs had been deprived of a basic consti-
tutional right traditionally associated with such a standard. In
Martinez the court preferred to look primarily at the classifica-
tion involved (sex) and not the rights affected.' By viewing sex
as a classification which invoked strict scrutiny-based analysis
the Tenth Circuit went farther than the Supreme Court had yet
gone, or indicated that it is likely to go.2 Moreover, a case arising
under the ICRA would seem to be a particularly inappropriate
place to extend the rule concerning sex-based classifications .
3
In light of the conflicting goals of the ICRA-to protect the
civil rights of individual Indians while preserving the quasi-
sovereign nature of the Indian tribes-it seems appropriate that
a court would engage in a balancing test when measuring a tribal
law against section 1302(8). However, to apply such a test in the
context of strict scrutiny is ill-considered when dealing with a
classification never before accorded such treatment. The better
course would be for the courts to adopt the approach suggested,
but not followed, by the Tenth Circuit in Martinez. That is, when
a challenged law is rooted in tribal tradition and cultural values,
a court would apply a balancing test in light of established four-
teenth amendment equal protection analysis. 4 However, when no
tribal cultural interest is involved, engaging in a balancing pro-
cess would be superfluous. This is essentially the reasoning un-
derlying those cases wherein tribes had adopted Anglo-American
practices.65
24 CAm. U. L. REv. 558, 559 (1975). However, Howlett is joined by a small number of
Supreme Court cases which have also upheld governmental action in the face of strict
scrutiny. See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
11 540 F.2d at 1046-47. While the court approached the case as a classification prob-
lem, in the balancing process it became clear that the court was also deeply concerned
with the nature and extent of the rights affected. Id. at 1047.
" None of the sex discrimination cases cited by the Tenth Circuit support application
of the strict scrutiny standard. 540 F.2d at 1047. Indeed, recent decisions emphasize that
the Supreme Court has no intention of requiring that sex-based classifications satisfy a
compelling interest test. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 97 S. Ct. 1192 (1977); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
0 See Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 629-30.
" See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 2172 (1977). See also note 33 supra.
11 E.g., Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Thus, a bifurcated standard is proposed." In each case the
court should first look to see whether a tribal law would violate
constitutional equal protection. If no tribal cultural interst is in-
volved, the court will apply the appropriate constitutional stan-
dard and end its analysis there. But if a tribal law is found to be
rooted in the tribal culture, and the tribal law would normally be
violative of constitutional equal protection, the court will proceed
to apply a balancing test in light of established equal protection
analysis.6
CONCLUSION
Having accepted a broad interpretation of federal jurisdic-
tion under the ICRA, the court in Martinez was faced with the
difficult task of giving substantive meaning to the Act's equal
protection clause. The Tenth Circuit purported to balance tribal
interests and cultural values against the individual interests af-
fected in light of established constitutional standards. Adopting
strict scrutiny analysis as the applicable constitutional model,"
the court overturned the ordinance, minimizing tribal arguments
that the sex-based distinction was culturally rooted. While the
Tenth Circuit was arguably correct in its result," utilization of
the hallmarks of strict scrutiny was inappropriate given the na-
ture of the classification involved.
" See Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 633-34 (suggesting the different bifurcated
model set out supra note 41).
" This bifurcated approach was implicitly adopted by the court in its treatment of
the case. Initially, the ordinance was measured against constitutional requirements. 540
F.2d at 1046-47. Only after it was found lacking under fourteenth amendment standards
did the court proceed to balance the interests according to its newly articulated test. Id.
at 1047. See note 33 supra.
" See note 33 supra.
" Had the Tenth Circuit applied its balancing test using established equal protection
principles as a guide, the same result might have been reached. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (sex discrimination), the Supreme Court held: "A classification 'must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated
are treated alike."' Id. at 76 (citation omitted). In Martinez the court concluded that the
ordinance was arbitrary, 540 F.2d at 1048, and unrelated to the tribal objective. 540 F.2d
at 1046 (by implication).
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RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ON
TERMINATION: RECENT TENTH CIRCUIT CASES
INTRODUCTION
When a government assumes the role of an employer, ques-
tions inevitably arise concerning an employee's rights when the
decision is made not to renew his employment contract or to fire
him. The employee may be entitled to procedural or substantive
protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' Last term the Tenth Circuit faced the issue of a govern-
mental employee's rights upon termination in several cases.'
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided two cases, Board of Re-
gents v. Roth3 and Perry v. Sindermann, 4 which set out a frame-
work for defining the liberty and property interests of government
employees that are protected by the fourteenth amendment.'
Roth concerned a professor who was hired for a one-year term to
teach at a state college; he had neither tenure nor a contractual
right to continued employment. Following the Board of Regents'
decision not to renew his contract for the following school year,
Roth brought a section 19836 action alleging infringement of lib-
erty and property interests. The Supreme Court held that to have
a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment a
"legitimate claim of entitlement" to the teaching position must
exist.7 Regarding liberty interests, the Supreme Court noted that
the failure to renew a contract was not, alone, a deprivation of
liberty within the scope of the amendment. The Court added that
a showing of serious damage to an individual's standing or asso-
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
I In addition to the cases commented upon herein, see Mogle v. Sevier County School
Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976); Sluder v. Dyson, No. 75-1589 (10th Cir., Aug. 9, 1976)
(Not for Routine Publication).
3 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
4 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See Shulman, Employment of Non-Tenured Faculty: Some
Implications of Roth and Sindermann, 51 DEN. L.J. 215 (1974).
5 Conceptually, these two cases have a basis in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
where the Court held that the requirements of procedural due process prohibited termina-
tion of welfare payments without a prior evidentiary hearing. See generally Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245
(1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 16 infra.
408 U.S. at 577.
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ciations in the community, or to an individual's opportunity to
gain further employment was required to prove the violation of a
liberty interest.'
In Sindermann, a companion case, the Court attempted to
define further the parameters of protected property interests.
Sindermann arose out of a Board of Regents' decision not to
renew the contract of Robert Sindermann, who had taught at
various state colleges for ten years, the last four of which had been
at a junior college under a series of one-year contracts. The college
had no formal provision for tenure; however it had established a
policy concerning the hiring of professors.' The Supreme Court
made it clear that the mere lack of a contractual or tenurial right
does not defeat an individual's property interest in his employ-
ment. The Court held that if a legitimate claim of entitlement to
continued employment existed then a proper due process hearing
must be held.'0 Additionally, the Court noted that a teacher, even
if not tenured, could not have the nonrenewal of his contract
based on exercise of first amendment freedoms."
Since 1972, courts have attempted to establish more pre-
cisely the type of liberty and property interests protected and the
manner in which that protection should be provided. When ana-
lyzing this complex problem it is important to note that courts
are generally reluctant to enter into the arena of government
personnel problems. While there is strong policy to afford a hear-
ing," the general consensus of the federal judiciary is that "the
Id. at 573.
The official publication for teachers provided:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administra-
tion of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he
displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and
as long as he is happy in his work.
408 U.S. at 600. Furthermore, guidelines issued by the Coordinating Board of the Texas
College and University System provided some form of job tenure for teachers who had
been employed in the state school system for seven years or more. 408 U.S. at 600 & n.6.
" Id. at 601-03.
Id. at 598. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
11 Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 530 F.2d 1335, 1341 (10th Cir.
1976) (quoting Jefferies v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974);
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir. 1974)).
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federal court is not the appropriate forum to review the multitude
of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies."' 3
I. THE FACTS AND FINDINGS
A. Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976)
In August, 1974, Governor Bruce King of New Mexico re-
moved John Mitchell from the Board of Regents of the Museum
of New Mexico. Mitchell had held this position since his appoint-
ment by King for a six-year term in 1971. King claimed that
Mitchell was removed for "neglect of duty and malfeasance."' 4
Mitchell alleged that the removal stemmed from an exercise of
his right of free speech. 5
Mitchell filed an action under section 1983's claiming that he
had served "faithfully, competently and with integrity" and that
the defendants had acted "willfully, maliciously, and intention-
ally" to deprive him of rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments. 7 The federal district court granted a
motion to dismiss, finding that Mitchell had no protected prop-
erty interest in the office, that no liberty interest had been in-
fringed, and that Mitchell's first amendment right had to be
balanced against "the state executive's interest in effectuating
his policy decisions.' 8 Mitchell appealed."
13 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1976). Accord, Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d
279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976);
Kalme v. West Va. Bd. of Regents, 539 F.2d 1346, 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Powers v. Mancos
School Dist. RE-6, 539 F.2d 38, 44 (10th Cir. 1976).
" King was acting under authority of N.M. CONST. art. 5, § 5, which provides that
the Governor "may remove any officer appointed by him for incompetency, neglect of duty
or malfeasance in office ....
"s The removal was related to a disagreement Mitchell had with King concerning who
should be elected president of the board. The removal came after Mitchell refused King's
request for his resignation. 537 F.2d at 387.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under the color of any statute. . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . .to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to any party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
" 537 F.2d at 387. See note 15 supra.
"' 537 F.2d at 388.
" On appeal, Mitchell alleged that removal violated his right to free speech, and
deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law. Since the trial court had
granted defendant's motion to dismiss, on appeal the factual allegations of the complaint
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Judge Barrett wrote the opinion for the Tenth Circuit and
both Judges Breitenstein and Doyle concurred in separate opin-
ions."0 To determine the existence of a property interest, Judge
Barrett looked to New Mexico law. Analyzing the New Mexico
Supreme Court's construction of state law, the court determined
that no property interest had been created." The court went on
to hold that injury to reputation was not a sufficient deprivation
of a protected liberty interest so as to invoke due process protec-
tion.2 Finally, the court held that Mitchell's first amendment
claim was without merit since limitations on speech are permissi-
ble to protect a substantial governmental interest."
B. Weathers v. West Yuma County School District R-J-1, 530
F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976)
Donald Weathers brought action under sections 1983 and
1985 2 seeking reversal of a federal district court decision2 1 that he
was not denied due process by the nonrenewal of his teacher's
contract. After a school board meeting in February, 1972,
had to be taken as true and all reasonable inferences had to be drawn in favor of the
complainant. Id. at 386.
" Judge Breitenstein concurred in the result, but could not concur in "much of the
supportive reasoning." Id. at 391. He took special exception to the court's reliance on Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), arguing that the court overstated that case's import. For a
discussion of Davis, see text accompanying notes 80-84 infra. In his concurring opinion,
Judge Doyle expressed similar concern about the court's reliance on Paul v. Davis and
"the apparent tendency of the [court's] opinion to expand and exalt the state's role in
defining federally protected rights." 537 F.2d at 392.
1, 537 F.2d at 390. The court relied upon the Governor's power under the New Mexico
Constitution to remove individuals from public office. Id.
22 Id. The court also held that injury to reputation was not deprivation of a protected
property interest. Id.
1 Id. at 391. The court held that the Governor could remove policymaking appointees
for political reasons, which include expressions made by the appointee in contravention
of the Governor's policy goals. Id.
' 530 F.2d at 1336. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) provides:
[Ilf one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) is quoted in note 16 supra.
2 Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo.
1974). After a court trial, the district judge held that Weathers had shown neither the
objective expectancy required for a property interest nor the infringement of a liberty
interest. Id. at 559-60.
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Weathers was informed by the principal that his contract might
not be renewed. At this time Weathers was given a copy of notes
taken at the meeting by the principal which stated several rea-
sons for not renewing Weathers' contract.26 At a meeting the next
day, the school board president refused to disclose the complain-
ants' identities to Weathers. In March the board voted unani-
mously not to renew Weathers' contract; no reasons were given
for nonrenewal.2 In his complaint, Weathers alleged that he was
deprived of liberty and property without due process of law and
that the board's action was arbitrary and unreasonable. 8 Weath-
ers did not allege that nonrenewal of his contract resulted from
the exercise of free speech or another constitutional right.
Judge Hill, writing for the Tenth Circuit, found that a school
board procedure concerning the manner in which citizen com-
plaints were to be handled by the board was not connected with
employment procedures in such a way as to give rise to the legiti-
mate expectancy necessary for a property interest. 2 The court
also held that evidence presented to establish foreclosure of op-
portunities for other employment was not sufficient to show the
violation of a protected liberty interest.?0 Regarding the question
of arbitrary and capricious state action, the Tenth Circuit held
that substantive due process protection was not greater than the
protection provided by procedural due process.3 Since no liberty
or property interest was found to exist, no substantive due process
protection was afforded.32
21 The copy of the note that was given to Weathers read as follows:
Swore or called a boy a bad name after the Brush game
Has too much busy work in class that doesn't figure into grade
Student prepared a 3-page assignment, handed it in and wasn't look[ed]
at
In group contest discussion, total group gets the same grade, regardless of
degree of participation by individuals.
530 F.2d at 1336 (footnote omitted).
"Id.
Id. at 1337-40.
Id. at 1338. Parental complaints regarding Weathers were not referred to the super-
intendent of schools as required by the policy. Weathers argued that the policy created
"an objective expectancy that he would not be denied renewal because of parental com-
plaints without a prior administrative effort to adjust such complaints." Id. The procedure
in question is set out in note 63 infra. Additionally, the board had a policy that it could
terminate nontenured teachers "without cause." 530 F.2d at 1338.
530 F.2d at 1339-40.
" Id. at 1340.
I d. at 1340-42.
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C. Powers v. Mancos School District RE-6, 539 F.2d 38 (10th
Cir. 1976)
Ronald Powers was a nontenured teacher employed by the
Mancos School District in Colorado. 31 In his third year of teach-
ing, Powers' principal did not recommend that his contract be
renewed and advised the school board that a better teacher could
be hired. The school board voted unanimously not to renew Pow-
ers' contract. No reasons for nonrenewal were given, nor were any
reasons ever publicly stated.3" After trial, the district court held
that Powers had not sustained the burden of showing that his
contract was not renewed for a constitutionally impermissible
reason, nor had he proven the existence of a protected liberty
interest."
Powers alleged on appeal that nonrenewal of his contract
violated his "academic freedom" as protected by the first amend-
ment, that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law,
and that he was dismissed, in part, for a constitutionally imper-
missible reason .3 No property interest, as such, was alleged.
Judge Barrett wrote the Tenth Circuit opinion, with Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Seth concurring.37 Judge Barrett, relying
3 Absent agreement to the contrary, a teacher in Colorado does not acquire tenure
until his fourth year. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-112(1) (1973). In his second year of teach-
ing, Powers became President of the Mancos Education Association. The following year
he was a candidate for mayor of Mancos. 539 F.2d at 40.
3, 539 F.2d at 41.
" The lower court decisions are Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 391 F. Supp.
322 (D. Colo. 1975) and Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 369 F. Supp. 648 (D. Colo.
1973). The first cite is the trial court's decision to dismiss with prejudice Powers' case since
he has not sustained his burden in showing that a liberty interest had been infringed or
that his contract had not been renewed for exercise of his first amendment rights. 391 F.
Supp. at 326. The latter cite refers to the trial court's determination, upon defendant's
motion to dismiss, that Powers' claim that his first and fourteenth amendment rights had
been infringed stated a claim for which relief could be granted. 369 F. Supp. at 649.
11 Powers felt that the decision not to renew his contract was based on criticisms he
had aimed at the board, his actions while president of the local teachers' association and
his use of "Jesus Christ Superstar" as a teaching device. 539 F.2d at 43.
11 Chief Judge Lewis felt that the case presented "no new nor novel question of law"
and therefore no long dissertation was necessary. Id. at 44. Judge Seth agreed that there
was neither a liberty interest nor dismissal for a constitutionally impermissible reason,
but disagreed with Judge Barrett's analysis of the case. Judge Seth felt that since no
liberty or property interest was found, the case was well within Roth and Sindermann.
Additionally, he found the trial court's decision that the nonrenewal of Powers' contract
was not in response to exercise of Powers' first amendment rights was supported by the
record. Id. at 45.
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on Weathers, decided that no protected liberty interest existed,
and upheld the trial court's determination that Powers had failed
to prove he was dismissed for exercising first amendment rights. 8
D. Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976)
Billy Prebble was informed during his third year as a profes-
sor at the University of Wyoming that he had not been awarded
tenure, and therefore, according to university policy, had a final
year in which to seek other employment. Prebble apparently
missed some eight days of teaching during the fall semester of his
final year, and in January, 1973, he was conditionally relieved of
all teaching duties for the spring semester. At that time the dean
of the college where Prebble taught recommended to the presi-
dent of the university that Prebble be terminated. A hearing was
held before the Tenure and Promotion Committee in February,
1973. There was some dispute concerning the procedures followed
at this hearing, but Prebble was afforded an opportunity to ex-
plain his absences on the days in question. Prebble asserted that
he "taught every class, although he was physically absent"' 9 at
times due either to job interviewing or to elk hunting.
At trial Prebble contended that he was discharged for exer-
cising his first amendment rights of free speech and association. 0
Additionally, he alleged that the procedures used at the hearing
did not meet the requirements of procedural due process." A jury
returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants. On appeal,
Prebble claimed that certain procedures at the trial level were
handled incorrectly 2 and that the proof clearly demonstrated
that he was denied due process at the hearing. Further, he argued
that he was terminated for the exercise of first amendment rights.
3' Id. at 42-43.
535 F.2d at 608.
Prebble alleged that his support of a department head who was about to be re-
placed, his outspokenness at faculty meetings, and his different teaching philosophies
were the reason for his dismissal. Id. at 609.
" Prebble objected to the fact that at the hearing he was neither given the names of
students whose statements were used as a basis for his dismissal nor permitted to cross-
examine them. Id. at 616.
12 Prebble argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the case against the univer-
sity, in directing a verdict for the trustees, in submitting an interrogatory on "neglect of
duty," in placing the burden of showing malice and lack of good faith on him, and in
selecting the verdict form. Id. at 609.
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Assuming the existence of a property interest,'3 the Tenth
Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Holloway, looked to the
issue of what process was due. The court found that Prebble had
been given notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard."
Possible objections to the hearing procedures were not persuasive
because Prebble personally had admitted the absences which
formed the basis for the discharge." Further, the court held that
Prebble had not carried the burden of proving that he was dis-
charged for exercising first amendment rights."
II. PROPERTY INTERESTS
A. Existence of Property Interests
Property interests arise not only from the traditional con-
cepts of property but also from legitimate claims of entitlement.,'
An entitlement may take the form, for example, of a lawyer's
license or a social security pension."8 To be protected by proce-
dural due process, an entitlement must be more than a mere
subjective expectancy in the mind of the claiming party; instead,
there must be a reasonable expectation to the entitlement."
When a claimed property interest is outside the scope of
"traditional property," the inquiry focuses upon the existence of
"rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
'3 The court assumed this point because it was not briefed. Id. at 614. The theory is
that since the teacher is hired for the school year, he thus has a legitimate expectancy
that he would complete the year. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952); Jefferies v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974).
" 535 F.2d at 616.
SId.
A Id. at 617.
,T Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
' See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8
(1970); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1, 3 (4th
Cir. 1973). In determining the presence of an expectancy, no distinction may be drawn
between a right and a privilege. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). Accord Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) where the dissent notes: "[Tihe Court's approach is a
resurrection of the discredited rights/privileges distinction, for a State may now avoid all
due process safeguards attendant upon the loss of even the necessities of life . . . merely
by labelling them as not constituting property." Id.
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support claims of entitlement to those benefits."50 These rules or
understandings must find a basis in some source independent of
the Constitution, such as state law.
51
To determine if a property interest existed in Mitchell, the
Tenth Circuit looked to the applicable state law as construed by
the New Mexico Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit relied heav-
ily upon State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez5 which held that the
Governor had the power to remove government officials ap-
pointed for a term of years. 3 The Tenth Circuit used this case as
the basis for deciding that under New Mexico law Mitchell, like
the government employees in Ulrick, could be removed at the
discretion of the Governor.
In interpreting Ulrick, the New Mexico Supreme Court had
said that when the Governor, as head of the executive branch,
assigns a reason for his action which is within the purview of the
New Mexico Constitution, that statement of reasons is conclusive
upon the courts.5 Essentially, the New Mexico court saw the
issue as one of separation of powers. Although action by the exec-
utive branch of a state government may be binding on that state's
judicial branch, that action is not binding on a federal court."
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
" Id. Accord, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Gotkin v. Miller, 514 F.2d
125, 128 (2d Cir. 1975). Bishop v. Wood involved a police officer who was dismissed for
cause. In the ordinance providing for dismissal for cause, certain procedures were outlined
which the city manager had to follow. The majority of the Court held that these proce-
dures determined the extent of the property interest involved. 426 U.S. at 344-45. In
dissent, Justice White argued that this view was incompatible with Roth, and having
granted a petitioner a right to his job unless there is cause to fire him, "it is the Federal
Constitution, not state law, which determines the process to be applied in connection with
any state decision to deprive him of it." Id. at 360-61. Further, he noted that the Court
had rejected the majority view in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In a separate
dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that there was a federal dimension to a property right.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 353. He also read Roth as not limiting the "independent
source" of property rights to state laws. Id.
52 32 N.M. 265, 255 P. 1077 (1927).
53 Id. at 291, 255 P. at 1087.
" In a subsequent case, Ulrick was cited for the proposition that the right to hold
public office is not a property right. Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 385, 362 P.2d
771, 774 (1961). It is unlikely after Roth and Sindermann whether such a proposition,
without more, could suffice to explain whether a reasonable expectation to entitlement
existed. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
Hutchens v. Jackson, 37 N.M. 325, 336-37, 23 P.2d 355, 365-66 (1933) (interpreting
N.M. CONST. art. 3, § 1).




The executive department of a state is not a coequal of the federal
judiciary and the federal judiciary is not bound by state executive
action. Since the ascription of reasons by the Governor is not
binding upon a federal court, in theory such a court is not pre-
cluded from finding a property interest in this situation.57
In a federal court, not bound by state executive action, the
determination of what construction of state law to apply might
focus upon whether a New Mexico court, without the limitations
imposed by separation of powers, would find a property interest.
In this context Eyring v. Board of Regents" may limit Ulrick. In
Eyring, the New Mexico Supreme Court construed a state statute
providing that a university president could only be removed "for
cause." The court held that the statute required formal charges
to be made and opportunity to be heard afforded. Failure to fol-
low these procedures voided an attempted removal. 9 Mitchell
also concerned the dismissal of a public official "for cause."
Therefore, in theory, under Eyring Mitchell should have been
formally charged and given an opportunity to be heard.
B. Effect of Policymaking Official Status
In Mitchell, the Tenth Circuit drew a distinction between
employees in policymaking positions and employees mainly in-
volved in day-to-day administrative activities of a government
agency. 0 The fact that an individual occupies a policymaking
position does not necessarily preclude a finding that he has a
protected property interest in continued employment.' However,
an executive, at least arguably, should have more power to re-
move employees in policymaking positions than he has with re-
spect to general employees, because making policy is one of the
functions and responsibilities of the executive. 2 The Tenth Cir-
'" However, the argument could be made that because the federal court must define
the property interest in terms of state law, the federal court should bind itself as would
the state court. It seems more likely that a federal court would not find itself so precluded.
See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" 59 N.M. 3, 277 P.2d 550 (1954).
" Id. at 8, 277 P.2d at 552-53.
537 F.2d at 391.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
62 The theory is that the Governor is responsible for the executive function and so
those who exercise similar functions should be responsible to the executive. Conversely,
the six-year term of museum regents theoretically might operate as a limit on the exercise
of executive power. Similarly, a "for cause" provision may have the same purpose.
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cuit did not make an in-depth analysis of this issue; rather, it
merely stated that policymaking appointees could be removed by
the Governor for political reasons, and that notice or a hearing
was not required." The court failed to discuss whether the term-
of-years provision or the "for cause" provision created a restric-
tion on the Governor's powers sufficient to create a reasonable
expectancy amounting to a protected property interest.
C. The Effect of Additional Procedures
A government may be able to dismiss an employee without
affording him procedural safeguards, but once such procedures
are established, they must be followed." In Weathers it was
argued that a school board policy concerning the handling of
complaints" gave Weathers the expectancy that those procedures
would be followed. Weathers argued that this expectancy rose to
the level of a protected property interest and the failure of the
" 537 F.2d at 391. The Governor's power to remove for political reasons "encompasses
removal for expressions made by the appointee in contravention of the policy goals of the
governor." Id.
" The theory is that once procedures are established, they raise an expectation that
the procedures will be followed. This expectation creates a property right that cannot be
taken without due process of law. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
The procedure reads as follows:
Individuals or groups often confront a single board member with issues
which usually should be handled by the Superintendent of Schools. In those
instances of apparent exception, it is suggested that the board member with-
hold an expression of opinion or commitment until the matter has been
presented to the Board of Education. It is often wise for the board member
to postpone the formulation of his own opinion until he has had the benefit
of hearing the issue discussed by the Board of Education where other aspects
of the problem are considered. A board member should not obligate other
members of the Board of Education by predicting how they will vote on any
issue.
In carrying out the policy for the handling of complaints the Board will,
therefore, observe the following procedure. Neither the Board of Education
as a unit nor any individual member will entertain or consider communica-
tion or complaints from teachers, parents, or patrons, until they have first
been referred to the Superintendent of Schools. Only in those instances
where satisfactory adjustment cannot be made by the Superintendent and
his assistants, shall communications and complaints be referred to the
Board. After hearing evidence submitted by the Superintendent, in such
event, the Board of Education will, if it deems advisable, grant a hearing to
the parties interested. Such a hearing may be held during executive session
of the Board.
530 F.2d at 1337-38.
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school board to comply with the procedures amounted to a viola-
tion of procedural due process. 6 The Tenth Circuit found that the
procedure was not related to decisions as to whether an individual
would be rehired, nor did it involve in any way the rehiring pro-
cess."7 Furthermore, the court stated that a "without cause"
clause in Weathers' contract negated any objective expectancy
that such procedure would be followed exclusively. 8
III. LIBERTY INTEREST
Due process also protects against state deprivation of liberty
interests. The initial criterion for judging whether a protected
liberty interest exists was stated in Roth: "Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him, notice and opportunity to be
heard are essential." 9 The Court in Roth made it clear that a
government does not infringe upon a liberty interest by the mere
failure to rehire an employee. 0 The Court focused on two basic
areas for determining the scope of protected liberty interests: the
protection of good name, reputation, honor or integrity; and the
ability to take advantage of other employment opportunities.7'
A. Foreclosure of Employment Opportunities
It is difficult to ascertain the standard that should be applied
to determine whether future employment opportunities have
been so impaired as to constitute infringement of a protected
liberty interest. In Roth, the Court felt that "[m]ere proof, for
example, that his [petitioner's] record of nonretention in one
job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclo-
sure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty.' "72
" The argument was that since the prescribed procedures were not followed, action
by the board in contravention of this policy would be void. See id. at 1338.
7 Id.
U Id. The talisman "without cause" seems to serve the function of negating any
procedures established. Although this concept may not be necessary to the analysis in
Weathers, the court seems to indicate that a gcvernmental agency may negate any proce-
dure established-no matter how essential to the decision involved-by merely ascribing
the term "without cause" to a contract. This seems a dangerous and unnecessary exten-
sion.
" 408 U.S. at 573 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
408 U.S. at 573.
I ld.
12 Id. at 574 n.13.
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The concern is with the type of "stigma" which would seriously
damage the opportunity to obtain other employment."3 From this
stigma, a tangible loss of liberty may be implied. 4 The Tenth
Circuit in Weathers adopted a "practical test" to determine
whether a stigma of sufficient magnitude resulted from the gov-
ernment's action.15 This test looks not only to whether the charges
are of the type that would likely stigmatize someone but also to
whether an individual's opportunity for future employment has,
in fact, been foreclosed. In this context, evidence of attempts to
obtain other employment becomes important."
While reiterating the principle that mere proof of nonrenewal
was insufficient to invoke the protection of procedural due pro-
cess, the Tenth Circuit in Weathers clarified the extent of foreclo-
sure necessary to violate a liberty interest. The court held that
more than a "disadvantage in obtaining other employment"
must be shown; instead, the plaintiff must show the type of
stigma that seriously damages the opportunity for other employ-
ment.'
The difficulty with a practical test for determining whether
opportunities are so foreclosed as to give rise to a protected liberty
11 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 659
(8th Cir. 1976); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th
Cir. 1975); Brouillette v. Board of Directors of Merged Area IX, 519 F.2d 126, 127 (8th
Cir. 1975); Lake Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community Col-
lege, 518 F.2d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976); Buhr v. Buffalo
Pub. School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1974); Abeyta v. Town of Taos,
499 F.2d 323, 327 (10th Cir. 1974).
" See Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1976).
, 530 F.2d at 1339. See also LaBorde v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 510 F.2d 590 (5th
Cir. 1975); Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Blair v. Board of
Regents, 496 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1974); Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973); Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972). But see
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974).
,1 Theoretically, a demonstration that a significant number of job opportunities had
been foreclosed and that this was directly related to the reasons for termination of the
employee would give rise to an inference that a protected liberty interest had been in-
fringed.
530 F.2d at 1339.
Id. See Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir.
1975). The court in Weathers held that the evidence of two unsuccessful attempts to
obtain other employment was insufficient to demonstrate an infringement of a liberty
interest in theory or in fact. 530 F.2d at 1339. Drawing upon the Weathers precedent the
court in Powers accented the fact that no reasons were given to Powers for his nonrenewal.
This arguably made the claim less substantial than the one made in Weathers where the
reasons were "not substantial" or "denied or explained." 539 F.2d at 42-43.
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interest centers upon the fact that the evidence of foreclosure will
generally be available only after-often a long time after-the
nonrenewal of the employment contract. If this evidence is suffi-
cient to require a due process hearing, the fact that the hearing
must necessarily be held some time after the nonrenewal could
work a hardship for either side of the controversy. Under some
circumstances it may become impossible to provide a full due
process hearing because a requisite element of due process is that
the hearing be held at a meaningful time,79 and this may be
impossible under the circumstances. On the other hand, the
practical test more closely reflects actual events, which is in line
with the theory that due process must be flexible in order to
protect the individual. 0
B. Protection for Good Name, Reputation, Honor, and Integrity
In Paul v. Davis' the Supreme Court narrowed the area of
due process protection against government infringement of a per-
son's good name or reputation. The case concerned the distribu-
tion by police of a notice to local merchants identifying Davis as
a "known shoplifter."" The Court, over a vigorous dissent, held
that although a "classic case of defamation" had been estab-
lished,83 defamation was not sufficient to invoke the guarantees
of procedural due process "absent an accompanying loss of gov-
ernment employment.
84
Paul v. Davis is the basis of the Tenth Circuit's discussion
of liberty interests in Mitchell. The court ignores the distinction
made in Davis between injury to reputation and injury to reputa-
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McGrath, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
" Davis was arrested and charged with shoplifting. He pleaded not guilty and the
case was filed away with leave to reinstate, which left the charge outstanding. Subse-
quently, the police distributed the flyer and shortly afterwards the shoplifting charge was
dropped. Id. at 695-96.
'0 Id. at 697.
" Id. at 706. The case did not deal with the problem of remarks which might cause
harm to reputation made in connection with the nonrenewal or firing of an individual. Id.
at 709. The Supreme Court went on to note that an injury to reputation which is uncon-
nected with government employment or which does not deprive an individual of a right
previously held under state law is protected by state tort law and is not a protected interest
under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 712.
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tion when it relates to government employment.8 5 Arguably,
Mitchell's stature as a nonsalaried policymaking official altered
his status as a mere government "employee," and made him more
susceptible to an injury to reputation. The court, however, by
failing to make the injury-related-to-employment distinction
does not reach this question.
The Tenth Circuit relied on Adams v. Walkere6 as additional
support for its finding that no violation of Mitchell's liberty had
occurred. In Adams the Seventh Circuit held that "use of the
talismanic phrase 'incompetence, neglect of duty and malfeas-
ance in office' in effecting the plaintiff's discharge was plainly to
satisfy the state Constitution and did not take liberty without due
process of law." 7 The Tenth Circuit applied this idea to Governor
King's use of the phrase "neglect of duty and malfeasance." The
phrase was the official basis for removing Mitchell from the
Board of Regents and served merely as the means by which King
satisfied the New Mexico Constitution. By using the phrase King
was able to remove Mitchell without infringing upon a protected
property interest.8 Furthermore, no liberty interest was infringed
" The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Davis must be read in light of the separate
concurring opinions of Judges Breitenstein and Doyle which limit the sweep of the court's
opinion, especially since Judge Barrett expressed agreement with Judge Breitenstein's
analysis of Davis. 537 F.2d at 392. Referring to a footnote in Davis, Judge Breitenstein
noted that section 1983 protects not only against governmental actions which deprive an
individual of rights having a genesis in state law, but also protects those interests guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 391-92. Judge Doyle expressed similar concern in "the
apparent tendency of the opinion to expand and exalt the state's role in defining federally
protected rights." Id. at 392.
None of the opinions in Mitchell refers to the distinction drawn in other circuits
between injury to reputation alone and the same injury when connected with employment.
Huntley v. Community School Bd., 543 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Cir. 1976); Colaizzi v. Walker,
542 F.2d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1976); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361,
365 (9th Cir. 1976).
- 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974). In Adams, the Governor of Illinois removed a member
of the Liquor Control Commission for "cause" and "for incompetence, neglect of duty and
malfeasance." Id. at 1004.
,1 Id. at 1007. The charge made in Adams was considered to have less effect upon an
individual's freedom to secure other employment than allegations relating to immorality
or dishonesty. Id. at 1008. Judge, now Justice, Stevens in his concurring opinion counseled
that the concept of "malfeasance" depends upon its context. Id. at 1010.
m If Governor King had removed Mitchell without using this phrase he would have
infringed a protected property interest because Mitchell had a legitimate expectancy that
he would not be removed from his position absent "neglect of duty and malfeasance." See
text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
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since in that context the words used have no further meaning and
no inference can be drawn to reflect upon Mitchell's good name.89
As a result of the Tenth Circuit's application of Adams in
Mitchell, words that would normally result in the infringement
of a liberty interest (because of their opprobrious meaning to the
community at large) do not do so because of the context in which
they are used. The words must be used to avoid violation of a
property interest.
C. Disclosure
An accusation that would injure a person's good name would
probably also lessen or foreclose his opportunities to find other
employment, especially when these reasons are disclosed to the
public or prospective employers. That disclosure is a crucial fact
where liberty interests are concerned was illustrated by the recent
case of Bishop v. Wood,9" where the Supreme Court held that
false reasons can be the basis for discharge or nonrenewal as long
as they are not broadcast.' Similarly, the Second Circuit has held
that the manner in which personnel records were disclosed, cou-
pled with procedures whereby employees were given neither rea-
sons for dismissal nor hearings, encouraged the very harm that
Roth and Sindermann meant to prevent.2
Since disclosure problems do not occur until the state has in
Arrelano v. Lopez, 81 N.M. 389, 391-92, 467 P.2d 715, 717 (1970). See Adams v.
Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1015 (7th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion). It should be noted that
the New Mexico Supreme Court has determined malfeasance to be something done wholly
wrongfully or without authority. Additionally, if an act is discretionary, it needs to be done
with an improper or corrupt motive. This definition does not affect the finding of a liberty
interest since that is defined by context of federal constitutional law. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975). Accord Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355 (1976) (White, J., dissenting);
Thurston v. Deckle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976).
-0 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
" Id. at 348.
," Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 427 U.S. 904
(1976). Retired Justice Tom Clark, sitting by designation, wrote for the court:
The appellees could change their disclosure procedures to prevent the dis-
semination of derogatory and possibly stigmatizing allegations unless notice
of the charges and a hearing are first afforded to the dischargee. Otherwise,
rudimentary procedural due process requires that such notice of charges and
a hearing be afforded before a dismissal can be effective.
525 F.2d at 337. See Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 1976); Greenhill v. Bailey,
519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1199
(8th Cir. 1974).
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some way published the reasons for nonrenewal, 3 in theory, a
hearing may be required where one would not be absent disclo-
sure. This results from the fact that disclosure might injure the
employee's reputation or foreclose other job opportunities. Again,
the hearing might not be held for some time after the alleged
incidents occurred, harming either or both parties. Even though
the disclosed reasons are not of the type which would normally
be considered stigmatizing, the fact that these reasons may be
false could be sufficient to require a hearing. 4
There are, however, limitations on the protection afforded
after disclosure. If the reasons for nonrenewal of a contract are
disclosed after an injury to reputation has allegedly occurred,
those reasons cannot serve retroactively to support the claim. 5
Furthermore, the reasons disclosed at a public hearing held on
the request of the person cannot serve as a basis for a claim.
In Powers, where no reasons had been disclosed for the nonre-
newal of the plaintiffs contract, the court had the opportunity to
discuss whether some future disclosure of a stigmatizing nature
would be grounds for a hearing. The court decided that there was
no need for a predisclosure hearing,97 but did not address the
question of whether a hearing should be held on disclosure of the
stigmatizing reasons, or in what circumstances a hearing would
be appropriate. In Weathers, the court looked to the reasons that
were given for nonrenewal, and, although they were either ex-
plained or denied, held that a due process hearing was not re-
" See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 352 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" This could be likely when specific factual incidents or objective characteristics are
the basis for not renewing a contract or firing an employee, rather than some subjective
conclusion as to the ability of an individual. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th
Cir. 1975) (hearing required where denigration of ability and not just performance); Lake
Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College, 518 F.2d 1091,
1096 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976) (hearing required where honesty or
integrity is at question); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (charge
of mental instability grounds for a hearing); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319-20 (4th
Cir. 1973) (accusation of fraud impinged upon a liberty interest). But see Stretten v.
Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1976) (incompetence not suffi-
cient); Blair v. Board of Regents, 496 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1974) (failure to meet
minimum standards not sufficient).
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
" Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 1976).
,7 539 F.2d at 42.
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quired since the plaintiff had not demonstrated the stigmatizing
nature of the charges."
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Due process as embodied in the fourteenth amendment pro-
vides not only procedural protection of individual rights against
governmental intrusion but substantive protection as well. Ac-
cording to one theory, substantive due process is a specific consti-
tutional protection in itself, provided by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and is invoked when the government acts in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.99 The more predominant theory is that
substantive due process protection is conditioned on the infringe-
ment of a specific constitutional right. 00 In the latter case, the
rights protected are not confined to those enumerated in the Bill
of Rights. 10
A. Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Right of Its
Own Accord
In Weathers and Powers, the Tenth Circuit faced the ques-
tion of whether substantive due process operates as a constitu-
tional restriction in its own right on arbitrary and capricious state
action. In Weathers, the court adopted the view that substantive
due process does not afford more protection than that provided
by procedural due process.0 2 The basic rationale behind this view
was expressed by Judge, now Justice, Stevens in the following
manner: "[C]ertainly the constitutional right to substantive due
process is no greater than the right to procedural due process.
Accordingly, the absence of any claim by the plaintiff that an
" Id.
At one time, substantive due process by itself was thought to be a strong source of
protection against the intrusion by the government into economic affairs. Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Supreme Court, however, later adopted the present view
that such regulations are valid if reasonably related to valid legislative purposes. West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist.,
451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971).
11 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976); Mescia v. Berry; 406 F. Supp. 1181,
1194 (D.S.C. 1974).
"I St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has
extended the scope of specific constitutional rights to include such things as the right to
travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
"2 530 F.2d at 1342.
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interest in liberty or property has been impaired is a fatal defect
in her 'substantive' due process argument."'0 3 Under this view,
substantive due process protection is provided against depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property, and, necessarily, the lack of a
liberty or property interest precludes any substantive due process
argument. Under this theory, if a state may dismiss an employee
for no reason at all and thereby prevent the expectancy required
for a property interest from arising,0 4 the state may premise its
action upon reasons unsupported by facts'' or in circumstances
where discharge of the employee "was a mistake and based on
incorrect information."'0 6 In Weathers, the Tenth Circuit found
that there was no property or liberty interest,07 and in Powers
that there was no protected liberty interest. 08 Consequently, no
substantive due process protection was available in either case.' 9
B. Substantive Due Process Protection Against an Infringement
of a Constitutional Right
Substantive due process may, however, protect against in-
fringement of a right guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion. Even though no cognizable property or liberty interest exists
"0 Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974). Accord
Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist.
No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1974); Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658
(7th Cir. 1974). Contra, Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir.
1971), which expresses the opposing view that an individual should be protected against
arbitrary and capricious state action regardless of the property and liberty interest in-
volved.
"0' A property interest, of course, requires that an individual have a reasonable ex-
pectancy to an entitlement; if dismissal can be for no reason, it obviates such an expect-
ancy. See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
"I Compare Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974)
with Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir. 1971).
" Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
101 530 F.2d at 1338-40.
1" 539 F.2d at 42-43. The court found that there was no protected liberty or property
interest although there was no allegation of infringement of a property interest. Id. at 41-
42. The finding that no property interest existed was required because of the way the court
analyzed the substantive due process issue. The court determined that if no liberty or
property interest exists, no substantive due process protection is afforded. Id. at 43.
* Essentially substantive due process, as a protection in and of itself, may not be
sufficient since a decision need not be based upon reasons supported by the facts. Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). However, where the government discloses these unsup-
ported reasons, substantive due process may be relevant since the scope changes from
reasons for dismissal to reasons which may be considered to carry the government's asser-
tion that these facts are true. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
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in the employment relationship, a state may not fire an employee
or fail to renew his contract for a constitutionally impermissible
reason-especially where first amendment rights are concerned."'
Where an employee is discharged for exercising a constitutional
right-such as a teacher speaking publicly against a school board
position"'-the action is considered arbitrary and capricious and
the employee is protected by substantive due process.2
Mitchell, Powers and Prebble all involved first amendment
claims. In Mitchell, the court held that the plaintiffs assertion
that he was dismissed for exercising his first amendment rights
was without merit,"3 and therefore no substantive due process
protection was available. The court relied upon the fact that re-
gents occupied policymaking positions, and from this reasoned
that expressions made in contravention of a policy goal set by the
Governor were within permissible grounds for removal." 4 Thus,
the political context and status of the speaker change the nature
of the protection. Arguably, then, removal was not for the expres-
sion, per se, but rather for the political differences evidenced by
those expressions.5
C. Burden of Proof
In both Powers"' and Prebble,"7 the Tenth Circuit stated
"' Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976); Prince
v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1976); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171
(10th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th
Cir. 1975); Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Gieringer v. Center
School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 857
(5th Cir. 1970); Comment, Teachers' Speech and First Amendment Rights, 53 DEN. L.J.
95 (1976).
"' See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
"I Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4-5 n.12 (7th Cir. 1974);
Mescia v. Berry, 406 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.S.C. 1974).
537 F.2d at 391.
"' Id. See Indiana State Employees Ass'n v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974).
"' The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, holding that attitude was insepara-
bly intertwined with protected first amendment expression, reversed a lower court deci-
sion upholding the dismissal of probationary employees based not on the statements
made, but rather on the attitude evidenced by those statements. Tygrett v. Washington,
543 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revg 346 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1972).
539 F.2d at 41.
, 535 F.2d at 617.
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that the plaintiffs failed to establish the fact that they were dis-
missed for exercising their first amendment rights. The Tenth
Circuit, among others, has determined that the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to show that he was dismissed for a constitu-
tionally impermissible reason."18 Where no claim is made that
termination was due to the exercise of a constitutional right, a
presumption of regularity cloaks official action."9 However, where
such a claim is made it must be examined to insure that the
termination of employment is not in retaliation for the exercise
of rights protected by the Constitution.'20
The Supreme Court recently indicated that where plausible
and valid claims of infringement of a constitutionally protected
interest exist, the burden of proving that nonrenewal was not
based on an impermissible reason may shift to the Govern-
ment.'2 ' In the recent case of Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,'22 the Court addressed the problem
of whether an individual could be dismissed for reasons only some
"' Prince v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell County
School Dist. No. 1, 511 F.2d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1975); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist.
No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1974); Callahan v. Price, 505 F.2d 83, 87 (5th
Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 513 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975);
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339 (10th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974); Calvin v. Rupp, 471 F.2d 1346, 1350 (8th Cir. 1973); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1971).
"I Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976). See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495
F.2d 658, 666-68 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol.
School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Illinois State Employees Union v.
Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
I" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1177
(10th Cir. 1975). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 562, 575 n.14 (1972).
' The Court has made it clear that where plausible claims of racial discrimination
in the termination of employees have been made, the burden of proof shifts to the Gov-
ernment to prove that the action was not premised on this constitutionally impermissible
reason. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209-11 (1973). See also Roper v. Ef-
fingham County Bd. of Educ., 528 F.2d 1024, 1025 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1973).
In Keyes, the state was required to show that segregative intent was not among the
factors that motivated its action "to any degree." 413 U.S. at 210-11. In some cases the
clear and convincing standard has been placed on the Government to show that the
termination of a teacher was not racially motivated. McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of
Educ., 541 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Chesterfield County School
Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1973). Arguably, substantive due process should be applied
to the exercise of free speech to the same extent as racial discrimination.
1 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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of which were constitutionally impermissible. The Court held
that if, without consideration of constitutionally protected ac-
tions, the individual would be terminated from employment,
then no protection is afforded.1 3 The Court stated that the bur-
den was properly placed on the claimant to demonstrate that his
conduct was protected and that this conduct was the "motivating
factor" in the decision to terminate his employment.' 4 Once a
prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the
Government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have decided without reference to the protected
activities that the employee's contract should not be renewed., 5
The question remains, of course, what establishes the prima
facie case that shifts the burden of proof to the government?
Inquiry and proof might be quite difficult in cases like Powers
where the Tenth Circuit asserted that the exercise of Powers' first
amendment rights "was not shown to have played a part in the
Board's decision" not to renew his contract,' 6 while also stating
that no reasons have ever been stated publicly for the nonrene-
wal.'27 By not requiring some reasons to be given for the nonrene-
wal of a contract, courts place the individual in the difficult posi-
tion of ascertaining whether they have been dismissed for a con-
stitutionally impermissible reason or not.
CONCLUSION
In determining whether property interests exist, the Tenth
Circuit has looked to applicable state law. It is not clear whether
separation of powers between branches of state governments will
preclude federal courts from findings of property interests. Addi-
tionally, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that the existence of
property interests may depend upon the policymaking status of
the individuals involved. The closer the function of the individual
comes to that of the executive, the more leeway the executive will
have in removing that individual without infringing a property
interest. The court has also found that while property interests
may be created by additional procedures, in order to create the
I2 Id. at 285.
' Id. at 287.
125 Id.
539 F.2d at 43.
'" Id. at 41.
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requisite expectancy such procedures must relate in some way to
the employment process.
A liberty interest may be infringed if injury is done to an
individual's good name or if opportunity for future employment
is foreclosed as a result of some stigma that the government has
created. Injury to reputation usually must be accompanied by
some other deprivaton. In determining whether future employ-
ment has been foreclosed, the Tenth Circuit will apply a practical
test. This test depends upon an actual showing that opportunities
have been significantly lessened by what the government has said
about an individual. Additionally, where reasons for termination
of an employee are not disclosed until some time after the termi-
nation, questions arise as to whether a hearing is then required.
The Tenth Circuit has determined that, absent a finding of
a liberty or property interest, substantive due process does not
protect the individual from governmental action. Substantive
due process does protect the individual from termination for a
constitutionally impermissible reason. However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has placed the burden of proof on the employee to demon-
strate that he was so removed.
Recent cases indicate that the Tenth Circuit echoes the gen-
eral feeling that federal courts should be reluctant to step into
intragovernmental personnel problems. A finding that some form
of due process is to be afforded, whether it be because a liberty
or property interest is involved or because of substantive due
process, would not dictate the form of the hearing. Some rudi-
mentary form of due process would provide a more appropriate
forum than the court's to air personnel grievances, serve as an
incentive to employers to more fully analyze their decision, amel-
iorate any problems that future disclosure might present, and




CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Search and Seizure
1. Standing
In United States v. Smith, I the Tenth Circuit refrained from
determining its position on an issue that had been specifically
reserved by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United
States,2 i.e., whether the holding in Simmons v. United States3
precludes a case by case analysis, rendering the "automatic
standing" rule of Jones v. United States unnecessary.4 Appellant
Smith, who had been convicted at a second trial of possession of
527 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1975).
411 U.S. 223 (1973). In order to have standing under Brown, defendants must (1)
be on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (2) allege a proprietary
or possessory interest in the premises; and (3) be charged with an offense which includes,
as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure. Id. at 229. As to the third criterion, the Supreme
Court stated: "But it is not necessary for us now to determine whether our decision in
Simmons . . . makes Jones 'automatic' standing unnecessary. We reserve that question
for a case where possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is 'an essential
element of the offense . . . charged.'" Id. at 228.
390 U.S. 377 (1968). The Supreme Court in Simmons held that concessions made
by a defendant in order to establish standing to move to suppress cannot be used by the
Government in its case-in-chief against him or her at trial. Id.
A 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones the Supreme Court held that in the case of a defendant
who had been convicted of possession of narcotics seized from the apartment of another
person, (1) the defendant need not make a preliminary showing of an interest in the
premises searched or the property seized and (2) because the defendant was lawfully in
the other person's apartment, he had made out a sufficient interest in the premises to
confer standing to contest the search. Id. at 263, 265. The Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1975), expressed the
following view of "automatic standing":
Automatic standing ordinarily comes into play where the search has not
intruded upon the privacy of the defendant but where that which has been
seized nevertheless can be used against him. In such cases if he is to have
standing to object to the seizure as the product of an unreasonable search
he must show that some recognizable interest of his has been offended by
the seizure-a showing that prior to Jones was highly embarrassing.
510 F.2d at 37-38.
The Government in Smith, however, suggested "that under Brown there is no doubt
about the continued validity of the automatic standing rule of Jones." United States v.
Smith, 527 F.2d at 695.
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stolen United States Postal Service money orders, 5 sought on ap-
peal to establish his standing to challenge an automobile search
and subsequent seizure of the money orders. The record indicated
that Smith, while in the process of moving from his apartment,
threw a brown sack containing the money orders into the unoccu-
pied vehicle of a person who was helping him move.' Smith's
actions were observed by a police officer who subsequently
searched the unoccupied vehicle and seized the brown sack.'
In its analysis, the court reiterated the criteria articulated in
Jones v. United States' for standing to contest a search and sei-
zure, stating: "Jones . . . suggests three alternatives which may
be used to establish standing, (1) substantial proprietary or pos-
sessory interest in the thing seized, (2) a similar interest in the
premises searched, and (3) legitimate presence on the premises
searched." ' After determining that only the first criterion was
applicable,'" the court concluded that the evidence "clearly es-
tablishes that as of the time of the seizure Smith had abandoned
the money orders"" and, therefore, did not have a substantial
proprietary or possessory interest in the thing seized at the time
of the seizure. 2 In side-stepping the "automatic standing" issue
left open in Brown, ' 3 the Tenth Circuit pointed out the similarity
I Appellant's first conviction was reversed and remanded with directions that an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress be held prior to retrial. See United States
v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974).
527 F.2d at 694-95.
Id. at 695.
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
527 F.2d at 695.
" The record indicated that Smith was not in the unoccupied car when it was
searched nor did he have a possessory or proprietary interest in the helper's vehicle since
Palmasano, the helper, was a stranger to Smith. In addition, the court pointed out that
even if Smith had permission to put some of his belongings into Palmasano's car, he did
not do so. His belongings were placed in his own vehicle. Only the money orders were
"thrown" into Palmasano's vehicle. Id.
I Id. at 695-96. In disposing of the money orders, Smith testified that he "just wanted
them away from me." Id. at 695.
" Id. at 696.
" See notes 2 through 4 supra and accompanying text. Other circuit courts of appeal
have confronted the problem and avoided it in a number of ways. See United States v.
Lang, 527 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1975) (possession at time of search not essential element of
crime charged); United States v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1974) (possession not
essential element of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute); United States v.
Dye, 508 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1974) (even though defendants charged with possession as
an essential element of the offense charged, the Sixth Circuit found no evidence of posses-
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between Brown and its decision in Smith:
[Tihe Government's case against Smith does not depend upon
Smith's possession of the stolen money orders at the time such were
taken from [the helper's] automobile. As a matter of fact, the
"possession" relied on by the Government in the instant case to
support the conviction is necessarily "possession" occurring prior to
Smith's abandonment of the money orders, because a finding of
"abandonment" connotes a lack of possession." '
Thus, the court held that Smith was without standing be-
cause he had no proprietary or possessory interest in the money
orders at the time they were seized by the police. 5
2. Probable Cause for Warrantless Search
In United States v. Rodriguez6 the issue addressed by the
Tenth Circuit was whether border guards had probable cause to
search the luggage of passengers on a commercially operated van-
trailer combination passing over the border. Appellant Rodri-
guez, one of the paying passengers, was ordered from the van by
sion at the time of the contested search and seizure); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendants not charged with physical possession at the time of the
seizure); United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant in conspir-
acy prosecution not charged with possessory crime); United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236
(6th Cir. 1974) (possession not an essential element of the conspiracy offense charged);
United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant never had actual or
constructive possession of his customers' suitcases at the time of the seizure). See also
United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 866-67 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975).
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Boston, framed the issue as follows:
What is left after Simmons to outrage one's sense of fairness-when there is
no intrusion upon a defendant's privacy and his claim of possessory right to
that which has been seized no longer has its devastating effect-is the matter
of "prosecutorial self-contradiction." The question is as to the degree and
quality of governmental inconsistency that suffice to create that condition
and, on balance, to trigger "automatic" standing. In such cases, as we read
Brown, it is not the facts as developed at trial or the prosecutor's theory of
guilt that controls. Rather, it is whether the defendant has been charged with
possession-whether possession is an essential element of the crime for which
he has been indicted.
510 F.2d at 38 (emphasis in original). See United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir.
1974).
1, 527 F.2d at 696.
ts Id. It should be noted that this analysis tends to eviscerate the "automatic stand-
ing" rule since a defendant charged with a possessory offense may arguably be said always
to have a "possessory interest" in the subject matter, regardless of whether he or she is in
actual physical control. This would afford such a defendant the "automatic standing" to
contest the seizure of the evidence alleged to be illegally possessed.
" 525 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1975).
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border agents'7 and directed to open his luggage which had been
taken from the trailer hitched to the van.' He was subsequently
convicted of unlawful possession of heroin with the intent to dis-
tribute.'9
In determining that the discovery of marijuana in the trailer
was insufficient in and of itself to establish probable cause to
search the defendant's luggage, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the warrantless search in this instance violated the defendant's
fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.20 Although the Government contended that Rodriguez
"voluntarily" opened his suitcase,2 ' the court noted that the Gov-
ernment failed to sustain its burden in showing that consent had
been freely and voluntarily given for the warrantless search.2 The
court also resolved that the search could not be upheld as a search
incident to a lawful arrest.2 3 Finally, placing particular reliance
" Passengers, including Rodriguez, were ordered from the van after a border guard
located marijuana in the precise place where an informant had said it would be. Id. at
1315-16. Although there was a noted absence of prior dealings between the agent and this
particular informant, the court "assumed" that the agent had probable cause to believe
there was marijuana in the trailer since he had inquired of others who had had prior
dealings with this informant, thereby satisfying himself that the informant was reliable.
The court also made note of the fact that the border agent was not required to obtain a
warrant before searching the trailer for marijuana due to the automobile exception to the
search warrant requirement. Id. at 1316.
" Id. at 1315.
Rodriguez was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
525 F.2d at 1316-17. Although Rodriguez' suitcase contained a large amount of
heroin (25 pounds), the court stated that "[s]uch fact, however, does not validate a
search that was invalid in its inception." Id. at 1315.
11 The court noted that the border patrol agents were armed and in full uniform and
that the passengers were ordered from the van and "told" to open their luggage. The mere
fact that Rodriguez, who understood little English, did so, does not mean that he voluntar-
ily consented to the search. Id. at 1315-16.
22 "[T]his burden is not met by merely showing acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority." Id. at 1316 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United
States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973)). See also United States v. Biswell, 442 F.2d
1189, 1191 (10th Cir. 1971).
" "The fact that marijuana was discovered in the trailer was not sufficient to justify
the arrest of Rodriguez for possession of marijuana." 525 F.2d at 1316. See United States
v. Castillo, 524 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1975). Castillo was the companion case to Rodriguez.
As driver of the van, Castillo was arrested for possession with intent to distribute the
marijuana found in the trailer. His conviction was subsequently overturned due to the fact
that he merely drove the van/trailer without having loaded or ever looked into the trailer.
Hence, the court determined he could not have been in possession.
The court in Rodriguez further noted that, even if the appellant had been subject to
a lawful arrest, "the scope of any permissible search incident to such arrest would not have
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on United States v. Di Re,2' the court concluded that the right to
search a vehicle for contraband does not carry with it a concomi-
tant right to search the person of an occupant of such vehicle and,
by extension, the occupant's suitcase.25
3. Airline Freight Inspections
The airline freight inspection 2 of a package shipped from
San Francisco, California, to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, pre-
sented the Tenth Circuit with a question as to the reasonableness
of the search and seizure of the package's contents and the corol-
lary question of the protection afforded by the fourth amend-
ment, if any, where there is a private as opposed to a governmen-
tal search.2 In United States v. Ford21 an airline agent in San
Francisco opened a package addressed to the defendant in Okla-
homa City where the apparent nervousness of the sender alerted
the freight agent that the package might contain contraband or
another substance ineligible for air freight 20 After determining
extended to his suitcase in the trailer" since the presence of a weapon or the possibility
of destruction of the evidence by the arrestee and his proximity to his suitcase were not
present as to Rodriguez. 525 F.2d at 1316-17. The court further hypothesized that, even if
"Rodriguez' suitcase had merely been under his seat in the bus, instead of in the trailer,
it could not be said that there was probable cause to search Rodriguez' suitcase." Id. at
1317 (citing United States v. Day. 455 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Collins,
439 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
2, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
1 525 F.2d at 1317. The Government relied on United States v. Medina-Flores, 477
F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1973), for the lawfulness of the search in Rodriguez. The Tenth Circuit,
however, distinguished the two cases on their facts, i.e., whether the driver and occupants
were total strangers, as in Rodriguez, or companions in crime, as in Medina-Flores. See
also United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 283 n.2 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v.
Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955).
" The right of freight shippers to inspect all packages is established by tariffs filed
by carriers with the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970). See
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1309 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing ATP Tariff CAP No.
96, Rule 24). "The practical effect of [the tariff] is that the person shipping goods
consents to the inspection of his goods by entering into the contract of shipment." United
States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 449 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973).
27 The Tenth Circuit stated:
[We must] consider the validity of the search, arrest, and seizure process
in San Francisco and Oklahoma City. It seems to us that the events which
occurred in California and Oklahoma were one episode and must be consid-
ered together for Fourth Amendment purposes. Illegality in either place
would be fatal to the government's case.
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 1975).
See United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).




that the substance in the package was heroin, local police officers
called to the scene proceeded to mark, reseal, and place the pack-
age aboard the plane for Oklahoma City. Thereafter, enforcement
officers in that city were informed of the situation.3 ' Upon claim-
ing the package, the defendant was immediately arrested.2
Reiterating the language of United States v. Harding,3 the
Tenth Circuit concluded that "the events which occurred in San
Francisco did not amount to a government search; rather, it was
a private inspection .. .not violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment. ,,34 In addition, the court determined that the seizure in San
1' Id. at 1309-10.
32 Ford was charged and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970). On appeal, the
defendant-appellant invoked her fourth amendment protection as to the contents of the
package. 525 F.2d at 1310.
475 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. ), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 964 (1973). The Tenth
Circuit, in Harding, held that the inspection was authorized by tariff regulations and was
thus a private search in the absence of "collusion with federal officers." 475 F.2d at 483.
See 5 L. ORFLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs § 41:25 (1967).
m 525 F.2d at 1312. All of the cases relied upon by the Tenth Circuit to support its
position seem to have entailed the following general fact pattern: Airline officials become
suspicious as to the contents of a package because of the demeanor of the sender or because
of the contents marked on the package; the package is opened by the airline agents who
determine that the package contains a suspicious narcotic substance or obscene materials;
and law enforcement officers, either local or federal, are then called to verify the contents
before the package is resealed. United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States v. Harding, 475 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1973).
The threshold question facing the Tenth Circuit, in determining whether information
obtained as a result of an airline freight inspection is usable by the Federal Government
at trial, is whether or not the Government participated in the initial search. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975), wherein the test appeared to be whether the
"initial opening of one of the trunks [was] by the freight agent." 508 F.2d at 994. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that the focus of inquiry should
be on whether the airline search was "made on the carrier's own initiative for its own
purposes." United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d at 398. The Tenth Circuit noted, in Ford,
that "[iun our case, as in Pryba and apparently in Issod, the government agents were
called in after completion of a privately motivated and authorized inspection by airline
officials .... " 525 F.2d at 1312.
Other cases have held that "an inspection by a carrier is not a governmental search.
United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972)." United States v. DeBerry, 487
F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1973). See United States v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973); United
States v. Tripp, 468 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910 (1973); Clayton
v. United States, 413 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). If the
search is conducted in the presence of or at the behest of government law enforcement
officers, then the evidence obtained may be inadmissible unless probable cause for the
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Francisco was reasonable and necessary where based upon proba-
ble cause under exigent circumstances. 5 Following the analysis of
the Second Circuit in United States v. DeBerry,31 the Tenth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the Oklahoma City officers were merely
reasserting dominion and control over the package and its con-
tents as part of one continuous episode and that the constitu-
tional rights of the appellant had not been violated thereby. 7
B. Arrest Without Probable Cause and Effect Upon Confession
The Tenth Circuit was confronted with a case "at the cross-
roads of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments"" in Stevens v.
Wilson.3" Appellant Stevens sought appeal from a judgment of
the federal district court which had denied habeas corpus relief
from a conviction affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court.40
Appellant Stevens "alleged that her arrest was unlawful and that
it tainted her subsequent confession since the confession was the
product of the invalid arrest . . . ."" The Tenth Circuit noted
search is present. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). For other cases
supporting this proposition see authorities cited in United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d at
398 n.41. See also United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975).
1 525 F.2d at 1313. It appears that the Tenth Circuit went one step beyond DeBerry
(no warrant required at the suitcase's destination) in that it required exigent circumstan-
ces where there was no search warrant at the package's place of dispatch, i.e., San Fran-
cisco. The court pointed out that if the officers had detained the substance until a magis-
trate could issue a warrant to seize it: "The time delay required to obtain a warrant...
might very well have warned the parties to the crime of the government's presence and
prevented their apprehension. If the contraband had not been shipped immediately, the
Oklahoma City addressee probably would have become suspicious and remained aloof."
Id.
36 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
37 525 F.2d at 1312-13. Under the DeBerry analysis, the seizure of the contraband by
a Los Angeles officer was legal where the carrier, under a legal inspection, put the mari-
juana in the officer's plain view; the marijuana could then be seized upon sight without a
warrant. The officer was deemed to have made the seizure by removing one of the bricks
of marijuana, marking it, and marking its container with his initials. Thus, when police
in New York removed the bag from the back seat of the defendants' car, they were not
making an initial seizure, but were merely reasserting dominion and control first exercised
by the government in Los Angeles over the suitcase. United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d
at 451.
31 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 591 (1975).
- 534 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1976).
,0 People v. Stevens, 183 Colo. 399, 517 P.2d 1336 (1973). The appellant was convicted
in the state court of possession of marijuana, in violation of CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 48-5-2
(1963), and of introducing contraband into the Colorado State Penitentiary, in violation
of CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-7-58(2) (Supp. 1967).
" 534 F.2d at 869.
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the chain of events leading up to the challenged confession to be
as follows: Stevens entered a restroom on the grounds of the Colo-
rado State Penitentiary; the restroom was searched after her exit
and marijuana was subsequently found; she and a companion
followed an investigator, at his request, to a room in the maxi-
mum security area where they were arrested and given their
rights under Miranda v. Arizona;42 and she was detained in the
room for interrogation during which time she made an inculpa-
tory statement.
4 3
The Tenth Circuit was in accord with the district court ruling
that Stevens' arrest was not a mere detention or preliminary in-
vestigation within the framework of Terry v. Ohio." However,
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
,' 534 F.2d at 869-70. The Tenth Circuit referred to the opinion of the Colorado
Supreme Court for this summary of the essential facts.
4 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In accordance with its reasoning in Stone v. People, 174 Colo.
504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971), the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction on
the ground that the alleged arrest was in the nature of a field investigation. In Stone such
detention was justified by something less than probable cause. Id. See People v. Stevens,
183 Colo. at 404, 517 P.2d at 1339. Thus, the supreme court concluded that removal of
petitioner from the prison lobby was a reasonable and sensible manner in which to investi-
gate criminal activity, and that a one-half hour detention for the same was reasonable
under the circumstances. Id. at 406-07, 517 P.2d at 1340. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
34-35 (White, J., concurring) (favors temporary detention on streets if pertinent questions
are asked). See also People v. DeBour, 19 Cmia. L. REp. (BNA) 2289 (N.Y. Ct. App., June
15, 1976), wherein the court held that an officer with a lesser degree of suspicion than that
necessary for a forcible stop under Terry may approach a private citizen on the street for
the purpose of requesting information; however, the officer must have an articulable
reason for doing so. It should also be noted that the Colorado Supreme Court in Stevens
pointed out that the record before it would not support the extent of an intrusion which
would be justified by probable cause to arrest. 183 Colo. at 406, 517 P.2d at 1340.
The federal district court disagreed with the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion
that the "arrest" was within Terry, ruling instead that there had been an arrest for the
purpose of interrogating Stevens. Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d at 870. The Tenth Circuit
agreed that the appellant's arrest was not a detention or preliminary investigation due to
the fact that "the appellant was confined within a room in the penitentiary; ...she was
confronted with the marijuana which had been discovered in the restroom following her
visit; .. . she was questioned thoroughly and a confession was obtained." Id. Judge
Barrett, in his concurring opinion, preferred to premise the finding that there had been
an arrest on the fact that the defendant had been told she was under arrest. Id. at 873.
Note the hypothetical effect of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), on Stevens'
habeas corpus claim in Stevens v. Wilson. In Stone the United States Supreme Court held
that, after a defendant has been afforded an opportunity for the full and fair litigation of
fourth amendment claims by the state, he may not thereafter obtain federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that illegally seized evidence was introduced at his trial. 428 U.S. at
494. It would appear that Stevens presents just the type of case where the appellant should
not be afforded habeas corpus relief since she raised the issue of no probable cause for
the arrest at the state level. 183 Colo. at 403, 517 P.2d at 1338.
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given the fact that there was an arrest, the court concluded that
the federal district court had failed to consider whether there was
probable cause to arrest based upon the seizure of the mari-
juana.' 5 In remanding for findings on this issue, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the presence or absence of probable cause was a
crucial question in the case'" and concluded "that the trial court
erred in merely determining the voluntariness of the confession
as a Fifth Amendment problem in failing to come to grips with
the illegality of the arrest and its effect upon the validity and
competency of the appellant's confession."' 7
The Tenth Circuit further instructed that if it was found that
an arrest had been made without probable cause,' 8 then the valid-
ity and competency of the confession would have to be considered
in light of Wong Sun v. United States" and Brown v. Illinois.2
11 The court stated that an independent determination of whether probable cause
existed for the arrest pursuant to the fourth amendment is "the crucial issue in a habeas
corpus case" and "entirely permissible and ... called for under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254."
534 F.2d at 870.
" Id. at 871. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) [A] determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made
by a State court of competent jurisdiction . . . , shall be presumed to be
correct, unless. . . that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual
determination, is produced. . . and the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination
is not fairly supported by the record.
, 534 F.2d at 872. The federal district court had concluded that a violation of the
appellant's fourth amendment rights was not a controlling consideration since voluntari-
ness of the confession was the crucial issue of the case and, under standards set by the
Tenth Circuit, the confession had been voluntary. Id. at 870 n.1.
" The court noted that "[clonceivably the total evidence amounted to probable
cause [to arrest]" but that "the issue would be at least a close question demanding
careful scrutiny" by the trier of fact. Id. at 871. For additional cases dealing with the
necessity of determining probable cause to arrest prior to determining the voluntariness
of confessions, see United States v. Rose, 526 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 905 (1976); Logan v. Capps, 525 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v.
Burnett, 526 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1976).
, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
422 U.S. 590 (1975). The Tenth Circuit does not view Brown as extending or enlarg-
ing Wong Sun but merely views it as a recognition by Illinois of the Wong Sun doctrine.
534 F.2d at 872. See United States ex rel. Mungo v. LaVallee, 522 F.2d 211, 218 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1975). For this reason, the Tenth Circuit found the state's argument that Brown was
to be applied retroactively as nonmeritorious. 534 F.2d at 872 n.3. In its analysis, the
Tenth Circuit noted certain criteria from Brown for determining whether a confession was
the fruit of an illegal arrest, e.g., whether Miranda warnings had been given; or the
1977
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On the other hand, if the federal district court concluded that the
arrest was valid, then the criteria of Miranda v. Arizona would
have to be examined to determine whether or not the confession
had been voluntary.5
II. FwrH AMENDMENT
A. Grand Jury Setting
1. Use of Privileges
In Thompson v. United States52 witness Thompson, as secre-
tary and representative of the Phillips Petroleum Co., asserted
the attorney-client and work-product privileges as defenses to a
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)53 contempt citation for failure to produce
certain corporate documents subpoenaed by a grand jury. At the
request of the Government, and in response to appellant's motion
to quash, the trial court examined the disputed documents54 in
camera. After conducting an ex parte hearing at which govern-
ment counsel was present, the court held that the Government
had met its burden in establishing a prima facie need for the
documents.5 5 On appeal, Thompson challenged the ex parte hear-
ing, asserting that a determination as to whether the documents
contained communications in contemplation or furtherance of
illegal activities required an adversary hearing."
presence of intervening circumstances. Id. at 872. See Santos v. Bayley, 400 F. Supp. 784,
789 (D.C. Pa. 1975) (held that the confession was an intervening independent act of free
will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest). The court also reiterated
that the burden of showing admissibility of a confession after an illegal arrest (that it was
the product of an accused's free will) rests upon the State. 534 F.2d at 872. See United
States v. Shavers, 524 F.2d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 1975).
11 534 F.2d at 871.
52 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976).
This subsection reads as follows:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court
or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply
with an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including
any book, paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court,
upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may
summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the
witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (emphasis added).
11 The Tenth Circuit also examined all of the disputed documents in camera and
determined that 28 of them involved the claims of attorney-client privilege and 7 made
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In rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit began with the
proposition that Thompson's attorney-client privilege was gov-
erned by common law.57 The court then noted that previous deci-
sions interpreting the privilege had held that the privilege must
give way when illegal activities on the part of the client are in-
volved. 5 Recognizing that this determination of existing or in-
tended criminal activity can be made during an ex parte hear-
ing,59 the court determined that the burden of demonstrating
some relationship between the subpoenaed documents and the
charges under investigation rests upon the Government. 0 The
Tenth Circuit then concluded that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion in conducting an ex parte hearing and that the
Government had met its burden in showing prima facie need.6'
As to Thompson's claimed work-product privilege, the court
followed the Hickman v. Taylor2 rule and the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Natta v. Hogan. 13 In light of these decisions, the court
was resolved to find that, in the absence of a claim by the appel-
lant that the documents had been prepared for pending litigation,
the Government had met its burden in showing "adequate rea-
son" for the production of the documents. 4 The Tenth Circuit
further stated that "[t]he question of the work-product privilege
5 Id. at 736-37. See FEn. R. EvID. 501.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir.
1965), aff'd 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); United States v. Weinberg, 226 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1955).
11 On the basis of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Thompson argued
that an adversary hearing was required. In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
those cases where an adversary hearing is required due to the witness' claimed defense of
illegal electronic surveillance by the government and the instant case where there is a
noted absence of such a defense. 532 F.2d at 737. See United States v. Vigil, 524 F.2d 209
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 425 U.S. 927 (1976). The court expressed the concern that
to allow an adversary hearing on Thompson's claimed privilege would turn the hearing
into a mini-trial on the merits and subvert the expeditious functioning of the grand jury.
532 F.2d at 737.
532 F.2d at 737.
I Id. at 738. See United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d at 1086. See also Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. at 14.
62 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The rule states that the proponent seeking an attorney's
documents must establish "adequate reasons" to justify production. Id. at 512.
392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968) (discovery does not apply to documents prepared
by an attorney in preparation for impending litigation).
1 532 F.2d at 738.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
is one for ultimate determination at the trial. We will not give an
anticipatory answer."'
In the case of In re Vigil," witness Vigil contended that her
marriage to a prospective defendant in a case under investigation
by the grand jury constituted "just cause" under 28 U.S.C. §
1826(a)"7 for her refusal to testify before the grand jury.1
8 Vigil
was served with a subpoena on July 22, 1975, directing her to
appear before the grand jury on August 19, 1975. On August 18,
1975, defense counsel filed various motions, memoranda, and affi-
davits, none of which sought to raise the marital relationship
privilege as a defense.69 On the following day a hearing was held
on Vigil's motions to quash the subpoena. After the denial of each
motion, she appeared before the grand jury and refused to tes-
tify.70 She was subsequently granted "use" immunity under 18
U.S.C. § 60021' and was ordered by the trial court to testify.72 On
the afternoon of August 19th Vigil again refused to testify, for the
first time mentioning her alleged marital relationship as one
ground for her refusal.73 Although the Government made a re-
0Id.
524 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1975).
,7 See note 53 supra for the text of the subsection.
* 524 F.2d at 217.
" Id. The court's decision indicates that these motions raised such issues as grand
jury selection, Vigil's right to have an attorney present in the grand jury room, and her
right to compel disclosure of electronic surveillance. Id. at 212. See notes 82 through 99
and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the electronic surveillance defense to
contempt proceedings.
7o 524 F.2d at 212.
An example of "use" immunity in this case would be to prohibit the use of any
specific answer she gave before the grand jury from being used against her in a subsequent
prosecution. However, it does not prohibit the use of evidence discovered from leads
supplied by that testimony.
11 254 F.2d at 217. As an additional ground for appeal, the appellant claimed that
the immunity granted was not broad enough. Id. at 219. Following the Supreme Court
decision in Kastizar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Tenth Circuit held that
the trial court did not err in refusing to issue protective orders. But see Justice Douglas'
dissent in Kastizar:
When we allow the prosecution to offer only "use" immunity we allow
it to grant far less than it has taken away. For while the precise testimony
that is compelled may not be used, leads from that testimony may be pur-
sued and used to convict the witness. My view is that the framers put it
beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes.
Id. at 466-67. For a recent criticism of "use" immunity and the grand jury system in
general, see Goldenberg, Congressional Reform of Grand Juries Expected, Rocky Moun-
tain News, November 15, 1976, at 3, col. 1, and at 14, col. 2.
71 524 F.2d at 217.
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quest that Vigil be held in contempt after her second refusal to
testify on August 19th, the trial court continued the matter until
August 22, 1975, in order to give Vigil another opportunity to
answer those questions for which she had been granted immun-
ity.74 Appellant appeared before the grand jury on August 22nd
and again refused to answer questions, asserting as one ground
the husband-wife privilege. Another hearing was held at which
time the trial court adjudged Vigil "to be in civil contempt" and
ordered her confinement until she complied with the orders of the
court .
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the merits of Vigil's claim
of a marital privilege," disposing of the issue on the ground that
it was not timely raised.77 In addition, the court determined that
the appellant's affidavit78 in support of the privilege was not
timely filed with the trial court. 9 In view of this failure to comply
with procedural requirements, the Tenth Circuit held that an
" The court's opinion indicates that 14 written questions were submitted to Vigil at
her first grand jury appearance. Id. at 212. It further indicates, without explanation as to
the contents, that Vigil was granted use immunity as to three questions. Id. at 217. When
the trial court continued the proceeding until August 22, 1975, it "broadened the immun-
ity order to include additional questions." Id. Throughout the entire proceeding it appears
that Vigil steadfastly refused to answer any question other than her name. Id. at 212 n.1.
Id. at 217-18.
7 The court gave some indication that it questioned whether the marital relationship
had been alleged in good faith, citing Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
Appellant Vigil relied on In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1974), to support her
claimed marital privilege. The Tenth Circuit, however, distinguished Snoonian on its facts
since the "husband-wife relationship was not in dispute and the court reached the merits
of the claimed privilege." 524 F.2d at 218.
" As indicated, Vigil first raised the husband-wife privilege at her first appearance
before the grand jury after pre-appearance hearings on her motions to quash the subpoena.
See text accompanying note 73 supra. The Tenth Circuit spoke of "the rather tardy
manner in which the marital relationship issue was sought to be injected into the proceed-
ing." 524 F.2d at 218.
The appellant's affidavit read as follows:
I, VERONICA VIGIL being duly sworn, depose and say that I am the wife
of Ray Otero. Ray and I began to live together in Boulder, Colorado in
October, 1973. In December, 1973, we became man and wife by mutual
consent in Boulder, Colorado. We continued to live together until April,
1975. I believe Ray Otero to be the target of the Grand Jury investigation.
Id.
79 Appellant's August 22nd hearing occurred at 11:00 a.m., at which time her counsel
sought to file an affidavit of "Veronica Vigil re her Marriage." This affidavit was not given
to the trial judge before or during the contempt hearing but was apparently filed with the
clerk of court at 2:54 p.m. on August 22, 1975. Id. at 217.
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evidentiary hearing on the marital relationship was not required
by the trial court.80 Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that Vigil's unsupported assertion of her marriage to a
prospective defendant was not "just cause" for her refusal to
testify before the grand jury.8
2. Illegal Electronic Surveillance
In support of her refusal to answer questions propounded by
the Government before the grand jury, Veronica Vigil further
alleged illegal electronic surveillance as a "just cause" under 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a).82 She claimed that the Government's denial of
such electronic surveillance was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. §
3504(a)(1) to sustain its position.83 In affirming the lower court,
the Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Gelbard v. United States.4 In Gelbard
the Court held that if there has been prior illegal electronic sur-
veillance and it can be shown that the interrogation of the witness
before a grand jury would be based upon such illegal interception,
then just cause not to answer exists under section 1826(a).1 The
Tenth Circuit then bifurcated its analysis, discussing issues
" By analogy to an untimely claim of illegal electronic surveillance in In re Lewis,
501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975), the Tenth Circuit concluded
that "the late filing of a bare claim of common-law marriage should not be permitted to
impede the work of the Grand Jury." 524 F.2d at 218.
524 F.2d at 218.
See note 53 supra for the text of the subsection.
3 This section provides:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority
of the United States-
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was ob-
tained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall
affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act.
18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
The evidentiary prohibition found in Gelbard is premised on the fact that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515 prohibits the presentation to grand juries of the compelled testimony of a witness
which was intercepted in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). 408 U.S. at 47. In a subsequent case
the Supreme Court narrowed the application of Gelbard, stating that the Court's conclu-
sion rested exclusively on its interpretation of Title 1I, i.e., that it was simply an effort
by Congress to afford special safeguards against the unique problems posed by the misuse
of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 n.ll
(1974).
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which were not considered by the Supreme Court in Gelbard:s1 (1)
The sufficiency of the witness' claim of illegal surveillance which
will trigger an evidentiary hearing on the existence or absence of
surveillance, 87 and (2) the sufficiency of the Government's denial
of surveillance under section 3504(a)(1)."'
As to the claim of electronic surveillance, counsel for Vigil
filed one affidavit by the appellant personally89 and two by her
counsel. 0 The court concluded that the information contained in
Vigil's affidavits were "grossly lacking" and, thus, insufficient to
establish the existence of electronic surveillance.9 The Tenth Cir-
cuit expressed the opinion that the affidavits did "no more than
describe the ordinary experiences which are encountered by the
telephone user from time to time in his daily life.
'9 2
Although the appellant's evidence of illegal surveillance was
insubstantial, the court focused on the sufficiency of the Govern-
524 F.2d at 213.
" The Supreme Court, in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969), held
that an adversary hearing was required in order to determine if evidence supporting
defendant's convictions was the product of an illegal electronic surveillance.
See also United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court held
that the witness' affidavits were sufficiently concrete and specific to make a prima facie
showing of electronic surveillance which shifted the burden to the Government to affirm
or deny under 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1). See also United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709
(2d Cir. 1973), where the court interpreted the language of § 1826(a), "without just cause
shown," to place on the witness the burden of coming forward with "just cause." But see
notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
0 See note 83 supra.
"' From her analysis of the questions asked at her first appearance before the grand
jury, appellant stated "her belief" that the questions were "directly or indirectly" based
upon illegal electronic surveillance. 524 F.2d at 214.
90 Id. The affidavits of appellant's counsel set forth general difficulties with Vigil's
phone, e.g., inability to get connections, substantial delay before the connection was
made, problems in dialing, a "double beep," and a "hollow sound" when there was rapid
dialing. See In re Freedman, 529 F.2d 543, 550 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
524 F.2d at 214.
92 Id. See also In re Freedman, 529 F.2d at 550; United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d at
1024-25; In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1972).
As to the affidavits filed by appellant's counsel in Vigil, neither appellant nor the
court squarely raised the issue of whether electronic surveillance of third parties conceiva-
bly could have been the basis for any of the questions propounded. See United States v.
Fitch, 472 F.2d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1973), where the Government did not specifically re-
spond to the allegation that the attorney had been subjected to surveillance. See also
United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975);
United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466,
468 (1st Cir. 1971).
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ment's denial, i.e., how far must the Government search for evi-
dence of illegal surveillance93 and what quality of evidence is
necessary to support the denial?9' The trial court heard testimony
from the two law enforcement officers conducting the investiga-
tion of the case, both of whom testified that there was no elec-
tronic surveillance. 5 In addition, the trial court was advised by
an Assistant United States Attorney that he had been assured by
11 The First Circuit has stated that "Itihe dominate [sic] weight of authority has
rejected a conclusory statement as an appropriate response [by the government]." In re
Hodges, 524 F.2d 568, 570 nn.1-5 (1st Cir. 1975). See In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 806
(1st Cir. 1974). But see In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1974), as interpreted by the
First Circuit in In re Hodges, 524 F.2d at 570 n.6. Other courts have taken the approach
that the Government's response may match the claim of surveillance, e.g., a general denial
in response to nonspecific allegations. See In re Freedman, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d
1257 (9th Cir. 1974); Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973). Still other
circuit courts have required some search of the relevant government agencies which may
be involved in the investigation, differing only in the number of agencies which should be
checked. In re Millow, 529 F.2d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77, 79
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Aloi, 511 F.2d 585, 602 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170,
1173 n.10 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d 1193, 1194 (2d Cir. 1973);
Bufalino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 473 F.2d 728, 734 (3d Cir. 1973); In re
Womack, 466 F.2d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 469 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972);
In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119, 120 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971). See Judge Okes' dissent in United
States v. Grusse, 515 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1975), where he would require the so-called
eight agency search of the FBI; Secret Service; IRS; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms; Customs; DEA; and Postal Service.
'" Some circuit courts have required that evidence of the search be in affidavit form
submitted by those government agencies which have searched or by those government
officials in charge of the investigation. In re Freedman, 529 F.2d at 549; In re Millow, 529
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Grusse, 515 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring); In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d
471 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); Korman v.
United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1973); Bufalino v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d
1193 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1972). See also In re Grumbles,
453 F.2d at 120 n.4. Other courts have found letters of a search acceptable. United States
v. Aloi, 511 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Womack, 466 F.2d
555 (7th Cir. 1972). And some courts have stressed the importance of oral testimony, under
oath, as acceptable evidence of the search. In re Jurney, 410 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971). See note 95 infra and accompanying
text. But see United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grumbles, 453
F.2d at 120 n.4. The First Circuit sidesteps what it considers to be the minimum standard
for an adequate government response under § 3504 because "the necessary facts and
circumstances are not presented [in the instant case]." In re Hodges, 524 F.2d at 570.
" In re Vigil, 524 F.2d at 215.
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''every agency of the United States which had had anything to do
with the case . . . that there had not been any electronic surveil-
lance either by court order or otherwise to the best of their knowl-
edge.""6 In holding that such denial by the Government satisfies
the requirements of section 3504(a), the court expressed its pref-
erence for testimony in court as opposed to denial by affidavit. 7
The court further stated its preference for the balancing approach
in determining the sufficiency of the Government's denial98 and
noted that its approach "is in harmony with that employed in the
other cases." 99
B. Trial Setting
In United States v. Smith"0 the appellant challenged his two
convictions for criminal contempt which had arisen out of his
refusal to testify in successive criminal trials. His argument was
twofold: (1) That the proceedings granting him immunity were
defective, 0' and (2) that the second contempt charge subjected
g1 Id. The Tenth Circuit stressed the fact that the Assistant United States Attorney
"also has assured this court that there has been no electronic surveillance." Id. (emphasis
in original).
7 Id. at 216.
Id. The court rejected Vigil's reliance on United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th
Cir. 1973), where the Ninth Circuit held the Government to greater specificity in what
agencies were elected and what was the substance of their responses. Id. at 1027. Instead
the Tenth Circuit stated that "[w]e consider a quest for certainty in this kind of inquiry
futile and regard a balancing or weighing evaluation to be more helpful because each case
presents individual demands." 524 F.2d at 216. Although the Tenth Circuit was not
specific as to what was to be balanced or weighed, it would appear from the above that
the court was referring to the facts presented by each particular case. Other courts have
spoken of the balancing test in terms of weighing the right of the witness to be free from
unwarranted surveillance against the right of the Government to operate grand juries in
an effective manner. See United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975);
Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d at 752 (5th Cir. 1972).
534 F.2d at 216-17, 220-22.
00 532 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1976).
101 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970) provides that:
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under sub-section (a) . . .when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination.
Appellant argued that it was error for the First Assistant United States Attorney to
sign the application for an immunity order under § 6003. He further argued that the trial
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
him to double jeopardy.'"2
Smith had been granted immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6003103
as the result of his claimed privilege against self-incrimination
when he refused to testify at the first bank robbery trial.'0 4 A
mistrial was subsequently granted when Smith persisted in his
refusal to testify despite this grant of immunity. In addition, the
prosecution commented upon Smith's prospective testimony in
its opening statement.' 5 At the second trial on the bank robbery,
Smith again refused to testify when called as a witness. This
resulted in the reinstatement of his grant of immunity. His per-
sistence in refusing to testify gave rise to the charges of and sub-
sequent convictions on the two counts of criminal contempt now
challenged. '
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "there is no merit what-
soever to the contention that 18 U.S.C. Section 6003 was not
complied with," since the United States Attorney may designate
any assistant to carry out his or her functions under section
6003.07 In addition, the court pointed out that the authorization
under section 6003 covered both of Smith's refusals to testify,
stating: "It is unreasonable to compel the Justice Department to
apply for immunity with a related review of the record each time
a problem of this kind comes up. To so hold would be to approve
court erred in accepting the general application and order granting immunity for the first
trial insofar as applying it to the second effort to obtain the appellant's testimony. 532
F.2d at 160. Following the authorization for immunity under § 6003, counsel was ap-
pointed for Smith when he claimed a lack of understanding of immunity. Although it is
unclear whether this appointment of counsel occurred before or after the immunity hear-
ing, the absence of counsel at the time immunity is granted is not a deprivation of any
constitutional right. United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1973). In addition,
the witness must demonstrate some prejudice caused by the absence of counsel at the
immunity hearing. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973).
0 532 F.2d at 160-61. Smith argued that he could be convicted of only one offense of
criminal contempt, citing the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
"1 See note 101 supra for the language of 18 U.S.C. § 6003. See also 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1970) which provides as follows:
[Tihe witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order . . . may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.
532 F.2d at 159.
105 Id.
10 The trial court brought contempt proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
,01 532 F.2d at 160. See note 101 supra.
VOL. 54
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
legal maneuvering by an accused. This we refuse to do."' 8 The
court then determined that Smith's two convictions were not dou-
ble jeopardy' 9 since they were distinct and successive acts of
contempt punishable as separate offenses." '0 The court also took
note that Smith was not prejudiced due to the fact that he re-
ceived identical concurrent sentences."' Expressing the courts'
general disfavor for multiplying contempt penalties where a de-
fendant has made his or her position clear,"' the court concluded
that the case did not evidence an attempt to multiply offenses
since the Government had reason to believe that Smith would
testify the second time and was therefore justified in calling him
a second time."3
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v.
California"' required extensive interpretation by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in the past year. In Faretta it was determined that a defen-
dant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right under the
sixth amendment"5 to proceed without counsel when he or she
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so." 6 An analogous issue
arose in United States v. Hill"7 and United States v. Bennett"'
as to whether a defendant charged with a federal crime has a
532 F.2d at 160 (citing In re Weir, 520 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1975)).
,o0 "Double jeopardy is a defense which, since it seeks to bar a second prosecution, is
ordinarily raised prior to trial." 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.07[1], at 8-51, -52 (2d ed.
1970).
"1 532 F.2d at 160, and cases cited therein. See also Lufman v. United States, 500
F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1974).
"1 532 F.2d at 160-61, and cases cited therein. See United States v. Abigando, 439
F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1971).
,,1 532 F.2d at 161, and cases cited therein. See People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166
N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.07[1], at 8-51, -52 (2d ed. 1970). The First Circuit uses a "single subject" test to
determine if the prosecution is attempting to multiply offenses. The court, however, noted
problems with the test because it may be too open-ended, i.e., there are infinite ways to
categorize information in terms of time, place, incident, transaction, and people involved.
See Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382, 390 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972).
"1 532 F.2d at 161.
" 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
The Supreme Court held: "Although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so
many words, the right to self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is
• . . necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment." Id. at 819.
" Id. at 834-35.
117 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976).
"1 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976).
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statutory"9 and/or constitutional right ° to represent him or her-
self with the assistance of counsel.'
2'
In United States v. Hill the defendant moved by both written
and oral motion to ask questions of jurors and witnesses at trial
while at the same time taking advantage of the assistance of
counsel. 1 2 The trial court denied both motions and the
defendant-appellant appealed, claiming that his right to repre-
sent himself had been denied.
2 3
Surveying the pre-Faretta decisions of other circuit courts of
appeal,2 4 the Tenth Circuit noted a trend indicating that a person
could either represent himself or be represented by counsel. How-
ever, a person does not have a right to hybrid representation.
5
I' 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) (emphasis added) provides: "In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein."
l2 See note 115 supra.
121 526 F.2d at 1024; 539 F.2d at 49. The argument advanced in Bennett proposed that
the right of self-representation under § 1654, the sixth amendment, and Faretta sustains
a defendant's right to hybrid representation, i.e., self-representation with the aid of coun-
sel. Id.
"1 The court's opinion contains the following colloquy between the trial court and
Hill:
THE DEFENDANT: Well, at this point, I would ask if-again I could be
allowed to assist in my defense.
THE COURT: You mean ask questions of jurors and ask questions of
witnesses?
THE DEFENDANT: To a certain extent, yes.
THE COURT: No. The Court is not going to grant you that request. I have
already ruled on it.
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, I didn't say that I wanted to dismiss them
[his attorney]. I said that I wanted to represent myself and I want to have
my attorneys assist me.
526 F.2d at 1024 n.3.
"I Id. at 1024. The record indicates that prior to the noon recess, defendant addressed
the court with reference to the absence of blacks on the jury. "[His] statements .. .
deteriorated to the point that defendant was finally physically removed from the court-
room." Id. at 1023. After the noon recess, and out of hearing by the jury, defendant again
addressed the court and requested permission to question jurors and witnesses. Id. It was
appellant's position that the court should have inquired to determine the exact nature of
his claim. Id. at 1024.
21 526 F.2d at 1024, and cases cited therein. See also United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d
82, 86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964); Manson v. Pitchess, 317 F. Supp. 816 (C.D. Cal. 1970). But see
Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974).
"1 526 F.2d at 1024.
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The court then determined that Faretta did not alter the estab-
lished rules concerning hybrid representation, 2 ' taking cogniz-
ance of the fact that the sixth amendment fails to address hybrid
representation as a right of constitutional dimensions.'2 Concom-
itantly, the court suggested that there is not any statutory right
of such representation since 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is written in the
disjunctive. 8 After concluding that Hill's request was in fact for
hybrid representation, the Tenth Circuit held there was no abuse
of discretion in the denial of his motions. 12
The defendant, in United States v. Bennett, 130 was convicted
in a first trial 131 of one count of forcibly interfering with a prison
hospital administrator in the performance of his duties. 32 During
a hearing on a pretrial motion, Bennett requested that he be able
to assist in his own defense by making the opening and closing
statements to the jury and by cross-examining particular govern-
ment witnesses. 33 The trial court ruled that Bennett could cross-
"' Id. The court cites to a post-Faretta decision, United States v. Swinton, 400 F.
Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), wherein it was held that a criminal defendant has no sixth
amendment right to act as her own counsel where she is also represented by an attorney.
See United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976); Stiner v. Oklahoma, 539 P.2d 750, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). See also United
States v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1265 (4th Cir. 1975).
It can be argued that Swinton seems to require some showing on the part of a defen-
dant seeking co-counsel status that his or her traditional representation is inadequate or
inappropriate. The defendant's allegations that she should take "personal responsibility
for the conduct of a trial whose outcome may seriously affect her life for many years";
that "citizens should participate in social institutions"; and that her cross-examination
of former associates would be more effective than that of her attorney were apparently
not sufficient. United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. at 807. The court stated that the
defendant was represented by "able counsel who have had ample experience and a thor-
ough acquaintance with the matters in litigation." Id.
'7 526 F.2d at 1025. See United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. at 806.
" 526 F.2d at 1025. See note 119 supra.
" 526 F.2d at 1025. See United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d at 49; United States v.
Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1265 (4th Cir. 1975).
The court in Swinton gave some indication of the test to be used by trial judges in
determining whether or not to allow a defendant to proceed pro se: a "balancing [ofn
considerations of individual freedom of choice against the need to ensure the orderly
proceedings essential to a fair trial." 400 F. Supp. at 806.
" 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976).
' For an understanding of the court's decision in Bennett, it is important to realize
that Bennett had two separate trials.
"2 The defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).
11 539 F.2d at 49. The court noted that throughout the first trial Bennett was assert-
ing only his right to represent himself with the assistance of counsel. Id.
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examine certain witnesses but that he could not argue the evi-
dence to the jury. In so limiting Bennett's personal participation,
the trial court determined that matters of argument should be
conducted by the defendant's court-appointed attorney. 34 Ben-
nett appealed his conviction on the ground that he had a statu-
tory and constitutional right to such hybrid representation. The
Tenth Circuit rejected Bennett's claim of a right to appear as co-
counsel, 131 primarily relying on its decision in United States v.
Hill. I The court determined there was no abuse of discretion in
denying such participation to Bennett and in limiting his per-
sonal activity to that of cross-examination of several witnesses.
37
Prior to his second trial, Bennett again requested that he be
allowed to make an opening and closing statement and be permit-
ted to cross-examine certain witnesses. As in his first trial, the
trial court informed him that he would be allowed to cross-
examine witnesses but not to make arguments. Bennett moved to
defend pro se.3 8 After denying a second motion by the defendant
to conduct his own defense, 9 the court appointed counsel on his
" Id. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1958).
" See note 121 supra.
31 See notes 124 through 128 supra and accompanying text.
539 F.2d at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
'9 At a second pretrial hearing the following dialogue occurred:
THE DEFENDANT: . . . I know I am not a qualified attorney to conduct
a full trial, but there are certain aspects of the trial that I feel that I am
competent to proceed with . . . . And because of this [denial of hybrid
representation motion] I was placed in the position of conducting my com-
plete trial, which I will do if the Court still denies me limited assistance of
counsel.
THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, you are just playing fox with the Court. I can't
understand what you want . ...
THE COURT: What do you want [Shaw, Bennett's attorney] to do?
THE DEFENDANT: Everything else that takes place in this trial.
THE COURT: You mean you want him to conduct your trial except the
part you want to do?
THE DEFENDANT: That is right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Shaw, the Court is going to direct that you conduct
this trial . . ..
THE DEFENDANT: I renews [sic] my Motion to be allowed to conduct
my own defense.
Id., Appendix at 56-57.
VOL. 54
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
behalf. 40 Thus, the Tenth Circuit was faced with yet another
interpretation of Faretta: How soon in the criminal process must
a defendant decide to proceed by counsel or pro se?'4
In holding that the right to self-representation "is one which
the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert before
trial,"'' the court noted that such assertion on the defendant's
part is necessary because the trial court must ascertain whether
the accused has made an understanding waiver of his right to
counsel.'43 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's conclu-
sion-Bennett "forfeited his right to self-representation by his
vacillating positions which continued until just six days before
the case was set for trial.""' Thus, there was no error in the trial
court's denial of self-representation."
United States v. Smith' and United States v. Montgo-
mery' raised several interesting issues relating to the effect
of Faretta upon pretrial plea bargaining. In Smith, the defend-
ant was arrested on June 8, 1974,148 and charged with a violation
of the Dyer Act.'49 On both June 10 and 11, while still in custody,
he requested an opportunity to speak with authorities, signing
waivers on both days.5 0 During the course of the interview 5'
'~' 539 F.2d at 50.
' Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Faretto, indicated some of the procedural
questions left open by the majority's decision:
If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still
have a constitutional right to the assistance of standby counsel? How soon
in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by
counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial?
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Stiner v.
State, 539 P.2d at 753, where the Oklahoma Court of Appeals directed attention to the
majority's opinion in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46, allowing standby counsel for the
accused in certain circumstances.
142 539 F.2d at 50.
"' Id. For a pre-Faretta treatment of this type of issue, see United States v. Shea,
508 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 539 F.2d at 51.
145 Id.
' 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1975).
529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
525 F.2d at 1017.
18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970).
525 F.2d at 1018.
S The court's opinion is unclear as to whether the defendant made his inculpatory
statements at both interviews or only at the June 11, 1974, interview. The court spoke only
of "the conversation" as being in the nature of plea bargaining. Id. at 1019 n.1.
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Smith made an inculpatory statement as to the Dyer Act viola-
tion. His principal reason for requesting the interview was to offer
to plead guilty to all charges if he could be assured of being sent
to a federal penal institution.'52 The Government introduced
these statements made by Smith during his personal attempt at
bargaining as part of its case-in-chief.'5 3 He was subsequently
convicted and sentenced;'54 this appeal followed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the follow-
ing issues: Whether it was error to admit, as part of the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, inculpatory statements made by the defen-
dant during plea bargaining; and, considering the precedents in-
dicating that plea discussions and agreements pursued by an at-
torney are privileged and inadmissible, of what importance is the
fact that Smith was not represented by counsel when he engaged
in these negotiations? Citing various authority'55 for the general
proposition that plea discussions conducted by a lawyer have
been recognized as privileged and inadmissible, the court ad-
dressed the policy reasons behind the protection of plea bargain-
ing.' 6 The court then concluded that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Faretta'57 and the given inadmissibility of
attorney-conducted plea bargaining discussions, 58 there should
be no distinction when a defendant, who is not represented by
, I Id. at 1018. In its analysis, the court concluded that Smith's purpose in requesting
the two interviews was "to work out an arrangement, whereby he would serve federal time
and thus avoid the state robbery charge." Id. at 1020.
The court indicated that the officer dealing with Smith knew that the purpose of both
interviews was to allow him to bargain. This knowledge was underscored by the fact that
the officer brought an FBI agent to the June l1th interview in connection with the bank
robbery charge. Id.
' Id. at 1019. It was the Government's position in the case that the statements were
confessions made after Smith was advised of his rights under Miranda and that he had
chosen to waive them. Id. at 1019-20. The Tenth Circuit, however, was not persuaded that
"[the signing of a Miranda waiver] effectively negates the legal consequence of the plea
bargaining," since he was seeking an agreement and not making a confession. Id. at 1020.
525 F.2d at 1017.
"' United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Burke v.
Mancusi, 425 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1970); State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 453 P.2d 22 (1969)
(dictum). See also AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY §
3.4 (Approved Draft 1968); FED. R. EvID. 410; FED. R. Civ. P. 11(e)(6). 525 F.2d at 1020-
21.
156 525 F.2d at 1020. To allow plea bargaining discussions to be admissible in evidence
"would effectively thwart the effort." Id. at 1021.
,., Id. See notes 114-28 supra and accompanying text.
525 F.2d at 1020.
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counsel, is seeking to plea bargain on his own behalf.'59 Thus, in
reversing and remanding, the Tenth Circuit held that it was error
to receive into evidence inculpatory statements made during plea
bargaining."'
United States v. Montgomery'' presented a somewhat differ-
ent issue than Smith in the area of plea bargaining. Defendant
Montgomery, who had been charged with federal offenses under
a two count indictment," 2 was represented at his omnibus hear-
ing and arraignment by an assistant federal public .defender.
6 3
Before entering his plea at the arraignment, Montgomery "stated
in no uncertain terms that he wished to be represented by some-
one other than a public defender."'' 4 This request was denied and
he "requested that he be allowed to represent himself."'' 5
This request was likewise denied. One month after his arraign-
ment, another federal public defender filed a motion for a con-
tinuance, indicating in the motion that plea bargaining had been
undertaken on Montgomery's behalf.'66 The defendant eventually
entered a guilty plea to a lesser included offense6 7 and was subse-
quently represented by a public defender at the sentencing.6 8 On
appeal, Montgomery alleged error in the trial court's refusal to
allow him to represent himself, citing Faretta. "9
"I Id. at 1021. "Such efforts [plea bargaining on his own behalf] are to be considered
on the same bases as they would be considered if [the defendant] had a lawyer." Id. The
court noted that Smith was considered as a case of first impression. Id. The writer has
been unable to find any cases subsequent to Smith which utilize the same attorney
privilege and Faretta analysis in an instance where defendant bargains on his own behalf.
525 F.2d at 1021-22.
529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
162 Montgomery was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1792 (1970).
1" 529 F.2d at 1405.
164 Id.
Id.
ea Montgomery was arraigned on December 9, 1974, and the motion for continuance
was filed on January 9, 1975. Id.
"' The defendant entered a plea of guilty at a hearing conducted in accordance with
FED. R. CraM. P. 11. At a Rule 11 hearing the trial court must determine that the defen-
dant understands the charges against him or her, that there has been no undue influence
upon the defendant to plead, and that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea. 529 F.2d
at 1405-06.
" 529 F.2d at 1406.
As to Montgomery's Faretta argument, the court stated:
Mr. Justice Stewart made clear [in Faretta] that in federal courts the right
of self-representation has always been recognized and that indeed specific
provision was made for it in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which is currently
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Concluding that his plea was voluntary, the Tenth Circuit
held that appellant Montgomery was "precluded from asserting
that his right to represent himself was infringed."'' 0 The court
deferred to those decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which have consistently held that a voluntary plea of guilty
blocks out any previous constitutional defects in the case 7, and
precludes any efforts to set aside such a plea on constitutional
grounds. "' In affirming Montgomery's conviction, the court
stated that "the voluntary plea of guilty by Montgomery is the
independent intervening act which renders ineffectual the prior
failure to allow appellant to represent himself at a trial.' ' 3
Where there was a twenty-seven-month delay between the
time of indictment and trial, the Tenth Circuit applied a Barker
v. Wingo'71 analysis to determine if the appellant in United States
v. Hay'75 had been prejudiced by such a lengthy delay. 76 Hay, an
codified in 28 U.S.C. Section 1654. Since, then, the federal law has always
recognized the right, it follows that a violation of this guarantee could be
claimed by the defendant regardless of whether Faretta carries retroactive
force.
Id. See Stiner v. State, 539 P.2d 750, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
7 529 F.2d at 1407. The Tenth Circuit determined that Montgomery's guilty plea
was voluntary and that he waived his right of self-representation when he permitted a
public defender to plea bargain for him. The court noted that Montgomery accepted the
benefits of the bargain by pleading to a lesser included offense. Id.
"I The court cites Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). But see Justice Marshall's dissent in Tollett:
[Elven where counsel does not consider and present to his client the possi-
bility of a challenge to the composition of the grand jury, the client is none-
theless held to have made an "intelligent" guilty plea.
If plea bargaining is to be constitutionally acceptable, it must rest upon
personal choices made by defendants informed about possible alternatives;
at least, they should know what options are open to them [for an intelligent
and knowing act within Brady].
Id. at 270, 273.
,"I The court cites Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The other two cases
in the trilogy are McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
,7 529 F.2d at 1407.
407 U.S. 514 (1972). In deciding whether a defendant has been denied a speedy
trial, the Supreme Court has suggested four factors to be considered: "Length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant." Id. at 530.
,75 527 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
'' The court's opinion indicated that the Government first learned of criminal activ-
ity involving Hay in January 1969. Following a lengthy investigation, the appellant was
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engineer employed by a prime contractor in the construction of a
public works system in Saigon, South Vietnam, was convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371.t 77
Balancing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice to
the appellant, the court first concluded that the relevant period
for determining whether there had been a denial of a speedy trial
was the period of time from the appellant's arrest to the time of
his trial, i.e., seventeen months."' The court then examined at
great length the reasons advanced by the government "for two
identifiable periods of delay": 179 (1) A deposition procedure in a
foreign country 80 and (2) the unavailability of a witness. 8, Prefac-
indicted by a grand jury on August 18, 1972. At the time of his indictment, however, Hay
was in Mali, Africa. Mali finally revoked his visa, and he was arrested on May 18, 1973,
when his plane landed in New York. He was subsequently convicted at his trial on October
13, 1974. Id. at 993-94.
The court noted the appellant's prejudice claim, "in addition to the anxiety and
concern usually attendant to pending criminal charges, is that he was unable to pursue
his occupation as an engineer because that required him to work overseas. The terms of
his bond restricted him to Colorado and his passport had been lifted." Id. at 996. See
United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir. 1974).
'7 The court's decision indicated that Hay, as the supervisor of a sub-contractor's
work (a French corporation, Les Establissements Eiffel), conspired with employees of
Eiffel to exert efforts to obtain the highest possible allowance on Eiffel's cost overrun claim
to the government of South Vietnam. The United States, through the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, loaned South Vietnam monies for the construction project. 527 F.2d
at 992-93.
"I' The court did not consider the time between appellant's indictment and trial
because he was not available for prosecution. Id. at 993-94. See note 66 supra.
'7, 527 F.2d at 994.
' The court noted that it was necessary to depose bank officials in Switzerland in
order to authenticate appellant's bank account in which he held the monies paid for his
services in the conspiracy. The trial court found that the circumstances of the case justi-
fied the delay, and the Tenth Circuit agreed that the Swiss deposition procedure was
"extraordinary and presented both legal and diplomatic problems." Id.
'" The trial court, however, found that the witness' testimony at trial was not essen-
tial. Id. at 995. The Tenth Circuit disposed of this problem by opining that "[wie do not
believe . . . that a witness must be absolutely indispensable to justify reasonable delay."
Id. But see Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 which, the court noted, might
be more stringent due to § 3161(h)(3)(A) which allows for a delay caused by the unavaila-
bility of an "essential" witness. 527 F.2d at 995 n.8. Although the writer has been unable
to find any recent case law interpreting this particular section of the Speedy Trial Act
Judge MacKinnon of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has written: "TheN
[of which (h)(3)(A) is one] are perfectly reasonable interpretations of excusable delay in
court proceedings and generally follow sound law in the United States." United States v.
Brown, 520 F.2d 1106, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (MacKinnon, J., Statement of Reasons in
Support of Sua Sponte Motion to consider the Case En Banc).
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ing its analysis on language from Barker v. Wingo, i.e., that "the
delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is consid-
erably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge,"' 82 the
court concluded that, given the reasons for the delay in a complex
case such as this,8 3 seventeen months was not long enough to be
so prejudicial as to justify reversal.8 4 The Tenth Circuit thus
determined that the appellant was not denied a speedy trial. 181
IV. TRIAL MATTERS
A. Pretrial Motions to Suppress
In United States v. Kay8 ' and United States v. Cassidy,'87
the Tenth Circuit reversed trial court decisions granting motions
to suppress evidence. In Kay there was a noted absence of any
witnesses sworn or any evidence received at the "hearing" despite
the fact that the defendant's fourth amendment issue was
"largely factual and sharply contested."' 8 Recognizing that "the
statements and argument of counsel are not a substitute for a
proper evidentiary hearing," the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the action was
improper at that time. 8 '
In Cassidy the trial court found that the defendant had not
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights' 8 since he had been under
considerable "pressure" at the time.'' Finding this to be "pure
speculation" unsupported by the evidence,' 2 the Tenth Circuit
407 U.S. at 531.
1 See notes 180 and 181 supra and accompanying text.
"" The court concluded that the 17-month delay did not prejudice Hay in the prepa-
ration of his defense. 527 F.2d at 996.
". Id. at 997.
,, No. 76-1299 (10th Cir., June 23, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' No. 76-1137 (10th Cir., Mar. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 76-1299 at 2.
,, Id. See United States v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974).
'" No. 76-1137 at 3. There was evidence introduced at trial that the defendant was
fully apprised of his Miranda rights and that he understood these rights. However, he
chose to give a statement to the agent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"' The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial judge had taken into consideration, among
other things, evidence introduced in a companion case in reaching his determination that
the statement was involuntary. No. 76-1137 at 3.
192 In holding that the trial court's findings in this matter were totally without merit,
the Tenth Circuit stated: "The observation by the trial court that Cassidy had been under
'pressure' during the time he was holding hostages and brandishing firearms in his escape
efforts and therefore could not thereafter 'voluntarily' give a statement is pure speculation
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reversed: "[Cilaims of instability, employment difficulties, psy-
chiatric treatment, fear of policemen and being tired and hungry
will not serve to overcome confessions given after proper Miranda
warnings with no evidence of force, threats or promises being used
to obtain the confessions."'' 3
B. Prejudicial Joinder of Offenses
In United States v. Kinard"4 the Tenth Circuit rejected the
appellant's argument that he had suffered substantial prejudice
due to the joinder into a single trial of six separate substantive
charges and a conspiracy charge.'95 Referring to the principles laid
down in United States v. Burkhart, " the court found determina-
tive the fact that proof of the various offenses would have been
admissible even if separate trials had been ordered.'97
In United States v. Day98 the defendant appealed denial of
and insufficient to support the trial court's findings." Id. at 4. See United States v.
Adams, 470 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1972), where the Tenth Circuit held that the determination
of "whether a waiver is understandingly and voluntarily made may be established by the
circumstances of the case." Id. at 251.
"I No. 76-1137 at 4 (quoting United States v. Ritter, 456 F.2d 178, 179 (10th Cir.
1972)).
' No. 75-1066 (10th Cir., July 14, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
Citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 and 13, the Tenth Circuit concluded that such joinder
was procedurally proper. No. 75-1066 at 11.
458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972). Articulating the general rule applicable to receiving
the evidence of other crimes, the Tenth Circuit, in Burkhart, held:
Such evidence in the first instance is inadmissible. There are, however,
several exceptions which allow such evidence to be received in special cir-
cumstances and for limited purposes. It may be received for the purpose of
proving a common plan, scheme or design to commit the offense charged or
for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity
or absence of mistake, inadvertence or accident.
Id. at 204. See DeVore v. United States, 368 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1966); Mills v. United
States, 367 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1966); Woodland v. United States, 347 F.2d 956 (10th Cir.
1965); Weeks v. United States, 313 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1963); Berry v. United States, 271
F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1972);
Moran v. United States, 404 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1968); Morgan v. United States, 355 F.2d
43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1025 (1966).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the defendant not only neglected to request a sever-
ance of the charges, but a claim of prejudicial joinder was not asserted at the trial court
level until the defendant made his motion for a new trial. Although it was recognized that
a "[flailure to request severance by a pretrial motion generally constitutes a waiver," the
Tenth Circuit refrained from deciding whether his objections should be heard as raised in
his motion for a new trial. Instead, it chose to proceed on the grounds that it was a
nonmeritorious claim of prejudice. No. 75-1066 at 12.
" ' 533 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1976).
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his motion to require the Government to elect between a homicide
charge and a charge of accessory after the fact."99 The appellant
argued that since he could not be convicted on both charges, there
was a legal bar to trying him on both counts. In determining that
this argument was fallacious, the Tenth Circuit noted that it
could have based its holding on the grounds that it was a proper
joinder in the absence of prejudice.00 However, in view of the
appellant's failure to make any pretrial motions with regard to
prejudice and his subsequent acquittal on the homicide charge,
the court determined that the proper grounds for affirmance of
the accessory after the fact conviction was that "acquittal on one
misjoined count cures a misjoinder. ' '2 1'
"I The Tenth Circuit acknowledged FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 as the proper remedy when
a defendant is prejudiced by a joinder. The rule provides the trial court with machinery
to require an election if, in its own sound discretion, it finds prejudice.
2"n The Tenth Circuit referred to the FED. R. CalM. P. 8(a) which allows joinder if the
offenses "are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan." See United States v. Van Scoy, 482 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1973),
where the Tenth Circuit held: "Although Van Scoy could not be convicted of both bank
robbery and being an accessory after the fact, it is clear the offenses are based upon
transactions constituting parts of a common scheme and thus fall within Rule 8(a) juris-
diction." Id. at 349.
11 533 F.2d at 526. The Tenth Circuit chose to base its holding upon the general
principle stated in Gornick v. United States, 320 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1963), where the
court refused to find prejudice in the denial of a motion to grant a separate trial on each
count when the appellant was found not guilty on one of the counts. See United States v.
Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1941); Culjak v. United States, 53 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1931);
Latses v. United States, 45 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1930); Weinhandler v. United States, 20
F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1927); Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1926); Beaux-Arts
Dresses v. United States, 9 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1925). But see Cross v. United States, 335
F.2d 987, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The Tenth Circuit noted, however, that the general rule is not applicable where there
is a multiplicity of charges so as to "make it difficult for the jury to sort out the evidence
pertaining separately to each charge, and the subsequent related problems with the in-
structions." 533 F.2d at 526-27. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
In his appeal, the appellant in Day also made a "belated expression" of his desire to
testify as to only one of the counts. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument as being
too late. However, it has been recognized that under some circumstances "[pirejudice
may develop when an accused wishes to testify on one but not the other of two joined
offenses." Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1964). For the appli-
cable standard in such cases see Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968),"
where the court held:
[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing
showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count
and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. In making such a
showing, it is essential that the defendant present enough informa-
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C. Jury Selection
Although the problems encountered in empaneling the jury
were "perhaps regrettable," the Tenth Circuit upheld the convic-
tion in United States v. Johnson.'20 At the time jury selection was
to commence, there was a noticeable absence of blacks in the
group of prospective jurors.103 After the jury array had been ex-
hausted, the United States Marshal was directed to get prospec-
tive jurors off the streets within the vicinity of the courthouse.
This was the manner in which the jury was finally selected. The
Tenth Circuit cited defense counsel's failure to make a motion to
challenge the array under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) as determinative. 104
A similar challenge to strike the petit jury was made in
United States v. Bennett 05 where there was only one black avail-
able on the jury panel. The appellant argued that an improper
selection of prospective jurors had been made in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 1861,200 because lists of actual voters were used in lieu
of voter registration lists. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the
grounds articulated by the court in Leggroan v. Smith"7 where it
tion-regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count
and his reasons for not wishing to testify on the other-to satisfy the court
that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh
the considerations of "economy and expedition in judicial administration"
against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testi-
fying.
Id. at 977.
2 No. 74-1666 (10th Cir., Oct. 31, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I Counsel for the defendant made a motion for a continuance (which was subse-
quently denied) but failed to make any motion challenging the array pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1867 (1970). See note 19 infra.
"I' The court noted that compliance with this section "is the exclusive means by
which a person accused of a federal crime may challenge a jury array on the grounds that
it was not selected in conformity with the provisions of the Jury Selection & Service Act
of 1968." No. 74-1666 at 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e).
539 F.2d 45 (1976).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970) requires "that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to
trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."
21 498 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974). In Leggroan the entire jury panel was challenged on
the grounds that it was selected from tax assessment rolls thereby effectively "excluding
nonproperty owners and prejudicially reducing the number of women, young people, poor
people and members of minority races." Id. at 169. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "no
rational basis exists for such a discriminatory exclusion and that the jury selection method
used was constitutionally improper." Id. at 171. See also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.
320 (1970) (reiterates the states' freedom in confining selection of prospective jurors to
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was recognized that a mode of jury selection must be upheld when
the proof offered failed to show "that a recognizable, identifiable
class of persons, otherwise entitled to be jury members, has been




In United States v. Trujillo °9 a sixth amendment challenge
was raised against the jury composition where the defendant ob-
jected to six of the jurymen who had previously served in narcot-
ics cases. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that "service on
prior juries in cases having similar issues does not of itself exclude
a juror from serving." 10
those citizens meeting qualifications such as age, education, good intelligence, sound
judgment, and fair character); United States v. King, 492 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1974) (the
court summarily held that the Jury Service and Selection Act of 1968 was not violated by
the use of voter registration lists); United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C.
1974) (court rejected complaint that a juror wheel, which was composed from the voter
registration list exclusively, consequently resulted in an improper representation of the
community as to race, economic status, or age); Overview, Criminal Law and Procedure,
52 DEN. L.J. 133, 148-49 (1975).
"1' 498 F.2d at 170. The Tenth Circuit, in Bennett, also noted that the statistics
offered by the defendant did not show that the proportion of blacks to whites actually
voting was any less than the proportion registered to vote in the counties from which the
array was drawn. The defendant had based his proof on national figures. 539 F.2d at 55.
2" No. 74-1834 (10th Cir., Sept. 17, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication). See also
United States v. Jasper, 523 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1975) (court rejected the claim that jurors
who had been challenged in a kindred case immediately preceding this one were ineligible
to serve on this jury).
10 No. 74-1834 at 9 (citing Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963)). See Virgin Islands v. Williams, 476 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1973),
where the Third Circuit stated:
[Federal courts have uniformly held that, absent some evidence of actual
partiality, a juror is not disqualified merely because he previously sat in a
similar case arising out of a separate and distinct set of circumstances even
though the offenses charged in the cases are similar and some of the same
prosecution witnesses testify in each case.
Id. at 773.
For courts upholding a jury panel despite the fact that some of the jurors had pre-
viously served in a similar case and/or heard testimony of the same prosecution witnesses,
see United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974);
United States v. Salazar, 480 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Estrada, 441 F.2d
873 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1120 (1968); United States v. Cooper, 332 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1964); Casias v. United States,
315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963); Calderon v. United States, 269
F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1959); Harbold v. United States, 255 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1958); Cwach
v. United States, 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1954); Belvin v. United States, 12 F.2d 548 (4th
Cir. 1926); Haussener v. United States, 4 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1925); Wilkes v. United States,
291 F. 988 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 719 (1923). But see United States v. Stevens,
444 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1971), where the Sixth Circuit held that "whenever avoidable,
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The absence of procedural safeguards necessitated by
pretrial and trial publicity provided the basis for appeals in
United States v. Hall"' and United States v. Coppola.2" The
Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant's contention in Hall that the
trial judge's voir dire of prospective jurors was inadequate in light
of the alleged prejudicial pretrial publicity. In determining that
there was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that, although the trial judge's questions were
not as numerous or detailed as those submitted by the appellant,
they contained the import of his inquiry."'
The Tenth Circuit likewise rejected the argument that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow counsel to ask the questions.
In averring to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, the court held that either the court or counsel is permitted
to conduct the voir dire."'
jurors should not be called to serve in cases involving witnesses or parties who participated
in cases in which they were previously impanelled."
2 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1976).
212 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1975).
213 The appellant also alleged error by the trial judge due to his refusal to ask all of
the questions offered by the appellant. 536 F.2d at 324. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409
U.S. 524, 527 (1973), where the Court held that a trial judge "was not required to put the
question in any particular form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the
subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner." See also Brundage v. United
States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) provides:
The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the
defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or
their attorneys as it deems proper.
For the scope of review of a trial court's discretion under this rule see Brundage v. United
States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966), where the Tenth Circuit held that "[tihe court's
discretion under this rule will not be disturbed, unless it appears from the record that its
voir dire was inadequate to properly test the qualifications and competency of the prospec-
tive jurors to sit on trial of the case." Id. at 618. See also United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d
1019 (10th Cir. 1975); Goosman v. A Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); Alvarez
v. United States, 282 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th
Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961); Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d
433 (4th Cir. 1951); Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1947).
The appellant also alleged error in the trial judge's failure to question each juror
individually. While the Tenth Circuit recognized that it may have been better practice
to conduct an individual voir dire of each prospective juror due to the publicity prior to
the trial, the failure to do so was not error. The court distinguished Silverthorne v. United
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In Coppola the appeal was based on the failure to admonish
jurors at the end of each day's session to refrain from reading
newspapers, watching television, or listening to radio accounts of
the trial. Although the Tenth Circuit recognized that it is better
practice to repeat this warning throughout the trial,"' the court
determined that there was no prejudice where the trial judge
relied on his preliminary admonition which had been given gener-
ally to all of the prospective veniremen prior to empaneling of the
jury.
216
D. Admissibility of Evidence
The question of hearsay as to the testimony of a prosecution
witness was confronted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Coppola.217 The appellant was convicted of first degree murder
and conspiracy to commit the murder of a fellow inmate, one
Willard Hardaway.2 1 The facts support the conclusion that Har-
States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968), where the defendant's conviction was reversed and
remanded when, in view of the voluminous and highly inflammatory publicity prior to the
trial, the court failed to conduct individual questioning of the prospective jurors. The
Ninth Circuit expressed its preference for the following rule: "Whenever there is believed
to be a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because
of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the examination of each juror with respect
to his exposure shall take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective
jurors." 400 F.2d at 639 n.1 5 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS §
3.4(a) (Tent. Draft 1966) (selecting the jury-method of examination)). The Tenth Circuit
distinguished Silverthorne due to the essentially factual newsreporting in Hall rather than
opinions as to guilt. It was felt that this newsreporting was neither inflammatory nor
prejudicial. 536 F.2d at 326. See United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1971)
(following the Ninth Circuit's rule). See also Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961).
2' 526 F.2d at 775-76. See Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961), where the court reversed the conviction because the trial
court permitted the jury to separate overnight and for a long weekend without cautioning
them prior to each separation against reading anything about the case:
And in all criminal cases whenever jurors are permitted to separate, the court
should invariably admonish them not to communicate with any person or
allow any person to communicate with them on any subject connected with
the trial, and not to read published accounts of the course of the trial.
272 F.2d at 507 (citing Brown v. United States, 99 F.2d 131, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1938)).
2I" The Tenth Circuit based its affirmance on the harmless error rule as articulated
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24.
217 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir, 1975).
21 Id. at 766.
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daway was killed when he failed to deliver a requisite amount of
heroin to the appellant, who had arranged for it to be delivered
inside the walls of Leavenworth."'
The prosecution witness, Killian Joe Herman, worked as an
orderly in the segregation area of Leavenworth. Herman testified
that he was to deliver heroin to one Molina as compensation for
killing Hardaway at defendant-appellant's behest. In this testi-
mony he related to the court certain responsive comments made
by the defendant-appellant to Herman in reaction to inculpating
statements that had been made by Molina to Herman regarding
Molina's payoff. 20 The import of these statements by the appel-
lant directed Herman to assure Molina that due payment would
be forthcoming and that he would keep Molina in heroin "'as
long as they was [sic] together and had the stuff available
. . ' '221 Herman's testimony regarding the statements of Mo-
lina to which the defendant-appellant had responded was admit-
ted into evidence despite considerable objection by the defense
that such testimony was hearsay.
22
The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the appellant's challenge to
admittance of this testimony, chose to view the hearsay state-
ments as adoptions by the appellant wherein "it appear[ed] the
accused understood and unambiguously assented to those state-
ments. 223 In conclusion, the court held that Herman's recounting
of Molina's statements and the defendant-appellant's comments
in response to them were properly admitted under the party ad-
missions exception to the hearsay rule.
"I Id. There had been evidence introduced at trial which indicated that the appellant
was the major supplier of heroin at the penitentiary. Id. at 776.
211 Id. at 768.
121 Id. at 769.
2 Id.
Id. n.2. See Naples v. United States, 344 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 4 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1069, 1071-72 (Chadbourne rev., 1972). See also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pear-
son, 194 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1952) (information given by the driver of the car regarding his
employment by the insured was sufficiently acquiesced in by the insured when he failed
to deny the statement made in his presence, rendering it an admission that the driver was
insured's employee at the time of the accident).
For cases holding that a statement made in the presence of an accused, which state-
ment necessarily calls for his denial if untrue, may be relevant as an adoptive admission,
due to his failure to deny the statement, see Ishler v. Cook, 299 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Arpan, 260 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Alker, 255 F.2d
851 (3d Cir. 1958); Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943).
1977
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In United States v. Jones224 and United States v. Swain2 1 the
Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of tape recordings over the
appellants' objections. In Jones the appellant was convicted on
the basis of tape recordings made contemporaneously with his
sale of cocaine and heroin to a government informant."' The
tapes were challenged on the grounds that they were "inaudible,
susceptible to misinterpretation and highly prejudicial."", The
appellant also argued that it was error to permit the informant
to corroborate his own testimony through use of these tapes.
2
1
Noting that the admissibility of a tape recording is "within
the sound discretion of the trial judge,"2 2 the Tenth Circuit held
that the discretion exercised here was without error where there
was also substantial corroboration for the informant's testimony
from the Drug Enforcement Administration agent who had made
the tapes in question. 230 The court, in assuming that the two tapes
were played in their entirety at trial, concluded that the record,
taken as a whole, showed no prejudicial error in connection with
the tapes.231 However, despite the court's acquiesence in the trial
"' 540 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1976).
" No. 75-1387 (10th Cir., Dec. 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
22 540 F.2d at 467.
22 Id. It should be noted that the Government admitted, prior to trial, that parts of
the two tapes were incomprehensible, other parts were incomplete, and still others were
totally inaccurate. Due to these problems, the Government assured that no use would be
made of the transcripts at trial. Id. at 469.
22 Id. The trial court permitted the informer to testify in the presence of the jury on
the contents of the inaudible tapes, despite objections from the defense that this was
extremely prejudicial and inflammatory. Id. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the flagrant
insufficiency of the recordings, noting that the court reporter was unable to decipher and
record what portion of the tape was being played or whose voices were being heard. Id.
I" Id. at 470. See United States v. Clements, 484 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974); United States v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229 (loth Cir. 1973);
United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); United
States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); United
States v. Madda, 345 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1965); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962); Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
2" 540 F.2d at 470. The Tenth Circuit stated that "[uinless the unintelligible por-
tions are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy, it may be
admitted; this is especially so where a witness who heard the statements also testifies and
the recording gives independent support to his testimony." Id. See Monroe v. United
States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
"1 540 F.2d at 469.
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court's action, the Tenth Circuit did provide the prosecution with
a caveat:
To avoid danger of reversal for an inadequate record and possi-
ble prejudice, some means should be used to identify clearly those
portions of the tapes played at trial. These tapes, or transcribed
portions of them, should be included in the record on appeal. In the
trial court's discretion the use of tapes may be conditioned on ad-
vance preparation of an accurate transcript . .. .
A similar issue arose in United States v. Swain33 where the
appellant based his challenge on the admission of a tape which
had been recorded contemporaneously with the attempted rape
for which he was now on trial. The appellant argued that portions
of the tape were inaudible and the admittance thereof constituted
prejudicial error. 234 Reiterating the importance of the trial judge's
discretion in these matters, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ad-
missibility of the tape:
It is well settled that a recording is admissible unless there are
inaudible portions which are so substantial that the recording as a
whole is not trustworthy . . . . Whether or not the inaudible por-
tions are so substantial that the recording is not trustworthy has
repeatedly been held to be a determination for the trial judge acting
within his discretion. m
The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial court had conducted an
in camera hearing wherein the tape had been reviewed in its
entirety and the court had subsequently determined that the in-
audible portions were not so substantial or untrustworthy so as
to require the tape's exclusion.23
E. Scope of Direct and Cross-Examination
The scope of cross-examination by defense counsel was ad-
dressed by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Brooks, 237 United
States v. Logan,25 and United States v. Estell.2 39 In these cases
In Id. n.3.
m No. 75-1387 (10th Cir., Dec. 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
23 Id. at 5.
''Id.
'' Id. at 6. See United States v. Clements, 484 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 437 (2d Cir. 1972); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641,
651-52 (1st Cir. 1963); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1961); Monroe
v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2" No. 75-1638 (10th Cir., Aug. 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
2' No. 75-1693 (10th Cir., Aug. 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
- 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976).
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the defendants-appellants argued that it was error for a trial
judge to restrict defense counsel's inquiry into the misdeeds of
government witnesses.2 1 In affirming the appellants' convictions,
the Tenth Circuit emphasized that "[tihe scope of cross-
examination is broad, but it is not unlimited. '24 ' Recognizing that
this determination is within the "sound discretion" of the trial
court,'2 12 the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court ruling would
not be disturbed where "Itihe matters sought to be inquired into
do not appear to be relevant or in anywise germane to the central
issue in the case .... ,,243
240 The same government witness testified in all three cases. The unrelated criminal
activity of the witness included the theft of government meat, forging checks, concealing
weapons, and a possible homicide. In his cross-examination of the government witness,
defense counsel sought to inquire into the witness' background in an attempt to bring out
these past criminal acts as evidence of his "evil character." No. 75-1693 at 6-7.
241 No. 75-1638 at 8. The Tenth Circuit agreed that such inquiry into the prosecution
witness' alleged misdeeds were irrelevant in that they had no connection with the charges
then pending against any of the defendants, namely, knowing possession of heroin with
the intent to distribute the same. Id. at 9. See No. 75-1693 at 6-7; 539 F.2d at 700. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in con-
cluding that such inquiry was "not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness." 539 F.2d
at 700.
242 No. 75-1693 at 6; No. 75-1638 at 8-9; 539 F.2d at 700. See United States v. Spivey,
508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Whitlock v. United States, 429
F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1970); McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1964);
Darby v. United States, 283 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1960); Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d
222 (10th Cir. 1960).
2I No. 75-1638 at 9. See No. 75-1693 at 6-7; 539 F.2d at 700. See also United States
v. Jones, No. 75-1338 (10th Cir., Mar. 25, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), where the
Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court for refusing to admit testimony bearing upon the
character for veracity of a prosecution witness. The Tenth Circuit adopted the language
used in Atkinson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 197 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1952), where it was
held that "[tihe credibility of the witness is always relevant in the search for truth
." Id. at 246. In Atkinson it was recognized that the trial court's duty is only to
protect [the witness] from questions which go beyond the bounds of rele-
vancy merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him. . . . Evidence challenging
directly the truth of what the witness has said about matters material to the
issue on trial, cannot be called collateral and immaterial to the issue of the
credibility of the witness, and it is admissible for that purpose.
Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also FED. R. EvID. 608(a); 3A WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 981, 983 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
It is curious why the Tenth Circuit did not affirm the trial courts' action in these three
cases on the grounds articulated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Pennix, 313
F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1963), where the court stated that "witnesses ... may, for purposes of
impeachment, be questioned as to prior convictions . . . . But it is clearly established
that the cross-examiner may not go further and inquire of a defendant concerning only
his prior arrest or indictment for a crime." Id. at 529 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit, in Brooks, noted that there was nothing in the record to indicate that
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In United States v. Larry "' direct examination of the defen-
dant's expert witness was wrongfully restricted by the trial court
where the defendant sought to rebut the trustworthiness of testi-
mony given by an expert government witness. The government
witness had testified to his conclusions concerning a chemical
analysis that had been conducted to detect the existence of her-
oin. The Tenth Circuit, commenting upon the trial court's mis-
conception of the answers called for by the questions, recognized
that the questions did not call for the opinion of one expert as to
the qualifications of another expert, but would only indicate disa-
greement as to the conclusions drawn by the other expert.245 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit concluded that this error did not require
reversal 242
F. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In United States v. Stricklin 2 7 the appellants' appealed their
respective convictions of possession of 2,250 pounds of marijuana
with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1).2 41 The defendants were apprehended while riding in a
pickup behind a vehicle and trailer which contained 2,250 pounds
of marijuana. Two bricks of marijuana were found in the pickup
and these were "similar or identical in appearance" to those in
the vehicle and trailer.24 The defendants contended that this
the government witness had ever been charged with murder, that there was evidence that
he had been arrested on a concealed weapons charge, but no evidence on a conviction,
and that he had allegedly stolen government meat and forged checks. No. 75-1638 at 8.
The Fourth Circuit, in Pennix, recognized that the probative value of this type of evidence
is "overwhelmingly outweighed by its inevitable tendency to inflame and prejudice the
jury .... " 313 F.2d at 529. See United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1970).
24 522 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1975).
245 Id. at 266. The court distinguished United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970), wherein the Tenth Circuit held that
it was improper to direct questions to one expert as to the qualifications of another expert.
'" 522 F.2d at 266.
247 534 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 831 (1976).
24K 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) states, in part: "[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-(1) to ... possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance .... " The defendants were also charged with and
convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1970).
"1g 534 F.2d at 1390. The search of the pickup was proper where nightime hunting
tools were in plain view of the officer, giving him probable cause to believe that appellants
were engaged in illegal hunting. Id.
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evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for posses-
sion of the marijuana in the trailer. 5 ' Concluding that this cir-
cumstantial evidence certainly supported the inference that the
two bricks of marijuana came from the trailer, 5' the Tenth Cir-
cuit characterized the situation as amounting to constructive
possession where "the appellants were all engaged in some joint
activity relative to the marijuana . ".2..52
Similarly, the sufficiency of the evidence connecting the ap-
pellant with the theft of a tractor and two trailers was the basis
for appeal in United States v. Wofford.25 3 The appellant argued
that evidence tending to show that he had "possession" of the
property subsequent to the theft was insufficient to prove that he
actually was in possession or that he committed the offense as
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 659.214 The Tenth Circuit, acknowledg-
1 534 F.2d at 1390. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), where the
Court held that although evidence should be viewed by circuit courts in a light most
favorable to the Government, the conviction must be supported by "substantial evi-
dence."
251 Id.
152 Id. See Amaya v. United States, 373 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1967), where the Tenth
Circuit defined "possession," as the term is used in the federal narcotics laws, to include
both actual and constructive possession:
[Tihat constructive possession meant that although the narcotic may be in
the physical possession of another, the defendant knowingly had the power
of exercising control over it; that possession was not limited to manual touch
or personal custody; that it was sufficient to constitute possession under the
statute if the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the narcotic and
control over it ....
Id. at 199. See also United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Cox, 277 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Malfi, 264 F.2d 147 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
In addition to the "constructive possession" rationale, the circuit courts have also
used language rejecting a distinction between the weight to be accorded direct evidence
of possession and that of circumstantial evidence of possession in supporting a conviction.
See United States v. Pinna, 229 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1956), where it was contended by the
appellant that direct proof of possession is essential in order to give rise to the presumption
of importation. In denying the validity of this argument, the Seventh Circuit held: "We
know of no reason . . . why possession proven by circumstantial evidence should be
treated any differently from possession proven by direct evidence." Id. at 218. See also
United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974); Sewell
v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1969); Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114
(9th Cir. 1962); Eason v. United States, 281 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1960); Wilson v. United
States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1951).
2m No. 75-1185 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
- 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970) defines the offense, in part, as follows: "Whoever ... steals,
or unlawfully takes, carries away . . . with intent to convert to his own use any goods or
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ing that the evidence received had established the defendant's
"dominion over" the stolen property,255 affirmed the conviction on
the following grounds:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had possession
of property recently stolen gives rise to the inference that the ac-
cused knew the property was stolen and also to the inference that
the defendant participated in the theft of the property. There is no
requirement that the possession need be exclusive in the accused
... . [Plossession can exist on a joint basis with another actor.'"
G. Trial Judge Conduct
The conduct of the trial judges was at issue in United States
v. Sporcich257 and United States v. Hill. 8 In Sporcich the appel-
chattels ... which constitute an interstate ... shipment of ... property; ... Shall in
each case be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both
2" There was testimony placing the defendant-appellant as one of three men attempt-
ing to drive the equipment onto the witness' rural property. In addition, the witness
testified that the defendant-appellant remained behind to watch the truck while the
others went to seek assistance in moving the vehicles. No. 75-1185 at 3.
256 Id. at 4. The Tenth Circuit cited Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.
1969) in support of this proposition. It should be noted that the trial court in Sewell was
careful to instruct the jury that they should acquit if possession was at all consistent with
innocence. In Wofford the Tenth Circuit stressed the instruction that possession had to
be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the inference of theft to be drawn.
No. 75-1185 at 5. See Rugendorg v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964), where Mr. Justice
Clark stated:
In Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, Chief Justice Fuller held for a
unanimous Court that "[plossession of the fruits of crime, recently after its
commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession,
and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight
unless explained by circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent
with innocence."
Id. at 536-37. See United States v. Lang, No. 75-1263 (10th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975) (Not for
Routine Publication); United States v. Prujansky, 415 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Riso, 405 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1968); Avon v. United States, 382 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.
1967); Minor v. United States, 375 F.2d 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967);
Gregory v. United States, 364 F.2d 210 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 962 (1966);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1960); Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d
252 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 921 (1960); Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d
681 (6th Cir. 1951).
A strong dissent in Wofford suggests that the Tenth Circuit allowed an impermissible
"inference upon an inference" to be made in this case when it held the proof sufficient to
sustain the conviction. The dissent points out that the witness' testimony placing the
defendant in the truck and later assisting in moving the equipment off of the highway and
onto the witness' property, etc. was too "meager" an association with the stolen property
to make this inference applicable. No. 75-1185 at 8-10 (Hill, J., dissenting).
No. 74-1569 (10th Cir., Dec. 5, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975).
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lant argued that she was denied a fair trial due to the deprecatory
remark by the trial judge as to the ethics of her counsel.259 Recog-
nizing that an allegedly prejudicial comment must be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis,2  the Tenth Circuit concluded that this
comment was indeed unfortunate, but it was "not so prejudicial
as to deny [the appellant] a fair trial.
2'
In Hill the appellant's claim of prejudice was based upon the
judge's order to have him removed from the courtroom due to his
endless "harangue" and the judge's subsequent smile during the
removal.262 In light of the neutralizing instruction given to the
151 In the presence of the jury, the court stated to defense counsel: "Mr. Wallace, there
are adequate remedies for that. This is not the time to try them out. Ethical counsel would
know better than to do it in a trial such as this. Now, if that's what you have in mind,
quit it." No. 74-1569 at 8 (emphasis in original).
"' See United States v. Roell, 487 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1973). In Roell the judge made
comments where counsel was a bit "overzealous" in questioning a witness. The Eighth
Circuit stated that "this court is required to view these comments from the perspective
of the proceedings as a whole." Id. at 403.
"I1 No. 74-1569 at 8. See United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 892 (9th Cir. 1974)
(citing Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962)).
In Smith the Ninth Circuit stated:
[Flew, if any judges can altogether avoid words or action, inadvertent or
otherwise, which seem inappropriate when later examined in the calm clois-
ters of the appellate court. But unless such misadventures so persistently
pervade the trial or, considered individually or together, are of such magni-
tude that a courtroom climate unfair to the defendant is discernible from the
cold record, the defendant is not sufficiently aggrieved to warrant a new trial.
305 F.2d at 205. See also United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1974) (while judge's
comments were improper, they did not approach the level of harshness or contempt for
the defense); United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 972 (1974) (trial court may "reprimand or rebuff" counsel if necessary to maintain
control); United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1973) (where court's comments
did not suggest guilt, comments were directed at counsel only, remainder of court's rulings
were evenhanded between both sides, and strong curative instructions were made in an
attempt to erase prejudice to the defendant, the Second Circuit concluded that a new trial
was not necessary); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 970 (1973) (conviction was reversed where the cumulative effect of the court's
remarks deprecating defense counsel was to prejudice the jury against the defense case);
Whitlock v. United States, 429 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1970) (rebuffing counsel as to several
points and objections did not interfere with a fair trial); United States v. Gleeson, 411 F.2d
1091 (10th Cir. 1969) (admonishing of counsel in regard to examination of exhibits did not
deny defendant a fair trial); Cooper v. United States, 403 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1968) (where
it was not reversible error for the court to refer to counsel's arguments as ridiculous).
20 After asking the defendant several times if he was finished with his outrageous
conduct, which included personal attacks on the court, the judge had him removed from
the courtroom by marshals. The judge admitted that he had difficulty in restraining
himself from smiling because of the magnitude of appellant's conduct.
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jury immediately following the defendant's removal,1 3 the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the trial judge's conduct did not prevent
the appellant from receiving a fair trial .2  The court noted that
these actions did not approach the conduct condemned by the
Second Circuit in United States v. Nazarro,211 where the trial
judge had participated in the trial to such an extent that a
"partisan purpose" on his part could be inferred.216
H. Closing Arguments
The prosecutor in United States v. Bishop26 7 remarked, in his
summation to the jury, that "the evidence in this case is uncon-
tradicted [as to the the defendant's passing of counterfeit
bills] ."265 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
this statement could be interpreted as a comment on his failure
to testify. 2"1 In affirming the denial of the defendant's motion, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the test articulated in Knowles v. United
States: 1 "Whether the language used was manifestly intended or
was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessar-
ily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to tes-
tify. ' " In applying the Knowles test, the Tenth Circuit empha-
sized the fact that there were witnesses other than the defendant,
63 The court stated to the jury, in part: "This is not evidence. Ignore what he has
said. He is highly emotional this morning . . . .It is not proper and you will not allow
yourselves to be influenced by his conduct or by what he says." 526 F.2d at 1025.
" The Tenth Circuit, acknowledging that the trial judge should not have smirked,
chose to recognize that the "appellant was entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
Id. (citing Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)). In Lutwak the Court
supported this proposition by citing Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure: "(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id. at 619-20, 620 n.4.
2- 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973).
266 In Nazarro the judge participated extensively in examining witnesses. It was noted
that he continuously rehabilitated prosecution witnesses and designed questions to inject
doubt as to the credibility of defense witnesses. He also frequently interrupted the testi-
mony of defense witnesses. The Second Circuit concluded that the only remedy for the
prejudice suffered here was to reverse and remand for a new trial. The court stated, "even
if a judge's interjections are not motivated by a partisan purpose, 'he must not. . . permit
even the appearance of such an interference."' Id. at 310 (citing United States v. Curcio,
279 F.2d 681, 682 (2d Cir. 1960)).
267 534 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1976).
I Id. at 219.
21 Id. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
-0 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955).
"1 534 F.2d at 220 (citing Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d at 170).
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Bishop, who could have been called to testify as to her lack of
knowledge and intent. Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that it was not error for the prosecutor to comment "that
the evidence against the defendant [was] uncontradicted, espe-
cially where the facts in issue could have been controverted by
persons other than the defendant." '72
In United States v. Adcox 2 3 the Tenth Circuit reacted with
strong disapproval to the prosecutor's closing argument wherein
he made an emotional appeal to the jury that the people of the
town in which the crime was committed were watching them (the
jury) to see if they were going to condone it or condemn it.27 ' The
Tenth Circuit interpreted this argument as placing the task of
enforcing the law on the jury which had the effect of implying
that what they did in this case would determine whether there
would be law or lawlessness.25 In spite of its recognition that the
prosecutor's closing argument was invalid, the Tenth Circuit af-




The failure to give a cautionary instruction on accomplice
testimony was held to be reversible error in United States v.
Holland, 277 where the only evidence against the defendant was the
testimony of accomplices. The Tenth Circuit found this to be
M 534 F.2d at 219. See United States v. Williams, 479 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Follette, 418 F.2d at 1266 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Desmond v. United
States, 345 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1965), where the First Circuit held that a comment concern-
ing the "lack of contradiction" is improper "unless it is apparent on the record that
there was someone other than himself whom the defendant could have called." Id. at 227
(emphasis added).
v' No. 75-1400 (10th Cir., Apr. 7, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I' Id. at 8.
vs Id.
171 Id. at 9. In support of its holding, the Adcox court cited United States v. Worth,
505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975), and United States v.
Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1971), wherein the Tenth Circuit affirmed both convic-
tions, despite its avid disapproval of the prosecutor's closing statements. The court noted
that "there was no infringement of appellant's substantial rights within the meaning of
Rule 52 FED. R. CraM. P." in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. No. 75-1400 at
9. See Overview, Criminal Law and Procedure, 53 DEN. L.J. 109, 120-21 (1976).
27 No. 75-1556 (10th Cir., Apr. 8, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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plain error "affecting substantial rights" and a reversal was re-
quired despite the fact that the defendant failed to request such
an instruction."
Faced with a similar situation, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
jury instructions on accomplice testimony in United States v.
Carpenter.'7 The court emphasized that the trial court had gone
even further than had previously been required by Butler v.
United States,2 80 since the trial court instructed the jury: "You
should never convict a defendant upon the unsupported testi-
mony of an accomplice unless you believe the unsupported testi-
mony beyond a reasonable doubt.
'28'
2. Defendant's Theory of Defense
A refusal by the trial court to instruct the jury as to the
defendant's theory of defense was the basis for challenge in
United States v. Swinton5 2 and United States v. Robison.283 In
Swinton the defendant contended that he was merely a
"procuring agent" and was not "engaged in the business of deal-
ing in firearms." The Tenth Circuit held that this request to have
a "procuring agent" instruction submitted to the jury was non-
meritorious in view of the fact that the defendant had chosen not
to testify and had also neglected to present any evidence that he
was acting only as such an agent.24
" Id. at 2. The rule of law regarding an instruction on accomplice testimony was
articulated in Butler v. United States, 408 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1969), where the Tenth
Circuit held: "[Iln federal courts the testimony of an accomplice need not be corrobor-
ated, but the court must instruct the jury as to the manner in which such testimony should
be considered." Id. at 1105. See United States v. Webb, 466 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Birmingham, 447
F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lujan, 444 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Reid, 437 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1971).
'7 535 F.2d 1218 (10th Cir. 1976).
408 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1969). The instruction given by the Tenth Circuit in Butler
was as follows: "The mere fact that a witness is an accomplice does not mean that he is
an incompetent witness or that he can't tell the truth, but it does mean that testimony is
to be weighed with great care and received with caution." Id. at 1105.
" 535 F.2d at 1219 n.2. See Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1968).
22 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 75-1494 (10th Cir., Mar. 31, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
521 F.2d at 1260. "While a defendant is entitled to instructions on any theory of
defense finding support in the evidence presented and the law . . . , a trial court is not
required to instruct on a defendant's theory of the case when such an instruction has no
foundation in evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
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A similar conclusion was reached in Robison where, indicted
for refusing and resisting arrest, the defendant based the theory
of defense on his apprehension as to the identity of the officers
who stopped him. Although the defendant testified as to this, the
Tenth Circuit held that there was no evidence to "reasonably
support" such a theory32
J. Post-trial Matters
1. Sentencing
In United States v. Murdaugh26 the trial court rejected the
defendant's "Motion for Jail Time" on the basis that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider the matter. The defendant appealed,
seeking credit for time spent in state custody on a related charge.
His motion was based on 18 U.S.C. § 3568, which states: "The
Attorney General shall give any such person [convicted of an
offense] credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent
in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sent-
ence was imposed.12 7 Acknowledging that giving credit is an
n, The Tenth Circuit's rationale for affirming the refusal to give the defendant's
instruction was based upon a series of events leading up to the willful injury of government
property. These included an officer in uniform showing an I.D. card to the defendant; the
officer's use of a radio; ample time for the defendant to observe the officer; and a lack of
hesitance on the part of the defendant in walking back to the patrol car with the officer.
The only evidence that supported the defendant's theory of defense was his own testimony
as to his subjective state of mind. The Tenth Circuit held that this was not enough, citing
United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hagen, 470 F.2d
110 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); and Beck v. United States, 305
F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1962). But see Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
where the court held:
[Iln criminal cases the defendant is entitled to have presented instructions
relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the
evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent,
or of doubtful credibility. He is entitled to have such instructions even
though the sole testimony in support of the defense is his own.
Id. at 617. See United States v. Indian Trailer Corp., 226 F.2d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 1955).
See also United States v. Garcia, 452 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1971), where the court recognized
that the phrase "any foundation in the evidence" did not necessarily mean
that a requested charge encompass, in the trial judge's eyes, a believable or
sensible defense . . . .We hold that where the defendant's proposed charge
presents, when properly framed, a valid defense, and where there has been
some evidence relevant to that defense adduced at trial, then the trial judge
may not refuse to charge on that defense.
Id. at 423.
'" No. 75-1636 (10th Cir., Apr. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
-7 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
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administrative function, 8' the Tenth Circuit held that judicial
review was nonetheless appropriate "to insure compliance with
that section in order to protect a prisoner's statutory right to
credit." ' 9 Although the federal courts have varied the jurisdic-
tional bases utilized for entertaining such motions,9 0 the Tenth
Circuit has recognized the proper avenue for relief as 28 U.S.C. §
2255.91 Noting that the defendant's motion was properly filed
with the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that it was error
to dismiss the motion for a lack of jurisdiction.
The issue on appeal in United States v. Marines22 was
whether the sentencing court gave improper consideration to a
felony charge, which had been dismissed as part of a plea bargain,
in imposing sentence for a misdemeanor charge based upon the
" In rationalizing the computation of sentencing as an administrative function, the
D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Lewis, 447 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stated that "[tihe
mandate and operative scheme implicit in the statute provides that the available credit
shall be applied after whatever sentence is imposed and not before sentence. Thus, the
court must first impose sentence before any 'credit' may be realized." Id. at 1265. See
Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1973); Bostick v. United States, 409 F.2d 5 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 890 (1969); Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968).
Due to the administrative character of the "Motion for Jail Time," most circuits have
held that the district court may refuse to entertain the motion where the appellant has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Pace v. Clark, 453 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Morgan, 425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d
386 (10th Cir. 1966).
' No. 75-1636 at 3. See United States v. Morgan, 425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970).
29o The Tenth Circuit recognized that federal courts have treated motions seeking
credit for time spent in state custody as falling under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) (addresses
the power of a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970); 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) (addresses the jurisdiction of federal district courts to entertain
actions "to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty"); and FED. R. CRiM.
P. 35 (a motion for reduction of sentence must be made within 120 days after the sentence
has been imposed). No. 75-1636 at 3. For an example of court discretion exercised in
treating these motions, see Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968), where the
Ninth Circuit held that justice required it to treat the appellant's "Motion for Jail Time"
as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in lieu of his actual petition under
FED. R. CalM. P. 35 where the motion was made five years after the sentence had been
imposed.
No. 75-1636 at 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 states, in part: "A prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming. . . that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to . .. correct the sentence." See Davis v.
Willingham, 415 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1969). For other circuits that have recognized 28
U.S.C. § 2255 as a proper avenue for relief, see Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th
Cir. 1970); Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969); Lee v. United States, 400
F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968); Bryans v. Blackwell, 387 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1967).
-7 535 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1976).
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same set of facts. In concluding that the appellant's claim was
nonmeritorious, the Tenth Circuit recalled its consideration of a
similar issue in United States v. Majors:
29 3
[T]he dismissed indictment and the charge contained in it are
within the kind of information which a court may properly consider
in passing sentence. The plea bargain and the indictment dismissal
resulting from it did not and, indeed, could not, deprive the judge
of the right and probably the duty of giving consideration to it.2'
2. Prisoner's Rights
In Robinson v. McCune25 the appellant, while serving two
concurrent five-year felony sentences at a federal penitentiary,
was sentenced to two one-year misdemeanor sentences to run
concurrently with each other, but consecutively "to any sentence
now serving. '29 6 The issue arose as to whether the defendant
should have been transferred, at his request, to a lesser custody
institution for the service of his misdemeanor sentences following
the completion of his service of the felony sentences.27 Prison
authorities chose to aggregate the defendant's sentences whereby
he was to serve one sentence for all purposes, including place of
confinement. 28 The fact that one sentence was for a felony and
the other for a misdemeanor was disregarded.
The Tenth Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 4161 requires ag-
gregation of sentences for purposes of sentence computation. 299
However, the court also acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. § 4083 had
been amended in 1959 to permit incarceration at a penitentiary
only if the offense was punishable by a sentence in excess of one
year.300 In reversing the trial court with respect to the issue of
-3 490 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975). See Overview,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 52 DEN. L.J. 133, 159-61 (1975).
114 535 F.2d at 554.
" 536 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 1976).
' Id. at 1341.
The appellant claimed that he was being unlawfully confined in the penitentiary,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (1970), to serve sentences imposed for misdemeanor
convictions. This provision provides, in part: "A sentence for an offense punishable by
imprisonment for one year or less shall not be served in a penitentiary without the consent
of the defendant."
"1 536 F.2d at 1341.
2- 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970) provides, in part: "When two or more consecutive sent-
ences are to be served, the aggregate of the several sentences shall be the basis upon which
the [good time allowance] shall be computed."
536 F.2d at 1342.
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place of confinement, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the
practice of aggregating consecutive misdemeanor sentences with
prior unexpired felony sentences for purposes of determining
place of confinement is not only unauthorized under § 4161, but
also does substantial violence to the clear legislative intent ex-
pressed in § 4083."3 °0 In accordance with this interpretation, the
court held that Robinson could not be "compelled to serve the
misdemeanor sentences at a penitentiary, in the absence of his
consent." 0
2
In United States v. Williams303 the limits imposed on a fed-
eral prisoner's right to privacy were challenged where the defen-
dant filed a motion to suppress evidence that was seized as the
result of a rectal search that had been performed prior to releasing
the defendant to a Deputy Marshal.30 The Tenth Circuit con-
firmed the trial court's overruling of the defendant's motion, not-
ing that the authority for the search was based upon 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4041 and 4042 which grant authority to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons to promulgate policies and procedures for the
treatment of inmates.305 In defining the court's scope of review in
these matters, the Tenth Circuit stated that "judicial review will
be granted only upon a showing that prison officials have exer-
cised their discretionary powers in such a manner as to constitute
I' ld. See also Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4 (1923); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
536 F.2d at 1392. See Dorssart v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ga. 1967);
United States v. Lomas, 60 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
No. 75-1401 (10th Cir., Apr. 23, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
'' The defendant was to be placed in the custody of a deputy United States marshal
for the purpose of transporting the defendant to a trial wherein he was to appear as a
witness. Prior to the defendant's release, permission was granted by the warden to conduct
the challenged rectal search wherein a plastic container, containing a piece of hacksaw
blade, an emery cord, two screwdrivers, and a small piece of metal, was discovered.
I The Tenth Circuit recognized that pursuant to these statutory provisions, "prison
authorities at the various institutions are authorized to formulate policies and procedures
necessary to meet the particular needs of the respective institutions." No. 75-1401 at 5.
The following policy statement was issued by the Warden of Leavenworth in March 1974:
Every inmate will be searched thoroughly with a magnetometer to detect any
contraband hidden in body cavities. A more thorough rectal examination will
normally only be necessary in those cases when a positive reading is received
from the magnetometer search, or when a Deputy U.S. Marshal or the Chief
Correctional Supervisor or his designee determines the inmate is a serious
escape risk or is extremely dangerous.
Id. There was evidence that the correctional supervisor at Leavenworth considered the
defendant to be a serious escape risk. Id.
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clear abuse or caprice." 06 The appellant failed to make such a
showing.
V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a)
Three separate cases, United States v. Katz,' 7 United States
v. Ratley,30 8 and United States v. Pauldino,30 1 presented the issue
of whether, because of the method of their appointments, special
attorneys appointed under section 515(a) 310 possessed proper au-
thorization to appear before grand juries. Appellant Ratley con-
tended that "the letters commissioning the attorneys were impro-
per in that they did not 'specifically direct' 31' the attorneys' activ-
ities and were not issued by the United States Attorney General
himself. '312 Recognizing that recent decisions of other circuits
had specifically rejected these arguments, the Tenth Circuit held
Id. See Rivera v. Toft, 477 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1973); Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d
292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973); Black v. Warden, United States Peniten-
tiary, 467 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1972); Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Perez v. Turner, 462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 944 (1972).
- 535 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1976).
3" No. 75-1403 (10th Cir., Apr. 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
3" No. 75-1336 (10th Cir., Mar. 17, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
i,' Section 515(a) provides that:
The Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of Justice, or
any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law, may,
when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any legal pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings .. .which
United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, whether or not
he is a resident of the district in which the proceeding is brought.
31, No. 75-1403 at 3. See In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1975) (broad authority to
Strike Force attorney under commission signed by Assistant Attorney General). The
Second Circuit states: "The 'specifically directed' phrase of § 515(a) should not be so
niggardly construed as to interfere with the federal government's ability to efficiently
administer its criminal laws." 522 F.2d at 64.
312 No. 75-1403 at 3.
3 DiGirlomo v. United States, 520 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975); Infelice v. United States, 528 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1975). See United States v. Agrusa, 520 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1975), wherein the court
held that under § 515(a) the Attorney General could delegate his authority to subordinate
officers of the Department of Justice. In United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362 (8th Cir.
1975), the Eighth Circuit rejected the position of the Second Circuit in Persico "that the
power of the Attorney General to authorize special attorneys to appear before grand juries
is limited to situations where there is a special reason to limit the role of the local district
attorney and where that reason has been made explicit by the Attorney General." 520 F.2d
at 368 n.11 (citing Persico, 522 F.2d at 60).
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that the special attorneys in each case" 4 had proper authority to
appear before the grand juries. 15
B. 18 US.C. § 1952
In United States v. Villano316 appellants Villano and Smal-
done appealed their convictions under section 19521'1 on the
ground that the evidence adduced at trial was of a local gambling
business patronized sporadically by one nonresidentl 8 and, thus,
under the reasoning of Rewis v. United States,"' their activities
did not constitute a federal offense.32 0 In upholding the convic-
tions, the Tenth Circuit determined that the evidence supported
the convictions based upon (1) an interpretation of the statute, 32 '
5, No. 75-1336 at 4; No. 75-1403 at 3; 535 F.2d at 595-96.
3, See note 314 supra.
31 529 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
, 529 F.2d at 1052. The Travel Act provisions in question provide that:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility
in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to-
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any
unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling ....
18 U.S.C. § 1952.
- The appellants' employees, Colgan and Amato, over the telephone in Denver,
Colorado, accepted bets for appellants' .illegal gambling operation. The evidence of inter-
state telephone calls came from one Ferris, a resident of Valentine, Nebraska, who testi-
fied that he placed bets by calling three Denver telephone numbers and by using a code
number. Ferris' testimony was corroborated by telephone company records. United States
v. Villano, 529 F.2d at 1050-51.
31 401 U.S. 808 (1971). The Tenth Circuit gave the following summary of the Rewis
case:
In Rewis there was a lottery or numbers operation in Florida near the
Georgia line. Two defendants were Florida residents and there was no proof
that they crossed state lines in connection with operation of their lottery.
Two other defendants were Georgia residents who traveled to the Florida
location to place bets.
529 F.2d at 1052.
' 529 F.2d at 1052.
3' The court stated:
From the terms of the statute itself we feel that the evidence supports the
convictions. There was proof to sustain an inference that the defendants
caused or aided and abetted the use by Colgan and Amato of interstate
telephone facilities in furnishing line information, accepting bets and arrang-
ing payoffs with Ferris.
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(2) an examination of its legislative history, 32 2 and (3) an analysis
of the Rewis opinion. 32 The court stated that a plausible argu-
ment for reversal might have been made on the basis of United
States v. Altobello324 and United States v. McCormick, 321 but held
the two cases inapplicable here because of the repeated use of an
interstate facility by the nonresident witness which produced a
substantial volume of gambling on his part.
32 6
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2042
United States v. 17,400 Dollars in Currency 327 presented the
Tenth Circuit with a unique claim to monies given to a
"cooperating individual, 3 28 Nocenti, by his principals and used
to set up an illegal narcotics transaction.3 29 After his principals
were arrested and subsequently convicted, Nocenti filed a claim
for the money which he had turned over to the Bureau of Narcot-
ics and Dangerous Drugs.
330
' Id. The Tenth Circuit cited the reasoning and conclusion of the Supreme Court in
Rewis for the proposition that, based on its legislative history, the Travel Act was aimed
at organized crime and persons residing in one state while operating illegal gambling in
another state. The Act does not apply to illegal activity solely because that activity is
patronized by out-of-state customers. Id. (citing United States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. at 811-
12). See note 319 supra. The court further summarized the Act's legislative history to the
effect that Congress intended "use [of] any facility" to apply to interstate telephone
calls. United States v. Villano, 533 F.2d at 1052-53 n.6.
" The Tenth Circuit distinguished Rewis, noting that the Supreme Court's decision
focused on the interstate activity of others. 529 F.2d at 1053. In Villano it was "the
defendants [who] situated their agents where they carried on transactions using tele-
phones, receiving local and interstate calls." Id. (emphasis in original). See also United
States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987, 992 n.6 (6th Cir. 1976).
324 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971) (incidental involvement of interstate facilities).
3- 442 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d at 992;
United States v. LaFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975); United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wechs-
ler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
3 United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d at 1053-54. The Fourth Circuit, for purposes of
satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of the Act, examines whether there has been any
use of an interstate facility in furtherance of one of the illegal activities defined in the Act.
See United States v. LaFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975); United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970); and United States v.
Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
32 524 F.2d 1105 (10th Cir. 1975). The case is an offshoot of the criminal prosecution
reported in United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 915 (1974).
321 524 F.2d at 1105. The court's decision indicates that Nocenti was operating with
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The majority of the court held that the money must be sur-
rendered to Nocenti because of the agency relationships involved:
Nocenti, as agent of two principals who were involved in a serious
crime, was no longer required to account for the money,33' and
Nocenti, as an informer, was not an agent of the United States.
3 32
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Doyle argued that, through-
out the transaction, which was for the purpose of arresting and
convicting Nocenti's two "principals," Smaldone and Merkow-
itz,33 Nocenti was really acting on behalf of the United States
Government, not on behalf of Smaldone and Merkowitz or on his
own behalf.3 3 Thus, in concluding that Nocenti was acting as a
government agent and that, therefore, "the government has a
better right [to the money] than Nocenti, ''1 3 Judge Doyle indi-
cated that 28 U.S.C. § 2042336 should govern how the money is
treated: Nocenti should have been required to prove independent
good title; were he not able to do so, the money would be inherited
by the United States Treasury.n? Judge Doyle further stated:
3' Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 412(2)(b) (1958)).
33 The majority found no case "where the government has formally or informally
asserted that an informer was a lawful agent of the United States or has accepted responsi-
bility for the actions of an informer as his principal." 524 F.2d at 1106. It argued, by
analogy, that the Government has consistently refused to accept responsibility for the
actions of informers in entrapment cases. Id. See United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). But see 524 F.2d at 1107 (Doyle, J., dissent-
ing) (wherein it is argued that the entrapment cases recognize an agency, imputing the
acts of the informant to the Government).
524 F.2d at 1107. According to Judge Doyle, the evidence indicated that Nocenti
journeyed to Peru with the money for one purpose-to bring back some cocaine that could
be used to arrest and convict Smaldone and Merkowitz. Id.
334 Id.
I Id. at 1108.
3m This section provides:
No money deposited shall be withdrawn except by order of court.
In every case in which the right to withdraw money deposited in court
has been adjudicated or is not in dispute and such money has remained so
deposited for at least five years unclaimed by the person entitled thereto,
such court shall cause such money to be deposited in the Treasury in the
name and to the credit of the United States. Any claimant entitled to any
such money may, on petition to the court and upon notice to the United
States attorney and full proof of the right thereto, obtain an order directing
payment to him.
28 U.S.C. § 2042 (1970).
"I It is Judge Doyle's position that Nocenti, as a government informer, should have
been compensated in accordance with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970), "which [under 21 U.S.C. § 886(a)]
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"The really objectionable aspect to me is that the court is lending
its aid to one who has no legal right to the award but, more
important, the court is going to the assistance of a wrongdoer-a
converter."
3 1
D. 18 U.S.C. § 2518
The appellant in United States v. Russo 39 alleged error in the
trial court's failure to suppress wiretap evidence 34 arguing that,
under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, 3 ' the wiretap orders and applications
therefor were deficient.342 In an opinion written by Judge McWil-
liams, the Tenth Circuit held that, based on an analysis of the
wiretap applications34 3 and United States v. Kahn, 344 the evidence
was sufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause which would
authorizes the Attorney General to pay an informer such sum or sums of money as he may
deem appropriate." 524 F.2d at 1109.
13 524 F.2d at 1109.
339 527 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976). Defendant Russo
was convicted of conspiring to carry on prostitution and bribery in Kansas [violation of
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3512, -3513, and -3901 (1970)] through the use of interstate facilities
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970). Id. at 1053.
Russo's telephone conversations with a co-conspirator, Lowman, were intercepted
by wiretaps placed on the telephones at the two massage parlors operated by Lowman.
Id. at 1054. The court's opinion indicated that there were five tapes of Russo's calls to
the target telephone which were introduced into evidence at his trial. Id. at 1057-58.
I" Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
2518 (1970).
312 The application for a wiretap and the order authorizing the same must include
"the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications
are to be intercepted .... " 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(IV) (1970) (emphasis added). It was
Russo's position on appeal that, since he was not so identified, the wiretaps should have
been suppressed. 527 F.2d at 1054.
113 The first application for the wiretap named Lowman and "others as yet unknown."
527 F.2d at 1054. Russo's name was mentioned in the FBI agent's affidavit in support of
the application.
The first application for extension of the wiretap did not include the appellant's name
although Russo's name was again mentioned in the affidavit supporting the application
for the second extension. The court's decision indicates that phone calls from one "Tony"
(later identified as Russo) were intercepted after the first order was granted and between
the first and second extensions. Id. at 1054-55.
3' 415 U.S. 143 (1974). The Tenth Circuit in Russo stated:
The rule that we glean from Kahn is that if the Government "knows,"
i.e., has "probable cause" to believe, that a particular person is committing
an offense for which the wiretap is sought, and also "knows" that such
individual is likely to use the target telephone in furtherance of such criminal
activity, then, and only then, need the application and order for a wiretap
identify such person by name.
527 F.2d at 1056.
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have necessitated the identification of appellant Russo in the
wiretap applications and order.34 In addition, the court con-





DENYING A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY
TO CALL A WITNESS WHO WILL INVOKE HIS FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
During the most recent survey period the Tenth Circuit de-
cided two cases' which involved the attempt by criminal defen-
dants to raise inferences favorable to their cases by calling wit-
nesses who would assert the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 2 The defendants in each case were prosecuted
on charges related to the illegal distribution of drugs and in their
defense sought to call as witnesses individuals who had been pres-
ent at the alleged drug sales. In each case, the Tenth Circuit
"1 527 F.2d at 1056. The court based its finding of no probable cause on a peculiar
factual aspect of the case, i.e., that Russo's name, although mentioned in the application
affidavits, was brought into the matter purely by double hearsay (an informant told the
FBI that Lowman had told him (informant) that Russo was a conduit for his (Lowman's)
protection money to the police). Id. at 1054. The court determined that this hearsay was
insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause. Id. Compare United States v. Dono-
van, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
36 527 F.2d at 1057-58. Even though conversations by Russo were intercepted before
the first and second wiretap extension applications and orders, the Tenth Circuit also
determined that their content was innocuous, e.g., that the conversations did not give any
evidence of prostitution, bribery, or interstate travel. Id. at 1057.
1 United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 979 (1976); United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485
(10th Cir. 1975).
2 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states, "No person . . .




affirmed the refusal of the district court to allow defense counsel
to cause the witnesses to invoke their fifth amendment privilege
in the presence of the jury.
Two constitutional issues were raised by the defendants on
appeal. Both defendants argued that the nature of a witness' fifth
amendment right required that the witness be compelled to in-
voke his privilege on the stand in the presence of the jury.' In
addition, one of the defendants argued that the action of the trial
court denied him his sixth amendment right to compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' The Tenth Circuit did
not directly address either constitutional issue. Instead, it de-
cided both cases on the basis of an evidentiary rationale used by
other circuits in factually analogous situations.5
This paper will discuss the fifth and sixth amendment issues
which the Tenth Circuit did not confront, and evaluate the
soundness of the evidentiary rationale used by the Tenth Circuit
in deciding the cases.
I. FACTS
A. United States v. Martin
Maurice Duke Martin was tried and convicted of two sepa-
rate counts of distributing heroin.6 The Government's primary
witness was an undercover agent for the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) who testified that he purchased heroin from
Martin on two different occasions.7 The only other person present
at the alleged sales was an informant who had originally intro-
duced the DEA agent to Martin.' At the defendant's first trial the
informant was subpoenaed by the defendant; the informant took
the stand in front of the jury but refused to testify on the grounds
Brief for Appellant at 8-10, United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975);
Brief for Appellant at 11-13, United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976)
(Not for Routine Publication).
United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 at 7.
See text accompanying notes 57-74 infra.
Martin was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
A second DEA agent testified that he had observed the other agent make contact
with Martin on both occasions, but that he did not see the sale take place. 526 F.2d at
486. Therefore, the jury based its decision almost entirely on the testimony of the one
agent.
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that under the fifth amendment he could not be compelled to
incriminate himself.' The trial ended with a hung jury.0
At his second trial Martin again caused a subpoena to be
served on the informant. The informant appeared at the trial, but
informed defense counsel that he would again refuse to testify.
Martin's attorney nevertheless attempted to put the informant on
the stand." The trial court refused to allow the witness to be
called, and later gave a neutralizing instruction admonishing the
jury to draw no inferences from the fact that the informant had
not appeared as a witness.
2
On appeal Martin argued that the trial court committed re-
versible error in refusing to allow him to call the informant. 3 He
maintained that a witness, in contrast to a defendant, had no
constitutional right not to take the stand. 4 Martin argued that a
witness' testimonial privilege against self-incrimination could not
be triggered until a question was put to the witness after he had
been sworn and placed before the jury."
B. United States v. Eitel
Jeffrey Eitel was indicted and convicted of distributing and




2 The trial court gave the following instruction:
There has been testimony in this case about an informant named Samuel
Hudson. As a result of a hearing held outside the presence of the jury, the
Court has determined that Mr. Hudson is not available to be called as a
witness by either side in this case.
The jury may not draw any inference from the fact that Samuel Hudson
did not appear as a witness in this case.
Id.
Id Id. at 487.
", Brief for Appellant at 8-10, United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975).
I d.
Eitel was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). At
Eitel's trial a DEA agent testified that he went to a certain Denver residence to negotiate
a purchase of methamphetamine. Eitel arrived a short time later and produced a sample.
The agent then demanded to see the entire quantity of methamphetamine before making
the purchase. At this point Eitel and Marcel Targa, who had been present throughout the
transaction, left the room. According to the agent, they returned accompanied by Owen
Plyler, were shown the purchase money, and again departed. Eitel, Targa, and Plyler soon
returned and, according to the agent's testimony, Targa gave the agent several packets
containing what was later identified as methamphetamine. No. 75-1537 at 3-4.
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Eitel attempted to call Owen Plyler, who was present at the
alleged sale, as a witness. 7 Out of the presence of the jury, the
court questioned Plyler concerning his intent to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege and allowed Eitel's counsel to ask Plyler
specific questions. Plyler asserted his testimonial privilege to
each question."8 After determining that Plyler had a legitimate
right to invoke the privilege and being assured that he would
stand on his privilege, the court refused to allow Plyler to be
examined in the jury's presence."
On appeal Eitel, like Martin, argued that a witness' privilege
against self-incrimination involves a limited option of refusal to
testify and not a prohibition against all inquiry. He asserted as
error the trial court's refusal to allow Plyler to be called as a
witness. 0 In addition, Eitel argued that the trial court's refusal
denied him his sixth amendment right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor."'
II. HOLDING
A. United States v. Martin
The Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed the issue raised by
Martin concerning the boundaries of a witness' fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court limited its sub-
stantive discussion to distinguishing United States v. Namet2
and United States v. Coppola3 from Martin. Both Namet and
Coppola were relied upon by the defense as supportive of the
proposition that a person can invoke the fifth amendment privi-
lege only in the presence of the jury after being called as a witness
and being placed under oath. 4 In addition, the court relied on
11 On cross-examination the undercover agent admitted that he had stated in the
complaint affidavit filed three months after the alleged transaction that it was Owen
Plyler, and not Eitel, who produced the original sample of methamphetamine. Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Charges arising out of the incident were still pending against Plyler but would be
dismissed if Plyler satisfactorily completed a treatment program he was then undergoing.
Id. at 4 n.1.
0 Brief for Appellant at 11-13, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
* No. 75-1537 at 7.
373 U.S. 179 (1963).
23 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 Namet and Coppola involved attempts by prosecutors to raise inferences adverse
to a defendant by calling witnesses who then invoked their fifth amendment right in front
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decisions from other circuits sustaining a trial court's refusal to
allow a defense witness to be called in similar circumstances. 5
The Tenth Circuit disposed of Namet by distinguishing it
factually." Without discussing the explicit language in Coppola
that lent support to Martin's argument,27 the court observed that
both Coppola and Namet really stood for the evidentiary proposi-
tion that the prosecution should not be allowed to ask questions
certain to produce a claim of privilege and with it an atmosphere
of guilt." The court reasoned that both Coppola and Namet ac-
tually stood for the proposition that a defendant should not be
allowed to use the same tactic to produce an atmosphere of inno-
cence.
B. United States v. Eitel
In the Eitel decision, the court did not attempt to define the
scope of a witness' fifth amendment right nor did the court dis-
cuss the issue raised by Eitel concerning his sixth amendment
right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.29
of the jury. In Namet, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim
that reversible error occurred when a prosecutor was allowed to call witnesses who then
invoked their testimonial privilege. The Court stated several reasons for its holding: First,
the prosecutor honestly believed the witnesses did not have a legitimate right to claim the
privilege and therefore no prosecutorial misconduct was involved; second, the witnesses
gave considerable nonprivileged testimony that corroborated the Government's case; fi-
nally, the few claims of privilege did not add critical weight to the Government's case but
at most constituted cumulative support for inferences already well established by the
nonprivileged portion of the testimony of the witnesses. 373 U.S. at 186-89.
In Coppola, the Tenth Circuit read Namet as supportive of the proposition "that the
privilege is not a prohibition against inquiry and cannot be effectively raised before the
question is asked and is applicable only to particular questions." 479 F.2d at 1160. Never-
theless, the court in Coppola found that reversible error had occurred, holding that the
conduct of the Government fell within that part of the Namet opinion prohibiting the
conscious efforts by a prosecutor to raise inferences adverse to the defendant from a
witness' claiming the self-incrimination privilege.
" United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); Bowles v. United States,
439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
" After briefly reiterating the facts and holding of Namet, the court stated: "In thus
holding the Court observed that no constitutional issues were involved, only a claim of
'evidentiary trial error.' This observation is equally applicable to the present case. Namet,
then, is clearly distinguishable on the facts." 526 F.2d at 487.
See note 24 supra.
526 F.2d at 487.
The only reference in the opinion indicating the court had given any consideration
to Eitel's sixth amendment claim occurred in a footnote. Therein the Tenth Circuit indi-
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Instead, the court again relied on authorities in other circuits that
had confronted similar factual situations. 0 Specifically, the court
adopted the evidentiary rationale stated by the majority opinion
in Bowles v. United States:3'
It is well settled that the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences
from the decision of a witness to exercise his constitutional privilege
whether those inferences be favorable to the prosecution or the de-
fense. The rule is grounded not only in the constitutional notion that
guilt may not be inferred from the exercise of the Fifth Amendment
privilege but also in the danger that a witness' invoking the Fifth
Amendment in the presence of the jury will have a disproportionate
impact on their deliberations. The jury may think it high courtroom
drama of probative significance when a witness "takes the Fifth."
In reality the probative value of the event is almost entirely under-
cut by the absence of any requirement that the witness justify his
fear of incrimination and by the fact that it is a form of evidence
not subject to cross-examination.2
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Boundaries of a Witness' Fifth Amendment Privilege
There is considerable authority for the proposition relied on
by both Martin and Eitel that a witness' fifth amendment privi-
lege, unlike that of a defendant, does not give a witness the right
to refuse to be called to the stand.3 According to this notion, the
privilege of the witness, as opposed to that of a defendant, is
merely an option of refusal and not a prohibition against all in-
cated that it had examined the dissenting opinions in Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d
536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971), and United States v. Beye, 445
F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971), but found the majority opinions more convincing. No. 75-1537
at 7 n.2. For a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinion in those two cases, see
text accompanying notes 57-65 and 75-79 infra.
11 United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Beye,
445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971). In addition to the cases cited in Martin, the court in Eitel
relied on United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971).
31 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
3'2 439 F.2d at 541 (citations omitted). Significantly, the Tenth Circuit did not articu-
late a rule absolutely proscribing a trial court from ever allowing a witness to be called
by the defense in this kind of situation. However, while leaving the ultimate decision to
the sound discretion of the trial court, the Tenth Circuit gave no indication of the factors
a lower court should consider in making its decision.
33 See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvIDNCE § 136 (1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2268
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); and authorities cited in note 34 infra.
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quiry. Thus, the privilege requires that questions normally be put
to a witness on the stand while he is under oath. 4
The reason for requiring that witnesses actually submit to
questioning before asserting the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination arises from the nature of the privilege
itself. The privilege is available only if a particular response falls
within the narrow scope of the privilege's protection. 35 Because
the judge, and not the witness, is the ultimate arbiter of this
question, a decision on the propriety of allowing the witness to
assert the privilege cannot be made until the question has been
put to the witness and he has stated the basis for his refusal to
answer.
31
If one accepts this rationale, it does not necessarily follow
that a witness should be required to assert his privilege before the
jury. If the purpose of requiring the witness to take the stand is
to insure that the privilege is not improperly used, that goal can
be accomplished in an in camera hearing out of the jury's pres-
ence. This is precisely the procedure suggested by several courts
that have faced the problem in situations similar to that found
in Martin and Eitel. 37 It is also the procedure followed by the trial
11 The cases articulating this rule tend to fall into three factually distinct categories.
First, there is a group of cases involving criminal trials where the rule is stated as dictum.
See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 424 U.S. 648 (1976);
United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971); People v. Hannon, 50 Misc. 2d
297, 270 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1962). Second, there are cases involving witnesses called before a
grand jury or other investigative body with subpoena powers. See, e.g., Hutcheson v.
United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); United States v. Cefalu, 338 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1964).
Finally, there are cases in which a prosecutor has called a witness and the witness has
stood on his fifth amendment privilege before the jury. United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d
1153 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965); Marcello v.
United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952); Commonwealth v. Donatelli, 202 Pa. Super.
565, 198 A.2d 338 (1964). The precedential value of the last two groups of cases is weakened
by the factual differences between these situations and the situations found in Eitel and
Martin. Moreover, when analyzed in terms of the rule's rationale, discussed in the text
accompanying notes 35-39 infra, the unqualified statement of the rule found in these cases
becomes highly suspect.
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvIDENCE § 136 (1972).
Id. In addition to making certain that the witness has a legitimate right to invoke
the privilege, requiring the witness to take the stand and plead his fifth amendment
privilege while under oath after specific questions have been put to him arguably serves
the additional purpose of testing the witness' resolve to stand on the privilege.
37 United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Beye,
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court in Eitel, and implicitly approved by the Tenth Circuit."
Absent an in camera hearing similar to the one held by the
trial court in Eitel,35 where the witness' privilege is actually put
to the test, the rule and its rationale should control. The trial
court in Martin arguably erred to the extent that it failed to
conduct a hearing of this sort.
B. A Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory
Process
The sixth amendment guarantees to every criminal defen-
dant the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses to testify
at his trial." This right was made applicable to state criminal
proceedings through the fourteenth amendment in Washington v.
Texas. 4
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "few
rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses in his own behalf." 2 However, the right is not absolute.
In Chambers v. Mississippi43 the Court made it explicitly clear
that "in exercising this right the accused must comply with es-
tablished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both
fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and inno-
cence."44 More recently, in United States v. Nobles,45 the Court
445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
No. 75-1537 at 9.
" See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
" The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states in part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" 388 U.S. 14 (1967). For further discussion of this case, see notes 66-68 infra.
1 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (citations omitted).
'3 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers the defendant sought to introduce the testimony
of three persons to whom another, McDonald, had confessed to having committed the
murder for which Chambers was being tried. The trial court excluded the evidence as
hearsay. The Supreme Court reversed and noted that, in this situation, the hearsay bore
the assurances of trustworthiness and also fell within the traditional exception for declara-
tions against interest. The Court then went on to say: "That testimony also was critical
to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affect-
ing the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied me-
chanistically to defeat the ends of justice." Id. at 302.
I /d.
422 U.S. 225 (1975). In Nobles the defendant attempted to impeach the credibility
of a government witness by using statements obtained from the witness by a defense
investigator. When defense counsel indicated he did not intend to produce the investiga-
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reaffirmed this qualifying language, noting that "[tihe Sixth
Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free
from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system . . .,.
Implicit in the holdings of these cases is the recognition that the
Supreme Court has accorded to the rules of evidence and also to
discretionary evidentiary rulings a constitutional dimension cap-
able of overriding an express constitutional guarantee.
Only two circuit court decisions have directly addressed the
sixth amendment issue raised by Eitel in a factually analogous
context.4 Neither case was cited by the Tenth Circuit. In Myers
v. Frye"5 the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that
he should be allowed to have a witness invoke the fifth amend-
ment before the jury. The court held that "[t]he Sixth Amend-
ment does not operate to prevent a state from adopting any limi-
tations on defense evidence in criminal trials, but only prevents
the adoption of broad arbitrary limitations." 9 The court saw the
refusal to allow the defendant to call the witness as neither broad
nor arbitrary." In United States v. Roberts5 the Ninth Circuit
said that the sixth amendment right "must be considered in light
of its purpose, namely, to produce testimony."" Since the wit-
ness' refusal to testify would not be testimonial in the literal sense
of that word, calling a witness who would refuse to testify did not
fulfill that purpose.53
tor's complete report, the trial court ruled that the investigator could not testify concern-
ing his interviews with the witness. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding
that the disclosure condition was improper. The Supreme Court then reversed the court
of appeals. In the decision, the Court rejected the defendant's sixth amendment claim,
and held that the evidentiary ruling was within the trial court's discretion in order to
assure that the jury would hear the full testimony from the investigator rather than only
a truncated portion favorable to the defendant. Id. at 240-41.
' Id. at 241.
17 United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113
(1975); Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968). For other courts that have spoken to
the scope of the right in other contexts, see Wisconsin ex rel. Monsoor v. Gagnon, 497 F.2d
1126 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. De Stefano, 476 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1973). Several
other circuit courts have implicitly rejected Eitel's sixth amendment argument. See note
30 supra.
' 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968).
11 Id. at 21.
'- Id.
503 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975).




Other circuits that have faced the kind of situation presented
by Eitel and Martin have side-stepped the sixth amendment
issue entirely.54 Rather than confront the difficult constitutional
question posed by this kind of situation, they have relied on a
purely evidentiary rationale, refusing to acknowledge that the
rationale itself had constitutional dimensions. 5
C. The Evidentiary Rationale
The reasoning adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Martin and
Eitel accurately reflects the approach to this problem taken by
the courts generally. The focus is not on the defendant's sixth
amendment right, nor on the extent of a witness' fifth amend-
ment privilege; rather, the primary concern is with the eviden-
tiary ramifications of allowing inferences to be drawn by a jury
from the assertion by a witness of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
This evidentiary rationale was succinctly stated in that por-
tion of the majority opinion in Bowles v. United States5 quoted
by the Tenth Circuit in Eitel.57 This evidentiary concern seems
to involve three elements: the "constitutional notion" that guilt
should not be inferred from the exercise of the fifth amendment
privilege; the inability to subject the evidence to cross-
examination; 5 and the potential danger of a jury giving undue
probative significance to a witness' pleading the fifth amend-
ment.
The first element, the "constitutional notion" referred to by
the majority in Bowles, really has no application to a witness, as
opposed to a defendant, asserting the fifth amendment privi-
lege. 9 Since the witness is not on trial, his constitutional right to
remain silent is not endangered by requiring him to take the
stand or by allowing the jury to draw inferences from his silence.60
4 See note 30 supra.
'1 See note 26 supra.
- 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
s See text accompanying note 31 supra.
For an excellent analysis of the majority opinion in Bowles, see Comment, An
Extension of the Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination, 52 B.U.L. Rlv. 149
(1972).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 157.
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Similarly, the inability to subject this kind of evidence to
direct cross-examination should not be accorded undue weight."
In the first place, the prosecutor will be able to appeal to the
jurors' natural skepticism of any attempt on the part of the ac-
cused to place the blame on another. 2 He will also be able to
impeach the silent witness by raising inferences concerning the
possibility of undue influence or ulterior motives . 3 In addition,
in the context of a criminal proceeding it does not necessarily
follow that the Government's right to cross-examine should be
deemed paramount to the defendant's right to compulsory pro-
cess. 4 Where the two rights cannot be accommodated in the con-
text of a criminal trial involving a defendant clothed with the
traditional protections of an accused, the balance arguably falls
in favor of permitting the defendant to raise the inference for
whatever value it might possess. 5
The third element, which involves a combined concern with
the unreliability of the inferences and potential prejudice to the
prosecutor, would seem to be the crux of the rationale. Since the
courts have allowed this evidentiary concern to effectively over-
ride the defendant's sixth amendment right to present witnesses
in his own behalf, a careful analysis of this aspect of the rationale
is necessary.
In Washington v. Texas,66 the Supreme Court held that if a
defense witness' testimony is relevant and material, it should be
admitted. 7 Unless the evidence can be excluded for some legiti-
6, Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 545 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
:2 439 F.2d at 545 n.13.
63 Id.
64 United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., dissent-
ing).
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 121 at 256 n.77 (1972).
66 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
67 Washington involved the attempt of a defendant to call as a witness another indi-
vidual who had already been convicted of the same crime. Texas statutes proscribed this
practice. TEx. REv. CODE ANN. art. 82 (1925) (repealed 1967); TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN.
art. 711 (1925) (repealed 1965). The Court formulated the issue of the case to be "whether
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right under any circumstances to put
his witnesses on the stand, as well as the right to compel their attendance in court." 388
U.S. at 19. After noting that the right to offer the testimony of witnesses is the right to
present a defense and is therefore a fundamental element of due process of law, Chief
Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
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mate reason, refusing to admit relevant and material evidence
violates a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to compul-
sory process."
In order for evidence to be considered relevant and material
for the purposes of admissibility it does not have be be completely
free from alternative interpretations; it is only necessary that the
evidence tend to increase the likelihood of the defendant's guilt
or innocence. 9 The inferences to be drawn from a witness' plead-
ing the fifth amendment clearly meet this test.7 0 Consequently,
if a court refuses to allow an accused to call a witness solely
because it believes the inferences to be drawn by the jury from
that evidence are unreliable or ambiguous, in the sense that more
than one logical inference follows from the invocation of the privi-
lege, the court would be disallowing relevant and material testi-
mony in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right.
We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State
arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had person-
ally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material
to the defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit
the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of
witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use. The judgment of convic-
tion must be reversed.
Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).
The Court also stated in a footnote that: "Nothing in this opinion should be construed
as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination
..... "Id. at 23 n.21. At least one court has interpreted this to mean that if the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right directly conflicts with a witness' fifth amendment right, the
former must give way to the latter. In other words, a witness cannot be forced to incrimi-
nate himself because his testimony would be relevant and material to the defendant's
defense. Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Neb. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482
F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973).
11 See notes 43-45 and 67 supra.
'9 C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185 (1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 38
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1940). See Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908), where
the Court stated:
The competency of a collateral fact to be used as the basis of legitimate
argument is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it
may afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry, or to assist, though remotely,
to a determination probably founded in truth.
Id. at 451 (citing Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 164 (1892)).
10 The probative value of such inferences has generally been conceded. See United
States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959); Comment, Exercise of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination by Witnesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the
Accused, 33 U. CI. L. REv. 151, 159 (1965).
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The issue of relevancy and materiality was effectively con-
ceded by the Bowles majority in their formulation of the problem.
The primary concern of the majority was not that the inferences
were lacking in probative value, but that the jury might accord
these very logical inferences undue weight.7 Thus, the court's real
concern was with the potential prejudicial effect to the prosecu-
torial function in allowing the evidence. This concern with preju-
dice, as distinguished from unreliability, arguably saves the ra-
tionale from the constitutional dilemma posed by Washington.7 2
If the potential for prejudice is significant, this danger protects a
court that excludes the evidence from the charge of arbitrariness
condemned in Washington.73 However, even if the court disallows
the evidence on this basis, it is according greater weight to the
possibility of prejudice to the prosecutor than to the defendant's
constitutional right to present relevant and material evidence in
his defense. This result can only be justified if the danger of
prejudice is very great, and a court should indulge in a very care-
ful consideration of the comparative constitutional values in-
volved.
The courts have not dealt with the difficult tension that ex-
ists between an evidentiary concern with potential prejudice to
the prosecutor and the defendant's constitutional right to present
evidence in his defense. Instead, the Bowles court and its progeny
have approached and resolved the problem by analogizing to pre-
cedents dealing with a fundamentally different situation-
prosecutorial attempts to raise inferences adverse to a defendant
by having a government witness stand on his fifth amendment
rights in the presence of the jury.7"
D. The Prosecutorial Precedents
A fundamental weakness in the majority's analysis in
Bowles, as adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Martin and Eitel, is
the reliance upon precedents involving prosecutorial attempts to
"' See text accompanying note 32 supra.
72 See note 67 supra.
13 See note 67 supra.
1, Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963); United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d
1153 (10th Cir. 1973); Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1964); Billeci v.




use this kind of evidence.75 Chief Justice Bazelon rightly pointed
out in his dissent in Bowles that the reasoning of these cases did
not necessarily apply to a situation in which it is the defense, and
not the prosecutor, that is attempting to raise the inferences." In
this situation the defendant is merely attempting to use the
other's refusal to testify as corroboration for other evidence pre-
sented in his defense." When the prosecutor uses this tactic it is
equivalent to an outright denial of the defendant's fifth amend-
ment right to remain silent because it is equivalent to using the
defendant's own silence as an element of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. 8 By contrast, when an accused suggests by inference
that another person is culpable, no equivalent right residing in
the prosecutor is impinged, unless the threat of prejudice is
deemed sufficiently great to trigger the due process protections
discussed earlier.
79
The two situations are simply not analogous. But rather than
abandon the analogy with all its inappropriate analytical bag-
gage, the courts have steadfastly refused to engage the difficult
constitutional and evidentiary questions that lurk beneath its
simple symmetry.
71 See note 74 supra.
76 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995
(1971). Judge Bazelon stated: "The position of a defendant asserting his Sixth Amend-
ment right to bring witnesses before the jury is not analogous to that of a prosecutor
attempting to insinuate that a defendant is guilty because his confederates refuse to
answer incriminating questions." 439 F.2d at 545 n.11.
7 Id.
79 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra. In People v. Dikeman, 555 P.2d 519
(Colo. 1976), the Colorado Supreme Court faced essentially the same situation that the
Tenth Circuit confronted in Martin and Eitel. The defendant sought to call a witness who
had originally been charged with first degree assault arising out of the same shooting that
led to the defendant's indictment. However, prior to the trial, the charges against the
witness were dismissed for lack of probable cause. The defendant maintained that it was
the witness who had in fact committed the assault.
Knowing that the witness would stand on his fifth amendment right, and over the
objection of the prosecutor, the trial court permitted the defendant to call the witness and
cause him to invoke his testimonial privilege before the jury. The jury subsequently
acquitted the defendant.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court. Following the established ap-
proach, the court analogized to precedents involving a prosecutor's attempt to use this
kind of evidence. According to the court, consistency required that the defendant and
prosecutor be treated alike. Without articulating it in these precise terms, the underlying
rationale seemed to involve the recognition of something akin to a right of due process
residing in the prosecutor.
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CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Martin and Eitel are most
susceptible to criticism for their failure squarely to confront the
fifth and sixth amendment issues raised by these appellants. By
relying on decisions that had in turn relied on and analogized to
precedents involving a prosecutor's attempt to raise inferences
adverse to a defendant, the court compounded its error.
A defendant's attempt to raise inferences in his own favor by
calling a witness he knows will stand on his fifth amendment
privilege does involve an evidentiary problem. Accordingly, it was
not entirely inappropriate for the court to focus on this eviden-
tiary concern. However, the question of the probative and preju-
dicial value of inferences to be drawn by a jury from a witness'
assertion of the fifth amendment privilege has unique constitu-
tional dimensions which do not come into play when a prosecutor
uses the same tactic.
To the extent that this kind of evidence is offered by a defen-
dant for the purposes of showing the existence of possibilities
other than the defendant's guilt, it is relevant and material to the
defense. Absent a compelling right of constitutional dimensions
residing in the prosecutor that would justify the exclusion of this
admittedly probative evidence, the defendant's sixth amendment
right should control, and the evidence should be allowed. In order
to exclude the evidence the court must, at the very minimum,
find that the potential prejudice to the prosecutorial function
outweighs the defendant's constitutional right to use the evidence
in his defense. This difficult constitutional balancing poses a crit-
ical issue that the Tenth Circuit completely failed to address.
Viewed in this light, the court's result in Martin and Eitel
becomes questionable. Allowing the speculative danger of preju-
dice to the prosecutor to take precedence over a defendant's con-
stitutional right arguably recasts the traditional balance of ad-
vantage in a criminal proceeding. Giving the benefit of any doubt
to the prosecutor arguably tips the scales of justice in a manner




FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE'
A. Rule 13, Counterclaims in Interpleader Actions
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Division'
was an interpleader action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 in which
one of the defendants asserted a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff, Liberty Bank. Liberty had sold an oil drilling rig in which
appellee Hazel Bailey held a security interest subject to Liberty's
prior security interest. The sale was held to retire the debt of the
owner of the rig. Liberty had no experience in the sale of such
equipment and thus received far less than the value of the rig.
The receipts of the sale were sufficient to pay off the debt to
Liberty and the sale expenses but little more. Liberty filed suit
in interpleader and deposited the remaining funds for distribu-
tion to the remaining creditors. Mrs. Bailey filed a counterclaim
alleging that she had a security interest in the rig and that the
sale was not properly conducted. 3 The trial court found for Mrs.
Bailey in the amount of her security interest, $19,000, plus attor-
ney's fees.
Liberty maintained on appeal that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to entertain the counterclaim under the Tenth Circuit rule
barring consideration of any issue other than entitlement to the
sum deposited in an interpleader action. Liberty relied on the
proposition that it was a mere disinterested stakeholder and thus
not an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rule 13.'
In earlier cases, the Tenth Circuit had held that an inter-
pleader claimant could not maintain a counterclaim against a
disinterested stakeholder.' It has been pointed out that the Tenth
I All references to rules in this section are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
' Mrs. Bailey's claim was based on the OKLAHOMA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
504 (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-504 (1963)) which requires that such sales be carried
out in a "commercially reasonable manner."
' Rule 13 allows the filing of either compulsory or permissive counterclaims against
"opposing parties."
In First Nat'l Bank v. Johnson County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 331 F.2d 325, 327
(10th Cir. 1964), the court, in dictum, stated that a disinterested stakeholder was not an
opposing party and the district court thus had no jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim.
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Circuit stood alone in this interpretation of Rule 13(a) .6
Applying the "logical relation" test7 between the claim and
counterclaim, the court held that Mrs. Bailey's counterclaim was
compulsory.8 She therefore risked losing her claim altogether if it
could not be maintained in the present action. Since there are no
policy considerations against allowing such counterclaims and
since Rule 13 does not bar the maintenance of compulsory coun-
terclaims in interpleader actions, the court held that there was
no good reason to disallow the counterclaim in this case.' In so
holding, the court expressly overruled its earlier decisions insofar
as they barred the interposition of compulsory counterclaims in
interpleader actions.'" Apparently, though, permissive counter-
claims, i.e., those arising out of independent transactions, are
still barred in the Tenth Circuit.
B. Rule 15, Amendments to Pleadings
In R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.1 defendant-appellant
Ralston Purina appealed from a judgment in an implied warranty
action brought under the Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code,"
seeking reversal on the issue of damages. Appellant claimed that
the lower court erred in allowing appellee to amend its complaint
on remand, 13 thereby allowing plaintiff-appellee to redefine its
damages claims and greatly increase the amount with the result
In Erie Bank v. United States Dist. Court, 362 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1966), the court adopted
the dictum of First Nat'l Bank and made it the rule in the Tenth Circuit. In Knoll v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967),
the court upheld the earlier holdings. However, Knoll was based on a transaction which
was independent of that giving rise to the interpleader action, i.e., a permissive counter-
claim.
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1715, at 448 (1972).
See Pipeliners Local 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1974). The test is
met when the original claims and counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occur-
rence and logically relate because of their common origin. Id.
540 F.2d at 1379.
Id. at 1380.
lo Id. at 1381. The court specifically overruled First Nat'l Bank, Erie Bank, and Knoll,
supra note 5, to the extent they disallowed compulsory counterclaims. Id.
11 525 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 WYo. STAT. §§ 34-2-314, -315 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
11 The case had been before the circuit court before in R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina,
No. 73-1627 (10th Cir., Apr. 17, 1974) (not for Routine Publication). Defendant had been
adjudged liable for breach of implied warranty, but the cause was remanded on the issue
of damages because the trial judge had failed to give any instructions on the matter of
damages.
VOL. 54
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
that the verdict on retrial was more than twice that originally
awarded. 4 The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion either in allowing the particular amendments or in
doing so after remand. 5
The court went on to explain that Rule 15(a) "contemplates
allowing amendments freely when justice requires." Two factors
were cited as determining whether an amendment should be al-
lowed: (1) Whether it will cause delay and (2) whether the adver-
sary will suffer prejudice. The timing of the offer of an amend-
ment, i.e., following remand, does not of itself require denial of
leave to amend. In the case at bar, the court noted that the
amendments did not raise substantially different issues, nor did
they complicate the proceeding." There was thus no error in al-
lowing the requested amendments. 9
In Dell v. Heard"5 the Tenth Circuit addressed a problem
arising under Rule 15(b).21 Plaintiff-appellant argued that the
election of parties defense used by appellee was not properly
raised in appellee's answer. But since appellant had not objected
to the election defense as later amplified by appellee, the court
held that the issue was tried by the implied consent of the par-
ties."2
In New v. Utility Equipment Co. International3 the court
reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend the plain-
tiff's complaint since leave to amend should be "freely given
when justice so requires ' 24 and where no prejudice to the opposing
party will result.
25
1, 525 F.2d at 751. Under the new complaint, damages of $262,000 were awarded as




1 Id. at 752. The court pointed out that the issues of future profit losses and diminu-
tion of the value of property were present in the first trial. Id.
19 Id.
- 532 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Rule 15(b) provides: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings."
532 F.2d at 1332.
No. 75-1565 (10th Cir., Apr. 22, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
v Id. at 4.
2 Id.
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The court went on to hold that the statute of limitations did
not bar the amended claim since, under Rule 15(c), it related
back. 2 The proper test for determining whether an amendment
should be allowed to relate back was held to be whether the
opposing party had notice of the underlying fact situation and
whether substantial prejudice would result.
27
These amendment decisions indicate a continuing willing-
ness to construe Rule 15 liberally so long as no one is unduly
prejudiced by such construction.
C. Class Actions
1. Rule 23
In Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.21 defendant Safeway was
accused of discriminatory employment practices. 29 Plaintiff Tay-
lor sought relief both individually and as a class representative
30
but the district court narrowed the class claim. 3' At issue was
whether Taylor met the prerequisites for a class action under Rule
23(a) .32
The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court determination that
Taylor did not meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3)
as defined in White v. Gates Rubber Co.:3 The plaintiff must
"demonstrate that other members of the class he purports to
" Rule 15(c) states: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading."
" No. 75-1565 at 4.
, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
Safeway was charged with violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16, and with violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
" Taylor sought to represent the class of those "Negro persons who are employed,
have been employed, or might have been in the past or will in the future be employed by
Safeway .. .in its various wholesale, retail, and distribution centers throughout ...
Colorado." 524 F.2d at 266.
1' The class was narrowed to include only "Negroes employed at the frozen food
warehouse in the Denver distribution center." Id. at 266-67.
, Under Rule 23(a), one or more members of a class may sue or be sued on behalf of
a class only if:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.
u 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
VOL. 54
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
represent [actual, not hypothetical complainants] have suffered
the same [or similar] grievances of which he complains." 3' After
summarily rejecting Taylor's claim that Title VII claims are not
subject to Rule 23, the court noted that there has been a failure
by the courts to give subsection (a)(3) a commonly accepted
meaning and that it is difficult to interpret (a)(3) in such a way
as not to be duplicative of subsection (a)(4) .1 The court then
accepted the White rationale that since (a)(3) was included as a
prerequisite it must have an independent meaning (that meaning
being that class action plaintiffs must at least establish that
"there is in fact a class needing representation") and that any
inquiry into typicality requires a comparison of the claims or
defenses of the representative with the claims or defenses of the
class.36
In the case at bar, the court upheld the trial court finding
that Taylor failed to show the existence of any discriminatory
practices outside the warehouse in which he was employed and
concluded that the trial court had no alternative but to limit the
class accordingly. 7 The court also rejected Taylor's contention
that his "across the board" attack of Safeway's employment
practices was sufficient to sustain the class claim, especially since
that argument, too, would render subsection (a)(3) superfluous.3
In Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc.31 the court reversed a
lower court finding that the plaintiffs were not representative of
the class involved. 0 The lower court's reliance on the facts that
one plaintiff was not indigent nor a resident of the local Navajo
reservation and that another lived out of state (but within fifty
31 524 F.2d at 269 (quoting White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo.
1971)).
u 524 F.2d at 269-70. In fact, both (a)(3) and (a)(4) were derived from a single phrase
in the original Rule 23: "one or more [representatives], as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all .... " Id.
-u 524 F.2d at 270 (quoting White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo.
1971)).
31 524 F.2d at 270.
11 Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that it would be "unrealistic" for a court to compare
plaintiff's claims and defenses with the hypothetical claims of a hypothetical class. Id. at
270-71.
3' 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975).
Relief was sought on behalf of "all persons of Navajo Indian descent who live in or
near the City of Farmington, New Mexico or frequent that city such as that might be
expected to seek emergency care in San Juan Hospital." Id. at 1183.
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miles) was deemed misplaced since the plaintiffs did not purport
to represent only indigent reservation residents.4
Then, in apparent contradiction to Taylor, the court noted
that subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) are often seen as duplicative,
completely ignoring the White rationale.42 However, the issue was
resolvable without this dicta since under the facts the plaintiffs
were indeed found to have met the typicality requirement; the
court held that all that was neccessary was that the claims of the
plaintiffs and of the other class members be based on the same
legal or remedial theory, thus in effect reverting to the White
test. 3
The court also reversed the district court's denial of a perma-
nent injunction because of noncompliance with Rule 65(a)(2)."
The lower court had consolidated the permanent injunction issue
with a preliminary injunction hearing without the appropriate
court order thus depriving the parties of proper notice.
In Hernandez v. Gray15 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district
court dismissal of a class action on the ground that a class action
may not be maintained by a putative representative who is not a
member of the class. Plaintiffs failed to establish a case or contro-
versy against the defendant because they had voluntarily left
their jobs for reasons unrelated to the present claim of discrimina-
tion.
In Royal Resources Corp. v. Bottger (In re King Resources
Co. Securities Litigation)" the court considered the question of
the propriety of a class certification in a complicated securities
case in which 16,000 individuals with diverse interests consti-
tuted the class. In spite of the chance of such great expense to
the defendants as to constitute irreparable harm, the court dis-
missed the appeal as premature since the trial court had yet to
Id. at 1188-89. See purported class note 40 supra.
528 F.2d at 1189 (citing 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.06-2 (1971)). See text
accompanying note 35 supra.
11 528 F.2d at 1189. Requiring that the claims of the class and its representatives be
based on the same legal theory differs very little from requiring a comparison of the claims
of the representatives with the claims of the class and finding a class in fact needing
representation.
11 Id. at 1186. Rule 65(a)(2) authorizes the consolidation of a preliminary injunction
hearing with a trial on the merits by court order but provides that the subsection is to be
so construed "as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury."
-s 530 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1976).
46 525 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1975).
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seek to create subclasses and was presently narrowing the
issues."
In Ryan v. Shea"8 the district court had held that "because
the class [was] formed pursuant to [Rule 23(b)(2) rather than
(b)(3)] no notice to the members of the class [was] required."'"
Since there was no objection to this ruling at the trial level, the
Tenth Circuit did not directly address the question, but did note
that district courts in the circuit have ruled that prejudgment
notice is not required when the action is brought under 23(b)(2).10
2. Other Rules as They Affect Class Actions
In Phillips v. Clark (In re Four Seasons Securities Laws
Litigation)5' plaintiff-appellant was an absent class member
who sought to be relieved of the class action judgment by filing a
motion under Rule 60(b).1s Appellant claimed he had new infor-
mation of which he was unaware at the time judgment was en-
tered. The court rejected his claim, holding that appellant was
represented by the actual parties of the class, thus making their
knowledge of the information imputable to him as well.
53
The court also held that appellant did not become a "party"
for purposes of 60(b) since he took no action, upon adequate
notice, to identify himself with the court proceedings. 4 It was
stated that the fact absent classmembers are bound by a judg-
11 Id. at 213. The court did not expressly rely on Rule 23(c)(4), but that rule provides
that a class action may be brought in respect to particular issues or that a class may be
divided into subclasses, with each subclass treated as a class subject to the other provi-
sions of Rule 23.
525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975).
, Id. at 275. Rule 23(b)(2) allows class actions where the opposing party has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making final injunc-
tive relief or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Rule
23(b)(3) allows class actions where the questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and where a class
action is superior to other available methods for resolving the controversy. Rule 23(c)(2)
expressly requires notice only in actions maintained under 23(b)(3) and does not mention
notice in regard to (b)(2) actions.
50 525 F.2d at 275.
51 525 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
52 Rule 60(b) allows motions by a party or his legal representative for relief from a
final judgment on several grounds, the relevant ones here being based on lack of knowl-
edge.
" 525 F.2d at 502.
Id. at 504.
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ment does not in itself make such members "parties" for 60(b)
purposes. 5
In Burdick Contractors, Inc. v. Nelson56 the court stated the
rule that a class action where there has been adequate notice and
representation bars individual suits arising from the same trans-
actions, but upheld the separate claims in the present case on the
particular facts.
Hellerstein v. Mr. Steak, Inc. 57 presented the question of the
appealability of an interlocutory order granting class action sta-
tus. Defendant-appellant relied on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin8
for the proposition that such orders are "final decisions" within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus appealable. The Tenth
Circuit distinguished Eisen on the ground that in that case the
Supreme Court was influenced by a burdensome notice require-
ment in granting final order status, a factor not present in the
case at bar. 9 This keeps the Tenth Circuit in line with the pre-
vailing view that such orders are not appealable unless they
sound a "death knell" to the entire case or place an undue burden
on the parties. 0
D. Rule 54: Judgments and Third-Party Practice
United Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.6 arose
from Hartford's denial of coverage under a banker's blanket bond
issued to the United Bank of Pueblo for a cash letter stolen while
being transported to the United Bank of Denver. Hartford had
filed a third-party complaint against the Denver bank which was
severed from the original complaint for purposes of the trial. Ten
months after judgment had been entered against Hartford in the
original action, the Pueblo bank moved for entry of final judg-
ment under Rule 54(b)2 The motion was granted and Hartford
appealed.
Id.
, No. 75-1315 (10th Cir., Mar. 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
'T 531 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1976).
417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen III).
531 F.2d at 473.
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) (Eisen I).
" 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976).
, Rule 54(b) allows entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims
or parties where there are multiple claims or parties only upon express determination that
there is no just reason for delay.
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The Tenth Circuit noted that there is no precise test for
determining what constitutes "just cause for delay" but stated
the general rule that the determination rests on a balancing test,
weighing the policy of preventing "piecemeal appeals" against
the hardship or injustice that might be inflicted on a litigant by
further delay . 3 On balance, the most important factor in the
court's view was that the as yet unlitigated action between Hart-
ford and the Denver bank would be facilitated by entry of final
judgment in the principal claim since the second action depended
on that claim. 4 It was thus concluded that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in granting the motion. 5
E. Rule 56: Summary Judgment
In Taylor v. Branch66 the court, reversing the lower court's
grant of summary judgment for defendant, reiterated the rule
that summary judgment should be granted only when the moving
party has established the absence of any genuine issue as to a
material fact. 7 But the court had to consider two other questions
in regard to Rule 56 as well. The first was whether a plaintiff
waives the right to challenge such a motion by failing to file
opposing affidavits or other evidence. Ordinarily, a plaintiff may
not rest on his pleadings in opposing a motion for summary judg-
ment, 8 but the court held that this case fell within a recognized
exception: A plaintiff may rest on his pleadings where the evi-
dence supporting the motion fails to show the absence of a genu-
ine issue as to any material fact.69 The second issue was whether
a formal hearing is required. The court held that a formal hearing
may be avoided by adoption of a local rule,70 thus adopting the
" 529 F.2d at 492.
*, Id. at 493. In fact, the court noted that final judgment was beneficial because if
Hartford's liability were to be reversed on appeal, the whole third-party action would be
moot. Id.
' Id.
" No. 75-1072 (10th Cir., Oct. 20, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
7 Id. at 3 (citing Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d
168 (10th Cir. 1974); James v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1972)).
" No. 75-1072 at 5.
Id. at 5 (citing Sterner Aero AB v. Page AirMotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974); Riggs v. British Commonwealth Corp., 459 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1972)).
70 No. 75-1072 at 6. The court cited Rule 78, which reads as follows:
Unless local conditions make it impracticable, each district court shall
establish regular times and places, at intervals sufficiently frequent for the
1977
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view of the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.7 However,
the court indicated that absent a local rule, a formal hearing
might be required," but since there was no evidence to show
whether the district court had such a rule, the lower court's action
was assumed proper in this regard.7"
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. In Rem-In Personam Jurisdiction
In the past year the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals twice
recognized the fine distinction between in rem7' and in personam
proceedings.75 Both cases involved an Oklahoma statute7" which
controls jurisdiction in trust cases.
In Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. v. Metcalf State Bank77
revenue bondholders sued the trustee pursuant to a mortgage
indenture relating to the bond issue. Defendant Metcalf and the
bond issuer Claremore sued in state court in 1972 for liquidation
of the trust property. When the plaintiff bondholders subse-
quently sued alleging breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by
the co-trustees, the federal district court dismissed their com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction.
prompt dispatch of business, at which motions requiring notice and hearing
may be heard and disposed of; but the judge at any time or place and on
such notice, if any, as he considers reasonable may make orders for the
advancement, conduct, and hearing of actions.
To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order
for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon
brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.
71 See Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. Howard, 459
F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1972); Season-All Indus., Inc. v. Turkiye Sise Ve Cam Fabrikalari, A.S.,
425 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1970); Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 985 (1964).
72 No. 75-1072 at 6 (citing Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964)).
7 No. 75-1072 at 6.
7 [J]urisdiction . . . could be asserted in rem or quasi in rem by basing
the court's ability to proceed on its power over local property or status rela-
tionships, rather than the presence of defendant himself . . . . [Hiowever,
the property or status had to be present within the borders of the court's
geographic domain.
4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070, by 266 (1969). See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
" See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
7S OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.23 (1971).
77 525 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1975).
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In Buck v. Hales s the alleged discretionary income benefici-
aries sued the co-trustees of the trust for wrongful payment under
the terms of a will. The plaintiffs requested the imposition of a
constructive trust on certain mineral interests and the forfeiture
of certain rights of other beneficiaries. Again, the federal district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In both cases the Tenth Circuit saw the nature of the pro-
ceeding as dispositive of the concurrent jurisdiction dilemma.
Precedent supported the rule of exclusive jurisdiction for the
court which first had possession of the trust property when con-
current in rem proceedings were filed in different courts.7" For the
Tenth Circuit, the key issue was whether the designation of a
proceeding as in rem by this Oklahoma statute0 was conclusive
in a federal action.
In Southwestern Bank the Tenth Circuit, applying the Erie
doctrine,"' held that the state statute's designation was not bind-
ing on the federal court. It found that the federal action existed
independently of the state statute and that the statute was
"really designed to place jurisdiction over the described causes of
action in a particular state court." 2 Ignoring the state statute's
designation of the action as in rem, the Tenth Circuit concen-
trated on three factors: (1) The lack of interference with the trust
property; (2) the breach of duty allegations not being brought in
the state suit; and (3) the relief requested being money damages.1
3
7N 536 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).
71 Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456
(1939); Kline v. Beuke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145
(10th Cir. 1970); Swanson v. Bates, 170 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948); Milam v. Sol Newman
Co., 205 F. Supp. 649 (D.C. Ala. 1962).
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.23(A) (1971) provides: "The district court shall have
original jurisdiction . . . in its discretion to supervise the administration of trusts; and
all actions hereunder are declared to be proceedings in rem."
" [T]he jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the dedendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now . . . due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).




Regardless of this statute's designation of trust administration
actions as in rem, the Tenth Circuit found the presence of these
three factors to indicate an in personam proceeding totally dis-
tinct from the state action.
In Buck the court reemphasized that the determinative fac-
tors identified in the analogous Southwestern Bank case 4 were
the remedy requested and the degree of interference with the
trust property which constituted the basis of the state court ac-
tions. In contrast with the plaintiff's complaint in Southwestern
Bank, the appellants in Buck had requested relief that, if
granted, would have greatly interfered with the state court's con-
tinuing supervision of the trust's administration. To have given
the appellants this relief would have directly contradicted the
state court's continuing directions to the trustee.5
The appellants also argued a second ground for their claim
of in personam jurisdiction in the federal court, namely, that the
assets they sought were no longer in the state court's possession,
but had already been distributed. This argument was summarily
rejected because "the actual handling of the trust property by the
fiduciaries" was a matter of administration within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state. 6
In Guarantee Reserve Life v. World Market Centers7 the
Tenth Circuit faced a similar jurisdictional conflict in an inter-
pleader action. Both the decedent's wife and the receiver for
World Market Centers, the decedent's employer, claimed the pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy on the decedent's life. Before the
filing of the interpleader action in federal court, the receiver al-
leged exclusive summary jurisdiction in the Texas Bankruptcy
" 536 F.2d at 1331-32.
, Id. at 1331. W.T. Hales died testate in 1938. The state court had construed various
terms of the trust since 1943. The trustees had been directed to follow a certain course of
action with respect to the trust property. The co-trustees had been given further adminis-
tration instructions in the ensuing years. The most recent judgment of the state court
construing the trust was entered March 26, 1975.
11 Id. at 1332 (quoting Kittredge v. Stevens, 126 F.2d 263, 267 (1st Cir. 1942)). The
Kittredge court cited Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939), as holding that
"where the 'contentions are solely as to administration' a federal court has no jurisdiction
over the suit even though the complainant may not be asking the court to grant relief
which would immediately affect a res within the custody of a state court." 126 F.2d at
267.
'" No. 74-1881 (10th Cir., Nov. 10, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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Court based on World Market Centers' possession of the policy.
Precedent clearly determined that an interpleader action is
an in personam proceeding and that the second concurrent action
is subject to the binding effects of the prior decision under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."5 The Tenth Cir-
cuit avoided the conceptual difficulties inherent in the applica-
tion of the "constructive possession" 9 doctrine by the Texas
Bankruptcy Court. Instead, the Tenth Circuit found that an in-
terpleader action begins with the filing of the insurance proceeds
with the clerk of the federal district court. The adverse nature of
the insurance company's possession of the proceeds and its
commencement of the interpleader action against the receiver
and the decedent's wife was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
federal court." The court then affirmed the district court's find-
ing on the merits that the receiver's evidence did not overcome
the decedent's wife's indicia of ownership.
B. Statutory Jurisdiction
In Cooper v. United States' a former inmate of Leavenworth
Penitentiary sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages
for an intentional injury caused by a fellow inmate. Citing United
States v. Denko,92 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Prison
Industries Fund93 provision was the exclusive remedy for such
actions. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the
"intentional" aspect of the tortfeasor-inmate's act removed the
action from the exclusive coverage of work related accidents en-
's See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
" Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966) (quoting Thompson v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940) (bankruptcy courts "have summary jurisdiction to
adjudicate controversies relating to property over which they have actual or constructive
possession"); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 431 (1924) (where the
rights of trustees to property adversely claimed were in issue, Congress could grant juris-
diction over the person who has possession of the property)).
" No. 74-1881 at 9. See In re Herz Impacting Corp., 349 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (insurer resisted claims of control by daughter and the bankruptcy trustee). This
type of interest, the heart of classic interpleaded cases, is, in effect, an adverse claim to
control of the fund.
91 No. 75-1461 (10th Cir., Dec. 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
-2 385 U.S. 149 (1966). See also Granade v. United States, 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1966);
Nobles v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Ga. 1963).
0 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970) (accident compensation for inmates).
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compassed by the Prison Industries Fund. Intentional injuries
were found to be distinguishable from accidental ones only within
the class of self-inflicted injuries .
4
In Melendez v. Singer-Friden Corp.95 the plaintiff alleged
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19646 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Injunctive relief was specifi-
cally requested only under the Title VII claim. On the Title VII
claim, the defendants obtained summary judgment because the
plaintiff filed too late and no equitable consideration justified the
tolling of the statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit, on review,
held that an appeal of the interlocutory order dismissing the
claim was properly granted. Relying on analogous precedent, 7 the
Tenth Circuit found that the posture and scope of the injunctive
relief requested was sufficiently curtailed by the partial summary
judgment to warrant its appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1).1s
In Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co.9 an unlawful job
discharge case, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the "two letter" proce-
dure of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).9 0 On May 30, 1973, the plaintiff received a letter from
the EEOC advising him that if he wanted to sue he should ask
9, 28 C.F.R. § 301.9 (1976). The federal prison regulations provide:
Injuries sustained by inmate workers willfully or with intent to injure some-
one else, or injuries suffered in any activity not directly related to their work
assignment are not compensable, and no claim for compensation for such
injuries will be considered. Any injury resulting from willful violation of rules
and regulations may prevent award of compensation.
529 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1976).
, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1970), as amended by Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-608, § 3(1), 88 Stat. 1972.
11 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 461 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir. 1972)
(summary judgment in trademark case denying injunctive relief appealable as an interlo-
cutory order); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972) (in request for injunctive relief
from police surveillance, the court's refusal to recognize a class considerably narrowed the
scope of any possible injunctive relief in the event plaintiffs prevailed on the merits and
thus was appealable as a denial of the relief requested); Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedito,
441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971) (order dismissing certain defendants in civil rights action
against whom injunction sought was appealable).
1' 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970) provides: "Jurisdiction will lie when . . . interlocu-
tory orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court .... "
" 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970).
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for a "right-to-sue" letter and that he would have ninety days
from the time he received that letter to bring suit. The right-to-
sue letter was requested and issued on December 6, 1973, and
Williams brought suit on March 6, 1974. Judgment was entered
for the defendant and both parties raised issues on appeal. South-
ern Union requested review of the jurisdiction of the trial court
on the ground that Williams' suit was brought too late.
Southern Union contended that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) the jurisdiction of a United States district court, in
a private enforcement action, was limited to a period of 270 days
from the date of the complaint's filing with the Commission. In
the alternative, Southern Union contended that Williams' failure
to bring suit within ninety days after receiving the initial letter
notifying him of the Commission's fruitless conciliation efforts
barred his action. 10
The Tenth Circuit cited the recent Eighth Circuit case, Tuft
v. McDonnell,"2 where that court faced the same jurisdictional
argument as that advanced by Southern Union. There, the
Eighth Circuit held that the 180-day period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f) is not a deadline for issuance of notice to a complaining party
by the Commission. 103 Relying upon precedent and the statute's
legislative history, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Commis-
sion could still bring suit after the 180-day period expired. 04 The
administrative proceeding was not finished until a decision was
made regarding the filing of suit. Only after this decision was the
aggrieved party entitled to be notified of his right to sue privately.
The Eighth Circuit found that the two-letter procedure com-
plied with the statute and, consequently, that the aggrieved
party's right to sue did not begin until he had received the right-
to-sue letter.0 5 The first letter in the two-letter sequence was
merely notice to the aggrieved party of the Commission's failure
at conciliation and not necessarily the end of the administrative
process. The issuance of the formal right-to-sue letter signaled
the termination of the administrative process.' °" Since the Com-
"' 529 F.2d at 486.
102 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1052 (1976).
" 517 F.2d at 1305-09.
104 Id.
I Id. at 1309.
'u Id. at 1307-09.
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mission had not exhausted its administrative remedies under
Title VII at the time of the first letter, there was no basis for
construing this letter as the statutory notice initiating the ninety-
day limitation period. The Tenth Circuit adopted the Eighth
Circuit's entire rationale and held that the trial court was correct
in asserting its subject matter jurisdiction. 7
C. Federal Tort Claims Act
The Tenth Circuit reviewed various tort actions against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act'° and its juris-
dictional counterpart. 109 These claims are of greater interest for
their applications of respective state law than for their jurisdic-
tional import. In the prior year, allegations of medical malprac-
tice," breach of duty from landowner to entrant,"' and federal
employee liability"' were asserted as grounds for federal tort
claims.
More informative than the jurisdictional aspects of Hartzell
v. United States"' was the Tenth Circuit's application of the
doctrine of Mile High Fence."' In 1971 the Colorado Supreme
Court replaced the traditional common law status classifications
of entrants upon another's land with the more flexible
"foreseeability and reasonable care" standard for landowners."'
Prior to Hartzell, the Tenth Circuit had applied this doctrine only
once, in 1972.116
"0 529 F.2d at 487.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
,0 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970) (United States as defendant).
,, Casias v. United States, No. 75-1595 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
" Tracey v. United States, No. 74-1633 (10th Cir., Oct. 17, 1975) (Not for Routine
Publication).
"I Turner v. United States, No. 75-1457 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication); Tunder v. United States, 522 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 75-1603 (10th Cir., Aug. 9, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
' Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
" The court in Mile High Fence stated:
It becomes obvious from an in depth analysis of the various sections and
comments of the Restatement, that status, particularly that of licensee or
invitee, is not the controlling determinant of liability. Again it is the foresee-
ability of harm from the failure by the possessor to carry on his activities with
reasonable care for the safety of the entrants which determines liability.
Id. at 547, 489 P.2d at 314.
"' Smith v. Mill Creek Court, Inc., 457 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1972).
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In Hartzell the plaintiff alleged that failure to remove dan-
gerous conditions or to warn spectators of them at an Air Force
Academy football game was unreasonable conduct. Citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court found that "reasonable
care on the part of the possessor. . . does not ordinarily require
precautions, or even a warning against dangers which are known
to the visitor, or so obvious to him.""' The Tenth Circuit has, in
this opinion and the 1972 Smith opinion, taken an approach that
is consistent with the applicability as well as the tenor of the
doctrine of Mile High Fence. "8
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the application of the res
ipsa loquitor doctrine in two suits against the United States. In
Udseth v. United States"9 the trial court refused to apply the
minority rule that the instructor pilot of a dual control aircraft is
responsible for the plane's operation. 20 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, stating that New Mexico law forbade the application of
res ipsa loquitor in the absence of any evidence as to who was in
control of the plane.'
In Federal Insurance Co. v. United States' the court allowed
the plaintiff to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor where a tank
exploded at the electroplating facility at Tinker Air Force Base,
Oklahoma. Even though the plaintiff could not prove which of
three possible theories accounted for the explosion, the district
court held that the identification of the precise instrumentality
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1964). For further discussion of the
importance and impact of the growing trend away from the traditional common law status
classifications, see Comment, Premise Liability: Foreseeable Emergence of the Com-
munity Standard, 51 DEN. L.J. 145 (1974).
"I The applicability of the Mile High Fence doctrine regardless of the plaintiff's
status seems to be the general tenor of the Tenth Circuit. The applicability of Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), was not extended beyond
the class of invitees in two subsequent cases. Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson, 16 Cal. App.
3d 881, 94 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1971); Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d
20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). See also Comment, supra note 117.
"' 530 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1976).
' For a discussion of the minority rule, see Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc.,
259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961).
' 530 F.2d at 862. There was no New Mexico case directly on point; consequently,
the views of the resident district judge were persuasive and ordinarily accepted. Stevens
v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir. 1975). The trial court had held the presumption
that the pilot in command was in exclusive control as not permissible.
1- 538 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1976).
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was sufficient for the doctrine's application. On the basis of this
precise identification, the lack of any defects in the tank's compo-
nent parts, and the fact that tanks do not usually explode in the
absence of negligence, the Tenth Circuit held that negligence on
the part of the Government was a reasonable inference.12
Michael A. Maxwell
John L. Ruppert
CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS IN DETERMINATION
OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CHAPTER XI
PROCEEDINGS:
Stipe v. Mullendore, 527 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1975)
By CHARLES P. LEDER*
In Stipe v. Mullendore' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether a trial court had erred in not awarding attor-
neys' fees pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement in a Chapter
XI bankruptcy proceeding and whether a $365,000 award of attor-
neys' fees was reasonable. The attorneys in this action were re-
tained "to collect all or as much as possible of the proceeds of life
insurance policies having a combined face value of $15 million."2
Because their clients were confronted with both secured and un-
secured creditors having claims exceeding $8 million, the attor-
neys filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy petition on behalf of their
clients and entered into a contingent fee agreement whereby the
attorneys "would receive 20% of the amount recovered from an
2 The difficult issue for the court was the possibility that the heater was not in "the
exclusive control" of the Government since it consisted of component parts. Citing Carter
Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okla. 209, 232 P. 419 (1924), the test is, when
there are several instrumentalities involved, some of which are under the control of the
defendant and others not, could the accident reasonably have occurred because of defects
in the instrumentality supplied by another?
* Associate, Berenbaum, Weinberger & Susman, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1973, Uni-
versity of Colorado; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
(In re Mullendore) 527 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 Id. at 1033.
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action against the insurance companies" and another claimant of
the proceeds.
3
A successful arrangement was reached satisfying the credi-
tors of the clients. In addition, the attorneys successfully negoti-
ated a settlement of their clients' claims against the insurance
companies. Under the terms of this settlement, the clients re-
ceived $5 million and the other claimant $3 million. After com-
pleting the Chapter XI arrangement and obtaining $5 million for
their clients, the attorneys filed an amended application with the
bankruptcy court "for an allowance of $1 million for attorneys'
fees. The request was based on 20% of the $5 million insurance
recovery and the 6,168 hours expended by [the] attorneys."'
This request was challenged by the clients, who by this time had
retained other counsel, and a hearing was held to determine the
proper fee. At the hearing the trial judge "indicated the contin-
gent fee contract would not be considered in arriving at a fee" and
instead made an allowance on a quantum meruit basis. The trial
court awarded $365,000 as the reasonable attorneys' fee and this
decision was appealed.
After finding that the attorneys were entitled to compensa-




The clients asserted that the attorneys should not be compensated because of their
failure to comply with General Order 44, which was abrogated by the Supreme Court on
October 1, 1973. 527 F.2d at 1035 & n.7. The Tenth Circuit held that this Order did not
cover debtors who, as in this case, were not in possession; the court thus reached a decision
similar to that reached by the Sixth Circuit in Cle-Ware Indus., Inc. v. Sokolsky, 493 F.2d
863 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974). But see In re Hydrocarbon Chem., Inc.,
411 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969). The Tenth Circuit stated:
In a Chapter XI proceeding, there are areas where counsel for a debtor not
in possession legitimately should function. To the extent that the work of
such counsel benefits the estate, compensation is normally allowed on proper
petition. Consequently, we hold that failure to comply with General Order
44 does not prevent [the attorneys] from receiving compensation.
527 F.2d at 1035-36 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1036 n.9.
The clients further argued that the attorneys in this case had failed to comply with
section 62(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1970), requiring a prior court
ruling regarding retention of counsel. However, the Tenth Circuit found no merit in the
contention. 527 F.2d at 1036. Finally, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the clients' conten-
tion that section 324 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 724 (1970), required disallowance
of fees. This section requires a bankruptcy petition to disclose the executory contracts of
the debtor. The Tenth Circuit found that compliance with the section would have allowed
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whether the fees should have been awarded pursuant to the con-
tingent fee agreement. In making its determination, the court did
not specifically decide whether contingent fee agreements were
permissible in a bankruptcy action; instead, the court's opinion
focused on whether the attorneys' fees awarded were reasonable.
The court analyzed sections 60(d) and 64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act 7 which allow an attorney compensation "only to the extent
of a reasonable amount to be determined by the court."8 In the
opinion of the Tenth Circuit, the Act prescribes "a single test in
determining the amount of attorneys' fees; that test is reasona-
bleness. '
The trial court had discretion in the awarding of attorneys'
fees and the Tenth Circuit refused to interfere with that discre-
tion because there was no showing that the "allowance was
plainly wrong or an abuse of discretion."'" However, the court did
set forth some of the factors it felt should be considered in a
determination of whether fees awarded by a bankruptcy court are
reasonable.
One factor to be considered by a trial court in an award of
attorneys' fees is a contingent fee agreement. The court specifi-
cally stated that the contingent fee agreement "might have had
some evidentiary value";" however, failure to consider such an
agreement is not reversible error because the ultimate determina-
tion of fees does not depend upon the agreement between the
client and the lawyer. Rather, the ultimate test is reasonable-
ness; hence, unreasonable fees are excessive and cannot be
awarded to an attorney.
court review of the fee contract early in the proceeding but could "find no compelling logic
or legal requirement for disallowing all compensation because the executory contract,
disregarded by the trial court, was not disclosed pursuant to § 724." 527 F.2d at 1037.
11 U.S.C. §§ 96(d), 104(a) (1970).
Id. § 96(d).
527 F.2d at 1038.
Id. (quoting Behringer v. Lybrand & Morgan, 270 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1959)).
II 527 F.2d at 1038.
I2 d. The court held that failure to consider the contingent fee arrangement would
be harmless error under Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inasmuch as the
ultimate test of the fee was reasonableness as determined by the trial court. Id.
" See Bankruptcy Act § 60(d), 11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (1970), which provides attorneys'
fees shall be allowed "only to the extent of a reasonable amount to be determined by the
court, and the excess may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit of the estate."
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As a result, the utility to the lawyer of a contingent fee agree-
ment is reduced. The historical and practical reasons for the use
of contingent fees disappear if the successful conclusion of an
action will not produce that which motivated the lawyer to accept
an otherwise undesirable case-namely, the "res out of which the
fee can be paid."" Under the court's ruling in Mullendore, the
trial court when computing reasonable fees may consider a con-
tingent fee agreement for whatever evidentiary value the agree-
ment may have, but it is not bound by the terms of that agree-
ment. Therefore, because the ultimate determination of the fee
rests with the court and is not based on the terms of the contin-
gent fee agreement, a lawyer in a bankruptcy proceeding, or any
other proceeding allowing only awards of a reasonable fee, will
find a contingent fee agreement of little practical value.
Even though the computation of a reasonable fee in a bank-
ruptcy proceeeding rests with the trial court, the Tenth Circuit
pointed out other traditional factors that should guide a court in
making the award. The court stated that the amount of the award
in Mullendore indicated that the trial court had considered:
[T]he contingent aspect of the [attorneys'] employment as it re-
lated to the results obtained; the size of the estate; the time and
labor involved; the results actually obtained; the novelty and com-
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILnTY (1975) states as Ethical Consideration
2-20 the following:
Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly ac-
cepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical
bases of their acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of circum-
stances, provide the only practical means by which one having a claim
against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of
a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution
of the claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid. Although a
lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily
improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a
case, to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client
who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrange-
ment. Because of the human relationships involved and the unique character
of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases
are rarely justified. In administrative agency proceedings contingent fee con-
tracts should be governed by the same consideration as in other civil cases.
Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal
cases, largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not
produce a res with which to pay the fee.
Id. at 7C (footnotes omitted).
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plexity of the legal problems involved; the opposition encountered;
the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys involved; and
the debtors' ability to pay.5
An analysis of the award given by the trial court satisfied the
Tenth Circuit that there had been no abuse of discretion in the
awarding of fees. The Tenth Circuit relied upon the judgment of
the trial court "to [give] credit where credit was due and to
avoid payment for duplicative services."'"
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPARTIALITY
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
December 5, 1974 marked the revision of a federal statute
addressing standards for disqualification of judges, 28 U.S.C. §
455.' Subsection (a) of the revised section 455 states: "Any jus-
tice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
527 F.2d at 1040. See Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B), which provides that:
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordi-
nary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee
is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
ABA, supra note 14, at 12C (footnote omitted).
'e 527 F.2d at 1040.
Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609.
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impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' This new statute,
according to legislative history, 3 is intended to conform with
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.4 Canon 3C(1) envi-
sions that a judge should disqualify himself any time his conduct
would lead a reasonable man, knowing all the circumstances, to
conclude that there exists an appearance of either impropriety or
lack of impartiality.5 The dictates of the new statute are, how-
ever, more forceful than those of the Code; the statute substitutes
a command, "shall disqualify himself," for the recommendation
of the Code, "should disqualify himself."6 Thus section 455(a)
requires disqualification any time there is an appearance of im-
propriety or lack of impartiality.7
On July 14, 1976, the Tenth Circuit, acting upon a petition
for a writ of mandamus' filed by the Justice Department, disqual-
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6351, 6353. See 120 CONG. REC. H10,729 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1974) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier); 119 CONG. REC. 33029 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Burdick). See also
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 407 F. Supp. 324, 326-27
(E.D. Va.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d
357 (4th Cir. 1976).
ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 3C(1) (1975).
1 Id. Canon 3C(I) states in part: "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . . 'See E.
THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973). The Reporter states:
Any conduct that would lead a reasonable man knowing all the circumstan-
ces to the conclusion that the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" is a basis for the judge's disqualification. Thus, an impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety . . . that would reasonably lead one to
question the judge's impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within
the scope of the general standard, as does participation by the judge in the
proceeding if he thereby creates the appearance of a lack of impartiality.
Id. at 60-61. See also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts,
86 HARV. L. REv. 736, 745 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification of Judges].
Compare text accompanying note 2 supra with Canon 3C(1), supra note 5.
See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 8, 14-16, 60-61. See also United States v. Brown,
539 F.2d 467, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1976).
1 Not all United States courts of appeals permit the use of the writ of mandamus to
review the refusal of a judge to disqualify himself. However, the Tenth Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit recognize the validity of such a procedure and the trend is toward a more
liberal availability of the writ. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051-
52 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d
655, 657 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Occidental Petroleum Corp.
v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 56-57 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963). See
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ified Chief Judge Willis Ritter of the United States District Court
for the District of Utah.' The Justice Department alleged that the
behavior of Judge Ritter at the pretrial proceedings demonstrated
actual bias or an appearance of bias in favor of the defense attor-
neys and, in turn, against the Government's attorneys and the
Government.' 0 The Tenth Circuit held that the impartiality of
Judge Ritter, in light of the total facts and circumstances, might
reasonably be questioned."
This Comment will analyze the interpretation and applica-
tion of section 455(a) by the Tenth Circuit as reflected in its
opinion in United States v. Ritter.
I. BACKGROUND
Common law originally held that a judge could be disquali-
fied only for "interest," defining it as a direct pecuniary interest.'2
At the time of the establishment of the American court system,
pecuniary interest still was recognized as the only basis for dis-
qualification.'3
In the United States, the first federal disqualification-for-
interest statute was enacted in 1792" and subsequently was
amended to cover both specified relationships and "substantial"
interests.'5 The 1948 version of section 455 stated:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel,
is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with
any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion,
for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.' e
also 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3553, at
386-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER]; Note, Disqualification
of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1440 n.45 (1966); Com-
ment, Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 US.C. § 455, 71
MIH. L. REV. 538, 548 n.42 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification for Interest].
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976).
540 F.2d at 461.
Id. at 462, 464.
1 Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947); Note,
Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Sta-
tus, and the Oregon Experience, 48 ORE. L. REV. 311, 321-22 (1969).
Frank, supra note 13, at 611-12.
" Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278-79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455
(Supp. IV 1974)).
*5 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3541, at 343.
* 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (amended 1974).
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The "of counsel" phrase was literally construed; it was held to be
applicable in situations where the judge had been an attorney for
one of the parties in the same proceeding now before him.'7 Au-
thorities were in conflict as to whether "substantial" interest re-
ferred only to a pecuniary interest or whether it could be applied
to "substantial" interest in the outcome of a case." The "material
witness" clause was construed as limiting disqualification to situ-
ations where the judge was actually called as a witness and the
testimony sought was relevant to the proceeding. 9 Disqualifica-
tion under the final clause, "so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial," was within the discretion of the judge in
question; and appellate courts rarely overturned the decision of
a trial judge who failed to disqualify himself.2 0
A second basis for disqualification of federal judges was cre-
ated in 1911 with the enactment of a statute which provided that
a judge could be disqualified for bias or prejudice." This statute
was replaced in 1970 by the similar, current section 144.2 Section
144 states in part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.Y
In order to create a legally sufficient affidavit, certain procedural
and factual standards must be satisfied. Foremost among these
"1 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 919 (1974). See Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 550.
1 See Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 553, 555. Compare United States
v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966), with Adams
v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1962).
" Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 557-58. See, e.g., United States v. Re,
372 F.2d 641, 645 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967); United States v. Gilboy,
162 F. Supp. 384, 400-01 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 559; Disqualification of Judges, supra
note 5, at 738-39. See, e.g., Shadid v. Oklahoma City, 494 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 834
(1970).
2" Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
144 (1970)).
- 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
" Id.
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is that the affidavit must state specific facts which support the
allegations of bias and prejudice. 4
Some courts and commentators have advocated applying an
"appearance" standard when interpreting this statute.15 How-
ever, most courts have strictly interpreted not only the procedural
and factual requirements, but also the phrase "personal bias or
prejudice," holding that the bias must be derived from a source
that is extrajudicial in nature." The term "party," as contained
in the statute, has been construed as requiring that the bias be
directed at a litigant; thus, bias directed at the attorney for the
litigant would not suffice. 7
The recent revision of section 455 provided the third ground
for disqualification: Where there exists an appearance of impro-
priety or lack of impartiality. 8 Disqualification on this basis has
been such a rare phenomenon in the past that section 455(a)
reflects a new trend in judicial disqualification.29 Since the revi-
sion of this section was intended to codify Canon 3C(1) of the
Code,30 the notes of the Reporter to the Code should be viewed
as an authoritative source in interpreting the new statute.' The
14 Id. Other relevant standards are: (1) That the affidavit must be certified by a
counsel of record, stating that it is made in good faith; (2) it must be filed in accordance
with certain time requirements; and (3) there is a limit of one filing per litigant per case.
Id.
25 See Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias-The Standard
Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 763-69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Disqualification Under Section 1441. See also Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State
Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v.
Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973), prohibition & mandamus denied sub nom.
Luongo v. United States Court of Appeals, 415 U.S. 911 (1974); United States v. Moore,
405 F. Supp. 771, 773 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
" United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1966). See WRIoHr, MILLER,
& COOPER, supra note 8, §§ 3542, 3551, at 345-47, 374; Disqualification Under Section 144,
supra note 25, at 756-58.
11 See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 504-05 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 522-23 (D.S.C. 1975).
See also Disqualification Under Section 144, supra note 25, at 756-58.
" See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
20 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3549, at 369. But see, Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Moore, 405 F. Supp. 771, 773 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); United
States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 1957).
31 See note 3 supra.
31 See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
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Reporter explicitly adopted the "appearance" standard by stat-
ing that the appearance of impropriety or a lack of impartiality
falls within the general standard of Canon 3C(1).12 Section 455(a)
establishes an objective standard, which requires the judge to
disqualify himself if there exists a reasonable factual basis which
casts doubt upon his impartiality.3 With this background in
mind, the opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Ritter can be analyzed.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Judge Ritter was serving as the trial judge in a criminal
antitrust action.34 At the arraignment on November 24, 1975,
Judge Ritter granted motions for bills of particulars for some of
the defendants and stated that he would grant similar requests
for the other defendants upon the filing of the appropriate mo-
tions. The judge granted these further motions at a January 16,
1976 hearing. At the same time, and over the objections of the
Government's attorneys, he entertained and granted additional
defendants' motions for further bills of particulars.
35
Prior to the January 16 hearing, the Government's attorneys
learned that six "anti-Ritter" resolutions had been considered by
the Utah State Bar Association. The attorney for one of the defen-
dants, Mr. Christensen, served as president of this association
during the period in which these resolutions received considera-
tion .3
Based on a connection between the bar association proceed-
ings and the behavior of Judge Ritter at the January 16 hearing,
the Government's attorneys filed an affidavit requesting the
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351, 6356.
3' See note 5 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6351, 6354-55. The legislative history states that section 455(a) functions as
a "catch-all" provision, the purpose of which is to promote public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. Id. The concept of "public confidence" has become the focal
point for advocates of liberal disqualification. See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 8; Miller,
Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 69, 74 (1970); 7 CuM. L. REv. 185, 191-92 (1976).
" 540 F.2d at 460.
" Id.
" Id. At the state bar meeting, Mr. Christensen delivered the recommendation of the
bar association's Board of Commissioners, which advised the membership on the disposi-
tion of the resolutions. Two of the resolutions were approved on a secret ballot. Id. at 460-
61.
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judge to disqualify himself. They alleged that this connection
resulted in actual bias or an appearance of bias. 7 Judge Ritter
denied the disqualification motion 38 on the grounds that the affi-
davit failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of sections 144
and 455(a), and that the alleged facts were insufficient to support
a motion to disqualify.
39
In response, the Government's attorneys filed with the Tenth
Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging: (1) That Mr.
Christensen served as Judge Ritter's attorney during considera-
tion of the "anti-Ritter" resolutions by the Utah State Bar Asso-
ciation, and that such a relationship constituted "actual bias";
(2) that the conduct of Judge Ritter at the January hearings
reflected "actual bias" in favor of Mr. Christensen and, in turn,
against the Government's attorneys and the Government; and (3)
that the total facts created an "appearance of bias."4
III. ALLEGATIONS OF ACTUAL BIAS
A. A Finding of Fact
The first issue presented by the Government's attorneys re-
quired the Tenth Circuit to determine whether Mr. Christensen
functioned as Judge Ritter's attorney in the proceedings con-
ducted by the Utah State Bar Association. The Government's
attorneys, basing their affidavit upon section 144, contended that
"actual bias" resulted from the relationship of Mr. Christensen
and Judge Ritter.4 The Tenth Circuit disposed of this contention
on a finding of fact. The court held that the record did not demon-
strate advocacy by Mr. Christensen on behalf of Judge Ritter but
rather that the attorney performed his official duties as President
of the Utah State Bar Association in a fair and impartial man-
ner.
42
In disposing of this issue, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
cases cited by the Government's attorneys-Rapp v. Van Dusen43
and Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler.44 In Rapp, a federal district court
11 Id. at 461.
38 Id.
11 Petitioner's Brief for Mandamus at 8.
,0 540 F.2d at 461.
1 Id. at 461, 462-63.
11 Id. at 463.
' 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965).
4 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
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judge was disqualified from a civil action where, upon a petition
for a writ of mandamus to the Third Circuit, it was found that
counsel for the defense had also represented the judge in the same
proceeding.5 In contrast, Mr. Christensen in Ritter did not func-
tion in the same proceeding as counsel for both defendant and
Judge Ritter.
In Texaco, Inc., the Tenth Circuit granted a petition for a
writ of mandamus which requested the disqualification of a fed-
eral district court judge from a civil action. It was found that one
of the plaintiff's attorneys had represented the judge in another
civil action that was pending at the same time, and in the same
court, as the proceeding in question." In contrast to the situation
in Texaco, Inc., the proceedings of the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion were not a civil action that was pending before the federal
district court in Utah. Thus, the first allegation of the Govern-
ment's attorneys was unsupported by precedent.
B. Adverse Rulings and an Insufficient Factual Basis
The Tenth Circuit viewed the second issue of "actual bias"
as based on two alleged grounds: (1) Judge Ritter's January 16
rulings on the motions of the defendants for bills of particulars
and (2) Judge Ritter's "caustic and overbearing" behavior toward
the Government's attorneys. 7 The court disposed of the first
ground on a finding of fact by noting that the granting of the
defendants' motions at the January 16 hearing had no connection
with the proceedings before the Utah State Bar Association. 8
Judge Ritter had announced his intention to grant these motions
on November 24, 1975, and the opinion established that the
"anti-Ritter" resolutions first came to the attention of the judge
about January 3, 1976.11
As to the second ground, the Tenth Circuit conceded that
Judge Ritter's behavior toward the Government's attorneys was
indeed "caustic and overbearing."' 0 However, the court noted
,1 350 F.2d at 808-10. The plaintiffs motion requesting disqualification was based on
the pre-1974 section 455. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
,6 354 F.2d at 656-57. Defendant's motion requesting disqualification was based on
the pre-1974 section 455. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
,1 540 F.2d at 463.
I Id.




that such behavior does not invariably demonstrate bias or preju-
dice against a party. The court concluded by commenting on the
weakness of the factual basis presented within the petition of the
Government's attorneys." As noted, specific facts are required to
uphold a section 144 motion to disqualify.12 Holding that the
Government's attorneys failed to establish actual bias by the alle-
gations contained in the first two contentions, the Tenth Circuit
directed its attention to the final issue-whether there existed an
appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality sufficient to
support a section 455(a) motion to disqualify.
IV. SECTION 455(a): APPEARANCE OF BIAS
A. Elements
When dealing with a section 455(a) motion to disqualify, it
is critical to determine what elements are necessary to establish
an appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality. Four issues
must be addressed. First, what are the procedural requirements?
Second, must the judge's alleged disqualifying behavior be for or
against a party, or may it be for or against an attorney? Third,
must the disqualifying behavior have an extrajudicial source, or
may the source be judicial in nature? Finally, what factual basis
is necessary to support a motion for disqualification?
1. Procedural Requirements
In rejecting the Government's affidavit requesting his dis-
qualification under sections 144 and 455(a), Judge Ritter found
the affidavit technically defective, under both statutes, because
it failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 144.51 As
section 455(a) is wholly unrelated to section 144, the requirements
for section 144 should not control.
54
51 Id.
52 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
- Petitioner's Brief for Mandamus at 8.
54 Even though section 455 has no procedural requirements, the affidavit of actual
bias or prejudice could serve as one procedural vehicle for filing a section 455 motion to
disqualify. WRIGHT, MILLER, & CooPERa, supra note 8, §§ 3541, 3550, at 343-44, 372. See
Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 102 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
See also Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias Under 28 U.S.C. Section 144
and Revised Section 455, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 139, 153-54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Disqualification Under Revised Section 4551.
Even assuming that section 144 could substantively affect section 455, such effect
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Aside from noting Judge Ritter's rejection of the affidavit for
a failure to satisfy "technical requirements,"55 the Tenth Circuit
omitted any direct consideration of procedural requirements.
However, the court recognized that section 144 prescribes the
procedure for filing a motion for disqualification based on actual
bias, whereas it failed to make a similar observation concerning
section 455(a) as to an appearance of bias." One could view the
Tenth Circuit's silence on this issue as a refusal to impose upon
section 455(a) the procedural requirements associated with sec-
tion 144.
2. May the Disqualifying Behavior Be Directed at an
Attorney? May the Disqualifying Behavior Have a Judicial
Source?
The second and third issues are closely related and may be
disposed of concurrently. In Davis v. Board of School Commis-
sioners of Mobile County,57 the Fifth Circuit construed sections
144 and 455(a) in pari materia. The court, therefore, held that the
construction of section 144 applied to section 455(a)-in essence,
that the disqualifying conduct of a judge must be directed at a
party rather than an attorney, and that the source of the conduct
must be extrajudicial in nature.58 The Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
tion is open to question.59 In section 144 the concepts of party, as
opposed to attorney, and the extrajudicial source, as opposed to
the judicial source, derive from the terms "party" and "personal"
should be restricted to section 455(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) states in
part: "He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. ... Thus, the interpretations of section
144 could govern the substantive law applications of section 455(b)(1) because both deal
with the same grounds, i.e., "actual bias." However, as these grounds are wholly un-
related to section 455(a), section 144 provisions should not apply. WRIGHT, MILLER, &
CooPFR, supra note 8, § 3542, at 345-46.
540 F.2d at 461.
Id. at 461-62.
57 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
517 F.2d at 1052.
" It should be noted that the case law cited by the Fifth Circuit in support of its
contention involved only the interpretation and application of section 144. Id. at 1050-51.
See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 81 (7th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Wilson v.
Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1973); Giebe v. Pence, 431 F.2d 942, 943 (9th Cir.
1970); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 101 (8th Cir. 1968).
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contained within that statute. 0 Section 455(a) contains no simi-
lar language."
On these issues, the Tenth Circuit refrained from direct con-
sideration of the question of extrajudicial/judicial source. How-
ever, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
attorney/party issue, and held that the disqualifying behavior
may be directed either for or against an attorney.6" In support of
such a conclusion, the court noted that the language of section
455(a) permitted flexibility in determining whether disqualifica-
tion is warranted in a particular situation.13 Such a finding was
necessary as the Tenth Circuit apparently viewed the major prob-
lem as favoritism toward Mr. Christensen. On the possibility that
favoritism existed, the court was willing to impute bias.64
3. Factual Basis/Reasonable Basis
a. Introduction
The legislative history of section 455(a) indicates that a
"reasonable factual basis," or "reasonable basis," must be estab-
lished when attempting to disqualify a judge.65 A fear has been
expressed that such a "reasonable basis" concept would be used
to impose a narrow construction upon the new provision.6 In
Davis, the Fifth Circuit adopted the "reasonable factual basis"
standard. There, the court noted that the standard was designed
to eliminate a subjective "in the opinion of the judge" test. 7 In
Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State Bar,"6 the
Fifth Circuit indicated that a "reasonable factual basis" consis-
" See WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3542, at 346-48; Disqualification
Under Section 144, supra note 25, at 756, 758. See also United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1966); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497,
522-23 (D.S.C. 1975).
Compare text accompanying note 23 supra with text accompanying note 2 supra.
62 The Ritter court stated "for bias in favor of or against an attorney can certainly
result in bias toward the party. Thus, if a judge is biased in favor of an attorney, his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned in relationship to the party." 540 F.2d at 462.
"Id.
' See note 62 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6351, 6355.
U Comment, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. REV.
109, 132 (1974).
7 517 F.2d at 1052.
6s 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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ted of facts sufficient to raise a reasonable inference, in the con-
text of the issues presented in a particular situation, of a lack of
impartiality on the part of a judge."
In Ritter, the Tenth Circuit failed to acknowledge the
"reasonable factual basis" standard. The court twice noted that
there was a dearth of facts supporting the petition of the Govern-
ment's attorneys,70 but emphasized that "circumstances" are
important.7 The court noted that section 144 requires facts suffi-
cient to prove actual personal bias, but stressed that section
455(a) provides a broader, more flexible ground for disqualifica-
tion.72
Had the court then discussed why an appearance of impar-
tiality is essential, there would be little reason for criticizing the
import of this decision. However, the court digressed into a dis-
cussion of a prior line of cases in which Judge Ritter had been
disqualified." The Tenth Circuit failed to cite any authority hold-
ing that the consideration of such unrelated, prior cases was ap-
propriate for determining the factual basis necessary to support
a section 455(a) motion to disqualify. It is unfortunate that the
court failed to elaborate upon the proper balance of facts and
circumstances necessary to support such a motion.
b. The appearance of impartiality: from whose
perspective?
Another pertinent issue in determining whether a sufficient
"reasonable basis" exists for disqualifying a judge is from whose
perspective-the judge's or the litigants'-should the matter be
viewed? By emphasizing the concept of "reasonable factual
$ 524 F.2d at 103-04. Parrish has been misconstrued as requiring, to support a section
455(a) motion to disqualify, facts which would convince a reasonable man that a bias
exists. See United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 506 n.30 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
540 F.2d at 462-63.
'Id. at 462. See also United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 51 n.5 (10th Cir. 1976);
Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 385 F. Supp. 711, 714 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" 540 F.2d at 461-62.
7 Id. at 464. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); United States v.
Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960); United States
v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958). Judge Ritter has
run afoul of the Tenth Circuit on occasions more recent than those cited in the opinion.
See, e.g., Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Peterson, 456 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1972).
"1 One student note views the distinction as being between the perspectives of the
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basis," many decisions have viewed the motion to disqualify from
the perspective of the challenged judge, thus imposing a narrow
construction upon section 455(a).1 Other courts and commenta-
tors have urged that when applying an "appearance" standard,
the proper perspective is that of the challenging litigant. Such an
interpretation is said to be more in keeping with the spirit of the
new provision. 6 The language of the revised statute" indicates by
its plain meaning that the emphasis should be upon the judge's
impartiality being reasonably questioned and not upon whether
his partiality is reasonably likely to exist. 8
The Tenth Circuit in Ritter captured the spirit of the new
provision. Avoiding all mention of a "reasonable factual basis"
concept, the court instead chose to emphasize that Congress re-
vised section 455(a) to conform with the Code and, furthermore,
that litigants have a right to expect impartiality in a federal
district court.7 9
CONCLUSION
In interpreting section 455(a), the Tenth Circuit applied a
liberal disqualification policy. 0 In doing so, it aligned itself with
uninvolved observer and the litigant. See Disqualification Under Revised Section 455,
supra note 54, at 148-49.
"5 See, e.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103-04 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d
1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Mavis v. Commercial Car-
riers, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 55, 61-62 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc.,
403 F. Supp. 367, 373-74 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 1975); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F.
Supp. 1275, 1277-79 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041,
1044-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
7 See, e.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 109 (5th Cir.
1975) (Tuttle & Goldberg, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also J.
MAcKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JusTIcE 240 (1974).
" See text accompanying note 2 supra.
7' See note 76 supra. In answering the question of whether a judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," one must focus upon whether, considering all the facts
and circumstances, the litigant might reasonably doubt the judge's impartiality, not upon
whether the litigant has factually established that the judge is actually partial. See H.R.
REp. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6351, 6354-55. See also Note, Judicial Ethics-Recusal of Judges-The Need for Reform,
77 W. VA. L. REv. 763, 773 (1975).
T, 540 F.2d at 462, 464.
SO In Ritter, the Tenth Circuit, to an uncertain degree, qualified its liberal disqualifi-
cation approach by noting that a criminal prosecution was involved. Id. at 464. Unfortu-
nately, the court refrained from elaborating upon the significance of this element. Section
455(a) fails to distinguish between a civil action and a criminal prosecution. See text
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those who view the appearance of impartiality from the perspec-
tive of the challenging litigant. Thus, the court committed itself
to the following propositions: (1) that a section 455(a) motion to
disqualify need not satisfy the strict "technical" requirements of
section 144; (2) that the disqualifying behavior of a judge may be
directed at an attorney as well as at a party; and (3) that circum-
stances can be as dispositive as facts in determining whether
there exists an appearance of impropriety or lack of impartial-
ity.8 '
The opinion of the court draws criticism on two aspects.
First, the court should have amplified its reasoning as to why a
section 455(a) motion to disqualify need not satisfy the
"technical" requirements of a section 144 motion to disqualify.
Second, the court should have elaborated upon the proper bal-
ance of facts and circumstances necessary to support a section
455(a) motion to disqualify.
However, the Tenth Circuit should be commended for cap-
turing the spirit of the new provision. The opinion in United
States v. Ritter should be regarded as the forerunner of a progres-
sive trend in the area of judicial disqualification.
Brian A. Magoon
accompanying note 2 supra. Hopefully, the Tenth Circuit meant only that a criminal
prosecution is one additional factor to be considered when a petition for a writ of manda-
mus has been sought. There is no support for a holding that bases the application of a
liberal disqualification policy solely upon whether the proceeding in question is a criminal
prosecution. See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 60-61. See also H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351-57.
11 540 F.2d at 461-62.

LABOR LAW
This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey will cover all major
labor law decisions with the exception of those cases decided
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' which are included
in the constitutional law section of the Survey. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's most significant decision in the area of labor law, Dartt v.
Shell Oil Co., 2 involved the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 19671 and is discussed in the case comment following the
overview.
OVERVIEW
I. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT'-NATONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 5
A. Unfair Labor Practices
In NLRB v. Dover Corp., I a supervisor threatened three em-
ployees with discharge if they continued their union activities
during an organizational campaign. No discharges actually oc-
curred, and the company's attorney gave oral assurances to the
employees that the threats were not authorized by the company.
In addition, an officer of the company had a notice posted stating
that supervisors are forbidden by law from threatening discharges
because of union activities. Thereafter, the same supervisor was
involved in a similar incident. Finding violations of section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,7 the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) entered a remedial order and petitioned
the court of appeals for enforcement.
Although the supervisor did not have the power to hire or
fire, the Tenth Circuit found in the record "credible and substan-
tial proof on which the Board could rely ' 8 and held that the
employer is responsible for the coercive statements of the supervi-
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. II 1972).
2 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970).
Id. §§ 141-197 (1970).
Id. §§ 151-168 (1970).
No. 74-1577 (10th Cir., Apr. 12, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
No. 74-1577 at 10. The court deferred to the NLRB credibility findings, stating that
such findings are "peculiarily [sic] within the province of the hearing office and the
Board and are ordinarily entitled to acceptance on review." Id. at 8.
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sor "when employees would have just cause to believe that he was
acting for and on behalf of the company."9 Even though the union
had lost a certification election which occurred after the viola-
tions but prior to the court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ordered
enforcement of the remedial order, noting that such orders have
been enforced when needed "for [their] future effect."10
In Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. NLRB," the Tenth Circuit
declined to set aside NLRB orders arising from the discharge of
an employee for violating an overly broad no-distribution rule.
The NLRB found that the rule prohibiting employees from
"distributing. . .handbills or literature of any type on company
property during working hours"'" violated section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act 3 and that the discharge of an em-
ployee for distributing union literature on company property dur-
ing his nonworking hours violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act." In sustaining the Board's findings, the court noted that no
exceptions to the rule were provided for and that employees could
interpret the rule as prohibiting distributions on their own time
in nonwork areas; 5 absent proof of unusual justifying circumstan-
ces, such a rule violates the Act."
The NLRB also had found that four separate incidents of
questioning employees regarding union attitudes during the or-
ganizational drive were unlawful interrogations. 7 While noting
that an employer is not prohibited from disseminating its views
on the virtues of organization," the Tenth Circuit sustained the
Board's findings as being supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole and granted enforcement of the Board's
order. 9 In sustaining the Board's findings the court noted that the
Id. at 10 (citing Furr's, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562, 566 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967)).
"0 No. 74-1577 at 14-15 (citing NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25 (1970)).
530 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 140.
, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
" Id. § 158(a)(1), (3). See 530 F.2d at 139.
, 530 F.2d at 141. The rule prohibited distribution during "working hours" which
here was essentially 24 hours a day. Id. at 142 n.7.
11 Id. at 141 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 796, 803-04
(1945)).
,7 530 F.2d at 144.
" 530 F.2d at 143 & n.9. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
" The court examined the company's entire course of conduct and held that
VOL. 54
LABOR LAW
discussions with the employees were "out of the ordinary" and
that the employer neither stated the purpose for the questions nor
gave any assurance against reprisal.20
In NLRB v. Lake Shore, Inc.21 two employees were dis-
charged for engaging in protected union activity. They later voted
under challenge in a certification election where their votes were
determinative. The NLRB ordered their reinstatement and certi-
fied the union as the exclusive bargaining representative.2 2 Desir-
ing to challenge the Board's reinstatement order and resulting
certification, the employer refused to bargain with the union;
whereupon the Board ordered it to do so after finding violations
of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 1
The validity of the bargaining order depended on whether the
Board had properly ordered reinstatement.
The employer contended that there was insufficient evidence
to support the Board's findings, specifically alleging that there
was no showing of knowledge by it that the fired employees were
union organizers and that there was no showing of discriminatory
motive. The Tenth Circuit sustained the Board's decision, find-
ing that the circumstances of the case were sufficient to raise the
necessary inferences.24 The court stated that at the very least this
case fell within Judge Lewis' statement in Rocky Mountain Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. NLRB: "The discharge of qualified workers who
are also active unionists '. . . is a circumstance of suspicion which
may give rise to justified inference of violative discrimination'; in
such case 'the issue must ...be determined by the degree of
significance to be given to the employer's explanation of the rea-
son for the discharge.' "25 The administrative law judge's opinion,
which was adopted by the Board, found unpersuasive the em-
ployer's explanation that the firings were economically moti-
vated. Finding that this case was one that depended on the credi-
"[wihile the proof is not strong, we feel it supports the Board's inferences. ... 530
F.2d at 144.
Id.
2, No. 75-1716 (10th Cir., June 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
I ld. at 4.
' Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 6.
5Id. at 6-7, as quoted in American Sanitary Products Co. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 53, 56
(10th Cir. 1967); Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 204 (10th Cir. 1967).
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bility of witnesses, the court honored the Board's choice between
conflicting testimony."
In NLRB v. P.A.F. Equipment Co." an employer's refusal to
bargain with the certified bargaining representative was found by
the NLRB to be an unfair labor practice.2 The company claimed
that its refusal to bargain was justified because it had been de-
nied due process of law when its challenge of the NLRB election 9
was dismissed by the Regional Director without a hearing and
when its request for Board review was denied. The court affirmed
the NLRB's authority to determine whether an election should be
held" and ruled that the Board's refusal to grant a hearing on this
"nonlitigable issue" was not a denial of due process.3 '
In NLRB v. Auto Crane Co. 32 a wage increase and a thrift
plan were unilaterally implemented by the employer while a
collective bargaining agreement was in force. After a union re-
quest for negotiation was refused by the company, the NLRB
ordered the company to bargain. 33 The Tenth Circuit refused en-
forcement on the ground that the agreement contained an effec-
tive waiver of the statutory right to bargain .34 The court held that
the language of the waiver- was sufficiently clear to deny this
No. 75-1716 at 9.
-7 528 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1970).
The challenge, based upon marginal participation in the organizational campaign
by supervisors, was raised by the company before the certification election. The charge
was filed four and one-half months before the election and the court observed that this
interval afforded ample time in which to offset the activity of the supervisors. The vote
in favor of the union was 83 to 40. 528 F.2d at 287.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). See NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206, 226
(1940).
1' 528 F.2d at 287.
32 536 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1976).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
536 F.2d at 312. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The contractual waiver provision and
the issues involved were the same as those considered in NLRB v. Southern Materials Co.,
447 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1971).
The provision stated in part:
[The Company and the Union, for the life of this Agreement, each volun-
tarily and unqualifiedly waive [sic] the right and each agrees that the other
shall not be obligated to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or
matter referred to, or covered in this Agreement, or with respect to any
matter or subject not specifically referred to or covered in this Agreement,
even though such subjects or matters may not have been within the knowl-
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particular remedy to the union"e and that, although the company
had no right to unilaterally change a term of the contract, it did
have the right to refuse to negotiate the change. 7
In a brief dissent, Judge Doyle stated that the company's
unilateral act changed the terms of the contract and that the old
agreement was no longer operative. Consequently, the union was
not bound by its waiver of bargaining rights and could lawfully
demand, and the company could not refuse, to bargain pursuant
to section 8(a)(5).
In NLRB v. Glaziers & Glassworkers Local 558 3 the union
picketed a construction site to protest the nonunion status of the
general contractor. When a sub-contractor's union employees re-
fused to cross the picket line and the sub-contractor indicated
that nonunion employees would be hired to complete the job, a
union representative implied that physical violence and destruc-
tion of property would result. The union contended that these
statements merely reflected actual conditions in labor disputes
and did not constitute coercion. 0 The NLRB held that these were
threats of prohibited activity4 and ordered the union to cease and
desist. The court found substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding of fact and ordered enforcement.2
B. Damages
In Fleming Building Co. v. Northeastern Oklahoma Building
& Construction Trades Council4 3 a company appealed a judgment
denying its claim for damages under section 303.44 The Tenth
Circuit agreed with the company that the standard of proof in
edge or contemplation of either or both parties at the time they negotiated
or signed this Agreement.
536 F.2d at 312 (emphasis supplied by the court).
3' The NLRB order was based solely on section 8(a)(5), addressing refusal to bargain.
The court pointed out that "[tihe Union by the clear waiver of the right to bargain has
traded that remedy for other contractual or legal remedies as it may do." 536 F.2d at 312.
37 Id.
11 Id. (Doyle, J., dissenting).
.39 No. 75-1819 (10th Cir., June 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
40 Id. at 3-4.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970).
No. 75-1819 at 5-6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acker Indus., Inc., 460 F.2d 649 (10th Cir.
1972).
43 532 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
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section 303 actions arising from unlawful strike activity should be
a preponderance of the evidence and not the "clear proof" 5 stan-
dard applied by the trial court. However, it held that this error
was harmless because, even under the less rigorous standard, the
damages alleged by the company were speculative and uncer-
tain."
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 12
v. A-1 Electric Service, Inc. 7 the court decided that, in a section
30148 suit to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, general contract law should apply to the measure of
damages. 9 The appropriate measure was held here to be that
amount which the company would have been required to pay to
the various union funds had it not violated the hiring hall and
union shop provisions of the agreement.
50
In fixing a cutoff date for measurement of damages, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the suggestion of the trial court that dam-
ages should be the amount owed the union as of the date the
union withdrew its members from employment with the com-
pany; such a result "would tend to weaken the enforceability of
collective bargaining agreements and allow the breaching party
to disregard the agreement and suffer only a minimal penalty."
'51
It also rejected a union proposal that the cutoff date should be
either the time of filing the complaint or the start of the trial
because both would encourage delayed filings to increase recover-
ies. Instead, the court settled on the end of the contractual year
as the most reasonable cutoff date for the measurement of dam-
ages.5 2
,1 The "clear proof" standard was drawn from the language of section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970). The Tenth Circuit cited Ramsey v. Mine Workers,
401 U.S. 302, 310 (1971), as implying that the preponderance of the evidence standard
should apply in all civil actions against labor unions except suits brought under section
6. 532 F.2d at 164.
11 532 F.2d at 165.
47 535 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 94 (1976).
- 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
,1 535 F.2d at 3.
Id. (citing Interstate United Corp. v. White, 388 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cir. 1967)). See
also 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs §§ 992, 1002 (1964).
11 535 F.2d at 3.




In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 2-124 v. American
Oil Co. " the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court dismissal of a
union suit to compel arbitration of a grievance arising from the
compulsory disability retirement of an employee. Although one
clause in the collective bargaining agreement provided that
"disputes concerning disciplinary action resulting in loss of pay"
were arbitrable,54 another clause, expressly excluding disputes
concerning the status of employees under the company retire-
ment plan, was given effect. The court declined to equate the
employee's retirement with discharge, thus not invoking the ac-
knowledged "national policy that doubts are to be resolved in
favor of arbitrability.'"'s
In Reid Burton Construction, Inc. v. Carpenters District
Council56 the court considered arbitrability of both a company
claim for damages arising from a union's alleged violation of the
no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and the
issue of whether the union's assertion of arbitrability was barred
by alleged "evasive" and "dilatory" pleading and procedural tac-
tics in the suit. The trial court, finding that both issues were
arbitrable, had dismissed the company's damage claim.
In deciding that the damage claim based on the no-strike
clause should be submitted to arbitration, the Tenth Circuit used
a two-part test:
(1) Whether the grievance and arbitration provisions were wholly
employee and union initiated or could be initiated by either the
employees or the employer, and
(2) whether disputes over the violation of no-strike clauses were
intended by the parties to be subject to grievance and arbitration
proceduress?
Although the language of the agreement was somewhat ambigu-
ous, 5 the court interpreted it as allowing either party to initiate
53 528 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
584-85 (1960).
535 F.2d 598 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976).
'7 535 F.2d at 601. The test was distilled from the holdings in two Supreme Court
cases: Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Atkinson v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
535 F.2d at 602.
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grievance procedures for the application or interpretation of its
terms. The provisions were also read as broad enough to include
arbitration of disputes concerning the no-strike clause.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, however, with the lower court's
holding that, where the issue litigated in a section 30111 action is
held to be arbitrable, equitable defenses to arbitration must also
be decided by the arbitrator. The trial court had relied on
Operating Engineers Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc."° in which
the issue of laches, arising from the failure of one party to pro-
perly make a dispute known to the other, was held to be a proper
subject for arbitration. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Flair
Builders, limiting its applicability to those situations in which
the equitable defense to arbitration arises from the misconduct
of a party outside the court proceeding and where the scope of the
arbitration clause is broad enough to support a finding that the
parties intended such a dispute to be arbitrable."' The court
found not only that the requisite intent was not present in the
case at bar but that:
Indeed, even had the parties so intended, we would conclude that
such an agreement would clearly exceed the proper subject matter
of a collective bargaining agreement and would not be enforceable
in court; it would be improper for the prospective parties of a lawsuit
to attempt by contract to bind the exercise of a court's inherent
judicial function .z
The case was remanded for determination of whether this equita-
ble defense, arising solely during the course of the trial, bars
arbitration of the underlying dispute.6 3 If so, the lower court,
under its section 301 jurisdiction, would be able to decide the
dispute on its merits.
Redstone Workers Association v. Mid-Continent Coal &
Coke Co. 64 involved payments made by trustees of a welfare trust
fund created under a collective bargaining agreement. In response
to an Association challenge of expenditures for employee trans-
portation, the trial court certified questions as to the validity of
29 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
'o 406 U.S. 487 (1972).
535 F.2d at 603.
" Id. at 604.
63 Id.
11 No. 75-1257 (10th Cir., Dec. 22, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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the expenditures under the agreement, their legality under sec-
tion 186,65 and an accounting to an arbitrator. Before the arbitra-
tor had ruled, the parties entered into a new agreement on em-
ployee transportation. The lower court dismissed the Associa-
tion's claims for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on
the grounds of lack of a case or controversy and mootness and,
although adopting the arbitrator's finding that the payments
were violative of section 186, held that liability for the illegal
expenditures must be determined under state law.66 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court decision with the exception of the
certification of the question of legality which went beyond the
permissible scope of an arbitrator's authority to resolve questions
of interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, 7 but ruled
this was harmless error in light of the ultimate dismissal. 8
The union in Local 2-477, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
v. Continental Oil Co."0 sought to enforce7" an arbitration award.
Two grievances, both arising from overtime outside of job classifi-
cations, were processed through the collective bargaining agree-
ment's grievance procedures to the point of submission to an
arbitrator. However, only one grievance was actually submitted,
and on motion by the union, made over written protest but with-
out appearance by the company, the arbitrator agreed to consoli-
date the two grievances. The Tenth Circuit held that the arbitra-
tor had no authority to consider a grievance added unilaterally
by a party or the arbitrator7 and, therefore, agreed to order en-
forcement of only that part of the arbitrator's award dealing with
the properly submitted grievance.7"
The scope of an arbitrator's authority was also considered in
Campo Machining Co. v. Local 1926, International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers.73 One provision in the collec-
29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
" No. 75-1257 at 5.
" See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974).
" No. 75-1257 at 6-7.
, 524 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
o See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
" 524 F.2d at 1050. An issue not submitted to an arbitrator cannot be the subject of
an arbitration award. Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508
F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
11 524 F.2d at 1051.
" 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976).
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tive bargaining agreement called for discharge, demotion, or dis-
cipline of an employee only with "good and sufficient cause."'"
Another authorized the company to make "reasonable" shop
rules if they were not in conflict with other provisions of the
agreement." An employee was discharged under a rule calling for
discharge for leaving the plant during the workshift without per-
mission. One employee left after an argument with his foreman
over tools which were needed but not readily available. Pursuant
to the agreement's arbitration clause, the resulting grievance was
submitted to an arbitrator. Considering the particular circum-
stances surrounding the discharge, the arbitrator decided that,
although the rule was reasonable, the employee's violation did
not constitute "good and sufficient cause" for a discharge and
ordered a lesser penalty." The company sought to have the award
set aside under section 30177 and was granted summary judgment
by the trial court. The Tenth Circuit stated that when an arbitra-
tor merely "interprets and applies the collective bargaining
agreement and his award is rooted in the agreement, the arbitra-
tor's decision on the merits is final and not reviewable." 5 Finding
that the arbitrator confined himself to interpreting and applying
the collective bargaining agreement, the court held that the arbi-
trator was within his authority and reversed and remanded the
case for an order enforcing his award.7"
II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT8
The Tenth Circuit considered the equal pay for equal work s'
and the overtime 2 sections of the FLSA in Brennan v. South
Davis Community Hospital.' The Secretary of Labor claimed
that female aides and maids had been paid less than male order-
" Id. at 331.
75 Id.
" The arbitrator ordered the employee's reinstatement with back pay, subject to the
company's right to suspend him for no more than one month from the date of the rule's
violation. Id. at 332.
" 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
" 536 F.2d at 332 (footnote omitted) (relying on United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
1, 536 F.2d at 334.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970) (hereinafter cited as FLSA).
Id. § 206(d)(1).
" Id. § 207.
538 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1976).
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lies and janitors for equivalent work. The court noted that only
"substantial equality of skill, effort, and responsibility as to the
jobs actually performed" 84 need be proven to sustain the Secre-
tary's charge 5 and rejected the hospital's contention that order-
lies performed "extra tasks"" which aides did not. The court
examined the "extra tasks" and concluded that both aides and
orderlies were engaged primarily in basic patient care and that
"[djifferences in the kind of effort expended but not significant
in amount or degree will not support a wage differential.""
Likewise, the "extra tasks" argument was rejected in the
case of the maids and janitors. Both were found to be involved in
general cleaning activities, and the additional tasks8 required of
janitors, which tasks involved greater physical exertion, were too
insubstantial to justify unequal wages.89
A hospital's claim that an x-ray technician came within the
"professional capacity" exception" to the FLSA's overtime provi-
sions6 ' was denied. The court of appeals accepted the lower
court's finding that the technician's work was not sufficiently
intellectual and varied in character to bring him within the ex-
ception 92
In Dunlop v. Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agriculture &
Mechanical Colleges" the Secretary of Labor, appealing an ad-
verse district court judgment, sought to recover overtime on be-
half of a security guard and the cafeteria cooks of a junior college.
Id. at 861 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp.,
503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975)).
m 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
" These tasks included weighing bedridden patients, setting up traction, cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, using the autoclave, and carrying heavy items. 538 F.2d at 861.
Id. at 862.
Janitors filled a soft drink machine, carried garbage cans, and removed snow. The
evidence showed that these activities took little time and that maids performed some tasks
that janitors did not, such as cleaning bathrooms and stripping and making beds. Id. at
863-64.
Id. at 864.
" 29 U.S.C. § 213(1) (1970).
" Id. § 207.
" 29 U.S.C. § 213 provides that the definition of "professional capacity" will be found
in regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. The court deferred to the appropri-
ate regulation, 29 C.F.R. 541.3 (1975), which defines a professional as one who consistently
uses his discretion and judgment in work that is not routine, but is predominantly intellec-
tual and varied in character. 538 F.2d at 865.
" No. 75-1188 (10th Cir., Dec. 15, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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The Tenth Circuit held that the cafeteria did not come within the
exemption provided for retail or service food establishments94 and
awarded the overtime.
The court also reversed the district court's judgment that the
Secretary could not recover overtime pay on behalf of a college
security guard who had worked at a State Athletic Association-
sponsored basketball tournament on campus but who was paid
from gate receipts rather than directly from the college. He was
held to be furthering the interests of the school by helping to
provide "for the safety of the participants and spectators."95 The
guard's contract did not specify an hourly rate. However, for the
purpose of determining an hourly wage for the computation of the
overtime compensation due, his salary was divided by the agreed
weekly work hours."A
In Dunlop v. Gray-Goto, Inc.,97 another case arising from the
failure to pay overtime, the court held that fringe benefits in the
form of paid vacations, bonuses, and insurance" may not be set
off against overtime compensation due under the FLSA. A pri-
vate agreement between the employer and employees as to the
substitution of these benefits for the right to collect overtime pay
was held not to be an effective waiver "of a right so charged or
colored with public interest."9 The company's bookkeeping sys-
tem, which showed employees as receiving overtime pay when
they had actually received their regular rate of pay for all hours
worked, was in violation of the FLSA's recordkeeping provi-
sions,'0 notwithstanding the company's "good faith" defense. 0'
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(18) (1970).
" No. 75-1188 at 9. In so holding, the court relied on the legislative history of the Act,
amendments to the Act, the administrative regulations (29 C.F.R. 779.316 (1975)), and
Hodgson v. Duke Univ., 460 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1972).
" No. 75-1188 at 11. See Triple "AAA" Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1967).
V7 528 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 These benefits are excluded from the calculation of an employee's "regular rate of
pay" under section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(1)-(2), (4) (1970).
11 528 F.2d at 795 (citation omitted) (quoting Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697
(1945)).
'® 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (1975).
"' The time cards accurately reflected the hours worked, but the figures were manip-
ulated when transcribed onto payroll cards. The company president testified that he had
been told "that was the way the records were supposed to be kept .... " 528 F.2d at 795.
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The case was remanded for a determination of whether the viola-
tions were "willful" under section 255.10'
Nancy A. Hopf
TIME LIMITATIONS FOR FILING UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., I the Tenth Circuit of Appeals gave
an expansive interpretation of the procedural requirements of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,2 an interpreta-
tion contrary to that previously given in this circuit.3 The ADEA
was enacted in 1967,' with the stated purpose of promoting the
employment of older persons based on their ability and experi-
ence by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age.5
Plaintiff Dartt was within the class protected by the Act and
" 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1970).
539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'g 10 F.E.P. Cases 844 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ADEA]. The procedural require-
ments for the Act are in section 626(d) which reads in pertinent part:
No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until
the individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an
intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed-
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful prac-
tice occurred .. . .
Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Burgett v. Cudahy Co.,
316 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973). Both of these cases held that section 626(d)(1) was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of suit under the ADEA.
For a general discussion of the ADEA, see Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 A Critique, 19 N.Y.L.F. 309 (1973); Freed & Dowell, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 196 (1972); Gillan, The
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act Revisited, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 761
(1976); Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and
Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227 (1974); Comment, Procedural Aspects of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. PIr. L. REv. 914 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). The Act forbids discrimination against persons who are
at least forty years of age but less than sixty-five. Id. § 631.
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claimed she had been discharged because of her age. She had
failed, however, to file a notice of intent to sue within 180 days
from her discharge, as is required by section 626(d)(1) of the
ADEA. The defendant-employer moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted this
motion.' The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the ADEA's
notice requirement is not jurisdictional but is a procedural condi-
tion precedent to suit.' By classifying the notice requirement as
procedural rather than jurisdictional, the court made it possible
for plaintiffs in ADEA cases to file notice after the 180-day period
and then bring suit, provided there were equitable factors justify-
ing the delay. To reach this result, the court analogized the 180-
day period during which notice must be filed to a statute of limi-
tations.' Traditionally, statutes of limitations have been subject
to tolling9 and estoppel.' 0 Had the court viewed the 180-day pe-
riod as jurisdictional, the district court would have lost all juris-
diction after expiration of this period and would have been unable
to use equity on the plaintiff's behalf to preserve her right of
action."
I. FACTS
Shell maintained that its reason for terminating Mrs. Dartt
on July 31, 1973, was that a reorganization in its credit card
department had left her without work." Mrs. Dartt was then
fifty-one years of age. Believing she had been discharged because
of her age, she sought the assistance of an attorney who told her
that she should instead contact the United States Department of
Labor. As a result of this advice, Mrs. Dartt met on August 9,
1973, with the Assistant Area Director of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor, Mr. Speer.'3 He interviewed
her regarding the discharge, filled out the Department's com-
plaint form, and told Mrs. Dartt that he would investigate the
10 F.E.P. Cases at 851.
539 F.2d at 1260.
Cases holding, in other circumstances, that a statute of limitations may be tolled
include: American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
* 3 POMEROY'S EQurrY JURISPRUDEN E § 917 (5th ed. 1941).
I d. § 812.
6 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 7364 (2d ed. 1970).




alleged discrimination. When she inquired how long the investi-
gation would take, Speer responded that it might take a year. 4
Speer advised Shell of Mrs. Dartt's complaint and attempted
conciliation. After several meetings, Speer concluded that his
efforts at conciliation were unsuccessful and then adopted an
investigative posture. At this juncture Shell agreed to prepare
statistical information on its hiring and promotion practices to
facilitate this investigation. 5
On March 5, 1974, Speer, having not yet received the re-
quested information from Shell, advised Mrs. Dartt by letter that
there would be some delay in completing the investigation. This
letter discussed Mrs. Dartt's private right to sue, and enclosed a
pamphlet concerning the provisions of the ADEA, specifically
pointing out the time limitations precedent to filing one's own
lawsuit."' Plaintiff testified that Speer's letter and the pamphlet
constituted her first actual notice of both her right to bring a
private action and the 180-day notice requirement. Upon receipt
of this letter, Mrs. Dartt immediately retained private counsel.
On March 14, 1974, 216 days after the alleged discriminatory
discharge, Mrs. Dartt's attorney gave notice to the Department
of Labor of her intention to file a private action for violation of
the ADEA. 17
II. FINDINGS OF THE COURT
The district court rejected Mrs. Dartt's contention that the
180-day filing period was directory rather than jurisdictional as
being "neither supported by authority nor reason."'" As for plain-
tiff's contention that she had given sufficient notice of her intent
to sue by orally informing the Department that she had been
discharged because of her age, the court found the mandate of
section 626(d)(1) required something more: "[T]he mere regis-
tration of a complaint of age discrimination with the local wage
and hour division of the Department of Labor cannot be held by




'7 On May 16, 1974, Speer notified Mrs. Dartt's counsel that the Department's efforts
had proved unsuccessful, and that she was free to take whatever action she wished. Mrs.
Dartt filed a class action on May 21, 1974. 539 F.2d at 1258.
'1 10 F.E.P. Cases at 846.
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626(d)."' s5 Plaintiff's final argument to the district court was that
the 180-day period was tolled when she filed her complaint, be-
cause the Department failed to advise her of her right to sue until
the 180-day period had expired. On this issue, the court held that
Mrs. Dartt had presumptive and constructive knowledge of the
provisions of the ADEA, and refused to toll the 180-day filing
period. 0
On review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court
that Mrs. Dartt's complaint to the Department did not constitute
notice as required by section 626(d)(1). 21 However, as to the re-
maining two issues on appeal, whether the 180-day filing period
was a jurisdictional prerequisite in the sense that it could never
be extended, and if not, whether the facts of the case warranted
equitable modification, the court of appeals reversed the district
court.
2
The court, while admitting that there was ample authority
to support the trial court's conclusion that compliance with sec-
tion 626(d) was a "'jurisdictional prerequisite' to any private
action under the ADEA," nevertheless reversed the district court
and found that failure to comply was not an absolute bar to
bringing an ADEA private action;2 3 however, as seen by the court
of appeals, the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the
filing of a private action which cannot be waived, but which
should be subject to possible tolling and estoppel.24 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on the legislative history of the
ADEA and cases giving a liberal reading to a similar notice re-
quirement in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25
1" Id. at 848. For a case holding that oral notice would suffice, see Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
10 The district court based its finding that plaintiff had presumptive notice on the
axiom that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes. 10 F.E.P.
Cases at 848. Although Mrs. Dartt had testified that she had never seen any posted notices
regarding the ADEA, the court also charged her with constructive knowledge, based on
posted notices at Shell "which would lead a reasonable person to know or to inquire into
his legal rights under the ADEA." Id. at 848-49. Such notices are required to be posted
by 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970).
21 539 F.2d at 1259.
Id. at 1260-62.
Id. at 1259.
24 Id. at 1260-61.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. 11 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Title
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Although the court expressed its reliance on the legislative
history of the Act to support its holding, it did not discuss por-
tions of that history which it considered pertinent." Interestingly,
other cases which have used the Act's legislative history have held
that the notice requirement is mandatory, i.e., of a jurisdictional
nature. 7 These courts have placed great weight on the changes
made in the procedural aspects of the bill between the time it was
introduced and the time it was enacted."8 The ADEA as originally
proposed contained enforcement proceedings similar to those
under Title VII.11 The bill as adopted, however, rejected these
procedural proposals, incorporating instead the enforcement
techniques of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.30 The oppo-
nents of the bill as proposed claimed it would cause the same
delays "which plague so many of our agencies, such as the EEOC
The procedures for filing civil suit under Title VH are similar to those under the
ADEA. Proceedings under Title VII are initiated by the aggrieved party's filing of a charge
of unlawful employment practices with the Commission. The charge must be filed within
180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Within 180 days of the filing of such charge, if
no civil action has been filed by the Commission or the Attorney General of the United
States, and no conciliation agreement has been entered into, the aggrieved party should
receive a "right to sue" letter. The aggrieved party must file a civil action within 90 days
of the receipt of such letter or lose the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), -5(f). For
articles discussing Title VII, see Casey & Slaywood, Procedural Aspects of Title VII
Litigation: Pitfalls for the Unwary Attorney, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 87 (1975); Dotsey, Equal
Employment Opportunity-A Brief History and the New Federal Approach Through
Affirmative Action, 8 FORUM 100 (1972); Employment Discrimination: A Title VII
Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540 (1974); The Second Decade of Title VII: Refinement of
the Remedies, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 433 (1975). For the legislative history of the ADEA,
see S. REp. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
" The court reached its conclusion after "examining the cases and the legislative
history" under the ADEA. 539 F.2d at 1259.
" Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D.
Kan. 1973).
" Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Vasquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (D.P.R. 1975).
S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
658.
, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970). Section 626(e) of the ADEA makes applicable 29
U.S.C. § 255 (1970), the statute of limitations contained in the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1970). Under section 255(a) an action must be brought within
two years from the time the cause of action accrues. Therefore, there are two time limita-
tions built into the ADEA: Notice of intent to sue must be given within 180 days of the
discriminatory act, and, once such notice has been given, an action must be brought
within two years of the discriminatory act.
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and the NLRB . . . . By utilizing the courts rather than
[administrative bodies] as the forum to hear cases arising under
the law, these delays may be largely avoided.'
On appeal, Mrs. Dartt argued that these changes in proce-
dures under the ADEA supported the conclusion that failure to
give notice within the 180-day period did not necessarily divest
the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Especially in light of the
expressed congressional concern for a speedy determination of the
rights of older workers, Mrs. Dartt urged, it would be more in
keeping with the intent of the ADEA to construe the 180-day
period as directory in nature.2
In adopting plaintiff's interpretation of the legislative history
and her argument that section 626(d)(1) should be construed as
directory, the court of appeals relied on cases which had given
similar time limitations in Title VII a liberal reading. For exam-
ple, Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc.3" compared the
Title VII requirement for the filing of a charge of discrimination
within 180 days of the alleged discrimination to a statute of limi-
tations. It found equitable modifications such as tolling and es-
toppel applicable. 4 Although Reeb and Dartt in essence reached
the same conclusion, the facts in each case were significantly
different. In Reeb, the plaintiff had been deceived by the em-
ployer into believing that her termination was the result of a
limitation of funds. It was only after the statutory time period for
filing a charge of discrimination had passed that the plaintiff
discovered her position had subsequently been refilled by an al-
legedly less qualified male. The court in Reeb held: "[T]he
ninety day period did not begin to run in the present case until
the facts that would support a charge of discrimination under
Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person
with reasonable prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to
" Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
31 Brief for Appellant at 9-12, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the use of legislative action on proposed amendments to a bill as an
extrinsic aid in statutory construction, see 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48.18 (4th ed. 1973).




the plaintiff."3 Thus, the equitable modification fashioned in
Reeb was based on the wrong of the employer. As will be seen, in
every case, except Dartt, in which the time limitations of the
ADEA have been tolled, the decision has been based on a wrong
done by the employer.
3
1
III. OTHER JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 626(d)(1)
While litigation under the ADEA has been limited, increased
public awareness of the Act and its prohibitions has led to an
increase in the number of suits filed under the Act. 7 In the years
immediately after the ADEA was passed, the trend was to find
the procedural requirements of the Act to be jurisdictional, i.e.,
mandatory in nature. 38 However, recently there has been a move-
ment, albeit tentative, in the direction of construing the proce-
dural requirements more liberally. 3
The first case to interpret section 626(d)(1) was Cochran v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Co.4" In considering the effect to be given
the requirement that notice of intent to sue be filed within 180
days, the court found that use of the word "shall" in the statute
indicated that the requirement was mandatory rather than direc-
3 Id. at 931. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
4(a), 86 Stat. 104, amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970) by extending the time for filing
charges with EEOC from ninety to one hundred and eighty days after the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful act.
"' See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
7 Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods
Div., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th
Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Woodburn v. LTV Aero-
space Corp., 531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976); Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th
Cir. 1975); Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Powell v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Brohl v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936
(M.D. Fla. 1976); Hughes v. Beaunit Corp., 12 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,092 (E.D.
Tenn. May 19, 1976); Mizuguchi v. Molokai Elec. Co., 411 F. Supp. 590 (D. Hawaii 1976);
Raynor v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burgett v. Cudahy
Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973); Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973);
Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
" Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 12 F.E.P. Cases 1494 (D.N.J. 1976); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F
Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975);
Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
11 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
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tory."1 In Cochran it was argued that because of the humanitarian
and remedial purposes of the Act, liberal construction was pro-
per.4" This argument, which was accepted in Dartt,43 was rejected
by Cochran as being addressed to the wrong instrumentality of
government."
The leading case for the proposition that section 626(d)(1) is
a jurisdictional requirement to maintenance of suit under the
ADEA is Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.45 Powell
distinguished the more liberal judicial interpretations of Title
VII's time limitations because of the different placement, within
the statutes, of the time limitations." Under Title VII, the re-
quirement of filing a charge of discrimination is found in a differ-
ent subsection than the subsection limiting the institution of
legal actions; the ADEA time limitation for the filing of notice,
however, is found in the same subsection which limits the filing
of legal actions." The Powell court argued that this indicated a
congressional intent to make compliance with the notice require-
ment in the ADEA jurisdictional."
Within the Tenth Circuit, both the court of appeals and a
district court had previously interpreted the time limitation of
section 626(d)(1). In Burgett v. Cudahy Co.4" the United States
District Court for Kansas found, as did the Dartt district court,
that the purposes for requiring filing of notice of intent to sue
prior to commencement of a private action were two-fold: First,
" The form of the verb used is often considered in determining whether a statutory
provision is mandatory or directory. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 32, § 57.03. For a discus-
sion on the importance of the distinction between mandatory and directory, see 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 32, § 57.01.
42 376 F. Supp. at 303.
539 F.2d at 1260.
" "The argument that the legislation is remedial and humanitarian and should be
construed so as not to deny relief in this case is addressed to the wrong instrumentality of
the government. Congress, not we, should decide this." 376 F. Supp. at 303.
494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974). The district court in Dartt cited Powell for this
proposition. 10 F.E.P. Cases at 847.
" 494 F.2d at 488.
47 The limitation in Title VII that charges must be filed within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II 1972), while the procedures
for filing a civil action under Title VII are found in section 2000e-5(f)(1). The 180-day
notice requirement in the ADEA is found in the section dealing with procedures for
bringing a private action, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
494 F.2d at 488.
361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
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the Secretary of Labor would be put on notice of possible viola-
tions of the Act, and the claims could be investigated in order to
determine whether agency action should be taken; second, the
alleged discriminator would be put on notice that a complaint
had been filed and could voluntarily rectify any discriminatory
practice. 0 The court in Burgett concluded that to serve these
purposes and effectuate the legislative intent, filing of notice of
intent to sue should be construed as jurisdictional.5
In Law v. United Air Lines, Inc.,5" the Tenth Circuit dealt
with an issue similar to that raised in Burgett. In a per curiam
opinion, the court adopted the trial court's holding that the lodg-
ing of notice of intent to file a civil action was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to plaintiff's cause of action, and declared itself to be
"in accord with Powell."" In Dartt, the court of appeals at-
tempted to harmonize its apparent rejection of Powell with its
holding in Law. 54 The court emphasized that in Law tolling was
not an issue because notice had been filed more than five years
after the alleged discrimination.5
Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,"6 a Fifth Circuit case decided
only a few weeks before Dartt, took a different view of section
626(d)(1). The plaintiff in that case had made an oral complaint
to the Department of Labor and was told to file a letter of intent
to sue; he had a letter prepared but became ill and was hospital-
ized, and the letter was never mailed. 7 The Fifth Circuit found
that it could not waive a limitation period established by Con-
gress and upheld the judgment against plaintiff, holding that this
claim was barred by failure to file timely notice of intent to sue."
Notwithstanding Hays, there has been some movement re-
cently to give a liberal interpretation to the procedural require-
ments of the ADEA when possible. Although the issue often is
whether the time limitations in section 626(d)(1) are subject to
Id. at 621; Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d at 1261.
361 F. Supp. at 621-22.
52 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 171.
'4 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
" 539 F.2d at 1261 n.3. "The Court in Powell simply was not faced with a situation
where the equities dictated a tolling. Neither were we in Law." Id.




equitable modifications, some cases have avoided this question
and have given a tardy plaintiff relief. A case relaxing the stric-
tures of section 626(d)(1) without tolling was Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp." The facts of this case were very similar to those in
Dartt. The plaintiff had failed to file notice of intent to sue within
the 180-day period, but had communicated orally with the De-
partment of Labor regarding her allegedly discriminatory dis-
charge. 0 The court held that although written notice was prefera-
ble, it was not required, and oral notice to the Department of
Labor within 180 days was sufficient notice.' The finding that
oral notice was sufficient has largely been avoided by other
courts,62 as it was by the district court in Dartt.
6 3
Methods other than the one employed in Woodford have also
been used to avoid a strict interpretation of the time requirement
of the ADEA, without actually tolling the requirement. In Moses
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,64 the court determined that the date
from which the 180-day period begins to run is the administrative
termination date, rather than the date on which the complainant
actually stops working. Moses' notice of intent to sue had been
given within 180 days of her administrative termination, but not
within 180 days of the date she actually stopped working.65 By
this construction of the date from which the 180-day period be-
gins to run, Moses did not have to deal with the issue of untimely
filing of notice. In Smith v. Schlitz Brewing Co.,6" a New Jersey
district court was also able to avoid tolling the time limitation by
finding that plaintiff's prompt filing of a complaint letter and
copies of correspondence with the Department of Labor fulfilled
the purposes which section 626(d)(1) was intended to serve, even
though plaintiff never specifically stated an intent to file suit.
Interestingly, this same approach was urged upon the court of
appeals in Dartt by the Department of Labor in its amicus curiae
369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
' Id. at 913-14.
6, Id. at 915. The issues of timeliness and tolling were not raised; instead, the court
only considered what constituted notice.
" See text accompanying note 66 infra.
"[ Woodford] disregards the clear mandate of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) . 10 F.E.P.
Cases at 847.
525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 94-95.
" 12 F.E.P. Cases 1494 (D.N.J. 1976).
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brief; however, the Dartt court did not select this route but in-
stead tolled the time limitation. 7
Cases prior to Dartt in which the time limitation of section
626(d)(1) was subject to equitable modification found some
wrong by the employer which made the employee unable to assert
his or her rights within the proper time. For example, the equita-
ble remedy of tolling in Bishop v. Jelleff Associates" was based
on the failure of the complainants' employer to post the required
ADEA notices. In reaching its decision, the court also considered
the relative "newness" of the Act, the plaintiffs' general lack of
sophistication, and their representation to the Department of
Labor that large numbers of elderly employees were being dis-
charged by the defendant employer.69 Similarly, Skoglund v.
Singer Co.70 found that section 626(d)(1) could be subject to equi-
table modifications. In holding that plaintiff's claim (that
defendant-employer had failed to post the required notices), if
proved, would be sufficient to toll the 180-day notice require-
ment, the court said: "Defendant should not benefit to plaintiff's
detriment by its failure to fulfill the responsibilities laid upon it
by Congress. It is basic to our system of justice that one should
not benefit from a wrong done to another."'"
A situation where a defendant was not allowed to benefit
from its own wrong was found in McGinley v. Burroughs Corp.7"
There, under facts similar to those in Reeb,73 the time limitations
11 The Secretary of Labor, as amicus curiae, argued that a result similar to Smith
should have been reached: "The lower court erred in dismissing this case for lack of a
timely notice of intent to sue, since the basic purposes contemplated by such notice were
fully satisfied by plaintiffs complaint to the Labor Department as a result of which
defendant was promptly notified of the asserted ADEA violation and given an opportunity
to settle it." Amicus Curiae brief by the Secretary of Labor at 15, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co.,
539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976). This argument was rejected. 539 F.2d at 1259.
398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974). Bishop has been distinguished by courts not
wishing to allow an employer's failure to post the required notices to excuse a tardy
plaintiff. See Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Hiscott v. General
Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Brohl v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Fla.
1976).
' 398 F. Supp. at 593.
7o 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975).
7' Id. at 804. At the hearing before the federal district court to determine if the
employer had failed to post the required notices as the plaintiff claimed, the notices were
found to have been properly posted and plaintiff's claim was barred, as there were no
circumstances to justify tolling. 13 F.E.P. Cases 253 (D.N.H. 1975).
72 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
71 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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of the ADEA were tolled where the plaintiff's failure to file within
the allotted time period was the result of the defendant's willfully
concealing the circumstances from which the plaintiff could have
ascertained the discrimination.74
The contrast between cases which had previously tolled the
time limitations and Dartt may be readily seen. In Dartt, the
court's decision to toll was based on factors other than the em-
ployer's wrong, because there was no wrong on the part of Shell
which prevented Dartt from asserting her claim within the proper
time. The court based its decision on the Department of Labor's
failure to advise Mrs. Dartt of the 180-day requirement.75 Mr.
Speer's usual custom was to advise complainants of this require-
ment, although there was no such statutory requirement.76 Fur-
ther, Shell's delay in providing information to assist the Wage
and Hour Division in its investigation was viewed by the court as
indirectly contributing to the Division's failure to notify Mrs.
Dartt of the time limitations before they expired.77 This finding
was made in spite of an affidavit indicating that Shell's delay was
due solely to the volume of the data requested.7" Finally, even
though Shell had posted the informational notices given it by the
Wage and Hour Division, the court found these official notices
"completely inadequate to inform Dartt as to the 180-day notice
requirement."79
CONCLUSION
The equitable conclusion reached in Dartt that the time limi-
tations of the ADEA may be tolled is not without precedent.'" But
the application of these equitable principles to the facts of Dartt
could, for all practical purposes, eliminate the 180-day require-
ment for notice of intent to sue. In previous cases, tolling occurred
407 F. Supp. at 909-10.
539 F.2d at 1262.
79 Id.
77 Id.
1, "The studies which Mr. Speer had requested were quite voluminous, and Mr. Speer
was aware that it would take several months to complete the compilation of the requested
data." Affidavit of Shell's manager of employee relations, attached to Shell's Response
to the Brief of the Amicus Curiae, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d at 1262.
McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Skoglund v. Singer




because of the inequitable conduct of the defendant, thereby giv-
ing effect to the maxim that one should not benefit from a wrong
done to another. The court in Dartt strained to find some wrong-
ful act on the part of Shell which could justify the application of
equity to this case, but the best it could do was to conclude that
Shell's failure to provide the Wage and Hour Division with re-
quested data contributed, in an indirect manner, to the Division's
failure to notify Mrs. Dartt of her right to sue prior to the running
of the 180-day period.8' Another "wrong" which the court cited
was the inadequacy of Shell's posted notices. However, these are
not "wrongs" which can fairly be said to be the fault of Shell, or
which should justify the equitable modification here fashioned.
There were, undoubtedly, circumstances which contributed to
Mrs. Dartt's tardy filing of notice of intent to sue. In her initial
contact with an attorney regarding her complaint, she received no
advice on how to maintain suit under the ADEA, but was merely
told to contact the Department of Labor. Had Mrs. Dartt re-
ceived more thorough legal advice at this point, the problem with
section 626(d)(1) might never have arisen. It may also have been
that the notices posted by Shell were inadequate to inform her of
her rights and duties under the ADEA. But again, this was no
fault of Shell's. The printed notice was furnished Shell by the
Department of Labor, and a reading of section 627 of the ADEA
which requires the posting of such notices can only lead to the
conclusion that the Department of Labor deemed these notices
"appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]."
It seems that the court determined that Mrs. Dartt's efforts
to present her cause, though thwarted by a series of circumstan-
ces (none of which was her employer's fault), were nonetheless
diligent and therefore deserving of the court's power to fashion
equitable modifications. This decision is in clear contravention of
the statute, and while admittedly the requirements of the statute
may be tolled, the factors necessary to support the maxims of
equity are not present in the facts of Dartt.5 3
1 See text accompanying note 71 supra for a discussion of one court's determination
of the effect of wrong-doing by the employer.
11 "Every employer, employment agency and labor organization shall post and keep
posted in conspicuous places upon its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by
the Secretary setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970).
0 1 PomERoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 363 (3d ed. 1905).
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Mrs. Dartt was allowed by the court to sue Shell although she
failed to meet the statutory requirements to maintain suit, and
even though the cause of her failure did not lie with Shell. It
seems less than a truly equitable remedy to penalize the employer
in such a situation. Perhaps such circumstances could be avoided
in the future by requiring the Department of Labor to notify
complainants of the 180-day requirement, or requiring the De-
partment of Labor to prepare ADEA notices for employers to post
which set out more specifically the rights and duties under the
ADEA.
As suggested in the opinion of the court which first had occa-
sion to interpret this section of the ADEA, decisions which serve
to change or modify statutory requirements are more properly a
legislative function left to Congress."4 However, in light of the
conflict between the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit," a final
decision by the United States Supreme Court might make clear
the question of whether section 626(d) is jurisdictional and if not,
under what circumstances equitable modifications might apply.
Cathleen Osborn Brandt
' Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971). See note
44 supra.
In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976), the court stated
that it could not waive a limitation period established by Congress, while Dartt found that
it could waive such limitation.
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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit decided relatively few significant cases in
the area of lands and natural resources during the past term. This
overview will examine cases decided involving the substantive
areas of public lands, condemnation, water and water quality,
interstate land sales, and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969.'
I. PUBLIC LANDS
One decision involving the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior to revoke grazing licenses issued under the Taylor Graz-
ing Act,2 Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton,3 is commented on
separately.' The other two cases of note dealing with public lands
involved a trust established pursuant to a federal land grant to
New Mexico and the administration of the federal coal prospect-
ing and leasing program on the public lands.
A. Trust Lands
In United States v. New Mexico5 the state appealed a sum-
mary judgment order entered by the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico in favor of the United States,
twenty-eight individual miners, and the United Mine Workers of
America, plaintiff-intervenors. The United States sought to en-
force the terms of a grant of 100,000 acres of federal lands to the
state in trust for the maintenance of "a miners' hospital."' The
42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-4347 (1970).
2 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970).
531 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1976).
The case comment on Diamond Ring Ranch follows this overview.
536 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1325. Fifty thousand acres were granted to the Territory of New Mexico by
the Ferguson Act for a "miners' hospital." Act of June 21, 1898, ch. 489, 30 Stat. 484. An
additional 50,000 acres were granted by the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act for
"miners' hospitals for disabled miners." Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557. That
Act imposed a trust upon the lands for the purposes designated and provided that:
Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value
directly or indirectly derived therefrom, for any object other than that for
which such particular lands, or the lands from which such money or thing
of value shall have been derived, were granted or confirmed, or in any man-
ner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust.
Id. § 10.
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state, in its constitution, had accepted the conditions imposed on
the land grant trusts7 and, in accepting the lands, stated that
they would be "exclusively used for the purpose" for which they
were granted.8 Pursuant to the grant, the state had established
and maintained the Miners' Hospital of New Mexico at Raton as
a general purpose hospital with a separate board of trustees and
separate trust account.' In 1968 the state reorganized the admin-
istration of its health care facilities. This led to a closing of the
special revenue trust account for the Miners' Hospital, a commin-
gling of revenues with the income received from other state facili-
ties, and a downgrading of the hospital from a general purpose to
an "intermediate care" facility, requiring that Miners' patients
in need of surgical or other special treatments be served by other
state facilities with payment for such outside care being charged
to the income from the Miners' trust funds.'0
The United States sought and obtained a determination that
the state had breached the trust provisions governing the land
grants. The district court ordered the state to upgrade the Min-
ers' Hospital and maintain it as a general purpose facility, to
cease the commingling of trust funds and spend them only for
Miners', and to restore certain funds spent for outside care to the
trust." The court refused to apply the cy pres rationale proposed
by the state'" and disallowed a setoff for administrative costs
claimed by the state for the operation of Miners'. Except for the
disallowance of a setoff, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court decision.' 3
N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 9.
Id. art. XIV, § 2.
536 F.2d at 1326.
,0 Id. Under the state hospital certification and licensing framework, a general pur-
pose hospital provides a full range of medical services, including surgical and maternity
care, while an "intermediate care facility" provides only basic health care to in-patients
without full-time physician supervision, but does not provide surgical or other special
treatment services. See also 45 C.F.R. § 234.130(d)(3) (1976).
536 F.2d at 1326.
,2 Id. The cy pres doctrine is an equity function that will, "when a charity is originally
or later becomes impossible, inexpedient, or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute an-
other charitable object which is believed to approach the original purpose as closely as
possible." G.G. BoGmrr & G.T. BoGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 431 (2d ed.
1964). It does not appear that a cy pres approach has ever been used in the past in dealing
with trusts created by federal land grants to the states, and it appears from the facts here
that its rejection was appropriate in this case. Maintenance of the Miners' Hospital had
not become clearly impossible, inexpedient, or impracticable.
11 The state had argued that it should be allowed to offset against the funds to be
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The affirmation was based essentially upon the proposition
that the trust provisions of the Enabling Act should be strictly
and literally construed. The Tenth Circuit relied upon three prior
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Act, Lassen
v. Arizona Highway Department," Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v.
Arizona,'5 and Ervien v. United States." While each to some ex-
tent indicated that the trust provisions of the Act should be
strictly construed, none would have necessarily called for the
holding here. Lassen and Alamo both involved interpretations of
the Act's provisions for and restrictions on state disposition of the
trust lands. Lassen indicated that the reason for a literal ap-
proach to the language of the Act was to insure "that the grants
provide the most substantial support possible to the beneficiaries
and that only those beneficiaries profit from the trust.""
Only Ervien directly dealt with proper utilization by the
state of the proceeds derived from trust lands. That case declared
that a New Mexico statute authorizing the use of three percent
of the income from trust land funds for advertisement to attract
settlers to the state was invalid as a breach of trust. The Court
stated: "There is in the Enabling Act a specific enumeration of
the purposes for which the lands were granted and the enumera-
tion is necessarily exclusive of any other purpose.""
On the basis of these strict interpretation approaches that
arose in what are arguably somewhat dissimilar situations, the
Tenth Circuit rejected New Mexico's argument that its use of the
funds was valid and was in furtherance of the general intent
behind the grant: attending to the health needs of disabled min-
ers. The court, looking at the express words of the Act, held that
returned to the Miners' revenue trusts the portion of the administrative costs incurred by
the state in operating Miners' during the period of centralized administration. Because it
concluded that the breach of trust involved was not motivated by bad faith and was of a
"technical nature," the Tenth Circuit ordered a modification of the district court judg-
ment insofar as it disallowed the setoff. 536 F.2d at 1329-30.
1 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
Is 424 U.S. 295 (1976).
251 U.S. 41 (1919).
'; 385 U.S. at 467. In support of its decision in United States v. New Mexico, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized language in Lassen to the effect that "Itihe Enabling Act
unequivocally demands both that the trust receive the full value of any lands transferred
from it and that any funds received be employed only for the purposes for which the land
was given." 536 F.2d at 1327 (quoting 385 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added by Tenth Circuit)).
" 251 U.S. at 47.
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the purpose of the trust was the establishment and maintenance
of a "miners' hospital" and that providing for the health needs
of miners in other facilities was not within the express purposes
of the trust so as to allow the trust fund to be charged for the cost
of such treatment. 19
This very narrow reading of the "purpose" of this trust land
grant may raise some serious questions for state officials seeking
some flexibility in the administration of various land grant
trusts.2" Does this mean, for example, that income funds derived
from lands granted in trust to be used for "schools and asylums
for the deaf, dumb, and the blind"'" could not be expended in a
community-based treatment and rehabilitation program?
The decision here also calls into question the continuing va-
lidity of cases dealing with grants to New Mexico of about 500,000
acres for "the establishment of permanent water reservoirs for
irrigating purposes. ' 22 The New Mexico Supreme Court has up-
held the validity of statutes making appropriations from the trust
funds arising from these lands for purposes which go beyond the
"establishment of permanent water reservoirs." It has been that
court's view that, "so long as the legislative and administrative
policy is within the fundamental purpose and the reasonable
meaning of the limitation," 23 the trust funds could be used for
such things as construction and maintenance of ditches and can-
als not connected with a permanent reservoir, construction of
flood control projects with incidental irrigation benefits, and joint
contractual arrangements with Arizona and the United States for
surveys of available ground water resources. 2 This broad inter-
" 536 F.2d at 1327.
" The extent and administration of federal grants of land in trust to the states are
discussed in U.S. PUBUc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION STAFF, LAND GRANTS TO STATES
(1970).
1' Grants of between 30,000 to 200,000 acres have been made to the states of Arizona,
Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming for such a specifically enumerated purpose.
Id. at 27-33.
2 This grant was contained in the Ferguson Act, ch. 489, § 6, 30 Stat. 484 (1898) and
was imposed with the same trust provisions applicable to the Miners' Hospital by the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 10, 36 Stat. 557 (1910). See note 6 supra.
'" State v. Ulibarri, 34 N.M. 184, 279 P. 509 (1929).
2, Id. See State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm'n v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d
622 (1963), for an example of the tensions many states have experienced in dealing with
a strict construction approach to trust lands. Compare Bryant v. Board of Examiners, 130
Mont. 512, 305 P.2d 340 (1956), in which a sharply divided court held that expenditure of
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pretation of the purpose of a grant seems now to have been specif-
ically rejected by the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit decision is also significant for the degree
to which it scrutinized the adequacy of the facility in question.
New Mexico asserted that it should be allowed to continue oper-
ating the Miners' Hospital as a limited care facility so long as the
needs of miners were being met. The district court ordered the
state to upgrade the facility so as to be eligible for licensing and
certification as a full service, general purpose hospital. 5 The
Tenth Circuit, after an examination of the semantics involved in
the congressional use of the word "hospital," concluded that Con-
gress intended the hospital established pursuant to the grant to
be a full service facility that provided surgical care, and so af-
firmed the lower court order."6
This is the only reported case in which it appears that a
federal court has interjected itself so far into the actual manage-
ment or operation of a state facility established pursuant to the
provisions of a federal land grant. The authority for the judicial
supervision exercised by the Tenth Circuit apparently was prem-
ised on the fact that "as trustee, New Mexico has the primary
responsibility for administering Miners' Hospital, but the United
States also 'has a continuing interest in the administration' of the
trusts created by the Enabling Act."2 The court here extended a
continuing interest in the administration of the trusts themselves
to a continuing interest in the quality and operation of the facili-
ties established pursuant to the trusts. Whether the United
States might now be able to secure federal judicial examination
trust funds for needed remodeling of the state capitol was not a permitted purpose under
Montana's Enabling Act grant of lands for the "erection" of a capitol building, with State
ex rel. Morgan v. State Bd. of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 309 P.2d 336 (1957), in which a
sharply divided court overruled Bryant after a short life of only several months.
' 536 F.2d at 1327.
" Id. at 1327-29. This conclusion was buttressed by a reference to the fact that the
hospital established after the initial grant of 50,000 acres in 1898 (see note 6 supra)
provided surgical care, thus evidencing New Mexico's original interpretation of the grant.
"By granting an additional 50,000 acres for the same trust purpose [in the New Mexico-
Arizona Enabling Act] Congress impliedly consented to New Mexico's interpretation of
the Ferguson Act." Id. at 1329. It is arguable whether Congress' implied consent to New
Mexico's original interpretation is equivalent to an expression of Congress' intent suffi-
cient to bind New Mexico's present action.
27 536 F.2d at 1328 (quoting Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295
(1976)).
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of the quality and operation of common schools, universities, and
penitentiaries established throughout the country under similar
land grant provisions is now open to question. It has been argued
that New Mexico's administration of its grazing program on trust
lands constitutes a breach of trust because of the low fees received
and the severe over-grazing that is allowed. 8 This Tenth Circuit
decision would seem to provide the doctrinal basis for close judi-
cial investigation of such an argument.
B. Coal Leasing
Hunter v. Morton 9 was an appeal from a summary judgment
in favor of the defendant, Secretary of the Interior, entered by the
United States District Court for the District of Utah. The appel-
lants had filed three applications for coal prospecting permits
with the Bureau of Land Management Land Office in Salt Lake
City. In 1968 the Land Office Manager rejected one of the appli-
cations entirely and a portion of the acreage in the other two
applications. The appellants were informed that they had thirty
days in which to post the bond required for issuance of permits
upon the non-rejected acreage and in which to appeal the rejec-
tions. While appealing the rejection decision, 30 the applicants de-
layed in obtaining permits upon the non-rejected acreage, appar-
ently intending to take this step after appeals were completed.
Before administrative review was exhausted, the Secretary of the
Interior issued an order suspending the coal prospecting permit
system until further notice and calling for rejection of all pending
permit applications .
3
On the basis of this order, appellants' appeals were dismissed
and their applications were rejected. The Department also re-
fused to issue permits for the acreage initially approved. 32 The
appellants then sought to compel issuance of permits on the ini-
tially approved acreage through a mandamus proceeding. In this
2 Comment, Administration of Grazing Leases of State Lands in New Mexico: A
Breach of Trust, 15 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 581 (1975).
- 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976).
Appeal from the decision of the Land Office Manager was taken to the Director of
the Bureau of Land Management. The Director's approval was then appealed to the Board
of Land Appeals. The appeals procedure is now somewhat modified and is controlled by
43 C.F.R. §§ 4.400-4.415 (1976).
31 Int. Dep't Order No. 2952, 38 Fed. Reg. 4682 (1973).
32 529 F.2d at 647-48.
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appeal from the district court summary judgment, the appellants
pressed four arguments: First, that they had a vested interest in
the permits by reason of the initial Land Office approval of some
of the applied for acreage, and that that interest could not be
defeated by the subsequent order of the Secretary; second, that
the order had become part of the administrative proceedings on
the applications, thus bringing into play all the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act;3 third, that the doctrine of estop-
pel should prevent rejection of their applications with respect to
the initially approved acreage; 34 and fourth, that the Secretary's
order was invalid because of a failure to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.15 All four arguments were re-
jected.
" Appellants apparently contended that the effect of the order in terminating their
administrative appeal and rejecting their applications should make the order reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970), notwithstanding its
otherwise exempt status as a general statement of policy concerning federal property. Id.
§ 553. This argument was summarily rejected by the court. 529 F.2d at 649.
", 529 F.2d at 649. The court, while noting that it did not contend that the estoppel
doctrine "can never be applied as to public lands," held that there was no factual basis
for invocation of the doctrine in this case. Id. For an example of the operation of estoppel
arguments in the public lands context, compare United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406
(9th Cir. 1975) (estoppel against Bureau of Land Management) with Union Oil Co. v.
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit has rejected an assertion of
estoppel against actions of the Secretary of Interior in the past. United States v. Ohio Oil
Co., 163 F.2d 633 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 833 (1947).
11 The argument that the Secretary's order was invalid for failure to file an environ-
mental impact statement pursuant to section 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), has
been considered several times. Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Duvels,
Inc. v. Frizzel, No. C-75-175 (D. Utah, June 6, 1976); Albrechtson v. Morton, No. C-392-
73 (D. Utah, Mar. 30, 1976); Goodwin v. Andrus, No. C-5105 (D. Colo., Nov. 25, 1975);
American Nuclear Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb. 26, 1975). The Secretary's
order recited that:
I have determined that the issuance of this order is not such a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment as to
require the preparation of an environmental impact statement under Section
102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(c)).
Order No. 2952, 38 Fed. Reg. 4682, 4683 (1973).
The argument has been successful in both Albrechtson v. Morton, No. C-392-73 (D.
Utah, Mar. 30, 1976), and American Nuclear Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb.
26, 1975). The ruling in American Nuclear was left standing upon appeal. American
Nuclear Corp. v. Kleppe, No. 75-1708 (10th Cir., Feb. 3, 1977) (Not for Routine Publica-
tion). District Judge Ritter, who decided Albrechtson, reached a contrary conclusion
several months later in Duvels, Inc. v. Frizzel, No. C-75-175 (D. Utah, June 6, 1976). The
noncompliance argument was analyzed and rejected in Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235
(D.C. Cir. 1976), in which the court unaccountably cited both Albrechtson and American
1977
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In rejecting appellants' contention that they had acquired a
vested right to the acreage applied for, the Tenth Circuit relied
on the well established rule that no protectable property interest
is created by a mere application or offer for a lease upon public
lands." Extension of this principle to an application for a pros-
pecting permit as opposed to a lease seems consistent with the
underlying rationale for the principle. The issuance of a prospect-
ing permit, like the decision to lease, is discretionary with the
Department,37 and no rights should vest until that discretion has
been fully exercised.
No direct consideration was given to the issue of whether the
approval of some of the acreage in the appellants' applications
might have created some vested right beyond the mere hope of
vesting created by an application. Although the appellants
argued that this approval gave them a better status than that of
a mere applicant, there does not appear to be any authority to
support such a contention. However, the rationale for not recog-
nizing vested rights breaks down after approval has been given.
After approval of some of the applied for acreage, no further
discretion could have been exercised by any officer of the Interior
Department. All that remained was for the applicant to post the
required bond and file forms within thirty days. 8 The Tenth Cir-
cuit appears to have held that the appellants' failure to act with
regard to the approved acreage within the allowed thirty days, in
effect, terminated the initial approval and relegated appellants
to a "mere applicant" status. 9 A more difficult case might have
arisen had the Secretary's order been issued during that thirty-
day response period.
II. CONDEMNATION
United States v. 20.53 Acres of Land" involved the taking by
the United States of several parcels of land near Downs, Kansas,
Nuclear in support of its decision. The argument appears to have been rejected here
because it was not properly developed at trial. 529 F.2d at 649.
11 McTiernan v. Franklin, 508 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1975); Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d
200 (10th Cir. 1971); Schraier v. Hickel, 419 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Duesing v. Udall,
350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1966). Cf. American Nuclear
Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb. 26, 1975).
30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
529 F.2d at 647.
"Id. at 648.
0 527 F.2d 1000 (10th Cir. 1976).
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for development of the Glen Elder Dam and Reservoir. Some of
the land adjoined Downs' sewage treatment plant and the taking
necessitated a relocation of the effluent outfall pipe. An original
award of $220,000 to the city was reversed on an earlier appeal
because of an erroneous finding that the whole facility was being
taken.'
Upon rehearing, the city was awarded $28,997 for potential
future operating costs of a chlorination plant the United States
built in connection with the reservoir project.4" The plant was
required because of Kansas health regulations pertaining to dis-
charges into recreational waters. Compensation was awarded on
the basis that the city might at some future time have to take over
operation of the chlorination facility. Rather than reverse merely
on the speculative nature of the award, the Tenth Circuit adopted
an approach used by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals4 3 and held
that, since the need for the chlorination plant arose because of
state regulations rather than federal requirements, there was no
compensable claim for the added treatment costs."
In opinions in two consolidated cases involving condemna-
tion of a pipeline easement from the Texas Panhandle to Red
Oak, Oklahoma,45 the Tenth Circuit found that the findings of the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma complied
with the requirements of United States v. Merz4" as to what must
be disclosed about the valuation procedure used to determine
compensation. After a detailed review of the record, the court
concluded that the compensation awards were supported by sub-
stantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. In both opinions
the court concluded that under Oklahoma iaw the proper mea-
" United States v. 20.53 Acres of Land, More or Less, 478 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973).
42 527 F.2d at 1001.
" City of Eufaula v. United States, 313 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1963). See also United
States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, More or Less, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1025 (1966); City of Milford, 190 Ct. Cl. 941 (1970).
" 527 F.2d at 1001.
Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. A Right of Way 80 Feet in Width, Nos. 74-1534, -1535,
-1536, and -1537 (10th Cir., Oct. 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Arkansas La.
Gas Co. v. A Right of Way 80 Feet in Width, Nos. 75-1157 and -1158 (10th Cir., Feb. 20,
1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" 376 U.S. 192 (1964). The Merz requirements are that a commission in an eminent
domain proceeding must specify the basis for its value findings and must indicate the
general route it followed in determining such value. Id. at 198-99.
1977
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sure of damages when a portion of a tract is taken is the difference
between the market value of the entire tract before taking and the
market value of the tract remaining.47 To arrive at this measure,
expert testimony as to specific types of damage to the remaining
portions was considered. This was held to be proper under Okla-
homa law as evidence of depreciation in market value48 and the
awards were affirmed.
III. WATER AND WATER QUALITY
A significant Indian water rights decision, New Mexico v.
Aamodt," is commented upon separately in this issue.50 Also of
significance are two decisions of the Tenth Circuit dealing with
regulations on effluents from petroleum refining point sources5
promulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 5 pursuant to authorization in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.13 Both opinions arose
in suits brought by the American Petroleum Institute and ten
private companies involved in petroleum refining and related ac-
tivities. One resolved the purely procedural issue of proper forum,
while the other reached the validity of the regulations themselves.
A. The Proper Forum
At issue in American Petroleum Institute v. Train54 was
whether jurisdiction to review the challenged regulations5 pro-
perly lay with the district court or the court of appeals. Suit had
been brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado and had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 6
"' McInturff v. Oklahoma Nat. Gas Transmission Co., 475 P.2d 160 (Okla. 1970);
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Emerson, 377 P.2d 565 (Okla. 1962).
11 See State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Bowles, 472 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970) (evidence
of gross sales before and after change in access road); State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v.
Robb, 454 P.2d 313 (Okla. 1969).
4' 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1157 (1977).
A case comment on Aamodt follows this overview.
40 C.F.R. §§ 419.10-.56 (1976).
52 Administrative notice of Apr. 30, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 16560 (1974), as corrected by
Notice of Sept. 4, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 32614 (1974), as amended by Notice of May 9, 1975,
40 Fed. Reg. 21939 (1975).
13 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
" 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 See note 51 supra.
*4 526 F.2d at 1344.
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The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 provide that review of actions of the Administrator under
authority of section 30151 is to be in the court of appeals." Review
of actions taken under authority of section 30411 is not specifically
provided for in the Act and, therefore, would be in the district
court. Since both sections were relied upon by the Administrator
in promulgation of the regulations,60 proper jurisdiction was at
issue. Appellants argued that section 301 was improperly relied
upon by the Administrator and that thus review in the court of
appeals was improper.6 '
The Tenth Circuit, following the approach to this issue that
had been taken in the Second,6" Third, 3 Fourth, 4 and Seventh"
Circuits and has been subsequently followed in the District of
Columbia Circuit 6 with respect to similar promulgations for var-
ious industries, refused to consider the issue of the Administra-
tor's statutory authority in connection with the jurisdictional
issue. Whether or not statutory authority under section 301 ex-
isted, that section was claimed as a basis in part for the regula-
tions. That being the case, review by the court of appeals was the
only proper procedure. 8 The Supreme Court has confirmed this
reasoning in its recent affirmance of the Fourth Circuit du Pont
case.6
9
5' 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 1369(b)(1)(E).
5, Id. § 1314.
40 C.F.R. § 401.10 (1976).
' 526 F.2d at 1345.
62 Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) (phosphates).
e American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975) (iron and steel
manufacturing).
64 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train (du Pont I), 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977) (inorganic chemicals).
63 American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1975) (meat products).
66 American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (potato process-
ing industry).
6, 526 F.2d at 1345, 1346. A contrary result was obtained in the Eighth Circuit where,
in an opinion rejected by the Tenth Circuit, it was held that, since the Administrator had
no authority to issue the challenged regulations under section 301, the court of appeals
had no jurisdiction to review. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975) (corn
wet milling).
526 F.2d at 1345-46.
6 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977), afl'g 528 F.2d 1136
(4th Cir. 1975), 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).
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B. The Merits
The same plaintiffs who asserted the jurisdictional issue in
American Petroleum Institute v. Train0 concurrently filed a peti-
tion for direct review of EPA action with the court of appeals.
Thus, in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,7 the Tenth Cir-
cuit reached and decided the merits of the Administrator's ef-
fluent regulations for petroleum refining point sources. 72 Space
limitations do not permit an exhaustive examination of the issues
involved. The essential issue, however, was whether the EPA has
statutory authority to impose effluent limitations on existing
sources by regulation or whether EPA may merely promulgate
guidelines for existing sources, leaving the imposition of regula-
tions to state permit authorities. Resolution of this issue involved
an interpretation of the scope and interrelationship of EPA au-
thority under sections 3017 and 304 7 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972. 71 Both sections were cited
by the Administrator as authority for the regulations, and the
regulations impose "effluent limitations guidelines. '76 The issue
arose because section 304 seems to authorize the EPA only to
publish "regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations
... .,7Appellants argued that "guidelines" could not impose
binding requirements but rather should only serve as guidance for
state permit authorities. EPA, on the other hand, relied on sec-
tion 301, which calls for the definition of control technologies by
the Administrator and for the establishment of effluent limita-
tions."
70 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.
71 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976).
72 See notes 51-52 supra.
13 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975).
74 Id. § 1314.
7 Id. §§ 1251-1376.
76 40 C.F.R. § 401.10 (1976). This is the statement of scope and purpose for all of
EPA's Subchapter N, Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-460 (1976),
which currently set water pollution control standards for some forty various industry
groups and subgroups including the petroleum refining group considered here. The joint
promulgation of "guidelines" and "regulations" arose in part from the timetable imposed
upon EPA by the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d
692 (D.C. Cir. 1975), after the Administrator failed to meet the one-year requirement for
publication of guidelines imposed by section 304(b) of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp.
V 1975).
- 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. V 1975).
11 Id. § 1311(b), (e).
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The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Senior Judge Breiten-
stein, held that, while section 301 did not clearly place the re-
sponsibility for establishment of effluent limitations at either the
federal or state level and did not refer to "regulations" as such,
since the control technologies are to be established by the Admin-
istrator, it is reasonable that he establish the limitations gener-
ally applicable to any category." It was also noted 0 that the au-
thority of the Administrator to impose section 301 limitations by
regulations could be derived from section 501(a) which authorizes
him "to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out
his functions under this chapter."'8 This reasoning parallels that
employed by several other circuits in upholding the validity of
effluent limitation regulations pertaining to other industry
groups. 2 The opinion is particularly similar to Judge Breiten-
stein's (sitting by designation on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals) in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,8 which
considered the validity of EPA effluent regulations for inorganic
chemicals manufacturing. 4 Both the Fourth Circuit case and the
Tenth Circuit case held that the EPA regulations are presump-
tively binding nationwide and the burden of convincing a state
permit issuer that the general limitations should not apply to a
particular situation is on the permit applicant. 5 A recent decision
of the Supreme Court on the issue of EPA authority has estab-
lished the validity of the Tenth Circuit's decision here.8
The Tenth Circuit also, in accord with du Pont,87 rejected an
attack on the validity of the regulations insofar as they imposed
limitations in the form of single numbers rather than a range of
" 540 F.2d at 1030.
Id. at 1032.
33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. V 1975).
12 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); American Frozen Food
Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train,
537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
1975); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). Contra, CPC Int'l Inc.
v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977).
40 C.F.R. §§ 415.10-.632 (1976).
ft 541 F.2d 1018, 1028; 540 F.2d at 1030.
11 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977), aff'g 528 F.2d 1136
(4th Cir. 1975), 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).
" 541 F.2d at 1029. Accord, Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620,
630 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044-45
(3d Cir. 1975).
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numbers. This was held to be a valid exercise of general rulemak-
ing in accord with congressional use of the words "best" technol-
ogy. s8 It was also indicated that the use of single numbers would
be tempered by the variance provisions allowed by the Act, 9
which provisions were also upheld by the court. 0 The court fur-
ther upheld the validity of all of the 1977 step limitations except
for those relating to storm runoff,9" but invalidated all of the 1983
step limitations because the record revealed no sound basis for
them.92 The analysis of the validity of the various regulations is
essentially the same as that employed in du Pont. The Supreme
Court's decision in that case has provided some resolution of the
imprecise language of the Act and guidance for the Administrator
and for the circuits in their tasks of implementation and review
of standards established under the Act.
IV. INTERSTATE LAND SALES
In McCown v. Heidler93 the Tenth Circuit held that officers
and directors of a corporate developer could be individually liable
for violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.9
Plaintiffs brought private actions alleging claims under the civil
liabilities section of the Act 95 against the officers and directors of
the apparently defunct corporations which had developed and
sold to the plaintiffs lots in a resort subdivision in Oklahoma. The
defendants, alleging that the Act did not extend liability to
"controlling persons" of a development corporation, sought and
were granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs in the
district court. The Tenth Circuit, while recognizing the possibil-
U 540 F.2d at 1030-31. Section 301(b) of the Act calls for application of the "best
practicable control technology currently available" (BPT) by July 1, 1977 (the 1977 step)
and for application of the "best available technology economically achievable" (BAT) by
July 1, 1983 (the 1983 step). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. II 1972).
1g 540 F.2d at 1031. The variance provisions are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12, .22,
.32, .42, .52 (1976).
" 540 F.2d at 1032-33. The propriety of variance procedures is examined at some
length in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976).
540 F.2d at 1033-38.
o2 Id. at 1038.
" 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970).
"1 Id. § 1709. This section provides a private right of action for untrue statements of
a material fact or omissions of a material fact in connection with subdivision sales against
a developer or his agent.
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ity of a strict reading of the definition of "developer," 96 held nev-
ertheless that the remedial, consumer-oriented purposes of the
Act justified extending liability to the officers and directors. 7 The
court noted that liability could be alternatively premised on the
guilt of the officers and directors in aiding and abetting the con-
duct of the miscreant corporations. The court found the situation
analogous to the civil liability of an aider or abettor in the securi-
ties fraud context.9 8
This is the first reported instance in which the Act has been
clearly held to cover officers and directors. The court cites several
cases in general support of its holding, but while all involved suits
which included officers or directors as defendants, each involved
only preliminary matters and not the direct issue here. It has
been held that liability under the Act does not extend to a succes-
sor corporation to the actual developer. 0 The decision is well
supported on policy grounds, especially in view of the Act's paral-
96 Id. § 1701(4) provides that " 'developer' means any person who, directly or indi-
rectly, sells or leases, or offers to sell or lease, or advertises for sale or lease any lots in a
subdivision." It would seem that the definition of agent to include "any person who
represents, or acts for or on behalf of, a developer in selling," id. § 1701(5), could be
construed to include the officers and directors of a corporate developer.
'7 In the words of the court:
The "developer" of a land sale plan is usually a corporate entity which, in a
fraudulent scheme as here alleged, ends up defunct and offers no reserve for
recovery to those persons defrauded; so, too, the end selling agent, when the
development collapses financially, is often long gone or cannot respond pecu-
niarily .... The basic protection of the Act, to be meaningful, must be
leveled against the fraudulent planners and profit makers for otherwise the
Act would be pragmatically barren. No legislative enactment should be ren-
dered ineffective to attain its purpose if such a construction can be avoided.
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 [1943] ....
527 F.2d at 207. For a discussion of the rationale supporting a liberal interpretation of the
Act see Note, S. 275-The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RuT. L. REv. 714
(1967).
' 527 F.2d at 207. See Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirmed denial
of certification as class action); Siebert v. Great Northern Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510 (5th Cir.
1974) (affirmed denial of preliminary injunction and certification as class action); Adol-
phus v. Zebelman, 486 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973) (action by minority stockholders to enjoin
sales); United States v. Del Rio Springs, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 226 (D. Ariz. 1975) (prelimi-
nary motion); United States v. Pocono Int'l Corp., 378 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(preliminary motion).
" Zachery v. Treasure Lake, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Cf. Bettis v.
Lakeland, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (recognizing potential for liability of
successor corporation).
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lels with the Securities Act of 1933101 which have been specifically
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 02 It is troubling
that the original version of the Act contained a "controlling per-
sons" provision 0 3 which for some reason was not carried forward
into the final legislation. There is no express exclusion of officers
and directors, and, if it is concluded that Congress intended to
leave determination of the precise scope of "developer" to judicial
determination, the Tenth Circuit's position certainly adds to the
effectiveness of the Act.
V. APPLICABILITY OF NEPA
Several cases decided this term considered the necessity of
filing an environmental impact statement (EIS), pursuant to
section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969.104 In Sanborn v. Brinegar'5 the Tenth Circuit upheld an
administrative determination that an EIS was not required. The
Kansas Highway Commission had prepared an extensive Nega-
tive Declaration for three highway projects in Wichita, Kansas,
involving $2,000,000 in alterations on 1.94 miles of roadway. The
report of the state commission examined potential impacts and
concluded that there would be no significant environmental im-
pact from the project. The Federal Highway Administration ac-
cepted this determination, thus relieving the need for an EIS, and
authorized federal funding for the project. The major dispute
centered around the following conclusion in the Negative Decla-
ration: "Since the predicted noise burden for the project area is
the same whether or not the proposed improvements are com-
pleted, the project will not have an adverse environmental impact
on the neighborhood."'' 0 The court determined that these find-
ings were supported by the record and held that the exception
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976). See also L.
RATNER, INTERSTATE LAND SALES 13 (1970).
1 S. 275, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4)(iii) (1967). The conference committee report
on the final version of the Act makes no reference to the definitional sections. CONF. REP.
No. 1785, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2873,
3066-67.
,01 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
Sanborn v. Brinegar, No. 74-1836 (10th Cir., May 17, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
I" Id. at 9.
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granted by the Highway Administration should be upheld, 107 even
though the projected noise levels would be above those levels at
which an EIS is required by Department of Transportation regu-
lations.0 8
In another case involving NEPA, Wyoming v. Hathaway,0°
the Tenth Circuit held that the Environmental Protection
Agency was not required to file an EIS in connection with an
order suspending and cancelling the registration of three predator
control poisons."10 The trial court had found that the order consti-
tuted major federal action significantly affecting the environ-
ment,"' and, this being the case, the EPA was required to con-
sider all possible alternatives and approaches and to file an EIS
pursuant to NEPA."' The Tenth Circuit considered the two re-
lated issues of whether a formal EIS was required"' and whether
there had been substantial compliance with NEPA in the adop-
tion of the order,'" and found in favor of the EPA on both issues.
The court noted the fact that the EPA was not in existence
at the time NEPA became law."5 Reasoning that the entire func-
tion of the EPA is improving the quality of the environment, the
court held that it would be pointless to require the EPA to pre-
pare an impact statement in connection with its own activities.
"If EPA fails to give ample environmental consideration to its
orders, its failure in this regard can be corrected when the order
is judicially reviewed, but collateral review such as was sought
here was never contemplated and is not to be allowed.""' As a
" Id. at 12.
See 23 C.F.R. §§ 771.10(e), 772.2(i) (1976).
' 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).
P.R. Notice 72-2, Mar. 9, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 5718 (1972). The poisons involved were
strychnine, sodium fluoroacetate, and sodium cyanide, used extensively in coyote control
programs. The cancellation was based in part on their toxicity and in part on the indis-
criminate pattern of their use. Id.
1" 525 F.2d at 67.
1 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
S 525 F.2d at 71-72.
' Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 71 n.4.
.. 525 F.2d at 72 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Aldrin-Dieldrin II),
510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension
II), 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Aldrin-Dieldrin
I), 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
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basis for denying collateral review, the court pointed to the fact
that the relevant statute allows a registrant to file objections and
obtain a public hearing within thirty days after notice of a cancel-
lation.' '7 Additionally any person who will be adversely affected
by a cancellation order may petition, within sixty days of the
entry of an order, for judicial review in the court of appeals."8 As
pointed out by Judge Seth in dissent, these remedies were not
particularly availing to the plaintiffs here, who, as consumers of
the economic poisons rather than registrants, had no right to seek
a public hearing on the order and would have had no administra-
tive record to present to a circuit court for review." 9
The determination that the EPA is not required to prepare
and file an impact statement in connection with its own actions
has been reached before by this court,'2 ° and by other circuits.'2 '
In each instance it has been held that strict compliance with
NEPA is not needed in connection with EPA regulatory actions.
However, each case, while excusing strict compliance, has turned
on the extensiveness of the public hearing process engaged in by
the EPA in connection with the challenged action. In Anaconda
Co. v. Ruckelshaus'2 2 the EPA had provided a public hearing
process in connection with the challenged regulations. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension 11)123 the
court viewed the extensive public hearings held by the EPA as the
functional equivalent of an impact statement procedure. In
117 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970). The appellants here (individual users, associations of
users, and the State of Wyoming) were consumers, not registrants who could have sought
hearings on the order.
IS Id. § 135b(d).
525 F.2d at 73 (Seth, J., dissenting).
"o Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1305 (10th Cir. 1973).
121 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension II), 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974) (extensive analysis of legislative history of NEPA); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA,
481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). All of these decisions other
than Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973), involved
actions under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970).
Such actions have subsequently been statutorily exempted from NEPA by the Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 7(c)(1), 88
Stat. 246, 259. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
122 482 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1973).
12 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA'24 the court, while holding that strict
NEPA compliance was not required, vacated the challenged ac-
tions because the hearing procedures had not supplied adequate
input from interested parties.
It is the court's treatment of the substantial compliance ele-
ment that is the most troubling here. While prior cases have
excused strict compliance, all have considered the need for some
public airing of the environmental issues involved. The opportun-
ity for public awareness of and input toward federal decisionmak-
ing on environmental issues has been a key element of EIS proce-
dures. -'25 Indeed a sensitivity toward the need for public hearings
is mandated by the Impact Statement Guidelines of the Council
on Environmental Quality'26 and the EPA Regulations on Prepa-
ration of Environmental Impact Statements.'27 As noted by the
court,'28 the Administrator's decision to cancel the poison regis-
trations in question was based upon consideration of detailed
petitions submitted by various conservation groups and upon a
private report prepared under the sponsorship of the Department
of Interior and the Council on Environmental Quality (the Cain
Report).' 29 The Cain Report contains a detailed and extensive
examination of current predator control problems and practices
around the country. No public hearings were held in connection
with the preparation of the report, but nearly 400 persons were
contacted in an effort to gain input.30 Only a few of those con-
tacted or responding represented livestock associations, but it
does appear that the views of the Wyoming Woolgrowers Associa-
tion, one of the appellants here, were received and considered. 3'
While it is apparent that in relying on the Cain Report the Ad-
ministrator was presented with serious and well-considered rec-
.2 481 F.2d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1973).
,25 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 271 (1974).
" 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (1976).
" Id. § 6.400.
525 F.2d at 68-69.
2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PREDATOR CONTROL, INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY, UNIV. OF MICH., PREDATOR CONTROL-1971 (1972). The Advisory Committee was
chaired by Stanley A. Cain and the committee's report is, therefore, referred to, both in
general usage and by the court, as the Cain Report.
"' Cain & Kadlec, Foreward to ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PREDATOR CONTROL, INSTITUTE
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNIV. OF MICH., PREDATOR CONTROL-1971 (1972).
"' Id. at 107-08.
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ommendations, the question remains whether federal decision-
making should be based on information sifted through a private
data evaluation process or rather should be based on the responsi-
ble official's own independent analysis of the relevant informa-
tion after direct exposure to the competing public concerns.
John H. Evans
WATER LAW: PUEBLO INDIANS' WATER RIGHTS
New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
This suit' was brought under a New Mexico statute providing
for adjudication of water rights. 2 New Mexico instituted the pro-
ceeding for a determination of water rights in the Nambe-
Pojoaque River system. The parties to the suit were the United
States, New Mexico, approximately 900 private landowners, and
the Pueblos of San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambe, and Tesuque.
Appeal was made to the Tenth Circuit from the New Mexico
District Court's decision that the Pueblos' water rights are sub-
ject to the New Mexico appropriation system.
The majority, Judge Breitenstein joined by Judge Hill, held
that the Pueblos are not subject to the state system.3 The Pueb-
los' rights were held to be superior to all competing claims, except
non-Indians claiming by adverse possession prior to 1858 and
possibly others in situations not before the court in this suit.4
The dissenter, Judge Barrett, would have held that the Pueb-
los are governed by the appropriation system for their uses exist-
ing prior to 1933.1 Uses beginning after 1933 would have been held
independent of the state system.'
I New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. New
Mexico v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1157 (1977).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-4-4 (1953).





LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Uncertainty as to the Pueblos' water rights arose for two
reasons. First, the Pueblos have a unique history as non-nomadic,
agricultural people whose titles and rights to their lands were
recognized by the Spanish and Mexican governments and by the
United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.7 Second, the
effect of the Acts of June 7, 1924 s and May 31, 19331 are unclear.
These Acts gave compensation for lands and appurtenant waters
lost to non-Indians during a period when the Pueblos' lands were
thought to be freely 'alienable.
The Pueblos are historically sedentary, agricultural groups
with highly organized social structures. The Spanish conquista-
dores entered the Area in the 1540's and Spain ruled the Pueblos
until 1821. In 1821 Mexico won independence from Spain. Mexico
ruled the Pueblos until 1848, when the territory they occupied
was ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi-
dalgo."' Treaty Articles VIII and IX guaranteed United States
protection of rights recognized by the previous sovereigns.
In 1851 the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834" was
extended to cover the Indians on the lands acquired from Mex-
ico.' 2 These Acts made buying or settling on Indian lands an
offense. 3 In 1858 the Pueblos' titles to their lands were formally
confirmed by Congress. 4 Plenary federal jurisdiction over the
Indians was later guaranteed in the New Mexico Enabling Act of
19101 and the New Mexico Constitution."
Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
Ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636.
Ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108.
0 Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
" Act of Feb. 27, 1851, ch. 14, § 7, 9 Stat. 574, which provided: "That all the laws
now in force, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, or such provisions
of the same as may be applicable, shall be, and the same are hereby, extended over the
Indian tribes in Territories of New Mexico and Utah."
11 The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, § 11, 4 Stat. 729, provided
in part: "That if any person shall make a settlement on any lands belonging, secured, or
granted by treaty with the United States to any Indian tribe, or shall survey or shall
attempt to survey such lands, or designate any of the boundaries by marking trees, or
otherwise, such offender shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand dollars."
" Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374. This confirmation specifically included
the land claims of the Pueblos of Tesuque, San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, and Nambe.
15 Ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, which provided "that until the title of such Indian or
Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the
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But in 1876 the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Joseph7 held that the Pueblos were not "Indians"
within the meaning of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. This
supported territorial court decisions that non-Indians could settle
on the Pueblos' lands. Joseph was qualified in 1913,11 and specifi-
cally overruled in 1926.11 However, prior to the reversal of Joseph,
about 3,000 adverse claims against the Pueblo lands were initi-
ated.20
In 1924 Congress created a board with authority to settle
these claims and determine compensation due the Pueblos for the
lands and appurtenant waters quieted in the non-Indian claim-
ants."' The board concluded that compensation for the lands lost
should be approximately $35 per acre, the appraised value being
$100 per acre.22 The 1933 Congress appropriated about $75 per
acre, $40 in excess of the board's suggestion. 3 The reasons for the
different rates are not made clear in the legislative history. 24 How-
disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States .... "
1, N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 2. The language in the constitution is the same as that in
the Enabling Act, supra note 15.
17 94 U.S. 614 (1876). The Joseph case was a prosecution under the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act. The defendant was accused of building and settling on 10 acres of Pueblo
land. The Pueblos were held not to be "Indians" and their lands not to be protected by
the Act, so the defendant was found not guilty.
'" United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). This was a prosecution for the
introduction of liquor into the Santa Clara Pueblo in violation of an 1897 Act making it
an offense to bring liquor into "Indian country." Act of Jan. 30, 1897, ch. 109, 29 Stat.
506. The Court found the defendant guilty and said that Joseph "cannot be regarded as
holding that these Indians or their lands are beyond the range of Congressional power
under the Constitution." 231 U.S. at 49.
" United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926). Candelaria, similar to Joseph,
was a prosecution for fencing and settlement of Pueblo lands. The Court considered the
Pueblos to be "plainly within [the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act] spirit and, in our
opinion, fairly within its words, 'any tribe of Indians.' " 271 U.S. at 441. The defendant
was found guilty.
H.R. REP. No. 787, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1924).
2 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636.
2' SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 71ST CONG., 2D SESS., SURVEY OF THE CONDITIONS
OF INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES, part 20, 10828 (1932).
Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108.
"[it is impossible to tell from [the 1933 Act] how much is being awarded for ...
excluded lands, how much for change in valuation basis, and how much for alleged loss
of water rights." Letter from Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior, to Edgar
Howard, Chairman of House Comm. on Indian Affairs (April 12, 1932), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 820, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1932).
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ever, Winters v. United States25 may have been an influence. 21
Winters held that water rights, prior and paramount to any sub-
sequent state-created rights, were reserved by the United States
for the Indians at the same time lands were reserved. It is possible
that the larger appropriation was intended to compensate for the
extinguishment of supposed Winters reserved rights.
II. THE Aamodt DECISIONS
A. The Majority
The majority considered two possible sources for the Pueblos'
water rights: Winters doctrine of reserved rights and aboriginal
rights as recognized by Spain and Mexico.27
The Winters doctrine was first stated in 1908, in a case in-
volving the water rights of a Montana Indian reservation.,' Non-
Indians were enjoined from building a dam which would interfere
with the flow of water to the reservation. The Winters Court
reasoned that when Congress created the reservation by treaty or
agreement, it must have impliedly reserved enough water to irri-
gate and make valuable the otherwise worthless, arid reserved
lands.29 The reserved water was exempted from the state appro-
priation system. 0 Reserved water rights have also been recog-
nized for Indian reservations created by Executive Order,3' and
other federal reservations of land such as national parks, forests,
wildlife refuges, recreation areas, 32 and national monuments.
3
Each reservation includes enough water to accomplish the pur-
pose of the reserved land.3
4
25 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1113-14.
Id. at 1106.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). For the development of the Winters
doctrine, see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United
States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334
(9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), 330 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1964); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
207 U.S. at 577.
= Id.
" Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963). This was a suit to determine the
rights of the respective states to the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries.
.1 Id. at 601.
'1 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). The Court found here that when
Devil's Hole was declared a National Monument water rights had been reserved to pre-
serve a unique species of fish living only in Devil's Hole.
" See generally Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-the Winters Doctrine Updated, 6
1977
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The Act of Dec. 22, 1858,' 5 which confirmed the Pueblos'
titles provided that it "shall only be construed as a relinquish-
ment of all title and claim of the United States to any of said
lands."3 Such a relinquishment is not equivalent to a reserva-
tion,37 so the United States made no reservation of land for the
Pueblos. The majority reasoned that no water rights could have
been reserved by the United States for the Pueblos, since no land
was reserved. The Winters doctrine was thus "not technically
applicable."38
Having rejected the Winters doctrine theory, the majority
apparently adopted the aboriginal rights theory. Aboriginal rights
arise from actual, exclusive, and continuous use and occupancy
"for a long time."39 Once the rights are established, they are good
against all except the sovereign. 0 Such rights can only be extin-
guished by "plain and unambiguous" action." The aboriginal
rights may be "recognized" by Congress and are then good
against the sovereign.42 Although the concept is usually applied
to land title, aboriginal rights have also been discussed for lake-
fishing rights,43 minerals," timber,4" and tidelands.4" The doctrine
GONZAGA L. REv. 215 (1971); Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it Grew: Federal
Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REv. 639; Veeder, Indian Prior
and Paramount Rights Versus State Rights, 51 N.D.L. REv. 107 (1974); Veeder, Winters
Doctrine Rights-Keystone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conserva-
tion and Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REv. 149 (1965); Comment, Application of the Winters
Doctrine: Quantification of the Madison Formation, 21 S.D.L. REv. 144 (1976). State
water rights have also been defeated through federal legislation such as reclamation pro-
ject acts. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
11 Ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374.
" Id.
" New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1111.
3 Id.
Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 491 (1967); Sac and Fox
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 315 F.2d 896, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1963). "A long time" has been
defined as 50 years or long enough to make the area "domestic." United States v. Seminole
Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 387 (1967); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Res. v.
United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 193 (1966). For a discussion of the colonial attitude toward
aboriginal rights, see Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
, Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
" Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 492 (1967).
,2 Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972),
supplemented 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). Pyramid Lake recognized that the area was
the aboriginal home of the Paiutes but emphasized the reserved rights.
" United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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has not previously been applied to water rights. Aboriginal land
rights were established for the New Mexico Pueblos in United
States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso.4 7 This case also held that the
1924 and 1933 Land Claims Settlement Acts did not extinguish
those rights.
4 1
The majority found that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo"5
recognized the Pueblos' rights in its promise to protect all rights
recognized by the previous sovereigns.'" The aboriginal rights
would not be subject to the state appropriation system because
the United States never relinquished its plenary control.' The
majority did not further define the Pueblos' rights, that being a
matter for interpretation of the Spanish and Mexican laws from
which the aboriginal rights derive. 5 However, the court did de-
cide the relative priorities of the Pueblos and three groups of non-
Indian claimants.
The first group consisted of non-Indians claiming adverse
rights prior to the 1858 congressional recognition of the Pueblos'
titles. This group may have some valid claims because the 1858
Act also recognized any adverse claims against the Pueblos. The
laws of Spain and Mexico were held to be determinative of the
priority of adverse claims arising before 1858.51
The second group consisted of non-Indians claiming rights
after 1858 but not depending on the 1924 and 1933 Acts. The court
recognized the possibility of such claims but did not have a spe-
cific case before it. So no determination of priority for this group
was made. 4
The third group consisted of non-Indians claiming under the
1924 and 1933 Acts. This group was held to have rights secondary
to the Pueblos because the 1933 Act55 provided that it was not to
1 Oneida Tribe of Indians v. United States, 165 Ct. C1. 487, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
946 (1964).
:6 Heckman v. Sutter, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902).
7 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. C1. 1975).
Id. at 1388.
" Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
537 F.2d at 1111.
Id. at 1112.
52 This interpretation is to be made by the district court on remand.
537 F.2d at 1112.
I /d.
Ch. 45, § 9, 48 Stat. 108.
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be construed to "deprive any of the Pueblo Indians of a prior right
to the use of water."56 The words "prior right" suggested to the
majority that Congress had determined the nature of the Pueblos'
rights to be generally superior. Any rights claimed under the 1924
and 1933 Acts must be secondary, because otherwise they would
interfere with the prior rights recognized by Congress. 7 The ma-
jority found that Congress did not impliedly relinquish its plenary
control of the Pueblos through the Acts of 1924 and 1933.
Although the majority termed the Winter reserved rights
doctrine "not technically applicable"58 to the Pueblos' rights, the
opinion suggested 9 that the Pueblos' rights may be quantified by
the "practicably irrigable acres" standard defined in Arizona v.
California,' a reserved rights case. The majority also referred to
another reserved rights case, Cappaert v. United States"' saying
that a balancing of competing economic interests is not required
in determining federally reserved rights.2 Under that doctrine,
economic hardship to the non-Indians would not be considered in
the decision of the Pueblos' priorities. 3 So the majority refused
to classify the Pueblos' rights as Winters doctrine reserved rights,
but nonetheless applied the Winters doctrine cases to supply
standards for quantifying the Pueblos' rights.
Thus the majority, declining to define fully the nature of the
Pueblos' rights, did decide that the state has no jurisdiction and
that Congress understood the Pueblos to have priority over the
non-Indians taking under the 1924 and 1933 Acts.
B. The Dissent
The dissent differed from the majority in saying that Con-
5' 537 F.2d at 1112.
Id.
" Id. at 1111.
"' Id. at 1113.
373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). See Kiechel & Burke, Federal-State Relations in Water
Resources Adjudication and Administration; Integration of Reserved Rights with Appro-
priative Rights, 18 RoCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 531 (1973); Note, A Proposal for the Quanti-
fication of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1974); Comment, The
McCarran Amendment-A Method of Clarifying the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 7
LAND & WATER L. REv. 587 (1972).
" 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
537 F.2d at 1113.
It is possible that aboriginal rights also do not involve a balancing of economic
interests. The cases on aboriginal rights do not discuss this point.
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gress intended to relinquish its plenary control of the Pueblos and
chose to do so through implication in the 1933 Act. No express
relinquishment is found, but the dissent would read it into the
1933 Act.
The dissent defined the Pueblos' rights in terms of the 1933
Act. The extra money allotted in that Act was seen as compensa-
tion for a loss of the Pueblos' general priority. The priority had
to be relinquished if there was an actual loss of water rights, as
the dissent would have held." The 1933 Act settled priorities for
the Pueblo water rights as of that date as being subject to the
state appropriation system, on parity with the rights of non-
Indians who took title under the 1933 Act. New Pueblo uses would
not be subject to the state system and would have priority." The
reasoning for the priority of post-1933 new uses was not explained,
except that such new uses were not involved in the "compromise"
of the 1933 Act. 6
The dissent and the majority also disagreed on the extent to
which the Pueblos are subject to New Mexico's appropriation
system. However, both the dissent and the majority rejected the
district court's holding that the Pueblos are completely subject
to the state's water laws. Both opinions found that the Pueblos
have rights outside the state system, although neither opinion
relied on the reserved rights doctrine. The Pueblos' water rights
are thus a new category of federal water rights, neither created
by federal reservation nor subject to the state system.
III. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED
The Aamodt decision raised two issues that will need to be
resolved in the future: the nature of the Pueblos' aboriginal rights
and the system of quantification and priorities to be used in dis-
tributing the water.
In determining the nature of the Pueblos' rights, the case of
Los Angeles v. San Fernando7 is helpful. There the court exam-
537 F.2d at 1118-19.
I d. at 1120.
I ld.
,14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). This was a suit brought by
Los Angeles claiming prior rights, under the "pueblo rights doctrine," to the water of the
Upper Los Angeles River area. Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654
(1958), found that the "pueblo rights doctrine" applies to New Mexico. See also R. CLRK,
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ined the water rights system used in California during the Span-
ish and Mexican rule. It was found that water was generally to
be used in "common""6 but certain agricultural communities
called "pueblos" were given priority in custom, usage, and official
directives." These pueblos were not Indian communities. The
reasons for the priority were that the pueblos were the basic units
of settlement and development in the New World, and that the
pueblos' agricultural products were of highest importance. 0 The
Pueblos of New Mexico may have had a similar priority of water
rights. Their communities were also agricultural, provided suste-
nance, and were a first instance of permanent settlement. The
California pueblos enjoyed an expanding right, which grew as the
pueblos' municipal needs grew." The right was not measured by
irrigable acres, as federally reserved rights are," but was based on
both municipal and agricultural needs. 3 Thus the rights derived
from the Spanish and Mexican laws may be very different from
those derived from federal reservation.
When the nature of the Pueblos' rights has been decided, the
problem remains of formulating a workable distribution of the
water. Both the majority and the dissent spoke in terms of his-
toric uses which may be impossible to determine. The problem
is also made more difficult by the confusion of "use" and "right."
The Pueblos' rights may be limited to the quantity historically
used," may be expandable to meet growing needs, 5 or may be
unrelated to "uses" and depend only on the measurement of irrig-
NEW MEXICO WATER RESOURCES LAW 41-43 (1964); 1 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
RIGHTS 2590-93 (2d ed. 1912); 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 68-69 (3d
ed. 1911).
11 Recopilaci6n de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, Book 4, Title 17, Laws 5, 7
(Compiled 1680), quoted in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 537 P.2d
at 1275-76, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
I d.
,o Id. at 234, 237, 537 P.2d at 1276, 1278, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 27, 29.
Id. at 252, 537 P.2d at 1289, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
7 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 232, 537 P.2d at 1275, 123 Cal. Rptr.
at 26.
" See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1120.
See Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 232, 252, 537 P.2d at 1275, 1289,
123 Cal. Rptr. at 26, 40 (1975). Section 9 of the 1933 Act indicates that the Pueblos' rights
are not limited to irrigation, but are for "domestic, stock-water, and irrigation purposes."
Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, § 9, 48 Stat. 108.
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able acres.76 The relationship between "use" and "right" must be
more clearly defined so that some disposition of the available
waters may be made.
Hopefully, the rights of the Pueblos will not be dealt with as
aboriginal rights, "[w]hatever those rights may have been,""
until the water system is so critically overburdened that a real
quantification system is imposed. When such becomes the case,
the lawmakers may be tempted to follow the example of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act7" in handling the extin-
guishment and compensation of previously undefined aboriginal
rights.7" There the Native Alaskans had various real property
rights which had been recognized by the Russian sovereign. When
Alaska was sold to the United States, the treaty contained a
provision promising to protect those claims recognized by pre-
vious sovereigns.8" The development of Alaska proceeded a step
ahead of the definition of those aboriginal rights. In 1971 Congress
responded to the developers' desires to be unhampered by enor-
mous and valuable native claims covering 100% of the state by
passing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The Act pro-
vided that almost all aboriginal claims were thereby extin-
guished"' and would be compensated by money payments8 and
limited selection of land rights. This legislative solution of the
Alaskan aboriginal claims problem was certainly complete and
conclusive, but the effect on the Alaskans may not be favorable
in the long term.
7, See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1113; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
596, 600 (1963).
" New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1111.
7, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (Supp. IV 1974).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in [19711
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2192; S. REP. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.
REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2297; S. REP. No. 581, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Block, Alaskan Native Claims, 4 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 223 (1971); Crews, Clouds over Alaska-the Native Claims, 3 NAT. RE-
SOURCES LAW. 460 (1970).
Treaty with Russia, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No.
301.
3. 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (Supp. IV 1974).
.2 Id. § 1605.
- Id. § 1611.
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CONCLUSION
The Aamodt case was remanded for an analysis of the Span-
ish and Mexican origins of the Pueblos' rights. This determina-
tion is certainly needed, but the court has already decided the
priority relationships. A more consistent approach is called for
where the rights being adjudicated are so vital. The possibility of
an ultimate disposition of the Pueblos' aboriginal rights in the
manner of the disposition of the Native Alaskan rights should be
avoided. The justice of trading money for resources that cannot
be replaced by purchase is questionable. This is especially true
in the Pueblos' southwestern area, where the water supply is in-
adequate and the land is worthless without water rights.
Wendy J. Busch
GRAZING LANDS MANAGEMENT
Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d
1397 (10th Cir. 1976)
INTRODUCTION
In a case involving possibly far-reaching environmental con-
sequences, Judge Doyle for the Tenth Circuit considered the au-
thority of the Secretary of the Interior and his delegees with re-
spect to the sanction of revocation of a grazing license issued
pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act.' A case of first impression,
Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton' reached the Tenth Circuit
on appeal from the Wyoming District Court's review of the ad-
ministrative action.' Although the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act of 19761 (FLPMA) has mooted some aspects of the
Diamond Ring Ranch controversy, the opinion is still valuable for
its interpretation and review of the Secretary's discretion to re-
voke grazing licenses and as an example of the Tenth Circuit's
attitude toward environmental issues.
1 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970).
2 531 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1976).
1 Judge Doyle affirmed district court jurisdiction predicated on 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1970); see notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text infra.
4 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. IV 1976).
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. The Administrative Process and Review by the District
Court
The plaintiff, Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc., held a Section 3
grazing license5 under the Taylor Grazing Act. This license enti-
tled the Ranch to graze cattle on areas of the Horse Heaven
Pasture, located within the Lander Grazing District in Wyoming.
In addition, the Ranch owned land located within the Pasture
and held grazing rights under a permit on other state-owned
land.'
Diamond Ring Ranch first obtained a grazing license under
the Act in 1966; the license was renewed annually thereafter. The
1971 license, in effect at the time here concerned, provided that
the Ranch would abide by all rules and regulations' relating to
the license."
On June 15, 1971, the Ranch sprayed 5,000 acres of the Horse
Heaven Pasture, of which 3,600 acres were federally owned, with
herbicide 2,4D,1 in order to eradicate large amounts of sage-
brush.'" The spraying was subsidized by the Agricultural Stabili-
zation and Conservation Service (ASCS) upon the Ranch's repre-
sentation that only its private land had been sprayed." The
I Ten-year grazing permits and annual grazing licenses are issued by district range
managers, employees of the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior,
with the advice of a local stockmen's advisory board. Permit issuing procedures, permit-
tee qualifications, and other details are governed by the Federal Range Code, 43 C.F.R.
§§ 4100 to 4115.2-6 (1975).
Congress had ratified the Secretary's authority to issue yearly grazing licenses in
addition to the term permits provided for in the Act by routinely appropriating money
for improvements out of the revenues from the yearly license fees. Brooks v. Dewar, 313
U.S. 354 (1941). Under the National Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
the Secretary is now specifically allowed to issue permits for a period of less than ten years
under certain circumstances. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(b) (Supp. IV 1976).
The terms "permit" and "license," as hereinafter used, have the same meaning unless
distinguished by the context.
531 F.2d at 1399.
43 C.F.R. §§ 4100 to 4115.2-6 (1975), promulgated by authority of 43 U.S.C. § 315a
(1970).
531 F.2d at 1399.
2,4D, or Dow Esteron 99 Concentrate, is a growth inducer which causes a dramatic
increase in a plant's growth rate, leading to the plant's death. For a discussion of the
problems with 2,4D, see Wisconsin v. Butz, 389 F. Supp. 1065, 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
531 F.2d at 1399-400.
The ASCS is a cost-sharing program administered by the Department of Agricul-
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Ranch failed to obtain the prior permission of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM)I2 before spraying the federal lands.
13
BLM personnel first discovered on July 28, 1971, that federal
land had been sprayed, and, after investigation, issued a notice
of violation to Diamond Ring Ranch." The notice alleged that
3,600 acres of public land had been sprayed, without requisite
permission, and that the Ranch's conduct amounted to a willful"3
violation of the regulations. The Department of Interior sought a
three-year suspension of the Ranch's license in Horse Heaven
Pasture and a twenty-five percent reduction of its grazing privi-
leges on other licensed lands as a penalty for the actions.
After a prolonged hearing, the hearing examiner found that,
although the Ranch's actions were willful," the herbicide was not
harmful to animals, no damage was done to wildlife, no suspen-
sion of grazing was necessary in order to protect the range, and,
in fact, the sprayed lands had actually been benefited.'" Accord-
ingly, the examiner suspended the imposition of a sanction, in
effect placing the Ranch on probation for one year.8
On appeal the Interior Board of Land Appeals reversed the
examiner's findings as to any beneficial effects of the spraying,
finding that some wildlife does use sagebrush for forage, and
ture to provide funds to private land owners carrying out conservation and forestry prac-
tices. 7 C.F.R. § 701.1 (1976).
The ASCS program is not applicable to "noncropland owned by the United States
• . . including, but not limited to, grazing lands administered by. . . the Bureau of Land
Management (including lands administered under the Taylor Grazing Act) ...... 7
C.F.R. § 701.8(b) (1976).
" "Cutting, burning, or removing vegetative cover" is allowed only after a permit is
issued by a BLM official. 43 C.F.R. § 4112.3-1(e) (1975).
" 531 F.2d at 1398.
" Id. at 1400.
lb 43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970) specifically provides a fine of not more than $500 as a
penalty for "willful" violations of the Act or the rules and regulations.
' 531 F.2d at 1400.
The hearing examiner's finding of willfulness was upheld by the Tenth Circuit after
a discussion of the applicable definition and the scope of review. 531 F.2d at 1404-06. The
issue of willfulness has been mooted by the FLPMA, which allows the Secretary to issue
a sanction for "any violation" of the regulations and conditions. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a)
(Supp. IV 1976).
" Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397
(10th Cir. 1976). The beneficial effects of 2,4D spraying include an increased growth of
forage and additional water in the soil, making it more resistant to erosion. Brief for
Appellee at 49-51.
l, 531 F.2d at 1400.
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noted that the BLM requires that all grazing be suspended for one
year after any chemical treatment of grazing lands. 20 The Board
also vacated the Ranch's probation and actually suspended its
grazing license for two years with respect to the acreage sprayed.,'
The district court, in reviewing the administrative record,
found that the Ranch's actions had not been willful, but rather
innocent and in good faith, and that, in any event, the maximum
sanction the agency may impose is a $500 fine.Y The Secretary
appealed the district court's ruling to the Tenth Circuit.
B. Appeal to the Tenth Circuit
1. Authority of the Secretary.
The first issue discussed by the Tenth Circuit was whether
the Taylor Grazing Act provides authority for the agency to sus-
pend, reduce, or revoke a permit or license for violation of the Act
or the regulations promulgated thereunder, or whether sanctions
are limited to the statutory $500 fine.
The court's upholding of the suspension, reduction, and revo-
cation power, while not finally determinative of the case,23 was
not merely gratuitous. The Secretary recognized that the case
could be decided simply on the traditional standard of review
grounds but invited the court to consider the issue of the extent
of the Secretary's authority, arguing that such a determination
was critical to the Secretary's continued ability to manage public
lands effectively .
2
Accepting the invitation, the court held that the Secretary
does possess such authority, and recognized that (1) broad regula-
tory power is granted to the Secretary by the Taylor Grazing
Act;25 (2) the legislative history of the Act indicates that the $500
2 12 Interior Bd. Land App. 358, 365-66 (1973).
21 531 F.2d at 1400.
22 Id.
" The court could have held merely that the agency's modification of the sanction
imposed by the hearing examiner was an abuse of discretion (as it did; see notes 37-56
and accompanying text infra) and never have reached the issue of whether the agency
actually has the authority to suspend a grazing permit or license.
' Brief for Appellant at 35.
" 531 F.2d at 1401-02. The Taylor Grazing Act requires the Secretary of the Interior
to "make provision for [the grazing districts'] protection, administration, regulation, and
improvement," and to
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fine provision was not intended to eliminate possible administra-
tive sanctions but was aimed primarily at trespassers;26 (3) Con-
gress has impliedly ratified the Secretary's interpretaion of his
authority under the Act;2 and (4) a line of condemnation cases
holds that a permit or license, conferring no rights, is not a com-
pensable property interest under the fifth amendment's just com-
pensation clause.
2 8
Although the recent passage of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 now provides specific revocation author-
ity for the Secretary, 2  an examination of the Act's legislative
origins indicates that the revocation authority provision resulted
make such rules and regulations. . . and do any and all things necessary to
accomplish the purposes of [the Act] and to insure the objects of such
grazing districts, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve
the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary injury, to provide
for the orderly use, improvement, and development of the range ....
43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970).
Nevertheless, this discretion is not without limits. While a grazing permit remains
outstanding, the Federal Government may not interfere with it (as by aiding or encourag-
ing third parties to use the lands covered) and the Secretary has an obligation under the
Act to adequately safeguard permits issued thereunder. Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d
738 (10th Cir. 1949); see generally 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1970).
11 531 F.2d at 1402-03. The court relied heavily on excerpts from the Senate debate
of June 12, 1934, held shortly before passage of the Act, to support its holding that the
$500 fine was never intended to be an exclusive sanction, and suggested that such an
interpretation would be an "absurdity." 531 F.2d at 1402. While the language quoted by
the court, taken out of context, appears to support that conclusion, a careful reading of
the entire debate suggests that the fine was considered "all the power that is needed" and
"ample punishment." See 78 CONG. REc. 11139-47 (1934).
" 531 F.2d at 1403. In a number of cases at the administrative hearing level where
the violation involved a trespass, the agency reduced grazing privileges conferred by
existing permits or licenses. Eugene Miller, 67 Interior Dec. 116 (1960); Clarence S. Miller,
67 Interior Dec. 145 (1960); J. Leonard Neal, 66 Interior Dec. 215 (1959). These cases were
never reviewed in a judicial proceeding.
The court here specifically cited the passage of the Classification and Multiple Use
Act, 43 U.S.C. 6§ 1411-1418 (1970) and its legislative history, S. REP. No. 1506, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3755, 3756, as approv-
ing the agency's procedures for public lands management. 531 F.2d at 1403.
For an analysis of ratification of the Secretary's implied authority in the mineral
leasing context, see Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963).
" 531 F.2d at 1404. The court's attempt to analogize to the condemnation cases
overlooked the fact that the agency's power of revocation has been defined strictly within
the condemnation context. The power of the agency to revoke a permit or license in that
context was never seriously questioned. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488
(1973); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951);
United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951).
- 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a) (Supp. IV 1976).
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from the same Interior Department interpretations of the Taylor
Grazing Act that the court relied on in its determination.
30
The FLPMA provides authority for the agency to "cancel or
suspend a grazing permit or lease for any violation of a grazing
regulation." 3' This provision appeared only in the House version 3
but generated no debate there,33 and it was incorporated into the
final bill by the Conference Committee.3 4 Basis for much of the
Act is found in the reports of the Public Land Law Review Com-
mission, which noted that the Interior Department regulations
35
provided for permit revocation .3  The FLPMA, as noted above,
specifically ratifies the Interior Department's interpretations of
its powers under the Taylor Grazing Act.
2. Agency Abuse of Discretion.
Finally, the court considered whether the Secretary's discre-
tion under the Taylor Grazing Act is so broad as to preclude
judicial review of the sanction imposed by the agency. After first
establishing that the agency's actions under the Taylor Grazing
Act are not within the limited class of nonreviewable agency ac-
tions,3 and affirming original jurisdiction in the district court,
38
the court proceeded to its review. Employing the "clearly erro-
neous" standard, 39 the court held that the agency's choice of sanc-
" See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a) (Supp. IV 1976) (emphasis added).
3, H.R. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976).
122 CONG. REc. H7581-655 (daily ed. July 22, 1976).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976).
43 C.F.R. § 9239.3-2 (1975).
3' 2 UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO, THE FORAGE RESOURCE (Study for the Public Land Law
Review Commission) 11-31 to 35 (1969).
" 531 F.2d at 1406. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970) excludes from judicial review only
those agency actions precluded by statute from judicial review or committed to agency
discretion by law. Courts interpret this section narrowly. Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061
(10th Cir. 1975); Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
There is no presumption against review absent a clear showing of legislative intent to
commit an agency's acts to its own discretion. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F.
Supp. 78 (D.C. Kan.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1973).
2' District court proceedings are contemplated by 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970). School Bd.
v. HEW, 475 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1973); Rettinger v. FTC, 392 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1968).
' "ITihe court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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tion was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion, and reinstated the
hearing examiner's suspended sanction. 0
Although the agency's decision carries a presumption of reg-
ularity,4 the court relied on several cases to support the proposi-
tion that an arbitrary choice of remedies or abuse of discretion
must be set aside.42 The cited cases could, however, have been
distinguished.
One of the cited cases, Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States,4" was remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
not because of agency error, but because the intervening passage
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959"4
so changed the complexion of the case that a new agency adjudi-
cation was necessary. 5 The other cited cases, Camp v. Pitts" and
National Nutritional Foods Association v. Weinberger,47 were
remanded to the respective agencies for further consideration
because the "inadequacy of explanation frustrate[d] review."48
In none of these cases did the courts set aside agency actions
merely because, in their judgment, the agency "went quite far"4
in its imposition of a penalty.
In reversing the penalty imposed by the agency, both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit relied on evidence indicating
that no harm occurred as a result of the spraying; there was,
however, substantial evidence0 in the record to the contrary.5'
00 531 F.2d at 1407.
" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
02 531 F.2d at 1407.
,3 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
" The Court noted that "[t]his [failure to consider the impact of the new act] was,
of course, the District Court's, and not the Commission's, error." 371 U.S. at 172 n.22.
" 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
,7 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975).
00 National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975).
The court noted that even where a court uses the "arbitrary, capricious" standard,
"agency action will not be upheld where inadequacy of explanation frustrates review....
Where the agency's 'finding is not sustainable on the administrative record made, then
the .. .decision must be vacated and the matter remanded [to the agency] for further
consideration."' Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)).
4' 531 F.2d at 1407.
Substantial evidence is quantitatively less than the weight of the evidence, and,
therefore, an agency's finding may be supported by substantial evidence and still not be
the only finding possible in light of the evidence. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
11 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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Even though the examiner's probationary approach may have
been "reasonable, '52 and even though the Tenth Circuit agreed
with that approach, a court may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the agency unless it finds there has been a "clear error
of judgment." 53 Although the court used the talismanic phrase
"clearly erroneous,"54 in fact it merely substituted a penalty it
considered "much more in keeping with the underlying facts."55
The court reexamined and reweighed the evidence and drew its
own conclusion, substituting its judgment for that of the adminis-
trative agency."
II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
A. The Issue Raised by the National Wildlife Federation
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) intervened as ami-
cus curiae because of its concern over the effect of the spraying
on range wildlife and the effect of the district court's ruling on the
agency's range management powers. The NWF contended that,
contrary to the examiner's findings, range wildlife was harmed by
the spraying because certain species use the sagebrush for for-
age.57 While the court did not reach the issue,5" the NWF argued
that, even if the Taylor Act did not authorize the agency to revoke
a permit, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 5 pro-
vides an alternate and independent source of authority. 0
B. The Environmental Impact Statement
NEPA is intended to formulate an approach to governmental
52 531 F.2d at 1407.
5' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
5 531 F.2d at 1407.
Id.
5' A reviewing court is directed to give proper respect to the ability of the administra-
tive agency to weigh evidence. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966).
" Brief for Amicus Curiae at 30-34. The species include sage grouse, antelope and
deer, the black-tailed jackrabbit, the sage sparrow, Brewer's sparrow, and sage thrasher.
' 531 F.2d at 1404.
5' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1970).
Section 2 of the Taylor Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970), requires the Secretary of the
Interior to protect the grazing districts. The NWF argued in its brief that NEPA requires
proper environmental safeguards to be taken, in light of the decision in Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.. 1971), which held that
agencies must seriously consider action to avoid environmental costs. Arguably in this
case such action would be license revocation.
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activity that will encourage the positive aspects of man's interac-
tion with his environment." To that end, Congress declared it to
be the "continuing responsibility" of the Federal Government to
use "all practicable means," among other things, to "preserve
important . . . natural aspects of our national heritage" and to
"enhance the quality of renewable resources." 2
To ensure implementation of this important national policy,
federal agencies are required to file an environmental impact
statement (EIS) whenever proposed activity would constitute
"major Federal [action] significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 63 Virtually all agencies are subject to
NEPA's EIS requirement," and full and good-faith compliance is
required 65
C. The EIS and Permitted Spraying
In noting that no real harm was shown from the Ranch's
actions,6 Judge Doyle overlooked the fact that other courts have
held that spraying with herbicides does have a significant effect
on the environment. Had the Ranch properly requested the BLM
to grant permission to spray, the BLM, on the basis of the prior
cases, would have first been required to file an EIS.67 In finding
61 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970).
2 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
11 The Statement must be detailed, setting forth the proposed action's environmental
impact, any adverse but unavoidable consequences, alternatives considered, the
"relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity" and a listing of "irreversible and irretrieva-
ble commitments of resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
" National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 156-57 (D. Kan.), afj'd, 455
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974), held that:
[NEPA's] purpose is to assure that, by following the procedures that it
prescribes, agencies will be fully aware of the impact of their decisions when
they make them. The procedures . . . are designed to secure the accomplish-
ment of the vital purpose of NEPA. That result can be achieved only if the
prescribed procedures are faithfully followed; grudging, pro forma compli-
ance will not do.
U 531 F.2d at 1407.
" Wisconsin v. Butz, 389 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (where only a general EIS
on use of herbicides in the "Eastern Region" had been filed, EIS required for spraying
forest areas with 2,4D); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (EIS required for
program of spraying water hyacinths with 2,4D); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Morton, No. 10113 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 15, 1974) (case dismissed when Department of
Interior agreed to prepare EIS before spraying herbicides on public lands in Roswell, New
Mexico).
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that "there [did] not appear to be much indication that the
particular spraying was seriously detrimental to the public
land," and that the issue was of "limited relevancy,""8 the court
has retreated from recent cases attempting to regulate the use of
herbicides because of concern for their long-term effects on the
environment. 9
D. The EIS and Agency Sanctions
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act70 codifies the
BLM's procedures relating to environmental planning and im-
pact, declaring as its policy that public lands be managed so as
to protect and preserve all aspects of the environment. 7' The
FLPMA places high importance on land use planning for public
lands,7" including federal rangelands administered under the
Taylor Act,73 where the planning vehicle is an "allotment man-
agement plan."74
A recent case, holding that no conflict could be found be-
tween the Taylor Grazing Act and NEPA to exempt the former
from EIS requirements, has ordered the BLM to file an EIS in
conjunction with its program of issuing grazing permits and licen-
ses,7" although the court did not go so far as to require an EIS for
each individual license or permit.76 The court did not, however,
consider whether an EIS would be required in connection with an
agency law-enforcement action such as is the case here, where a
possible sanction might significantly affect the environment.
a' 531 F.2d at 1400.
" See cases cited note 67 supra.
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. IV 1976).
I' d. § 1701(a)(8).
7 Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711-1714.
" Id. § 17 02(e).
7, Id. § 1702(k).
11 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 837-38
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mer., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
Congress has ratified the court's decision by stating that nothing in FLPMA is in-
tended to interfere with the BLM's EIS program as approved by the court. H.R. REP. No.
94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976). In addition, the provisions in the FLPMA declar-
ing that certain distributions and uses of range-improvement funds do not come under
EIS requirements "do not affect [NEPA's] applicability to other aspects of grazing
operation of BLM. ... Id.
7' 388 F. Supp. at 838. Cf. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776
(1976), rev'g Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed at
length in Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group v. Hills, 420 F. Supp. 582 (D. Colo. 1976).
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Such a question appears to have arisen only once, in Gifford-
Hill & Co. v. FTC." That court held that the FTC, while acting
in its enforcement capacity, is not subject to the requirements of
NEPA, even where its actions may have environmental conse-
quences.7" Although NEPA was not intended to repeal other stat-
utes by implication,7" cases excepting an agency from NEPA gen-
erally occur only when their policies are superior to those of
NEPA. 80
The Taylor Act's policies and those of the FLMPA, however,
are not in conflict with NEPA, but rather in harmony in their
concern for the protection of the environment.8 A consistent in-
terpretation of both statutes would require an agency, where more
than one alternative sanction exists, to examine the environmen-
tal ramifications of each.8"
Given the new statutory authority contained in the FLMPA
for permit revocation and suspensions and the new mandate for
intensive range management, the BLM should carefully examine
71 389 F. Supp. 167, 174-75, 176 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(on procedural grounds; the circuit court did not reach the merits of the case discussed in
note 78 infra).
" The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin an FTC antitrust adjudicatory
proceeding on the grounds that it had failed to file an EIS. The court found two categories
of federal actions covered by NEPA: (1) federal actions with direct impact on the environ-
ment and (2) actions by nonfederal parties requiring federal permission. The court held
this FTC adjudication fell into neither category.
" The policies of NEPA supplement those found in "existing authorizations of Fed-
eral agencies." 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1970). Accord, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,
694 (1973).
" In each case, the court took a "time is of the essence" approach: Flint Ridge Dev.
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976), rev'g Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520
F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975) (NEPA must yield to necessities of time limits imposed on the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclo-
sure Act of 1968); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973) (natural
gas shortage); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1154
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (Congressional declaration of deadline for agency action);
Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (price controls). See Note,
1975 DUKE L.J. 743.
" 43 U.S.C. § 315 and 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). "The Taylor Act is not purely environ-
mental since it is aimed at promoting the highest use of public lands; NEPA seeks to
protect the environment." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F.
Supp. 829, 838 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mer., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
913 (1976).
12 Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 743, 751-52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970) requires the study,
development, and description of "appropriate alternatives" when there are "unresolved
conflicts" concerning environmental impact.
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the environmental effects of permit revocation and formulate a
consistent policy for its use as a sanction. A programmatic EIS
covering its use appears to be indicated. Unfortunately, the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Diamond Ring that the revocation was
an abuse of discretion leaves the BLM without any indication as
to what type of violation would properly trigger a loss of grazing
privileges. Further judicial clarification of this issue is likely as
the BLM intensifies its efforts in the area of range management.




By ROBERT M. DORR,* DONALD M. DuFT,**
CHERYL L. HODGSON,*** AND SUE W. BRANCH****
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit this term considered a variety of cases
which involved intellectual property. Of particular interest to
franchisers and franchisees is the decision in Redd v. Shell Oil
Co.,' in which the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the
District Court for the District of Utah that Shell's restrictions on
the use of its trademark "Shell" for gasoline constituted an illegal
tying arrangement under the Sherman Act.2 Redd and Value
House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., I another trademark case worthy
of note, are discussed in greater detail below.
In CMI Corp. v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc.4 the Tenth
Circuit upheld an opinion of the District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma on the question of patent validity but re-
manded the case on the issue of patent infringement.5 Implicit in
the decision was a holding that the district court's factual find-
ings comparing the processes of the parties' method patents were
clearly erroneous.' The district court had given heavy evidentiary
weight to the appellant's advertising materials. Descriptions of
the process in these materials contradicted those presented at
trial; therefore, the district court had held appellant estopped to
deny those prior assertions.7 While the Tenth Circuit agreed that
those representations should be considered, it held that the prior
* Partner, Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado; B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engi-
neering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.
** Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
*** Associate, Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1972, Louisiana Tech Univer-
sity; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
**** A.B., 1964, Duke University; M.S.L.S., 1966, University of North Carolina;
J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
523 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1975).
534 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 878.
See id. at 883.
Id. at 876.
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statements did not form "a proper basis for an estoppel,"' and
furthermore that they could not "serve to controvert what is
clearly demonstrated to be the actual fact."'
Two appeals to the Tenth Circuit were related to copyright
and trademark activity but turned on other issues. In United
States v. Blanton" defendants' conviction for criminal infringe-
ment of copyrighted sound recordings was upheld after an appeal
based primarily on criminal procedure grounds." In Medco Prod-
ucts Co. v. Commissioner2 legal expenses incurred in asserting a
trademark were held not to be deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses, since their origin was capital in nature. 3
I. Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975)
During the past term, an important trademark case arose on
appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Utah. The district court had, by summary judgment, dramati-
cally extended the application of per se antitrust tying theories
from the field of "rent-a-name" franchises to the field of
"distributor" franchises. For only the second time in its history,
the United States Trademark Association filed an amicus curiae
brief. 5 The Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment of the
district court and limited antitrust tying violations strictly to the
prior precedent involving only "rent-a-name" franchises. 6 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 7
The facts were simple. Redd had entered into a sales contract
with Shell as a jobber, or distributor, of "Shell" gasoline manu-
factured by Shell. Redd was not restricted in distribution of gaso-
line from other companies or sources. The sales contract specifi-
Id. at 884.
Id. at 883.
" 531 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
531 F.2d at 444.
' 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975).
'+ Id. at 139.
" See 182 U.S.P.Q. 280 (D. Utah 1974).
IS 65 TRADEMARK REP. 511 (1975).
x Redd had relied on Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), for
its assertion that a trademark was a separate product for antitrust tying purposes. The
Chicken Delight situation involved a trademark franchiser whose primary product was its
name. In Redd the product involved was gasoline which was identified to its source of
origin by a trademark. 524 F.2d at 1057.
"7 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
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cally restricted Redd to use of the trademark "Shell" only on
gasoline acquired from Shell. Redd, however, purchased gasoline
at a significantly lower cost from another supplier and distributed
that gasoline as "Shell" gasoline. Upon acquiring knowledge of
Redd's substitution activities, Shell demanded that Redd cease
this practice. Redd immediately brought an action in federal dis-
trict court, alleging that Shell's restrictive provision violated per
se the antitrust laws based upon Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. IS
Shell countersued for trademark infringement.
The Tenth Circuit held that Redd was guilty of trademark
infringement and that Shell's activities did not constitute a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. This section is based on the trademark
infringement holding. A brief discussion of the history of trade-
mark law, in light of the facts of this particular case, ensues, and
a summary of the Chicken Delight standard and its respective
limits also is presented.
A. Evolution of Trademark "Value"
The United States Supreme Court in United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co. 10 recognized the role of trademarks in the
United States: "Its function is simply to designate the goods as
the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will
against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the
subject of property except in connection with an existing busi-
ness."
20
Earlier, the Supreme Court in Menendez v. Holt2' recognized
that the trademark owner need not be the manufacturer of the
goods on which the trademark is used.
The growth in the United States of the use of trademarks is
unsurpassed in commerce. As the United States Supreme Court
has recognized:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by sym-
bols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark
is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The
448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
248 U.S. 90 (1918).
Id. at 97.
21 128 U.S. 514, 520 (1888).
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owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of poten-
tial customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it
appears.2
Unfortunately, in early evolution, the common law of trade-
marks was adjudicated on a state-by-state basis, leading to non-
uniformity of protection for trademark owners. Trademark rights
were awarded only on a territory of use basis.23 This Balkanization
of trademark common law was substantially eliminated by the
passage of the Federal Lanham Act in 1946.24 Section 45 of that
Act incorporated, however, the common law concept of a trade-
mark: "The term trade-mark includes any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination tlereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others. '2 5 With the
passage of the Lanham Act, a trademark owner upon using a
mark in interstate commerce could for the first time register the
mark with the federal government and be accorded nationwide
protective rights in his mark-even in those territories not yet
entered.
One provision of the Lanham Act provided the impetus for
the growth of a new business tool-that of the franchise system.
Section 5 of the Lanham Act specifically provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may
be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to
the benefit of the registrant or applicant for registration, and such
use shall not affect the validity of such mark or its registration,
provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive the
public."
The phenomenal growth of franchise operations in American
business has been well documented.27 A significant portion of
these businesses involve trademark licensing franchise systems.
2
1
" Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
2 See 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26.1 (1973).
2 See id. § 26.13.
- 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
- Id. § 1055.
27 D. THOMPSON, FRANCHISE OPERATION AND ANTITRUST 26-40 (1971).
Pelton, Fisher, & Prestia, Tying and Trademark Franchising: A Look at the Devel-
oping Case Law, 3 AM. PAT. L.A.J. 254 (1976).
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Such operations provide predictable quality for consumers, secu-
rity and guidance for franchisees, and may well provide for lower
failure rates than is common in nonfranchised businesses.29 Yet
attempts by franchisers to control various aspects of franchisee
activity have been criticized as being anticompetitive.'
B. Antitrust Tying Restrictions on Franchise Trademark Use
In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.31 the Ninth Circuit held
that the trademark owner (franchiser) had violated the antitrust
laws by requiring its franchisees to purchase certain supplies only
from the franchiser. The franchiser made no use of the mark and
merely licensed other people to use it. Such use of a trademark
has been termed a "rent-a-name" use. 32 In this case the franchise
operated as "Chicken Delight" and was required to buy mixes,
paper plates, napkins, cooking utensils, and the like from the
franchiser at significantly higher prices than such commodities
were priced from other sources. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The burgeoning business of franchising has made trade-mark licens-
ing a widespread'commercial practice and has resulted in the devel-
opment of a new rationale for trade-marks as representations of
product quality. This is particularly true in the case of a franchise
system set up not to distribute the trade-marked goods of the fran-
chisor, but, as here, to conduct a certain business under a common
trade-mark or trade name. Under such a type of franchise, the trade-
mark simply reflects the goodwill and quality standards of the enter-
prise which it identifies. As long as the system of operation of the
franchisees lives up to those quality standards and remains as repre-
sented by the mark so that the lublic is not misled, neither the
protection afforded the trade-mark by law nor the value of the trade-
mark to the licensee depends upon the source of the components.3
The purpose of this article is not to challenge the soundness
of the Chicken Delight case; however, its logic is specious. The
Ninth Circuit concluded: "Just as the patent or copyright fore-
closes competitors from offering the distinctive product on the
market, so the registered trade-mark presents a legal barrier
" D. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 33-34.
10 Id. at 55-123.
31 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
"2 McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58
CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (1970).
" 448 F.2d at 48-49 (footnotes omitted).
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against competition. ' 34 Yet a trademark differs markedly from a
patent or a copyright. Patents and copyrights are constitutionally
protected monopolies-no other person or company can manufac-
ture a patented or copyrighted article without infringement
thereof.35 Patents and copyrights present true barriers to competi-
tion. However, a trademark presents no such barrier and would,
rather, seem to enhance competition. The use of a trademark does
not prevent others from offering the same product but merely
prevents others from using a confusingly similar trademark to
offer their products. The value to the public, and hence the en-
hancement of competition, is the public's ability to identify
between the same competing products.
The soundness of the Chicken Delight holding notwithstand-
ing, the facts of the Shell case simply did not fall within the
teachings of Chicken Delight. In fact, Chicken Delight specifi-
cally limited itself to the case of a franchise system "set up not
to distribute the trademarked goods. ' 3 Chicken Delight, Inc. nei-
ther raised nor sold chickens but merely franchised a method of
doing business, which it tied to purchases of common items such
as paper products. The Chicken Delight decision specifically lim-
ited its findings of a tie-in to those situations "where the tied
product is not itself the product represented by the mark.
37
J. Thomas McCarthy, a recognized expert in the law of
trademarks, has distinguished between "rent-a-name" and
"distributing" franchises as follows: "In those franchises where
the franchisor manufactures nothing itself, but really is in the
business of selling a franchise package consisting primarily of the
trademark license, it appears correct to characterize the trade-
mark as a tying item and designated items as tied-in."38 Professor
McCarthy defines "distributing franchises" as having as their
"primary purpose. . . to provide the franchisor with a system for
marketing his wares, either at the wholesale or retail level.
39
3' Id. at 50.
Contra, Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 513 (1964) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting
in part). Judge Lumbard felt the economic power generated by a trademark was indistin-
guishable from that generated by a copyright or patent. His analysis is commented on in
Pelton, Fisher, & Prestia, supra note 28, at 262.
3' 448 F.2d at 48.
Id. at 52.




With regard to these types of distributing franchises, he states:
"The franchisee who is primarily a conduit through which prod-
ucts made by the franchisor flow to consumers is in a somewhat
different position. He can legitimately be required to deal exclu-
sively in his franchisor's line of products." 0 Perhaps on a proph-
etic note concerning the Redd case, McCarthy continues:
"Similarly, a gasoline refiner might properly require its own
brand of gas to be pumped from leased pumps and tanks bearing
its trademark, but cannot require a dealer to sell only a desig-
nated brand of tires, batteries, and accessories without violating
the prohibition against tying."'"
If the Tenth Circuit had upheld the district court's summary
judgment that Shell's acts constituted a per se tying relationship,
then the entire evolution of trademark law would have been ig-
nored. The amicus curiae brief of the United States Trademark
Association stated:
[T]he decision below will have an adverse impact on those systems
of distribution in which manufacturers sell products bearing their
trademarks through independent distributors. Many products are
thus distributed to retailers or to the public. Shell, for example,
distributes its gasoline and other petroleum products to its dealers
through jobbers such as Redd.
If Shell could be required to furnish its jobbers with standards
and specifications so that they can sell non-Shell gasoline under the
SHELL trademark, then other manufacturers would be obligated to
do likewise with the distributors of their branded merchandise. As
a result a distributor of branded merchandise, such as appliances,
automobiles, etc., would be free to sell under the brand name or
trademark products which were neither made nor selected by the
trademark owner. The trademark would then no longer identify
source but only quality, and any product which the user believes to
meet the quality could be sold thereunder. The resultant system
would be the functional equivalent of having no trademarks at all."2
Confusion and lack of business certainty result from a situation
in which distributors or even retailers sell, for example, "Ford"
cars not manufactured by Ford or "IBM" typewriters not made
by IBM. Fixing responsibility for repairs would be chaotic.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted).
12 65 TRADEMARK REP. 511, 523 (1975) (footnote omitted). Contra, A Review of Recent
Tenth Circuit Decisions, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 227, 239-41.
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C. The Tenth Circuit Holding In Redd Is Eminently Correct
The Tenth Circuit opinion in Redd carefully distinguished
between Redd's position as a jobber ("not doing business as Shell
Oil Company") 43 and that of a franchisee. Emphasizing that
trademark use in this case was permissive, the court concluded
that in such circumstances the trademark could not be held to be
a separate product for purposes of antitrust law.44 The court sin-
gled out the following facts: (1) The gasoline was sold as a trade-
marked product; (2) no one else in the market sold the Shell
trademark; and (3) Shell did not sell the trademark separately. 4'
For the court to extend the rule of the Chicken Delight situation
to such a "typical sale of a trademark product"46 would have been
unwarranted.
D. Conclusion
Had the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court, then the
Tenth Circuit would have condoned and approved Redd's acts of
unfair competition. Redd had sought to palm off cheaper gasoline
as gasoline coming from Shell; yet Redd was not paying Shell for
the privilege of using the "Shell" mark as is the situation in the
"rent-a-name" franchises. Redd was simply attempting to force
Shell, at virtually no profit to Shell, to maintain quality control
standards over any gasoline sold by Redd.
In truth, Redd had chosen to use an identical trademark,
"Shell," on an identical product, gasoline, in direct competition
with Shell. This is per se trademark infringement-per se unfair
competition. It flies in the face of our common law heritage and
the whole philosophy of the Lanham Act.
II. Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424 (10th
Cir. 1975)
In Value House the Tenth Circuit restated the relationship
between trademarks registered under the Lanham Act47 and al-
4 524 F.2d at 1056.
U Id. at 1057.
4Id.
," Id.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1127 (1970).
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leged infringing marks which were in use prior to that registra-
tion."
Plaintiff began using the name "The Value House" in Maine
in 1961 and was granted federal registration for that tradename
in October of 1969. Without knowledge of the plaintiff's use of the
name, defendant adopted on or about May 1, 1968, the name
"Value House" in connection with its retail business in New Mex-
ico and registered the mark under the New Mexico Trademark
Act49 on August 5, 1968.50
Plaintiff began to expand outside of Maine in 1969 and now
has business locations in Maine and six other eastern states.5'
After discovering defendant's use of a nearly identical name in a
similar business, plaintiff brought suit in federal district court for
trademark infringement, claiming under the Lanham Act a right
to exclusive use of the name throughout the United States. The
court dismissed plaintiff's complaint and granted defendant's
counterclaim by issuing an injunction restraining plaintiff from
using the name in New Mexico, western Texas, and southern
Colorado.5" The Tenth Circuit upheld both the ruling on infringe-
ment and the injunctive relief.1
3
The court of appeals rejected each of the plaintiff's argu-
ments after holding there was no error in the findings of fact of
the trial court.54 The Tenth Circuit held that, although plaintiff
had used the tradename first, the defendant did not have knowl-
edge of that prior use.55 Thus, since defendant's use preceded
plaintiff's registration, the constructive notice provision in sec-
tion 22 of the Lanham Act could not apply.5
The court also concluded that, although the Lanham Act
provides for registration with constructive notice and affords na-
tionwide protection, the remedies section of the statute limits a
" For a discussion of this limited area defense, see 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 23, §
26.18 (1973).
,' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-4-6 to -12 (1953).
523 F.2d at 427.
51 Id.




Id. at 429 (applying 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970)).
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defendant's liability to instances in which the defendant's use is
intended to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.57 Since there
had been no finding of actual confusion or even of any customers
in common, the Tenth Circuit held plaintiff had no basis for a
remedy.5 8 Defendant had also innocently adopted the use of the
mark prior to plaintiff's registration and was, therefore, entitled
to a prior use defense.5 9
The court rejected the plaintiff's common law infringement
claim on the grounds that the parties had established rights to
their widely separated markets. 0 In addition the preservation of
defendant's geographical market against any future expansion by
plaintiff was upheld."' Thus, under Value House, the owner of a
registered trademark may be permanently prevented from using
the name in the geographic area of an innocent user.2
' Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970).
523 F.2d at 429.
" Id. at 430. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) requires that such use must precede registration.
The court, therefore, also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the date of filing should
be the determining date. 523 F.2d at 430. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) provides that concurrent
registration may be granted only if prior use occurs before the filing date. Plaintiff argued
that the disparity between the operative dates in the two sections would produce the
anomalous result of an innocent user being able to preserve concurrent use though not
eligible for concurrent registration. The court limited its analysis to the plain meaning of
the statute. The two sections, however, are reconcilable. The key date for analysis of
defenses is the date of registration, which cuts off the prior use defense. But in a concur-
rent use proceeding neither party yet owns a registration. Some prior date would, there-
fore, logically be required.
0 523 F.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 432.
62 Id. Only after an abandonment by defendant or "other changed circumstances"
might the decree be reexamined. Id.
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By ROBERT E. OLSEN* AND WENDY H. LYNCH**
This section is concerned primarily with how recent decisions
of the Tenth Circuit have affected pleading and proof in securities
cases. Six cases are discussed. Of these, the most significant is
Holdsworth v. Strong, I one of the progeny of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,l which reexamined the elements of due diligence and
reliance in 10b-5 actions. The other cases considered dealt with
land sales as securities transactions, the awarding of attorney's
fees and implied section 15(c) civil actions, the defense of sover-
eign immunity, the determination of a "security" as a factual
question, and derivative actions for the recovery of short-swing
profits. If any trend is evidenced in these cases, it is that the
Tenth Circuit, perhaps unlike the Supreme Court, continues to
give expansive interpretations to the federal securities laws, find-
ing nontechnical, common law solutions to increasingly technical
statutory problems.
I. DUE DILIGENCE AND RELIANCE IN 10b-5 ACTIONS
On March 30, 1976, in the Ernst & Ernst decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that "scienter," which it defined as
the defendant's intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,3 must
be alleged and proved to establish liability under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule 10b- 51 promulgated
* Associate, Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw & Harring, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1966,
Harvard University; M.A., 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1975, University of
Denver.
* B.B.A., 1972, Pace University; J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 425 U.S. 185, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
425 U.S. at 193.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). Rule 10b-5 provides:
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
thereunder. Among the many matters left unresolved by this
holding was the continued validity of the traditional defense of
lack of due diligence. The Tenth Circuit, in Holdsworth v.
Strong,' was the first court to consider that continued validity.
By analogy to the common law of torts, the court held that proof
of the plaintiff's failure to exercise due diligence did not bar re-
covery where intentional conduct on the part of the defendant
was required to be proved.
The trial court in Holdsworth concluded that the defendant
had intentionally defrauded the plaintiffs, within the meaning of
rule 10b-5, when he purchased their minority shares in a close
corporation.! Prior to the sale, plaintiff K. Jay Holdsworth and
the defendant, both founders of the corporation, had been direc-
tors, close personal friends, and business associates for more than
ten years. Both were lawyers, and plaintiff Holdsworth was also
an accountant. Plaintiffs sold their stock without first examining
the books and records of the corporation. The defendant's mis-
representations concerning the financial condition of the corpora-
tion were major elements of the fraud."
The defendant's principal argument on appeal was that, be-
cause of Holdsworth's status as a corporate insider, an attorney,
and an accountant, Holdsworth had a duty to ascertain the finan-
cial condition of the company prior to selling his stock. The defen-
dant also argued that the plaintiffs were not justified in relying
upon the defendant's misrepresentations.'
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
An initial opinion in the case was subsequently withdrawn, apparently as a result
of the intervening Ernst & Ernst decision.






The court considered the primary issue to be:
[W]hether in an intentional fraud case such as the instant one, the
victim is barred from relief if he does not exercise due care to avoid
being deceived, due diligence being generally defined as the require-
ment that an insider "must fulfill a duty of due care in seeking to
ascertain for himself the facts relevant to a transaction" before he
may claim reliance on a material misrepresentation or omission.'0
Because a private right of action under 10b-5 was judicially
implied" and not expressly permitted by statute, courts had to
define the elements of that action.'" Gradually, courts evolved
standards of conduct to which plaintiffs were required to con-
form,'3 and "[a]lthough a variety of rationales has been used, a
common doctrinal end has been reached: the plaintiff will not be
able to successfully maintain a private 10b-5 suit if his own care-
lessness has contributed to his loss."'
4
That the due diligence requirement was a judicial creation
helps to explain a lack of consistency in decisions considering it.
Several courts have described the due diligence requirement in
terms of the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentations or omissions.15 Other courts have explained
Id. at 692 (citation omitted).
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
,2 Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to
an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 561, 568 (1975); Note, The Due Diligence Require-
ment for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753, 761 [hereinafter cited as The
Due Diligence Requirement].
'" The Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 754. In Straub v. Vaisman &
Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623 (3d Cir., June 15,
1976), the court traced the development of the due diligence requirement, observing that
initially a defendant's failure to disclose facts, even if the facts were material, would not
result in a cause of action under rule 10b-5. Where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the facts, such knowledge would, in effect, destroy the requisite materiality. Some courts
took a further step and began to deny recovery in those cases where the plaintiff had
constructive knowledge of the information withheld by the defendant. In an effort to
prevent investor carelessness and to reduce the number of 10b-5 suits, plaintiffs' actions
were closely examined, often in terms of materiality and reliance, and each plaintiff was
required to show that he exercised due care or due diligence in the transaction. Id. at
90,109.
4 Wheeler, supra note 12, at 568.
" In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1973), the court noted that
"[tihe cases generally hold that before an insider may claim reliance on a material
misrepresentation or nondisclosure, he must fulfill a duty of due care in seeking to ascer-
tain for himself the facts relevant to a transaction." Accord City Nat'l Bank v. Vander-
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the requirement in terms of the defendant's duty to disclose' or
in terms of the materiality of the information;" while still others
have imposed a duty of due care without any particular explana-
tion or discussion of it."
In Holdsworth, the Tenth Circuit treated the plaintiff's due
diligence as a separate issue, i.e., as an affirmative defense, 9 and
compared it to the common law tort defense of contributory negli-
gence. 0 This comparison required that the court distinguish those
10b-5 cases in which the defendant's misrepresentation or nondis-
closure resulted merely from his negligence. Thus the court
noted: "[Wihile . . . contributory negligence is logically related
to negligence where the defendant is charged with negligent mis-
representation, . . . where he is charged with intent to defraud,
mere contributory negligence of plaintiff becomes trivial in com-
parison."' The court quoted, with approval, Dean Prosser's state-
ment that "where there is an intent to mislead . . . mere negli-
gence of the plaintiff is not a defense ....
As the Holdsworth court recognized, those circuits which
have most clearly required due diligence on the part of the plain-
tiff are generally those which have allowed a 10b-5 action based
upon the defendant's negligent conduct.13 Because Ernst & Ernst
boom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). See Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
11 In other words, where the plaintiff had ready access to the misrepresented or non-
disclosed information, the defendant may have had no duty to disclose. White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974). See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42
(7th Cir. 1963).
See Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 896 n.11 (D. Utah 1973).
" Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Wheeler, supra note 12, at 573.
" See The Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 760, wherein the author
urged that due diligence be treated as a separate element, stating, "its potential utility is
evident. The approach is also theoretically impeccable." Id.
Although tort concepts, particularly those of fraud and deceit, are not determina-
tive of 10b-5 actions, such concepts have often been utilized as an interpretive aid. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623, at 90,110 (3d Cir. June
15, 1976); Landy v. Federal Depository Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 169 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
, 545 F.2d at 694.
22 Id. (quoting W. PROSSEa, THE LAw OF TorTS 716 (4th ed. 1971)).
13 545 F.2d at 692; 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcurrms LAw: FRAuD § 8.4, at 652 (1975). See
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required that scienter now be proved, the continued validity of
those decisions became important. The Tenth Circuit reasoned:
Use of the tort analogy plainly demonstrates the inappropri-
ateness of due diligence in 10b-5 suits under the Ernst & Ernst
doctrine, for the due diligence standard as applied to 10b-5 suits is
about the same as the application of contributory negligence. Just
as contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort case
of fraud, similarly due diligence is totally inapposite in the context
of intentional conduct required to be proved under Rule 10b-5. 4
Although the defense of lack of due diligence was rejected
under the facts of Holdsworth, it is important to consider that in
Holdsworth there was "substantial evidence of intentional fraud
and deceit . "25 It is, therefore, unclear that the Tenth Circuit
has completely foreclosed the use of the defense of due diligence
in 10b-5 actions. The defense may still apply if, for example, the
defendant's misrepresentation or omission was the result of reck-
lessness,"0 or it may remain a valid defense if the defendant and
the plaintiff were both reckless, i.e., if the defendant's conduct
was something less than intentional while the plaintiff's conduct
was something more than merely negligent.
The Holdsworth court seemed to acknowledge these possibil-
ities when it stated: "The importance of Ernst & Ernst in the
present case is that it calls for scrutiny of the defense of due
diligence and prompts the question [of] whether it applies to
these facts even if it is applicable to more extreme
circumstances.'"7 Such extreme circumstances might well in-
Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974);
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S..30 (1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963);
Wheeler, supra note 12, at 581. But see Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d
100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), which applied a duty of due diligence
to intentional misrepresentations.
24 545 F.2d at 694. But see note 45 and accompanying text infra.
545 F.2d at 691.
Recklessness has been defined as conduct "in conscious disregard of, or indifference
to, the risk" that such conduct will be misleading. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 1~b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw.
U.L. REv. 423, 436 (1968). Generally, "[i]ntentional conduct (following the tort pattern)
comports a stricter scienter than reckless conduct. . . although the boundary line is not
easily discernible." BROMaERO, supra note 23, § 8.4, at 542.
545 F.2d at 693 (emphasis added).
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clude gross conduct by the plaintiff over an extended period of
time.28 Thus, the court observed: "If contributory fault of plaintiff
is to cancel out wanton or intentional fraud, it ought to be gross
conduct somewhat comparable to that of defendant. '2 In
Holdsworth, however, the plaintiffs' alleged lack of due diligence
consisted only of a failure to examine the books and records of the
corporation, which records "failed to accurately reflect the condi-
''30tion of the company....
Ernst & Ernst did not address the issue of whether reckless
behavior on the part of a defendant may be sufficient to impose
civil liability under 10b-5. The Supreme Court stated: "In certain
areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of inten-
tional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We
need not address here the question whether, in some circumstan-
ces, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 3' Since Ernst & Ernst, courts have taken note
of this unresolved issue. Some have assumed, for purposes of
argument, that recklessness suffices in a 10b-5 action.32 One court
has specifically interpreted Ernst & Ernst as holding that rule
10b-5 does not encompass negligence but does encompass those
" For example, in Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), the evidence revealed that, over a period of several
months, the plaintiff received from the defendant checks which were subsequently dis-
honored for insufficient funds. Although such an event normally required a customer's
trading account to be "frozen" for 90 days, the plaintiff continued to transact business
with the defendant customer and to accept his personal checks. In this action, the plaintiff
sought recovery for the last five dishonored checks. However, the court held the plaintiff
to the "objective standard of a reasonable investor exercising due care in light of all facts"
and concluded that the plaintiff's recovery was barred for failure to exercise due diligence
in spite of the fact that the defendant's misrepresentations were allegedly intentional. 434
F.2d at 103-04.
545 F.2d at 693.
Id. at 691.
425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
32 Carroll v. Bear, Steams & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Even were
we to assume arguendo, that recklessness is a sufficient predicate for 10b-5 liability, under
no stretch of the imagination would the plaintiff's allegations of failure to properly evalu-
ate and diligently research her portfolio and investment objectives amount to reckless-
ness."); Siclari v. Rio de Oro Mining Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,672, at 90,312 (S.D.N.Y., July 21, 1976) ("Even assuming ... that reckless
disregard for the truth can, under certain circumstances, satisfy the scienter requirement
[of Ernst & Ernst] . . .the allegations in the instant case do not rise to such recklessness.
Absent an allegation that the Mining Record had reason to know or suspect that the article
was untrue, recklessness does not exist.").
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actions intended to deceive or "so reckless as to be indistin-
guishable from deliberate fraud."33
In McLean v. Alexander,34 the Delaware District Court held
that an "accountant's 'knowing misconduct' short of actual in-
tent to defraud," was sufficient for 10b-5 liability.35 The McLean
court stated:
It necessarily follows that scienter for purposes of imposition of civil
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 encompasses knowing
or intentional misconduct. If the result were otherwise, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be more restrictive in substantive scope
than the substantive law of fraud. Reckless disregard for the truth
is also a cognizable basis for liability in common-law fraud actions.
There is no hint in Hochfelder that the court intended a radical
departure from accepted principles."
If, as the above cases appear to indicate, recklessness on the
part of a defendant may subject him to 10b-5 liability, a determi-
nation of whether Holdsworth precluded the use of the due dili-
gence defense under all circumstances is of critical importance.
3
1
When the Third Circuit considered the status of the due
diligence defense following the Ernst & Ernst decision," the court
noted that there are obvious benefits if parties are required to
Coleco Indus. v. Berman, [Aug. 25, 1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-16 (E.D.
Pa., Aug. 9, 1976) (digest of opinion).
1, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725 (D. Del., Aug. 13,
1976).
1 Confronted with the issue of recklessness, which the Supreme Court left unresolved
in Ernst & Ernst, the court ruled that scienter is present when an accountant either has
actual knowledge of material facts which he fails to disclose or recklessly disregards
material facts when rendering an audit opinion. Id. at 90,551-53.
Id. at 90,550.
See Wheeler, supra note 12, at 583:
If the Court decides that negligent conduct cannot support a damage award
under 10b-5. . .the logic of common law doctrine suggests that the due care
defense is either not available at all in this area of the law, or available only
in those cases where the defendant has acted with recklessness, that is, where
the defendant's conduct falls in the middle ground between a negligent and
an intentional violation of the rule.
In McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725
(D. Del., Aug. 13, 1976), the court reasoned: "There is, however, a wide spectrum of
prohibited behavior between negligence and specific intent to defraud. In that uncharted
land of knowing and reckless midconduct, defendant should be entitled to contest liability
by asserting a due diligence defense." Id. at 90,548.
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,623 (3d Cir., June 15, 1976).
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exercise care in securities transactions. 9 Rather than elect be-
tween two extremes-plaintiffs lack of diligence as either com-
pletely irrelevant or as a complete bar to recovery under all cir-
cumstances-the court chose a flexible approach: To encourage
investor caution, a plaintiff must act reasonably. 0 Factors con-
sidered by the Third Circuit in determining such reasonable con-
duct included the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 41 the
plaintiff's opportunity to detect the fraud; the sophistication of
the plaintiff; the existence of a long-standing business or personal
relationship; and the plaintiff's access to relevant information. 2
Given the language of the Holdsworth decision and the facts on
which it was based, it is conceivable that the Tenth Circuit may
also adopt such a flexible approach.
B. Reliance
Like due diligence, reliance by the plaintiff on the misrepre-
sentation or omission of the defendant has been judicially implied
as an element of 10b-5 actions. 4 Although several circuits have
not distinguished due diligence from reliance,44 the Tenth Circuit,
" Id. at 90,110.
Id.
" The Holdsworth court found either a "fiduciary" or "quasifiduciary" relationship
existing between Holdsworth and Strong. 545 F.2d at 697. It based this finding, however,
not on their relationship as minority and majority shareholders respectively, or on any
other fact commonly denoting such a relationship, but rather on their long business and
personal associations. Id. at 696-97. It is doubtful that the court intended to include every
more-than-casual relationship within the scope of a "fiduciary relationship," with the
consequent heightened burdens of disclosure on the so-called "fiduciary." Rather, it would
appear that the court was simply seeking to buttress its argument that a showing of due
diligence was not required in the case of intentional wrongdoing.
" Straub v. Vaisman & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,623, at 90,110 (3d Cir., June 15, 1976).
11 Commentators have agreed that this development results from the tendency of the
judiciary to analogize statutory torts to the common law torts of fraud and deceit. See
Stoll, Reliance as an Element in lOb-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REv. 169, 171 (1974); The Due
Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 758. As with due diligence, the fact that reliance
is a judicially created element probably explains the lack of clarity and uniformity in
decisions considering it. See note 45 infra; Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under
Rule lob-5, 32 U. Cm. L. Rav. 824, 824 (1965).
11 See note 15 supra. In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), the court concluded: "At some point in time after the
publication of a curative statement . . . stockholders should no longer be able to claim
reliance on the deceptive release. . . .This is but a requirement that stockholders too act
in good faith and with due diligence in purchasing and selling stock." 446 F.2d at 103. In




in Holdsworth, sought to treat them as separate concepts." In
Holdsworth, the plaintiffs' recovery was not barred by their fail-
ure to exercise due care or due diligence, but the court reasoned:
"We are not saying that once the plaintiff has proven scienter on
the part of the defendant that he has discharged his require-
ments. Plaintiff must show that he relied on the misrepresen-
tations and that the reliance was justifiable."" In other words,
reliance involves the question of whether the plaintiff was in fact
influenced by the untrue statements or omissions of the defen-
dant. However, whether the plaintiff was in fact influenced is
wholly irrelevant to whether the plaintiff should have been influ-
enced, i.e., whether the plaintiff exercised due care under the
circumstances."
With regard to misrepresentations, the question is whether a reasonable
investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation
and in the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to rely upon the
misrepresentation. With regard to nondisclosures, the issue becomes whether
a reasonable investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the nondis-
closure and in the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to receive
full disclosure from the party charged and would have acted differently had
the alleged nondisclosure not occurred.
422 F.2d at 230. In Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973),
the court stated that "plaintiff has not met his burden of proof as to causation because
his reliance was unreasonable in that he failed to make a careful and diligent effort to
inquire into and discover the true facts concerning the alleged fraud." Id. at 1056. But
see McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725
(D. Del., Aug. 13, 1976), which concluded that due diligence "imposes on the plaintiff the
duty to act with the caution expected of a reasonable person in his position. In short, due
diligence requires plaintiff to demonstrate that whatever actual reliance he claims is well-
founded." Id. at 90,547. This definition of due diligence contrasts with the test of reliance
found in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), i.e., "the misrepresen-
tation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in the
recipient's loss." Id. at 462.
11 Throughout its opinion, the court used, but failed to define, the term "justifiable
reliance." Frequently, it used the term synonomously with "materiality." E.g., 545 F.2d
at 695. However, it also observed that where the falsity of a misrepresentation should have
been "palpable," id. at 694, or that where a defendant's misrepresentations were
"obviously false," id. at 695,-in other words, where a plaintiff, in the words of the court,
has failed to exercise due diligence-no reliance could be justifiable. The court was not
entirely successful, therefore, in differentiating due diligence from reliance, or in demon-
strating that a showing of lack of due diligence has no application in those 1Ob-5 actions
alleging intentional midconduct.
" Id. at 694.
, Wheeler, supra note 12, at 592. When courts combine due diligence with the re-
quirement of reasonable reliance "the question of whether the plaintiff did, in fact,
rely-which properly is an element of causation-is confused with whether the plaintiff
should have relied-which properly is more a matter of policy." Id. at 593.
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The Tenth Circuit stressed the requirement that a plaintiff
must show a causal connection between the defendant's misre-
presentation or omission and the plaintiff's injury. If the causal
link is not proven, the defendant will escape liability. In the
court's opinion, "[tihe causal relationship provided by proof of
reliance or materiality sufficiently satisfied the need for [a] cau-
sal link." 8
The recent Supreme Court decision of Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States49 brought into question the continued validity of
the reliance requirement in 10b-5 actions. In Affiliated Ute, there
was no positive proof that the plaintiffs had relied on the defen-
dants' misconduct when deciding to sell their stock. Instead, the
Court created a presumption of reliance once materiality had
been established, stating:
[U]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a fail-
ure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision .... This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requi-
site element of causation in fact."
However, as noted by the court in Holdsworth, the deceit in
Affiliated Ute consisted of a nondisclosure. The weight of author-
ity since Affiliated Ute has been to invoke a presumption of reli-
ance in nondisclosure cases once materiality5 has been proved,
but, in misrepresentation cases, to require a showing of reliance
in fact.2 In Holdsworth the Tenth Circuit followed this trend.
545 F.2d at 695.
" 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
Id. at 153-54.
"Misrepresented or omitted facts become material, hence actionable under 10b-5,
when, considering the complaining parties as reasonable investors, the disclosure of the
undisclosed facts or candid revelation of misleading facts would affect their trading judg-
ment." Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971), and cert. denied sub. nom. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 405
U.S. 918 (1972).
" Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974);
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F.
Supp. 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Krendl & Krendl, Reviewing the Scienter Requirement in
IOb-5 Cases in the Tenth Circuit-Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), 53 DEN.
L.J. 261, 275 (1976); Stoll, supra note 43, at 181. Contra Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp.
782 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117
(E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Caesar's Palace SEC Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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The court expressly stated that reliance is still an element in 10b-
5 actions. In nondisclosure cases, reliance is not eliminated but,
because of the difficulty of proof in such cases, once materiality
is shown, reliance is presumed. In the words of the court:
In [a] nondisclosure situation, once causal connection is proven by
showing materiality, that is to say, whether a reasonable investor
would have considered the withheld facts important . . . the reli-
ance element is inferred.
Where, as here, there are affirmative misrepresentations, the
problem of proving reliance is not the same and reliance is the ap-
propriate and decisive way to prove the chain of causation.1
3
Although the Tenth Circuit in Holdsworth sought to clarify
the issues of due diligence and reliance and determine their ap-
propriateness in the securities context following the Ernst &
Ernst decision, the two concepts have still not been adequately
differentiated. Hopefully, there will be further refinement in fu-
ture securities cases, particularly when courts are faced with de-
termining whether due diligence is an appropriate defense in a
10b-5 action based on a defendant's reckless, as opposed to inten-
tional, misconduct.
II. LAND SALES AS SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
McCown v. Heidler54 illustrates how the federal courts have
moved away from the concept that the offer and sale of real
estate, without more, is not a securities transaction." Numerous
judicial and administrative opinions in recent years have de-
tected "securities" within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Se-
curities Act of 193311 in nonresidential condominium sales57 and
545 F.2d at 695 (citations omitted).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975). McCown also involved an interpretation of the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970 Supp. IV 1974),
which is not discussed in this section of the Survey but is addressed in the section on lands
and natural resources.
" See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973). Cf. SEC v.
Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (wherein the court noted that the Securities
Act "affects, not ordinary land sale contracts, but 'investment contracts' which evidence
primarily a right to participate in the proceeds of an income-producing venture, member-
ship in which is secured through entrusting an investor's capital to the management of
others.").
Is 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). Section 2(1) provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
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in resales of instruments relating to purchases of raw land."5
McCown, melding these lines of opinions, held that offers and
sales of lots in a real estate development raised the factual
question of whether the sales, regardless of the character of the
development as either residential or nonresidential,59 constituted
securities transactions where the lots were represented and sold
as "investments. ''760
Although the court acknowledged SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.'s"
definition of an "investment contract," it clearly relied for its
holding on SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.'s62 concept of an
"investment contract." In defining "investment contracts," and
hence "securities," Howey and Joiner employ somewhat different
tests.
In Joiner, the United States Supreme Court concluded that,
in defining a security, the test is "what character the instrument
is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distri-
bution, and the economic inducements held out to the pros-
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guaran-
tee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
11 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
" See, e.g., Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318
(D. Minn. 1972).
11 The court noted that in 1971 the majority of purchasers indicated that they ex-
pected to reside on their lots. 527 F.2d at 210. The potential effect of the decision was to
permit a class action, brought on behalf of all lot purchasers and not just those who
purchased for "investment," to proceed under the federal securities laws. Whether class
action certification should be granted under circumstances such as those in McCown,
where the expectation of each purchaser is critical to a determination of the status of each
sale as an "investment contract," is doubtful.
" The Tenth Circuit noted:
We agree that land, as such, is not a security and that a land purchase
contract, simply because the purchaser expects or hopes that the value of the
land purchased will increase, does not fall automatically within the confines
of the Securities Acts. However, we do not agree that land or its purchase
necessarily negates the application of the Securities Acts.
Id. at 208.
"1 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
42 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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pect." The Court noted: "In the enforcement of an act such as
this it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as
being what they were represented to be." 4 Under Joiner, there-
fore, the manner of offer may be sufficient to characterize the
offered item as an "investment contract" where it is widely of-
fered or dealt in."5
In the later Howey decision, the Supreme Court defined an
"investment contract" as "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party."6 Under the Howey test, a promoter's representa-
tions may be irrelevant unless such representations are consid-
ered as part of an overall scheme or where the manner of the offer
might lead an investor to expect profits solely from the efforts of
another. Under Howey, therefore, it is the nature of the transac-
tion as it is conducted in fact that is of primary importance.
Joiner and Howey may also be construed as separate, but
Id. at 352-53. The Court established essentially a two-pronged test of what consti-
tutes a security:
In the Securities Act the term "security" was defined to include by name or
description many documents in which there is common trading for specula-
tion or investment. Some, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are pretty much
standardized and the name alone carries well-settled meaning. Others are of
more variable character and were necessarily designated by more descriptive
terms, such as "transferable share," "investment contract," and "in general
any interest or instrument commonly known as a security." We cannot read
out of the statute these general descriptive designations merely because more
specific ones have been used to reach some kinds of documents. Instruments
may be included within any of these definitions, as matter of law, if on their
face they answer to the name or description. However, the reach of the Act
does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or
irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved
as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as
"investment contracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security.' " The proof here seems clear that these defendants' offers
brought their instruments within these terms.
Id. at 351.
" Id. at 353.
" See note 63 supra.
" 328 U.S. at 298-99. Since the McCown court did not rely on the Howey test, its
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's construction of the term "solely" in the Howey test is
dictum. 527 F.2d at 211. In other words, the Tenth Circuit has not adopted the standard
set forth in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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overlapping, tests. In fact, when the Howey Court defined an
"investment contract," it stated: "[S]uch a definition necessar-
ily underlies this Court's decision in Joiner."67 Courts often fail
to adequately differentiate the tests and instead utilize both
Howey and Joiner in reaching a decision.68
In either case, the apparent distinction between the two tests
may explain the recent tendency of courts to disregard formal
appearances and to inquire into the substance and economic real-
ity of a purported securities transaction. Recently, the Supreme
Court adopted such an approach in United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman.69 In Forman, the Court rejected a Joiner analysis
when it was confronted with the issue of whether shares of
"stock" in a nonprofit housing co-operative were securities as
defined by the securities acts. In holding that such shares of stock
were not encompassed by the acts, the Court contrasted the
Howey test, where "the investor is 'attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return' on his investment," with those instances in
which "a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume
the item purchased-'to occupy the land or to develop it them-
selves,' "0 and concluded that the securities acts do not apply to
the latter instances.7
However, in McCown, it was obviously the alleged offering
of lots as "investments," and not the alleged investment of money
in a common enterprise with respect to which investors were to
exercise no efforts, that the Tenth Circuit found decisive. The
court was so impressed with the manner in which the lots were
touted as "investments" that it quoted nineteen instances of the
use of the word in the developers' promotional materials. Yet,
there should be no question that not every "investment" is a
security, no matter how many times the word may be used in
promotional literature. As one court has stated:
" 328 U.S. at 299.
" See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 91-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Olpin v.
Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1969); Chapman v. Rudd Paint &
Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1969).
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
Id. at 852-53. Although the Tenth Circuit, in McCown, recognized that many lots
were purchased for the purpose of acquiring a home site as opposed to merely an invest-
ment, the court dismissed this distinction by simply noting "the duality of this
'investment/ownership package.' " 527 F.2d at 211.
"1 421 U.S. at 853.
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The mere presence of a speculative motive on the part of the pur-
chaser or seller does not evidence the existence of an "investment
contract" within the meaning of the securities acts. In a sense any-
one who buys or sells . . . hopes to realize a profitable
"investment." But the expected return is not contingent upon the
continuing efforts of another.7"
To fix on the repeated use of the word "investment" as an indi-
cium of a securities offering is to reduce the sweep of the securities
laws to a question of semantics.
The Joiner test provides no objective standard for the deter-
mination of which representations constitute the offer of an
"investment contract," and, therefore, it promotes confusion.
The strength of the Howey test, however, is that it focuses on
what should be the key element of a securities transaction-the
separation of ownership and control in an enterprise. In reliance
on the Howey test, some property interests, although not literally
"securities" within the meaning of section 2(1)-e.g., limited
partnership units-have long been regarded as securities almost
as a matter of law.73 McCown, however, could reverse this trend
by making each such determination hinge on the subjective stan-
dards of the trier of fact. If the court in McCown was willing to
accept the promised development of common area facilities as
evidence that subdivision lots may have been offered and sold as
securities, another court will no doubt find the same evidentiary
support in assumed developer obligations to obtain zoning vari-
ances, to prepare and file a plat, to mark a property with bound-
ary stakes, or to take any other action more properly the subject
of real estate law than securities law.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND IMPLIED SECTION 15(c) CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Attorney's Fees
In Hail v. Heyman-Christiansen" the sole issue on appeal
was whether attorney's fees, as an added element of damages,
may be awarded to a successful plaintiff whose judgment is based
exclusively on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.75 The Tenth Circuit
" Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis added).
" See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.12[2] (1st ed.
1972) and cases cited therein.
536 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1976).
See notes 4 and 5 supra.
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in a per curiam opinion held that they may not be awarded,
dismissing as irrelevant the plaintiff's observation that the ap-
plicable Blue Sky Law"6 would have permitted recovery of attor-
ney's fees on a showing of facts substantially identical to those
alleged in the complaint.
The court relied on Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur" for the
proposition that attorney's fees are not recoverable in a 10b-5
action."8 Mitchell, in turn, is in line with the principles of equity
which have traditionally shaped the fashioning of remedies in
federal securities litigation.7" Thus, except where expressly au-
thorized by statute," the awarding of attorney's fees has typically
been restricted to class and deriviative actions,' usually brought
under sections 14 and 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 2 Only in such actions
have plaintiffs convincingly depicted the public interest as their
motivation in bringing suit.
3
Occasional cases have suggested broader possible bases for
the awarding of attorney's fees under the federal securities laws.
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(I)(b) (1953).
77 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
7, 446 F.2d at 106.
See generally Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Gilbert v.
Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
" Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970), permits the awarding of
attorney's fees where a claim or defense is without merit. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v.
Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 277 (10th Cir. 1957). Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)
(1970), permits the assessment of attorney's fees in actions alleging certain manipulations
in connection with exchange-registered securities. Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a) (1970), grants the trial court discretion to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff
successfully alleging misrepresentation in filings made pursuant to the Act or rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
" See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 515 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1975); Wechsler v.
Southeastern Properties, Inc., 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); Dillon v. Berg, 482 F.2d 1237
(3d Cir. 1973); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 657 (W.D. Okla.
1973).
,2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, p(b) (1970). Section 14 incorporates proxy requirements. Section
16(b) permits short-swing profits by corporate insiders to be recovered for the corporation.
,3 Thus, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the
court stated that the purpose of awarding counsel fees in securities cases was to encourage
the vigilance of private attorneys general to provide corporate therapy for the protection
of the public investor. The court in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384
F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425
U.S. 910 (1976) (the Second Circuit modified the district court's decision but affirmed on
the issue of attorney's fees), denied attorney's fees with the comment that the tenor of




A 1974 federal district court decision 4 denied counsel fees be-
cause the complaint neither sought a judgment financially bene-
fiting other investors nor presented "any overriding considera-
tions of justice." 5 The use of the disjunctive implied that such
considerations might well be unrelated to the public interest. A
1973 Second Circuit case8 denied an award of attorney's fees
unless "special circumstances" existed calling for the interven-
tion of a private attorney general. 7 While it is conceivable that
such "overriding considerations" or "special circumstances"
might be present in a 10b-5 action, no federal appellate court to
date in a reported decision has been pursuaded to recognize them.
B. Implied Section 15(c) Civil Actions
Hail suggested, but did not consider, several other issues.
The court noted that the plaintiff's complaint had raised two
additional claims for relief: "[Flailure to acquire reasonably cur-
rent information concerning the corporations whose stocks were
being sold (violating Rule 144 of the SEC, promulgated under
Section 15(c) of the [1934] Act); and . . . violation of Section 2
of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD by failing to obtain the
financial statement of plaintiff prior to recommending specula-
tive securities. '"88
Although the court's summary is confusing and somewhat
inaccurate, 9 it suggested that the plaintiff had purchased re-
stricted securities from the defendant broker-dealer in reliance
upon rule 144. One of the conditions of rule 144 is that there be
available adequate, current public information concerning the
issuer of the securities being sold.90 At least one administrative
" Smith v. Manusa, 385 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 535 F.2d 353 (6th
Cir. 1976).
' 385 F. Supp. at 454 and cases cited therein.
'n Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
'7 484 F.2d at 1267 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970)).
536 F.2d at 909 n.1.
" Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976), was not "promulgated under Section 15(c) of
the [1934] Act .... " Rather, it is a safe-harbor implementation of the exemption from
registration contained in section 4(1) of the 1933 Act. It permits restricted securities to
be sold under certain specified conditions without constituting the seller an "underwriter"
for purposes of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. Rule 144 mandates no conduct and therefore
cannot be violated in the sense that rule 10b-5, for example, can.
" 17 C.F.R. 230.144(c)(2) (1976). Rule 144(c)(2) provides that, with respect to non-
reporting issuers, the public information requirement shall be deemed satisfied if essen-
tially all of the information specified in Rule 15c2-11 is publicly available.
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decision' has concluded that compliance with rule 15c2-1111 by a
broker-dealer selling restricted securities satisfies the above-
mentioned condition of rule 144. Apparently the complaint in
Hail had alleged that the broker-dealer, by violating one of the
section 15(c)(2) series of rules, had "violated" rule 144.
The more precise argument would have been that by violat-
ing rule 15c2-11 the broker-dealer had caused rule 144 to be un-
available to the seller and had thereby sold the restricted securi-
ties to the plaintiff in violation of the registration provisions of
the 1933 Act. 3 For such a violation, the remedy under section
12(1) would have been available to the plaintiff. 4 The complaint,
however, seemingly went beyond this analysis and suggested an
implied private right of action for violation of either section
15(c)(2) and the rules promulgated thereunder, or rule 144, said
implied private action being arguably independent of sections
10(b) and 12(1).11
The Tenth Circuit has not had an occasion to consider
whether section 15(c) creates a private right of action. Other
courts, however, generally in reliance on section 29 of the 1934
Act,"6 have implied such a civil action, at least with respect to
section 15(c)(1). Among the courts which have either acknowl-
edged or permitted a civil claim based on section 15 (c)(1) are the
Second and Seventh Circuits, and the United States District
Courts for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of California, and the
0
MBS Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,865
(May 23, 1972). But see George D.B. Bonbright & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,965 (July 18, 1972).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1976), promulgated under section 15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1970).
"s Jacobs, Persinger, & Parker, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,945 (June 13, 1972); preliminary note to rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976).
"15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
Violations of the section 15(c)(1) series of rules are deemed violations of section
10(b) by virture of rule 10b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-3 (1976). The argument for an implied
private action founded on section 15(c)(1), however, does not rest on the application of
rule 10b-3.
,1 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). Section 29(b) provides that "[e]very contract made
in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every
contract . . . which involves the violation of. . .any provision of this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void .... 1"
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Northern District of Illinois. 7 Moreover, despite the first proviso
of section 29(b) 9 -which would appear to bar the bringing of a
suit under section 29(b) for avoidance of a contract with a broker-
dealer, where the contract or its performance results in a violation
of one of the section 15(c)(2) or (c)(3) series of rules-at least one
court has recognized an implied private right of action under
section 15(c)(2).1
While the implied section 15(c)(1) civil action seems clear,
the existence of a section 15(c)(2) civil right of action is less so.
To reach the latter result, the plaintiff must argue: (1) That the
proviso of section 29(b) bars only a suit based on a violation of a
rule under section 15(c)(2) (e.g., rule 15c2-11) but not one based
on a violation of section 15(c)(2) itself; (2) that section 29(b)
applies only to claims for rescission and not for damages; or (3)
that a section 15(c)(2) remedy exists irrespective of the rights
created by section 29(b). The first of these arguments, while liter-
ally correct, would tend to frustrate the legislative intent of im-
plementing the federal securities laws through rules and regula-
tions. The second, which also is not illogical, has received a gener-
ally negative judicial reception. 00 Only the third argument has
11 Iroquois Indus. Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47
(7th Cir. 1968); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa., 1972); Smachlo v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,148 (S.D.N.Y., June 15, 1971); Shulof v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,147 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 18, 1971); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1970): Maher v.
J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone
& Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D. Cal., Sept.
30, 1965); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also Lorenz v.
Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (assuming arguendo that a section 15(c)(1)
action will lie).
" "[P/rovided, (A) That no contract shall be void by reason of this subsection
because of any violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or
(3) of subsection (c) of Section 15 of this title .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
," Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), on the implication of statutory reme-
dies).
11 Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Maher v.
J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F




genuine appeal. There is no apparent reason why the statutory
prohibitions contained in sections 15(c)(2) and (c)(3), and the
rules promulgated thereunder, should be given effect only by an
enforcement action. Perhaps the intent of the drafters of the first
proviso of section 29(b) was simply to ensure the regularity of
trading markets by barring the innocent purchaser (or seller) of
a security from avoiding certain contracts with a broker-dealer
where the effect would be to restore an innocent seller (or pur-
chaser) to the status quo. Where such a consequence can be
avoided, the statutory tort theory should support an implied right
of action against the broker-dealer under sections 15(c)(2) and
(c) (3).,o1
Although the trial court in Hail did not find it necessary to
rule on the plaintiff's rule 144 claim, it might well have dismissed
it. Rule 144 may establish a norm of conduct against which the
actions of a broker-dealer might be measured. °0 It was promul-
gated, however, not primarily as a part of the SEC's regulation
of broker-dealers but rather as part of the SEC's continuing effort
to prevent leakage of unregistered securities into trading mar-
kets.'0 3 Thus the rule imposes no affirmative duty on broker-
dealers' 4 and, even if it protects the public in an abstract sense,
it creates no liability which cannot be enforced through existing
statutory means.0 5 Similarly, plaintiff's claim of violation of sec-
tion 2 of the N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice was properly dis-
missed by the trial court,'0 perhaps because the broker-dealer's
,0, See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1342-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
102 Cf. Lavin v. A.G. Becker & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,446 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 10, 1973); Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (alleged violation of N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice relevant to suggest what
duty the defendant had to the plaintiff under rule 10b-5); SEC Release No. 34-9420, 3 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 25,592 (Feb. 11, 1972) (N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice are written
norms of conduct).
" See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 73, § 4.01.
Contra Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
... Id. Cf. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972).
'I" See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966). The trial court dismissed the claim on the strength of Utah v. DuPont
Walston, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,812 (D. Utah,
Oct. 1, 1974), which in turn had relied on Colonial Realty Corp.
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failure to obtain a financial statement of its customer before rec-
ommending a speculative security for purchase may already
have been a violation of section 15(c)(2) and rule 15c2-5(a)(2)' s
promulgated thereunder.
IV. DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Green v. Utah, '08 in one of the few reported decisions on
point, tested the question of whether the eleventh amendment to
the United States Constitution"' bars the bringing of a suit in
federal court"" against a state under the federal securities laws.
Under the eleventh amendment, states, absent a judicially per-
ceived waiver-either express or implied-have been held im-
mune from suits of their own ditizens or those of other states, to
enforce federal statutory liabilities."' Only the Second, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits, however, have previously considered the ques-
tion in a federal securities context. On facts remarkably similar
to those of Green, the Sixth Circuit twice,"' and the Fourth Cir-
cuit once,"' have held that the eleventh amendment protects the
Commonwealths of Kentucky and Virginia respectively from suit.
The Second Circuit in Forman v. Community Services, Inc."'
found that the State of New York had waived its sovereign im-
munity by subsidizing a nonprofit cooperative apartment com-
pany which allegedly issued securities."5
07 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-5(a)(2) (1976). Rule 15c2-5(a)(2) imposes upon a broker-dealer
arranging credit in certain transactions the obligation to ascertain and document, includ-
ing the retention of a customer financial statement, that the transaction is suitable to the
customer's financial situation and needs.
539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976).
' The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
"I Federal district court jurisdiction is exclusive under the 1934 Act and concurrent
with the state courts under the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1970). There is
some equitable appeal to the argument of the plaintiff in Green that if the federal district
court were to dismiss her action under the 1934 Act for which federal jurisdiction is
exclusive, it would unfairly deny her a right of action altogether.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
"' Yeomans v. Kentucky, 514 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983
(1976); Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1976).
" Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973). See also MacKethan v. Virginia,
370 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Va. 1974).
1" 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
"1 500 F.2d at 1255-56.
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In Green a Utah industrial loan company depositor brought
suit under section 10(b) against the State of Utah and the Utah
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, among others, for gross
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in allegedly failing to
supervise and control adequately the loan company which was in
receivership at the time the action was commenced. Assuming
arguendo that the depositor's thrift-certificate passbooks, deben-
ture bonds, and thrift certificates were "securities" within the
meaning of section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act,"6 the Tenth Circuit
distinguished between regulatory and proprietary functions of a
state and held that, in the absence of a clear congressional intent
to subject states to suit, sovereign immunity protects the states
when they are engaged in regulatory functions pursuant to estab-
lished governmental powers."' The court did not find it necessary
to decide the corollary issue of whether the federal securities laws
manifest an intent to subject states to suit when engaged in pro-
prietary functions, nor did it seek to define what such proprietary
functions might include."8 The implication of the court's reason-
ing, however, was that proprietary functions include the raising
of capital through the issuance of securities, and that, when en-
gaged in such activities, states, state agencies, and political sub-
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). By somewhat sketchy analyses, the federal courts
have consistently held that evidences of indebtedness issued by industrial banks or in-
dustrial loan companies do not constitute securities exempt from 1933 Act registration by
having been "issued or guaranteed by any bank .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). Cf.
Commercial Credit Co. (SEC No-Action Letter), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 78,544 (Nov. 5, 1971) (nonnegotiable passbook accounts of industrial loan
company not exempt from registration under either section 3(a)(2) or section 3(a)(5) of
the 1933 Act).
"I This distinction, first articulated in Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y.
1842), and labelled the "proprietary-governmental" distinction, was employed by the
Eighth Circuit in Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), aff'd, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). In
the context of securities law the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasoning in Employees, re-
christening the distinction the "proprietary-regulatory" dichotomy. Brown v. Kentucky,
513 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1976); Yeomans v. Kentucky,
514 F.2d 993, 994 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1976). As a solution to the
problem, at least one author has suggested that the characterization of the state function
be made but one element in a multipronged test to determine whether immunity attaches
in a particular case. Note, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity,
1974 DUKE L.J. 925.
"' The court suggested, nevertheless, that intentional wrongdoing, like aiding and
abetting or any other active participation by a state, is insufficient to alter the general
rule. 539 F.2d at 1274.
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divisions enjoy no eleventh amendment protection."'
The waiver concept is a particularly arcane concept of consti-
tutional law.' 0 It is consistent, however, with the essential nature
of federalism as permitting the state and federal governments to
exercise power independently of each other. Nevertheless, one
wonders whether the Tenth Circuit, or any other federal appellate
court, would allow a state to be immune from civil suit in federal
court under the circumstances in which the state's regulatory
power was used, for example, for criminal purposes. The Tenth
"I Id. at 1272-73. State agencies and political subdivisions have generally been held
to enjoy no immunity under the eleventh amendment, regardless of the nature of the
functions they exercise, although some courts have indicated that this may involve ques-
tions of fact. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911); Wright v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1152-54 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Southern
Bridge Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948, 951 (E.D. La. 1970).
'I" The basic fiction is that, by ratifying the Constitution which has always included
the commerce clause, the thirteen original states in 1787 gave to Congress the power to
enact laws regulating commerce and thereby effectively waived immunity from suit
brought on violations of such laws, at least insofar as the intent of Congress to subject
the states to suit was clear. Such argument ignores the fact that the eleventh amendment
was not ratified by the required number of states until 1797. It is generally accepted that
all sections of the Constitution must be construed together with no one constitutional
guarantee enjoying a preference over any other. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); Linn Land Co. v. Udall, 255 F. Supp. 382 (D. Ore. 1966), rev'd on other grounds
sub nor. Udall v. Battle Mountain Co., 385 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
957 (1968). In construing the eleventh amendment and the commerce clause together, one
reasonable harmonization is that the framers of the Constitution gave to Congress the
power to enact laws regulating commerce, which power was modified by the right of the
states, under specified circumstances, to be immune from suit in federal court. Such
construction is supported by the analogous principle of state constitutional law that the
last in time of two conflicting constitutional provisions, or of a constitutional provision
and an amendment, is preferred. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by General Assembly, 171
Colo. 200, 467 P.2d 56 (1970); Sharpe v. State, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 904 (1969); City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
Under this doctrine of last change, the eleventh amendment would control. Instead, by
articulating the theory of waiver or implied consent, the courts have used illogic and a
patent legal fiction to reach a result more appropriately grounded on concepts of federal-
ism. Green illustrates this latter point. Instead of focusing on whether Utah, as a matter
of state law, had waived its sovereign immunity to suit in federal court, the court con-
cerned itself almost exclusively with whether Congress, as a matter of federal law, had
intended to subject the states to suit under the federal securities laws. See Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Tress., 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (question of waiver is a matter of state
law); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 311 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 377
U.S. 184 (1964). But see Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp., 423
F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970) (Congress must express an intent to override a state's immunity
in order to subject the state to suit by private individuals). By such reasoning, the implica-
tions of the statutory definition of "person" contained in the 1934 Act, for example,
become a major, and mistaken, issue.
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Circuit's distinction between regulatory and proprietary func-
tions assumes that governmental authority is, and can be, effec-
tively used at the state level to accomplish objectives consistent
with those of the federal securities laws. However, the enactment
of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,21 which included a
sweeping overhaul of federal law with respect to municipal securi-
ties, would seem to indicate some congressional dissatisfaction
with that assumption.
V. DETERMINATION OF A "SECURITY" AS A FACTUAL QUESTION
In United States v. Gibbs, In the Tenth Circuit concluded in
dictum that what constitutes a "security" is essentially a ques-
tion of fact to be submitted to the trier of fact, even in a civil case.
This result was contrary to its earlier holding in Ahrens v.
American-Canadian Beaver Co. 123 and to the literal approach of
Joiner. 12, It was consistent, however, with the implicit rejection
of the Joiner approach which culminated in United Housing Inc.
v. Forman. 125 Like McCown v. Heidler, 26 this development cre-
ates a problem because it fails to suggest which transactions out
of the general multitude of transactions should be regarded as
"securities" as a matter of fact thereby making available to plain-
tiffs the special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies af-
forded by the federal securities laws.'"
I Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
' No. 75-1568 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
428 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1970).
2 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). See note 63 supra.
Out of different considerations, perhaps, the right to submit to the jury the question of
whether an instrument or transaction is a "security" has generally been upheld in criminal
cases. United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972);
Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1961).
'- 421 U.S. 837 (1975). So many courts have adopted the "economic realities" test
set forth in Joiner, or a "substance versus form" test, with respect to devices not literally
within the definition of "security," that it comes as a surprise to find an occasional court
holding that a particular note, for example, is a "security" per se solely because a note is
defined as a security in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act or section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.
Compare, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (a "note" is a security) with Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
336 (1967) (in construing the meaning of "security," form should be disregarded for sub-
stance and the emphasis should be on economic reality) and United Hous. Foundation,
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
'v See Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 787 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (quoting Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967)).
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VI. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF SHORT-SWING
PROFITS
The court, in Morales v. Mapco, Inc.,2 8 held that section
16(b) of the 1934 Act"9 permitted a corporation to recover short-
swing profits where an insider acquired warrants to purchase
stock, voluntarily exercised the warrants (or otherwise acquired
the underlying stock) by paying cash of $9.00 per warrant more
than six months later, and sold the underlying stock within six
months after exercise. The court held that, until the warrants
were exercised by the payment of cash, the warrant holder had
no equity ownership in the corporation but, instead, had only a
right to purchase stock. The first date of exercise therefore trig-
gered the application of section 16(b). The court distinguished
cases concerned with the conversion of shares of one class of cor-
porate securities into those of another, and involuntary transac-
tions such as those resulting from mergers. The court also held
that the exercise of each warrant constituted a "purchase" within
the meaning of section 16(b) and that a showing of intent to
realize short-swing profits is not required under the terms of the
statute.
" 541 F.2d 233 (loth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).




During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered only
a limited number of cases involving federal taxation. Due to the
relatively Small number of cases and to make the survey of this
area as complete as possible most of these cases will be discussed.'
Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Commissioner
2
presented three issues concerning the taxation of insurance com-
panies: (1) Are unpaid premiums (including deferred premiums
and due and unpaid premiums) and the loading portions of these
premiums, assets of a life insurance company;3 (2) are unpaid
premiums, including their loading portions, to be included within
a life insurance company's underwriting income;' and, (3) are
purchased blocks of cancellable accident and health insurance
policies amortizable over their useful lives? 5
With respect to the first issue, the Tenth Circuit, contrary to
the decisions of four other circuits, held that unpaid premiums
This overview will deal only with cases involving federal tax questions; it will not
discuss those cases that may have arisen in a tax setting but were decided under principles
of other areas of the law. All citations to the Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 as amended; all citations to sections refer to sections of the Code.
2 525 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077
(1974), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 814 (1976).
1 In 1958 Standard did not include unpaid premiums in computing its assets under
section 805. In 1959 and 1961 Standard included in its assets only the net valuation
premium and excluded loading with respect to unpaid premiums. 525 F.2d at 787.
1 In 1958, 1959, and 1961, Standard claimed deductions for increases in loading in
computing gain from operations under section 809. Id. at 787-88.
1 Standard bought blocks of policies from other insurance companies. Id. at 788.
"Unpaid premiums" fall into two categories, namely, "deferred premiums" and "due
and unpaid premiums." Deferred premiums are those premiums on policies with install-
ment payments which become due after December 31 but prior to the policy's anniversary
date. Due and unpaid premiums are those premiums which are due but unpaid before the
end of the year. "Loading" is the amount added to the "net valuation premium" (the
amount necessary to provide the policy's benefits under applicable mortality tables) in
order to cover acquisition and management costs, operating expenses, commissions, prof-
its, and dividends. Together, the loading amount and the net valuation premium comprise
the "gross premium" or the amount charged the insured for carrying his particular risk.
527 F.2d at 787. These definitions were adopted by the Tax Court in Bankers Union Life
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 661, 663 (1974).
State and federal insurance regulations required Standard to compute most of its
policies' reserves as if all of the premiums on these policies were paid a year in advance,
although this is rarely true; reserves are treated as a liability to an insurance company
and figure into the computation of assets under section 805 and gain from operations under
section 809. I.R.C. §§ 805(a), 805(b)(4), 809(c)(2).
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are not to be included in the calculation of assets under section
805.6 The applicable Treasury regulation, to the extent that it
required these unpaid premuims to be treated as assets, was in-
validated by the Tenth Circuit.7 The reasoning underlying the
decisions of the other four circuits did not persuade the Tenth
Circuit because those cases were based upon the fiction that the
annual premiums were received in full and upon the simple desire
to achieve uniformity in accounting for reserves and unpaid
premiums.' The Tenth Circuit noted that the other circuits had
failed to distinguish the fact that, while reserves are required by
state law in order to protect policy holders, "income taxes are,
uniformly, owing on income actually earned. 9 The Tenth Circuit
held that unpaid premiums are not section 805(b)(4) assets be-
cause the insurance company has no enforceable right to them.
Nor does the insurance company have a right to due but unpaid
premiums; non-payment of premiums only causes the policy to
lapse. 10
With respect to the second issue, the Tenth Circuit held that
unpaid premiums were not includable in premium income under
section 809(c)(1) because premium income under that section
includes only those premiums to which an insurance company
has a legally enforceable right."
The Tenth Circuit, with respect to the third issue, agreed
with the Tax Court that purchased blocks of cancellable acci-
dent and health insurance policies may be amortized over their
I Among the cases holding that unpaid premiums must be included in assets under
section 805 are: Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1974); Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,
432 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1970); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d
842 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1969); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
399 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1118 (1969).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.805(a)(4)(ii) (1960). The pertinent part was inconsistent with the
underlying statute and therefore void. 525 F.2d at 789-90. United States v. Correll, 389
U.S. 299 (1967); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
525 F.2d at 789.
Id. (emphasis in original). '"Potential profitability' should not give rise to a tax."
Id.
525 F.2d at 790 & n.4.
Id. at 791. The court also invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1)(i) (1960) insofar
as it applied to unpaid premiums in which an insurance company has no legally enforce-
able right. 525 F.2d at 791.
"1 Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 807, 839 (1975).
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useful life if the record discloses facts from which a reasonable
estimate of useful life can be made,' 3 but held that in this case
there could be no amortization because the record did not disclose
sufficient facts from which such a reasonable estimate could be
made."
In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner,'5 the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed a Tax Court decision concerning the reasonableness
of compensation payments made by a closely held corporation to
an employee who was also a majority stockholder. In 1956 the
corporation and Mrs. Joscelyn, its majority stockholder and an
employee, entered into a contingent compensation agreement.'6
Pursuant to this agreement, the corporation (taxpayer) paid her
$67,187 in 1968, $88,457 in 1969, and $97,552 in 1970. The Tax
Court held that $50,000, $54,500, and $57,500 respectively were
reasonable and properly deductible under section 162(a)(1).' 7
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit
stated that the reasonableness of a given amount of compensation
is a question of fact to be determined by an examination of all
the evidence. Therefore, a trial court's decision on this question
will not be upset unless it is found to be clearly erroneous.' 8 Es-
chewing any rigid rules for making these determinations, the
Tenth Circuit outlined some of the factors to be considered, in-
cluding the fact that the compensation agreement was entered
into between a closely held corporation and its stockholders.'"
" 525 F.2d at 791.
" Id. at 791-92. Judge McWilliams dissented on the first two issues.
, 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1976).
" The agreement basically provided that Mrs. Joscelyn, who was president and gen-
eral manager and held 248 of the outstanding 250 shares of stock, would receive a salary
of $6,000 per year plus an annual bonus of 10% of the first $10,000 of net income, 20% of
the next $10,000, and 30% of the net income over $29,000. The years in question were 1968
through 1970. 528 F.2d at 178 & n.1.
" Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 564, aff'd, 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir.
1976). A fortiori, payments that exceed the reasonable level of compensation (most often
considered dividends in disguise) are not deductible. See, e.g., Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Com-
missioner, 503 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1974); Carole Accessories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32
T.C.M. (CCH) 1285 (1973).
" 528 F.2d at 179.
" Id. The factors listed by the Tenth Circuit were:
1. The employee's qualifications.
2. The nature, extent and scope of the employee's work.
3. The size and complexities of the business.
4. A comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income.
1977
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The Tenth Circuit did not discuss each of the factors it listed.
Instead, it focused upon the fact that the taxpayer had never
made a distribution or paid a dividend. It noted: "The non-
payment of a dividend in conjunction with a contingent scheme
for a controlling shareholder has frequently been recognized as an
indication that unreasonable and excessive compensation is being
paid."20
At the trial and on appeal, the corporation attempted to
justify the payments on the basis of the "reasonable when made,
reasonable when paid" rule. This rule states that if a contingent
compensation agreement is both reasonable when made and the
product of a free bargain between the employer and the employee,
then compensation will be reasonable when paid, although it is
in excess of what is normally considered a reasonable amount.2'
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, refused to apply this
rule, stating: "[Tihe premise of the regulation is a free bargain
made solely for the purpose of securing the services of the em-
ployee. 22 In Pepsi, there was no free bargain for two reasons: (1)
The bargain was between Mrs. Joscelyn as employee and herself
as the corporation's controlling shareholder; and (2) the bargain
was not made for the purpose of securing Mrs. Joscelyn's services,
since, as controlling stockholder, she would probably have pro-
vided the services without the agreement.23 With respect to the
5. The prevailing general economic conditions.
6. A comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders.
7. The prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in compa-
rable concerns.
8. The salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees.
9. In the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers the
amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous years.
This list of considerations originated in Magson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115
(6th Cir. 1949).
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit stated that "special scrutiny should be given to
compensation paid by a corporation whose stock is closely held." 528 F.2d at 179 (citing
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d
45 (10th Cir. 1967)).
" 528 F.2d at 183 (citing Pacific Grains, Inc. v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 603, 607 (9th
Cir. 1968); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 45, 48 (10th Cir. 1967); Logan Lumber
Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1966); Long Island Drug Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 111 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940)). The implication of
such an arrangement is that the profits are being distributed disguised as compensation.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) (1954) for the IRS's statement of the rule.




second reason the Tenth Circuit said: "A bonus contract that
might be reasonable if executed with an executive who is not a
controlling shareholder may be viewed as unreasonable if made
with a controlling shareholder, since incentive to the stockholder
to call forth his best effort would not be needed."
24
In Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner,5 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed a Tax Court decision"6 holding that the legal expenses
incurred by Medco in bringing a trademark infringement suit2
must be capitalized and could not be deducted as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162. The court stated:
"The origin and character of the claim for which an expense was
incurred determines whether it is a deductible business ex-
pense. ' 2 The general rule is that any expense which produces
benefits lasting more than one year must be capitalized and can-
not be fully deducted in the year incurred.29 In Medco the expen-
ses were definitely business related but produced benefits that
would last more than one year. The expenses were "capital in
nature"; they were not incurred in the operation of the business,
and they were not ordinary and necessary in relation to the mar-
keting of electrical therapeutic equipment.3
The Tenth Circuit found support for its decision in section
177, under which a taxpayer may elect to treat expenses incurred
24 Id. at 182.
- 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975).
2S Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 509 (1974).
" Medco, an Oklahoma corporation, had been marketing electrical therapeutic
equipment under its trademark since 1955. In 1966 Medco learned that an Illinois corpora-
tion was marketing similar products under the name Medco. In a trademark infringement
suit, Medco was awarded $1,000 in damages. Medco Products Co. v. Medco Hosp. Supply
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Il. 1968).
" 523 F.2d at 138 (citing United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963)). The issue in
Gilmore was whether the expense was business or personal. However, in Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), the issue was whether fees incurred in an appraisal
action were capital expenditures or deductible business expenses under section 212. There,
the Supreme Court refused to adopt a "primary purpose" test (taxpayer's primary purpose
for incurring the expense determines deductibility) and affirmed the origin of the claim
test.
. 523 F.2d at 138.
" Id. at 139. See Commissioner v. Polk, 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1960); Okemah Nat'l
Bank v. Wiseman, 253 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1958); Hales-Mullaly v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d
509 (10th Cir. 1942). Similar results were reached in Georator Corp. v. United States, 485
F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973), and in Danskin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1964). Since legal expenses in a trademark action made the taxpayer's property more
secure they were capital, not ordinary and necessary, expenses. 523 F.2d at 139.
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in connection with trademarks and tradenames as deferred ex-
penses and pro rate them over a five-year period. The Treasury
regulation under section 177 includes legal fees; therefore, the
court reasoned, Congress did not intend such fees to be deducted
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Since Medco did
not elect section 177 the expenses must be capitalized. 3'
In Brown v. Commissioner, 32 the Tenth Circuit, following the
lead of the Second, 33 Sixth, 34 and Seventh 35 Circuits, declared that
payments in satisfaction of alleged but unproven liability under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 3 must be
treated as long term capital loss rather than an ordinary and
necessary business expense. Mr. Brown was employed by Western
Nuclear Inc. (Western) as vice president and treasurer. Between
January and May of 1966 he sold 3,000 shares of Western stock
in order to raise the cash needed to exercise employee stock pur-
chase options on 16,000 shares which he purchased within the
prohibited six-month period. Gain on the sale of the 3,000 shares
was reported as long term capital gain. In 1968 a shareholder
brought suit to recover the short swing profits. Mr. Brown did not
contest the suit but paid Western the full amount of recoverable
damages. Mr. Brown had no inside information; his only motive
for not fighting the suit was a desire to avoid adverse publicity
and embarrasment to himself and Western, and to prevent harm
to his business reputation.
3 7
The Tax Court, relying on three of its previous decisions, 38
5' 523 F.2d at 140.
529 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'g 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300 (1973).
Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 61 T.C. 1 (1973),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
" Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170 (1969),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev 'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). This section is designed to prevent the unfair use of
inside information by corporate directors and officers. It provides that any profit realized
by a director, officer, or beneficial owner on the purchase and sale or sale and purchase of
his company's stock within six months (commonly referred to as "short swing profits")
may be recovered in an action brought by the corporation or a shareholder on behalf of
the corporation.
3 The repayment was originally reported as a long term capital loss, but in an
amended return it was deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 529 F.2d
at 610-11.
Cummings v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 91, aff'd on rehearing, 61 T.C. 1 (1973), rev'd,
506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Anderson v. Commissioner,
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stated that the only issue was whether Mr. Brown made the re-
payment to protect his employment and his business reputation.
Finding this to be Brown's motive, the Tax Court held that the
payment was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense." The Tenth Circuit accepted the Tax Court opinion
as to Mr. Brown's motive but held that the tax benefit rule
40
applied, and, therefore, the repayment had to be treated as a long
term capital loss."
In Gardiner v. United States,2 Ms. Gardiner (taxpayer) had
bought depreciable property but failed to take the allowable de-
preciation deductions for 1964, 1965, and 1966; she did, however,
take deductions for later years. When the property was sold in
1971, the taxpayer did not reduce her basis by the amount of the
depreciation she could have deducted in 1964-66. The taxpayer
reported a loss on the sale, but the IRS reduced the property's
basis by the amount of depreciation that could have been claimed
and determined that the sale produced a gain. The taxpayer's
refund claim for the amounts she failed to deduct was disallowed
by the IRS because it was not timely filed.' 3 In a refund action
the trial court found for the government."
At trial and on appeal the taxpayer contended that the miti-
gation sections of the Code, sections 1311-1315, would allow the
56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973); William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C.
170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
" Brown v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300, 1302 (1973).
0 The rule was announced in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), and
United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969). Basically, the rule states that if a
taxpayer was taxed at lower than the ordinary income rate when the money was received,
he cannot be allowed to take a deduction against an ordinary income when the money is
repayed. It would be an unfair tax "windfall" if the taxpayer were allowed to fully deduct
the repayment.
" 529 F.2d at 612-13. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the tax benefit
rule should not apply because Brown was acting in separate capacities when he sold the
stock and when he repaid the profits. Section 16(b) liability focuses on both relationships
of stockholder and employee. 529 F.2d at 612-13. The court also rejected an argument
based upon bifurcating the transaction into a stock sale and a separate section 16(b)
problem. Mr. Brown sold stock in order to exercise the option; all the events in the
transaction must be considered together. 529 F.2d at 614.
,2 536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976).
,' Refund claims must be filed within three years from the time the return is filed, or
two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. I.R.C. § 6511(a).
" Gardiner v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Utah 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 903
(10th Cir. 1976).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
case to be reopened although the statute of limitations had run.
This argument was based principally on sections 1312(1) and
1312(7). Section 1312(1) applies when the IRS or a court requires
inclusion in gross income of an item that was erroneously in-
cluded in gross income in a prior year. The court found that the
failure to take allowable depreciation deductions did not consti-
tute an erroneous inclusion in a prior year and thus section
1312(1) was not applicable.45 Furthermore, the court stated:
The meaning of an item of gross income is, under Section 61 of
the 1954 Code, limited to specific items and does not include every-
thing that results in an increase in tax. It is restricted to positive
items and does not include negative elements such as deductions
(like depreciation), the omission of which results in increased
taxes."
Section 1312(7) permits a case to be reopened when, with
respect to transactions affecting basis, certain enumerated errors
have been made. The key word is "transaction"; if there is no
transaction, the section does not apply. The Tenth Circuit found
that the failure to take an allowable depreciation deduction did
not constitute a transaction for purposes of section 1312(7)"7 as
the word "transaction" means a business transaction in the ordi-
nary sense and not the failure to make an entry on the books.48
Furthermore, the failure to take the deduction was not an errro-
neous charge to the capital account of an item that should have
been deducted, and, therefore, section 1312(7)(c)(iii) did not
apply.49
Should a state court determine whether a transfer is a tax-
able event under federal law? This was the ultimate question
presented in Imel v. United States.50 The federal tax issue was
whether a transfer of appreciated property by a husband to his
former wife, pursuant to a divorce settlement, was a nontaxable
division of property between co-owners or a transaction giving rise
,1 536 F.2d at 906.
4 Id. (emphasis in original). The court viewed depreciation as a deduction from gross
income and not as an element in the calculation of gross income. Id.
1, 536 F.2d at 907. See also, United States v. Rushlight, 291 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1961);
Granger v. United States, 3 A.F.T.R.2d 59-319 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
536 F.2d at 907.
Id. at 907-08.
523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
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to taxable capital gains.' The Tenth Circuit, relying on a Colo-
rado Supreme Court case holding that under Colorado law the
wife has an interest in her husband's property which vests at the
time the divorce action is filed, decided that the transfer was a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.52 Determina-
tion of the federal issue in Imel depended upon the nature of the
wife's interest in jointly acquired property held in the husband's
name. This issue was decided by the Colorado Supreme Court.
5 3
On appeal the Tenth Circuit did not question the correctness of
the state court determination. The court's opinion focused on
the propriety of accepting the state court decision as controlling. 5
", See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1002.
2 Pursuant to COLO. App. R. 21.1, the federal district court certified questions of state
law to the Colorado Supreme Court. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1116 (D.
Colo. 1974). In In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo.
1, 517 P.2d 1331 (1974), the Colorado Supreme Court stated that "under Colorado law,
the transfer involved here was a recognition of a 'species of common ownership' of the
marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between co-owners." Id. at 8,
517 P.2d at 1334. The transfer was not made to release the husband from an independent
obligation to support the wife. Id. at 9, 517 P.2d at 1334.
The Tenth Circuit felt that the district court had not abused its discretion in asking
the Colorado Supreme Court to determine the issue of ownership under Colorado law. 523
F.2d at 857. The Supreme Court has recently stated that use of certification procedures
"rests in the sound discretion of the federal court." Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974). Furthermore, certification is "particularly appropriate" when the question is
novel or the law unsettled. Id. The Tenth Circuit did feel that it was improper for the
district court to ask the Colorado court whether the transfer was a taxable event for federal
income tax purposes. 523 F.2d at 857. The Colorado Supreme Court expressed a similar
feeling and declined to answer that question. In re Questions Submitted by the United
States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 8, 517 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1974). One author has concluded
that there was Colorado law for the district court to follow and, therefore, use of certifica-
tion procedures was improper. Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax Policy?,
47 U. COLO. L. Rxv. 533, 541 (1976).
' In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 517
P.2d 1331 (1974). The district court made its own analysis of Colorado law and reached
the same conclusion as the state court. Although the district court had difficulty defining
the exact nature of the wife's interest, it felt it was a "species of common ownership." 375
F. Supp. at 1115.
" For this reason the validity of the decision is not discussed. For a thorough analysis
of the wife's interest and the correctness of the state and district court opinions, see Note,
Federal Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of State Law,
52 DEN. L.J. 799 (1975); See also Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax
Policy?, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 533 (1976).
11 523 F.2d at 855. The Government argued that the wife's interest as defined by the
Colorado Supreme Court was not within the concept of common ownership for federal tax
purposes and that under United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), taxability of the
transaction should be determined with reference to the wife's right during the marriage
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In the leading case on taxation of marital property settlements,
United States v. Davis,5" the United States Supreme Court, with-
out the benefit of a state supreme court decision on point, applied
its own analysis of Delaware law and found the transfer taxable. 7
In Pulliam v. Commissioner,5" the Tenth Circuit, in a similar
situation, found that such transfers in Colorado were taxable."
However, a line of cases after Pulliam indicates that when a state
supreme court has determined the nature of the wife's interest in
marital property, a federal court should use that interpretation
in deciding whether a taxable transfer occurred. 0
In Collins v. Commissioner (Collins )," the Tenth Circuit
had found no significant differences between Colorado and Okla-
homa law and therefore relied on Pulliam to find a similar trans-
fer taxable in Oklahoma. Then, in Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Con-
and not upon divorce. The Tenth Circuit did not read Davis as determining when the
wife's interest had to vest before the division would be nontaxable. 523 F.2d at 856.
As a general rule, federal law determines which legal rights and interests shall be
taxed, whereas state law controls the creation of these interests and rights. Taxation,
however, does not depend upon labels placed on interests by state law. Instead, the courts
must look behind the labels to the "economic reality" of the situation and determine if
Congress sought to tax the particular transaction involved. 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 61.01-02, at 1-3 (1970). See also Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Moryan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). For an argument
that Congress did not intend to tax the type of transfer involved in Imel, see Note, Should
State Courts Determine Federal Tax Policy?, U. COLO. L. Rlv. 533, 548-51 (1976).
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
5 Referring to DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1531(a) (1953), the Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the
Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. The
wife has no interest-passive or active-over the management or disposition
of her husband's personal property. Her rights are not descendable, and she
must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the
marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as the court deems
"reasonable."
370 U.S. at 70.
329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964). The Tenth Circuit, using
its own interpretation of Colorado law, determined that the wife did not have a vested
interest in her husband's property and declared that a transfer pursuant to a divorce
decree was a taxable event. Id.
11 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit used its own analysis of Kansas law to find such
transfers taxable. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1974).
" In Davis, the Supreme Court stated that its decision "may permit different tax
treatment among the several States." 370 U.S. at 71. In Wiles the Tenth Circuit said,
"Davis requires us to follow Kansas law." 499 F.2d at 259.
El 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
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mission (Collins 11),61 a case dealing with the state capital gains
tax involved in the same transaction, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the wife's interest was a species of common
ownership; thus, the transfer was not taxable. The Supreme
Court, in a one paragraph per curiam opinion, 3 reversed Collins
I and remanded it for reconsideration in light of Collins 11.61 The
Collins III remand must have indicated to the Tenth Circuit that
the Supreme Court felt that the state's characterization of the
wife's interest, if available, should be controlling.
By declaring that the wife has an interest in her husband's
property which vests upon the filing of a divorce action, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court created federal income tax advantages for
some of the citizens of the state.6 5 Imel is based upon the general
rule that state court interpretations of state law control. It fails,
"446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
0 Collins v. Commissioner (Collins Il), 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
11 On remand, the Tenth Circuit followed the Oklahoma Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the law and found the transfer to be a nontaxable division of property between co-
owners. Collins v. Commissioner (Collins IV), 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Whether or not a taxpayer will find an "advantage" in Imel depends on his point
of view. The maxim "taxes postponed are taxes saved" is not a sufficient analysis of the
situation. When appreciated property is transferred to an ex-spouse pursuant to a divorce
settlement, the transferee may do one of two things: make a living transfer of the property
or keep it until death.
In a "division of property" jurisdiction, while the transferor would pay no income tax
on the transfer, his basis will be carried over to the transferee. On a subsequent sale, the
transferee would be obliged to pay tax on the total appreciation, including that which
occurred prior to the divorce. In a "taxable event" jurisdiction the transferor in effect
satisfies his marital obligations with appreciated property and must pay income tax on
the amount by which the fair market value on the date of the transfer exceeds his basis.
The transferee's basis in the property will be its fair market value on the date of the
transfer. On a subsequent sale the transferee spouse would be taxed only on the post-
divorce appreciation. Therefore, when the transferred property is subsequently sold the
transferee would seem to fare better in a "taxable event" state.
If the transferee makes an intervivos gift of the property, any gift tax due would be
based on the fair market value of the property on the date of the gift and the donee's basis
would be that of the donor, increased by any gift tax paid. Like the transferee who sells
the property, the transferee who gives it away (and the donee) fares better in a "taxable
event" jurisdiction because the burden of at least part of the appreciation is placed on
the transferor.
If the transferee holds the property until death, he will not pay income tax on the
appreciation regardless of the local rule. However, because of the new carryover basis rules
for inherited property, there could be different income tax consequences to the transferee's
heirs or legatees, depending on the local rule. This situation is analogous to those involving
gifts, mentioned above: The higher the transferee's basis, the lower the amount of income
tax due to appreciation when the heir disposes of the property. Apparently, the only people
who will benefit from Ime! are transferors.
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however, to consider the equally basic rule that, for federal tax
purposes, the state construction (or label) is not controlling, but
rather the true nature of the interest and the transaction must be
considered." However, once the Colorado Supreme Court deci-
sion was accepted by the Tenth Circuit as controlling, the result
in Imel easily followed.
In The J.E. & L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. v. United
States,7 the J.E. and L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. (Foundation),
a tax exempt charitable organization, challenged a district court
decision"8 denying relief in a suit for refund of taxes paid on in-
come produced by overriding royalty interests." Prior to 1969
such income was specifically excluded from taxation. This case,
however, involved the construction and application of the 1969
amendments.7 0
Prior to the amendments, a tax exempt corporation could, by
forming a subsidiary, indirectly engage in a business that would
" In tax cases the Supreme Court has frequently construed state law differently from
state courts, reflecting what the Court considered the "economic realities" of the situa-
tion. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S.
103 (1932). 10 J. MEaRTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 61.02, at 3 (1970).
The Tenth Circuit refused to apply the holding of In re Questions Submitted by the
United States District Court to a case dealing with the taxability of the wife under sections
71 and 215. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1975). The wife argued that
periodic payments, because of a pre-payment option, were really a tax free division of
property between co-owners as per the district and Colorado Supreme Court opinions in
Imel. The Tenth Circuit looked to the "true nature" of the payments and found them to
be in satisfaction of the husband's marital obligation, and not a division of property, even
though the payments "may be characterized by Colorado courts as a property settlement
... Id. at 469. In Imel, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Hayutin "on the facts" and
because it dealt with "different provisions of the Code." 523 F.2d at 856. For views on the
nature of a Colorado spouse's right to a division of property upon divorce, see Note,
Federal Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of State Law,
52 DEN. L.J. 794, 808-11 (1975); Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax
Policy?, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 540 (1976).
,7 533 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1976).
,1 J.E. & L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 673 (N. D.
Okla. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 The court stated: "Overriding royalty is a term used to determine the partition of
the lessee's interests in a mineral lease." 533 F.2d at 522.
In 1947 Mr. Mabee and his wife transferred oil and gas leases to the Mabee Petroleum
Corporation (Petroleum) which became a wholly owned subsidiary of the Foundation in
1948. Petroleum declared dividends in kind to the Foundation in the form of overriding
royalty interests in the leases. As a result Petroleum owned 20-30% and the Foundation
70-80% of the leasehold estate mineral interests. Id.
7o The part of the Code in issue was section 512. 533 F.2d at 522-23.
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otherwise produce taxable income. The subsidiary would operate
the business but pay all the income to the parent in the form of
rents or royalties which were not taxed to the exempt parent
corporation. According to the House and Senate Reports, the
purpose of the amendment was to stop this practice.7
On appeal, the Foundation argued that the exclusion of over-
riding royalties from taxation in subsection 512(b)(2) was not
changed by the addition of subsection 512(b)(15) because that
subsection refers only to "royalties." The Tenth Circuit found
that "royalties" in subsection 512(b)(15) included overriding roy-
alties and that the inclusion of "overriding royalties" in subsec-
tion 512(b)(2) was for clarification only and not intended as an
addition to the word royalties."
The court also rejected the argument that the Foundation's
overriding royalty income was not derived from the subsidiary
corporation as required by subsection 512(b)(15) because the in-
come was paid directly to the Foundation by the purchasers and
not to the subsidiary corporation. The Tenth Circuit stated that
it was the intent of Congress to make this type of income taxable
and that a "mechanical formality" cannot be used to avoid that
result .13
In United States v. Russell,7" the United States brought a
debt action against the surviving widow of T.C. Russell, seeking
payment of federal estate taxes previously assessed against Mr.
Russell's estate. The major portion of the taxable estate consisted
of joint tenancy property which passed to Mrs. Russell outside of
probate and was, therefore, unavailable for the payment of taxes.
The tax was assessed against the estate but not against Mrs.
Russell personally.75 The only issue considered by the Tenth Cir-
cuit was whether a general tax lien pursuant to section 6321 could
1, H.R. REP. No. 91-413, Part 1, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1969); S. REP. No. 91-522,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
72 533 F.2d at 523. The fact that the words "overriding royalties" were not added
parenthetically to subsection 512(b)(15) did not indicate intent to exclude them from the
purview of that subsection. Id.
7 533 F.2d at 524.
532 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1976).
7' This was the second time this case came before the Tenth Circuit; the original case
was United States v. Russell, 327 F. Supp. 632 (D. Kan. 1971), rev'd, 461 F.2d 605 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972).
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arise against Mrs. Russell personally if an assessment had not
been made as required by section 6322.76
Mrs. Russell argued that no lien could arise without an as-
sessment. The government contended that, since the estate was
properly assessed, a lien could arise against her because the trans-
fer provisions of section 6324(a)(2) made the surviving tenant
personally liable for the unpaid tax. The district court and the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the government. The jointly held prop-
erty was a part of the taxable estate; its value was included in
the assessment made against the estate even though the property
did not pass through probate and was not available to pay the
tax. In this situation a separate assessment against Mrs. Russell
was not required. Since the estate was properly assessed, the
transfer provisions did not impose any new obligation on Mrs.
Russell but merely facilitated the collection of an existing liabil-
ity.
77
In Silver Bell Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,7 8 Silver Bell
Industries, Inc. (Silver Bell) owned mining claims which were
sold by the IRS to satisfy a lien for delinquent federal employ-
ment taxes. In the district court,79 Silver Bell challenged the va-
lidity of the sale on several grounds and raised essentially the
same issues on appeal. Agreeing with the district court, the Tenth
Circuit found no merit in Silver Bell's arguments.
Section 6335(d) provides that tax sales shall take place
within the county where the property is located, unless the Secre-
tary or his delegate issues a special order to the effect that the
sale shall take place elsewhere.80 The Tenth Circuit declared that
1, Section 6322 provides: "Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien
imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue
until the liability for the amount so assessed. . . is satisfied .... " (emphasis supplied).
" The court seemed to place some weight on the fact that Mrs. Russell was also
executrix of the estate, which was insolvent, and that she therefore took the property fully
aware of the outstanding tax debt due. The court more than once referred to the particular
facts and circumstances of the case and concluded with the remark: "We deem it advisa-
ble to caution the Government that our affirmance in this instance should not be relied
upon for a like result in the event of failure by the proper officials to effect the assessment
lacking here." 532 F.2d at 177.
" No. 74-1641 (10th Cir., Feb. 19, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 822 (1976).
" Silver Bell Indus. v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-5682 (D. Colo. 1974).
The properties were located in San Miguel County but sold at an auction in Denver.
The criteria for issuing a special order are stated in Treas. Reg. § 301.6335-1(c)(1) (1954).
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this section required strict compliance and that a sale is invalid
if the procedures are not followed." The burden of showing literal
compliance with statutes regulating land sales for taxes rests with
the claimant under the sale." Even though no special order was
produced and the testimony raised a serious question as to its
existence, the Tenth Circuit did not invalidate the sale. The
claimants under the sale produced deeds reciting that the lands
were "sold as provided by Section 6335 . . . and the regulations
promulgated thereunder . . . ." Such a recital is prima facie
proof of the facts stated therein.
83
Silver Bell next argued that, prior to the filing of the lien, it
had paid all amounts due for the second quarter of 1971, and,
therefore, the seizure and sale for that period was invalid .8 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that, even if the payments had been
credited in the way Silver Bell had directed, there was still a
substantial sum due at the time of the sale. 5
In addition Silver Bell did not properly redeem the properties
from the government. Approximately three months after the sale,
Silver Bell paid the government enough to satisfy current liabili-
ties and all but about $3,000 of the total amount owed. This was
viewed by the IRS as an overpayment of taxes. The Tenth Circuit
held that, even if the payment was applied toward redemption,
it was insufficient to redeem all the properties and the IRS was
under no duty to apply selectively the credit to redeem some of
the parcels.8
Essentially, the regulation requires the sale to take place in the county where the property
is seized, unless it appears to the district director authorizing the seizure that substan-
tially higher bids may be obtained if the property is sold outside the county. Id.
No. 74-1641 at 5 (citing Thatcher v. Powell, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 119, 125 (1821)).
No. 74-1641 at 5 (citing McAndrews v. Belknap, 141 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1944)).
Section 6339(b). The Supreme Court has held that, in conjunction with a tax sale,
there is a rebuttable presumption that persons acting in public office have been duly
appointed and are acting with authority. Keely v. Saunders, 99 U.S. 441, 447 (1878). The
Tenth Circuit found that the presumption had not been overcome by Silver Bell. No. 74-
1641 at 8. Silver Bell also challenged the revenue officer's authority to select the method
of sale used, which was public sale under sealed bids pursuant to section 6335(e)(2), and
his authority to issue certificates of sale under section 6338(a). Because Silver Bell did
not establish lack of authority at trial, the proceedings were presumed regular. No. 74-
1641 at 8-9.
" Silver Bell made two payments in October, 1971, and directed that the payments
be applied to taxes owed for the second quarter, ending June 30, 1971. The IRS, however,
credited the payments toward third quarter liability. No. 74-1641 at 9.
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 11-13 n.10.
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Silver Bell did not effect a timely redemption under the re-
quirements of section 6337(b) by mailing personal checks to the
purchasers. The date of the sale was determined to be the date
of the publicly conducted auction, not the later date when the
offers to purchase were accepted by the Special Procedures Divi-
sion of the IRS. Silver Bell had mailed the checks within the
statutory 120-day period but they were not received until the
121st day. Section 7502(a)(1)87 does not apply to articles mailed
to private parties, and, therefore, the general rule that payments
to creditors are effective upon receipt applied, making the at-
tempted redemptions untimely.
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In Burns v. Commissioner,9 Mr. Burns received for services
rendered in 1966, 6,420 shares of Community National Life Insur-
ance Company (Community National). 0 During the same year,
Mr. Burns sold 4,200 shares and reported their value on his in-
come tax return at $33,520 and reported gain accordingly. The
Commissioner valued the shares at $71,542 and assessed a defi-
ciency. In a petition to redetermine the deficiency, Mr. Burns
argued that the shares could not be valued at market because
they were subject to restrictions on sale." The Tax Court found
that there were no restrictions on sale and upheld the deficiency.
On appeal Mr. Burns challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence behind the decision and contended that the Tax Court
erred as a matter of law in failing to make a specific finding of
the value of the shares on the dates received. The Tenth Circuit
stated that issues of valuation and the existence of sale restric-
tions were questions of fact and then applied the "not to be re-
versed unless clearly erroneous" standard. Although Rule 52 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to the Tax
Court, and Tax Court Rules do not require findings of fact and
conclusions of law, such findings and conclusions should be made
'7 This section provides that articles mailed to the IRS shall be considered delivered
on the date mailed.
" No. 74-1641 at 14-16.
" 36 A.F.T.R.2d 1 75-5341 (10th Cir. 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
0 Mr. Burns was in the business of arranging corporate mergers and acquisitions. He
received the Community National stock for helping Community National to acquire three
other insurance companies. Id. at 6236.
" The Commissioner's determination of market value was based upon comparable
sales of Community National stock. Id.
11 Burns v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 977 (1974).
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to permit adequate review." It was clear from the opinion that the
Tax Court had determined the value of the shares on the dates
received." Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that the record
supported the Tax Court finding that sale of the shares was not
restricted."
In Gates v. United States,"6 taxpayers brought an action to
obtain the refund of taxes, interest, and penalties paid for 1962
through 1968. Granting the government's motion for summary
judgment, the district court dismissed the action as to each tax
year. Taxpayers' appeals respecting 1962, 1963, and 1964 were
dismissed by the Tenth Circuit because their tax liability for
those years was fully adjudicated by the Tax Court" pursuant to
a petition to redetermine deficiencies."s The taxpayers' timely
refund claim for 1966 was dismissed because it failed to give the
government reasonable notice of the nature of the claim, a juris-
dictional prerequisite." To be sufficient the claim must thor-
oughly apprise the IRS of the grounds upon which recovery is
sought. '0 The claims for 1967 and 1968 were rejected on the same
0 Bums v. Commissioner, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5341 at 6236 (citing James Petroleum
Corp. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir. 1964)). The court recited the stan-
dard:
The basis for the decision however is not indicated in the findings or the
opinion, and this must appear. There is no way for us to determine whether
there is "substantial evidence" to support the findings if there are not find-
ings on the specific facts concerned. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §
7482, states that the Court of Appeals shall review the decisions of the Tax
Court in the same manner and to the same extent as the decisions of the
District Courts. This requires complete findings of fact to demonstrate the
basis for the decision.
36 A.F.T.R.2d at 6236-37 (citations omitted). Section 7459(b) requires the Tax Court to
include in the report on any proceeding "its [written] findings of fact or opinion or
memorandum opinion." Rule 151 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure re-
quires that briefs contain proposed findings of fact.
" See Bums v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 977, 979 (1974).
" Mr. Burns had testified that he orally agreed not to sell the shares without approval
and introduced a letter allegedly containing written restrictions. Neither the Tax Court
nor the Tenth Circuit found the letter convincing because Mr. Burns sold 65% of his
Community National stock in 1966 but argued that the letter prohibited him from selling
at all. Furthermore, in 1967 Mr. Burns had transferred a substantial number of shares
without mentioning any restrictions. 36 A.F.T.R.2d at 6237.
No. 75-1391 (10th Cir., Apr. 28, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Gates v. Commissioner, T.C. No. 5897-67 (Sept. 19, 1968).
" Final action by the Tax Court prohibits relitigation of the issues, for the years
involved, in a refund suit. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (1954).
' Herrington v. United States, 416 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1969). The refund claim for
1977
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grounds. The claim for 1965 was dismissed because the plaintiff
failed to respond at the hearing on the motion for summary judg-
ment to the government's affidavits that no refund claim for that
year could be discovered. The timely filing of a claim is jurisdic-
tional, and the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate disputed
jurisdictional facts.
In Woods v. Commissioner'0 1 Woods, an inmate at Leaven-
worth Prison, filed a suit in district court requesting that a three-
judge court be convened to declare section 107 unconstitutional.
This section provides the parsonage rental deduction. 02 The dis-
trict court dismissed the action on the ground that Woods lacked
standing.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not consider the standing
issue0 3 but went directly to the merits. The court considered the
issue in one paragraph and, relying on the principles of Waltz v.
Tax Commission,'4 found that the tax exemptions extended by
section 107 did not violate the Establishment Clause. Because
there were no grounds on which to base a claim of unconstitu-
tionality, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly
refused to convene a three-judge court. 10
Ward L. Van Scoyk
1966 (Form 843) stated the grounds for the refund: "$960.73 was illegally withheld after
the statue [sic] of limitations had run in addition to $721.04 previousely [sic] paid."
No. 75-1391 at 3-4.
I No. 75-1644 (10th Cir., Apr. 19, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 856 (1976).
I" Section 107 exempts from federal income taxation the rental value of living quar-
ters furnished to ministers of the gospel as part of their compensation, or that part of
their compensation used to rent or provide a home. Woods argued that the section violated
the Establishment Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
0 On the authority of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that taxpayer suits can be maintained in certain circumstances. The court noted,
however, that there was a serious question whether inmate Woods was a taxpayer in light
of certain statements he made in his pauper's affidavit, filed when the proceedings were
initiated. No. 75-1644 at 2.
1" 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Supreme Court stated, "There is no genuine nexus be-
tween tax exemption and establishment of religion." Id. at 680. Tax exemptions to
churches do not violate the first amendment. Id. See also, Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Swallow v. United States,
325 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 951 (1963).
'"I No. 75-1644 at 3. See generally Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Saiz v.
Goodwin, 450 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1971); Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1970); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).
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The Denver Law Journal's second annual Tenth Circuit
Survey reviewed decisions handed down by the Tenth Circuit
between September 1, 1974 and August 31, 1975. Four of these
decisions were subsequently reviewed by the United States Su-
preme Court. The Court's holdings are briefly summarized below.
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association,
426 U.S. 776 (1976). In Flint Ridge Development Co.' the Su-
preme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision of Scenic Rivers
Association v. Lynn2 in an 8-0 opinion by Justice Marshall. The
Court held that, although the National Environmental Policy
Act 3 (NEPA) requires the filing of an environmental impact
statement where practicable, an impact statement in this case
was inappropriate because it clearly conflicted with authority
held by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act.' Compliance with the NEPA requirement would necessitate
extending the thirty-day mandatory effective date after filing of
the statement of record. Such extension is within the Secretary's
power only when the disclosure is found inadequate.
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). In Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District,5 in a 6-3 opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision of United States v.
Akin.' The Court held that the McCarran Amendment7 did not
divest federal district courts of jurisdiction under section 1345 of
28 U.S.C.8 but gave consent to concurrent federal and state juris-
diction where federal water rights were at issue, including deter-
426 U.S. 776 (1976), rev'g 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975).
520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed in 53 DEN. L.J. 223 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970), which requires developers to disclose to the secretary
information needed by potential buyers concerning unimproved tracts of land to prevent
false and deceptive sales practices.
424 U.S. 800 (1976), rev'g 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
6 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed in 53 DEN. L.J. 225 (1976).
7 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), giving consent to join the United States as a defendant in
certain water rights adjudications.
I The statute provides for original jurisdiction in the district courts of all civil actions
brought by the United States unless otherwise provided by Congress.
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mination of water rights reserved for Indians, notwithstanding
the United States' fiduciary obligation to protect Indian rights.,
Moreover, the doctrine of abstention" was held inappropriate as
a ground for refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the federal court
since the doctrine applies only in special situations, none of which
were present in Akin.
However, the Court found other factors which clearly sup-
ported dismissal of the Government's suit and resolution of all its
water right claims by state court proceedings. Most significant
was the furtherance of the McCarran Amendment policy of en-
couraging unified adjudication of water rights for use of state
waters under state law, to avoid piecemeal litigation."
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
U.S. 1 (1976). In Train"2 the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit and held that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was without authority to regulate the discharge of radioac-
tive materials into navigable waterways.
3
Respondents had sought a declaration that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972's (FWPCA)
charged the EPA with controlling such discharges of radioactive
materials. Under the FWCPA it is illegal to discharge
"pollutants" into navigable waters without an EPA permit. The
act defines "pollutant" to include "radioactive materials." EPA
disclaimed any authority over radioactive discharges into naviga-
ble waterways in light of regulations, already issued by the At-
omic Energy Commission"' pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954,11 governing the discharge of such materials into waterways
by EPA licensees. In an 8-0 opinion by Justice Marshall, the
Court held that Congress had evinced no intent to diminish the
Atomic Energy Commission's control over discharges of source,
byproduct, and special nuclear materials, and, therefore, EPA's
424 U.S. 800, 809-12 (1976).
" The Court calls the doctrine "the exception, not the rule." Id. at 813.
Id. at 818.
2 426 U.S. 1 (1976), rev'g 507 F.2d 743 (1974).
' For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit opinion, see 53 DEN. L.J. 228 (1976).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV 1974).
Now succeeded in its regulatory capacity by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5841(f), 5842 (Supp. IV 1974).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
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authority to regulate "pollutants" under the FWPCA does not
extend to such materials. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit in relying
on the "plain meaning" of the statute to construe its meaning had
erred in excluding the FWPCA's legislative history.
Salone v. United States, 426 U.S. 917 (1976). In Salone 7 the
Tenth Circuit held that a federal employee filing a civil action
under the Civil Rights Act of 196411 is entitled only to judicial
review of an administrative denial of a claim of discrimination
and is not entitled to a trial de novo.19 During the pendency of
Salone's petition for a writ of certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court decided Chandler v. Roudebush, ° wherein a black
woman, like Salone, brought suit in federal court to challenge the
administrative denial of her discrimination claim. The Court held
in Roudebush that the plain meaning of the statute, reinforced
by the history of its 1972 amendments, compelled the conclusion
that federal employees have the same right to a trial de novo as
is enjoyed by a private sector or state government employee. In a
memorandum decision, Salone was vacated and the case re-
manded to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Roudebush.2'
W. Cecil Jones
" 511 F.2d 902 (1975), vacated mem., 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
See 53 DEN. L.J. 29 (1976).
425 U.S. 840 (1976).
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FOREWORD
By JUDGE ROBERT H. MCWILLIAMS
Two years ago the University of Denver College of Law em-
barked on a most ambitious program of making an annual survey
of the opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. Since the court is headquartered in Denver, it was
appropriate that, out of the eleven ABA-approved law schools in
the six states included within the Tenth Circuit, the University
of Denver should take the initiative. The decision to make such
a survey was apparently prompted by a desire to provide a schol-
arly endeavor for the Denver Law Journal and its contributors,
and to provide a useful aid to the practitioner who desires a quick
insight into the work of the Tenth Circuit during the preceding
year. We are certain that these desired goals have in each in-
stance been attained.
As for the Court, we are indeed satisfied with the work prod-
uct contained in the first two annual surveys. The selection of the
cases to be reviewed has been excellent. And in view of the very
considerable number of opinions filed by us each year, selectivity
is very important. In the calendar year of 1976 we filed 479 written
opinions, including 311 signed opinions and 168 per curiam opin-
ions. It is at once obvious that no survey could include a critique
of that number of opinions, nor should it. Many of our opinions
announce no new law, but simply apply long-established legal
principles to slightly different fact situations. Neither reporter
systems nor law journals need be concerned with such cases. A
law journal should be concerned with the unusual and the unique.
In this regard we believe the student editors of the Journal have
exercised good judgment in selecting which cases should come
under their close scrutiny.
Of course at the heart of any successful survey of this type is
the scholarship and objectivity of the reviewer. As might be well
imagined, the members of the Tenth Circuit look forward to the
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annual survey with great interest, and perhaps a slight degree of
trepidation! As concerns the latter, any shortcomings in our opin-
ions have been duly noted, as they should be, but in a professional
manner. And in our view the overall scholarship of the two pre-
ceding annual surveys has been uniformly good, which is no mean
feat, when considering the great volume of cases being consid-
ered.
So, we salute the Denver Law Journal on the two preceding
annual surveys of our opinions, and we eagerly look forward to the
third survey. Indeed, we trust that this will become a continuing
thing. It is good for all concerned. To assist in achieving that goal,
we pledge our continued cooperation.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In the last term, the Tenth Circuit decided several cases
which were primarily concerned with questions of administrative
law. Questions raised in these cases related to, among other
things, access to agency information, allowance of benefits, and
issuance of certificates and permits under statutory provisions
and agency regulations implementing these statutes. In general,
the decisions reached by the court were justified on the basis of
traditional administrative law theories. The court continued to
defer to the determinations made by administrative agencies on
questions subject to agency discretion where the court found the
evidence sufficient to support the determination, thus narrowing
the scope of judicial review. However, the court also continued to
maintain its role as final arbiter on questions of statutory inter-
pretation and other questions of law. The decisions by the court
were generally consistent with its prior decisions and also with the
decisions of other circuits.
What is perhaps most significant about the cases heard by
the court is not the final theories under which the cases were
decided, but the types of questions which are being raised under
various federal statutes before the various agencies. Although the
court's decisions covered a broad range of topics, the heaviest
concentration of cases occurred in the areas of equal employment
opportunity, social security administration, regulation of natural
gas, and access to administrative information; it is in these areas
that the court made its most significant contribution to the body
of case law in the Tenth Circuit.
I. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l was the subject of
review in Campbell v. United States Civil Service Commission'
and Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB. 3 In both cases, the scope
of one of the exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the
FOIA4 was involved. In each case, the Tenth Circuit concluded
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
2 539 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).
1 The FOIA provides that each governmental agency shall make available to the
public information specified in the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Certain
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that the requested materials were exempt based on principles
adopted by other circuits for determining the scope of an exemp-
tion.
In Campbell, employees of the Environmental Research Lab-
oratory in Boulder, Colorado, sought disclosure of a report con-
taining two parts and three appendices' compiled as the result of
a routine investigation of the laboratory's personnel manage-
ment. After the Civil Service Commission denied disclosure of the
entire report on the grounds that each component was protected
from disclosure by an exemption,' the employees brought an ac-
tion in the district court pursuant to the FOIA to compel disclo-
sure.7 When the district court ordered disclosure of only Part I
and Appendix III to the report the plaintiffs appealed" the deci-
sion to the Tenth Circuit. By the time the Tenth Circuit reviewed
the case, the only question for determination was whether Ap-
pendices I and II were exempt from disclosure.'
The Tenth Circuit first analyzed the question under exemp-
tion six of the FOIA, which provides an exemption from disclo-
sure for "personnel and medical files and similar files," the dis-
types of information, however, fall within one of nine exemptions from disclosure. Id. The
relevant exemptions, for this Overview, provide that disclosure requirements do not apply
to matters that are included in either (1) "personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy," or (2) "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would . . . interfere with enforcement
proceedings .... " Id. § 552(b)(6), (7)(A).
The two parts contained appraisals and evaluations of personnel. Appendix I listed
employees erroneously classified in the Service; Appendix II named employees who had
been promoted contrary to Commission regulations; and Appendix III included a statisti-
cal analysis of the responses of laboratory employees to certain questionnaires. 539 F.2d
at 60.
6 Id.
The FOIA authorizes the district court of the complainant's residence to enjoin an
agency from withholding records and to order production of records improperly withheld.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
539 F.2d at 60.
Following the ruling of the district court, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled that Civil Service Commission personnel management evaluation reports
were not exempt from disclosure. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In
Vaughn, however, the question of disclosure of appendices, similar to Appendices I and II
of the laboratory report, was not addressed; the plaintiffs in that case did not appeal a
decision of the district court exempting such appendices from disclosure. After the deci-
sion in Vaughn, the Civil Service Commission released both parts of the report as well as
Appendix III. Campbell v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 539 F.2d at 61.
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closure of which would "constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy."' 0 Based upon the decisions of other
courts," the Tenth Circuit quickly concluded that both append-
ices fell within the "similar files" clause of the exemption.'"
Hence, the court was left with only one issue to determine:
whether or not disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy."
The court noted that Congress had recommended the balanc-
ing of an individual's right of privacy against the public's right
to government information.'3 The court then identified three fac-
tors which had been considered in prior cases" applying this bal-
ancing test:
1. Would disclosure result in an invasion of privacy and, if so, how
serious?
2. The extent or value of the public interest purpose or objective
of the individuals seeking disclosure.
3. Whether the information is available from other sources.'5
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 4 supra.
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 371-82 (1976) (case summaries
of honor code violations are "similar files" within the meaning of exemption 6); Wine
Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 502 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974)
(list of names and addresses of wine producers held to be similar files); Robles v. EPA,
484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) (files on homes with high radiation levels discovered in EPA
study held to be similar files). It is not clear that the Robles court actually concluded that
the files in question were "similar files." While the court found the argument to that effect
persuasive, it precluded exemption from disclosure because disclosure would not have
resulted in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
"1 Based on Rose, the court claimed that since the appendices included "personnel
information, it cannot be effectively argued that these are not 'similar files."' 539 F.2d at
61. In addition, the court construed both Wine Hobby and Robles to give a "broader
interpretation to the term [similar files] than we are required to give here." Id.
" The legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act with respect to exemption
6 provides: "The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' pro-
vides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the
preservation of the public's right to Governmental information by excluding those kinds
of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [19661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2428.
The Supreme Court has concluded with respect to exemption 6 that, "Congress
sought to construct an exemption that would require a balancing of the individual's right
of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act
'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."' Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
" See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73,
77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gettman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11 539 F.2d at 61.
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Under the FOIA and cases interpreting the Act, the burden lies
with the Government to shift the balance in favor of non-
disclosure to establish the exemption."
In Campbell, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district
court had not abused its discretion in finding the balance in favor
of non-disclosure with respect to Appendices I and II. The court
reasoned that (1) a serious potential invasion of privacy would
result if information regarding an individual's job classification
and salary were made publicly available," and that (2) the public
interest is best served by "disclosure of general agency perform-
ance rather than by specific revelation of individual problems."'"
Hence, the information contained in the Appendices was deemed
to be too specific to warrant general public availability at the
expense of individual privacy. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
exemption of the Appendices from disclosure, even though the
general policy of the FOIA favors disclosure. 9
The scope of exemption 7(A)2" of the FOIA was considered in
Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB.2 ' Pursuant to a charge of
unfair labor practices by the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
International Union, the NLRB filed a complaint against the
company; Climax then requested that the NLRB make available
affidavits and statements obtained from company employees re-
lative to the charges made in the complaint. 2 The NLRB denied
the request based on the fact that the affidavits were investiga-
tory records compiled for law enforcement proceedings, the pro-
duction of which would interfere with the proceedings, and that
the affidavits were therefore exempt from disclosure by exemp-
tion 7(A) of the Act.3 In a suit brought by Climax to compel
' The agency seeking the exemption has the burden of establishing the exemption.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States
Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gettman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
674 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" 539 F.2d at 62.
Id.
, The exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information
Act "do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective
of the Act." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 4 supra.
2 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).




disclosure, the district court concluded that the affidavits were
exempt.2
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Climax argued that the
NLRB had failed to meet the burden necessary to establish the
exemption. Specifically, Climax denied that the NLRB had es-
tablished that "disclosure would interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings ... ."5 The Tenth Circuit rejected Climax's argument
and adopted the contention of the NLRB: "[D]isclosure of em-
ployee statements in any unfair labor practices case would inter-
fere with enforcement proceedings." 6 The court justified its posi-
tion by reasoning that the relationship between an employer and
an employee is sensitive, and that a "labor case is peculiarly
susceptible to employer retaliation, coercion, or influence to the
point that there is no need for an express showing of interference
in each case to justify giving effect to the exemption contained
in Section 7(A) . . . ."I The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that doc-
uments obtained in NLRB enforcement proceedings are abso-
lutely protected from disclosure while the proceedings are pend-
ing is consistent with the decisions of the First and Second Cir-
cuits.28
II. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Three Tenth Circuit cases considered the retroactivity of the
1972 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 In
" Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. Colo. 1975).
25 539 F.2d at 64.
I d.
27 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1976); Title Guaranty Co. v.
NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976). The court in Title Guaranty found it "unnecessary to
make the broad determination that any investigative information obtained in connection
with a pending enforcement proceeding is per se nondisclosable." 534 F.2d at 491. The
court did note, however, that disclosure of statements and affidavits of employees ob-
tained by the NLRB in connection with law enforcement proceedings could well result in
interference with the enforcement proceeding. Id. Without requiring the NLRB to estab-
lish that such interference would occur, the court held that the exemption did apply to
such information. Relying on the Title Guaranty decision, the First Circuit in Goodfriend
W. Corp. rejected the district court's conclusion that the exemption applied to employee
affidavits obtained in NLRB enforcement proceedings. Instead, the court adopted the
Title Guaranty holding that "all statements of employees obtained in connection with
unfair labor practice proceedings pending before the NLRB are exempt from disclosure
under § 552(b)(7)(A)." 535 F.2d at 146.
" Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
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each of the cases,39 although the effective date of the amendment
was March 24, 1972, the court concluded that the amendment
should be given retroactive effect. In a subsequent, unrelated
case, the United States Supreme Court also gave the amendment
retroactive effect.3' With the advantage of hindsight, the Tenth
Circuit's decision on this question seems unassailable.
2
In Weahkee v. Powell,33 a former employee of the EEOC
brought an action against agency officials, alleging unlawful dis-
crimination against himself and others as American Indians.
34
Prior to this suit, both the EEOC and the United States Civil
Service Commission rendered administrative determinations
adverse to Weahkee.3 1 The district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the theory that the complaint
did not point out any specific objections to the administrative
record. The district court did not, however, hold that the admin-
istrative decision was supported by the record. The Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that the failure "to examine the administrative
record and determine whether the administrative record contains
substantial evidence supporting agency action" was error.36
By disposing of the case in this manner, the Tenth Circuit
was able to avoid the determination of whether federal employees
are entitled to a trial de novo in district court as other Title VII
claimants are, a question on which the circuits were then split. 7
. EEOC v. Duval, 528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 535 F.2d
1213 (10th Cir. 1976); Weahkee v. Powell, 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
' International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins &
Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1977). The issue of retroactivity had evaded review in
two Supreme Court decisions during the 1975 Term. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238 n.10 (1976); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 824 n.4 (1976).
32 At the time the Tenth Circuit decided these cases, supra note 2, there was a split
in the circuits on whether the amendment should be given retroactive effect with the
Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits favoring retroactivity. Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 820 (1976); Koger v. Ball,
497 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1974); Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Sixth
Circuit had opposed retroactivity. Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1974),
vacated, 426 U.S. 432 (1976).
33 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. 11 1972).
31 The plaintiff had also presented the trial court with claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1982, and 1985 (1970), but these claims did not affect the administrative law ques-
tions. 532 F.2d at 730.
31 532 F.2d at 729. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
11 Four courts of appeals had held that federal employees had a right to a trial de novo
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The Supreme Court subsequently held, in Chandler v.
Roudebush,38 that federal employees also have a right to a trial
de novo in the district court. Under Chandler, the district court
cannot substitute a review of the administrative record in lieu of
a trial de novo.
On the contrary, the options which Congress considered were en-
tirely straightforward. It faced a choice between record review of
agency action based on traditional appellate standards and trial de
novo of Title VII claims. The Senate committee selected trial de
novo as the proper means for resolving the claims of federal employ-
ees. The Senate broadened the category of claims entitled to trial
de novo to include those of private-sector employees, and the Sen-
ate's decision to treat private-sector and federal-sector employees
alike in this respect was ratified by the Congress as a whole.
The respondents' contention that administrative dispositions of
federal employee discrimination complaints would . . . furnish an
adequate basis for "substantial evidence" review cannot overcome
the import of the statutory language and the legislative history.3
Following Chandler, the 1975 Tenth Circuit decision of Salone v.
United States,0 which held that federal employees did not have
a right to a trial de novo, was vacated.4 Therefore, in light of the
above decisions, on remand Weahkee must be given a trial de
novo by the district court, as opposed to the more limited review
of the administrative record.42
The appellant, Weahkee, also claimed that the district
court's refusal to review the administrative record was a denial
of due process. This claim was based upon the Administrative
Procedure Act.43 The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the
under section 717(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. 111972). Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d
1226 (6th Cir. 1976); Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
919 (1976); Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sperling v. United
States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976). Three courts of
appeals had held that federal employees had no right to a trial de novo. Haire v. Calloway,
526 F.2d 246 (1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1976); Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nor., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); Salone
v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
' 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
Id. at 861-63 (footnote omitted).
*0 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 917 (1976). See also 53 DEN. L.J.
29 (1976).
" 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
:2 532 F.2d at 729.
'1 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 701-706 (1970).
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APA was inapplicable by reasoning that the 1972 amendment
provided the exclusive administrative procedure for federal em-
ployee discrimination charges. The same conclusion was subse-
quently reached by the Supreme Court in Brown v. General Serv-
ices Administration."
In EEOC v. Duval,45 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Commis-
sion's authority to file suits in district court during the same
ninety-day period during which the charging party can file suit.46
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the EEOC's right
to file suit does not terminate upon the expiration of the 180-day
period following the filing of the charge and during which the
EEOC can conduct an investigation and attempt conciliation. 7
During this initial 180 days, the charging party cannot initiate a
Title VII suit.'8 This period is designed to provide the EEOC an
opportunity to investigate the charge and to attempt conciliation.
Of course, in practice, neither goal is completed within the 180-
day period because of the serious backlog in charges pending
before the Commission. 9
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion, which allows the EEOC to
file an action after the 180-day period, was not accompanied by
much helpful discussion. The court simply noted that other cir-
cuits had reached the same result. Among the considerations
" 425 U.S. 820 (1976). In his opinion for the Court in Brown, Justice Stewart stated:
[T]he congressional intent in 1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive
administrative and judicial scheme for redress of federal employment dis-
crimination. We need not, however, rest our decision upon this inference
alone. For the structure of the 1972 amendment itself fully confirms the
conclusion that Congress intended it to be exclusive and pre-emptive.
Id. at 829 (emphasis supplied).
' 528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
11 528 F.2d at 947. Accord, EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976).
11 The charging party is not barred from initiating other available legal actions, such
as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), by the fact that he or she has filed a Title VII claim and the
fact that the charging party has filed a Title VII charge does not toll the statute of
limitations on other claims. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers
Local 790 v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
The charging party is precluded from filing a Title VII suit in district court during
this initial 180 days in order to afford the EEOC time to effect a voluntary conciliation
agreement with the employer free of the interference of a pending law suit. 528 F.2d at
948. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 461.
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which led other circuits to reach this conclusion was the fact that
Title VII expressly limits the employee's right to file suit to a
ninety-day period while no similar express limitation is imposed
upon the EEOC.50 Moreover, at the time of the enactment of the
1972 amendment, which authorized the EEOC to file actions in
district court, Congress was aware that the EEOC was not able
to complete most of its investigations and conciliation procedures
within 180 days. With this knowledge, courts have been unwilling
to attribute to Congress an intent to limit the EEOC enforcement
powers to the initial 180 days because such a construction would
largely defeat the remedial purpose of the amendment. 51
The more difficult question confronting the Tenth Circuit
was whether the charging party had the exclusive authority to
initiate suit during the ninety-day period following receipt of the
"right-to-sue" letter. 5 In Duval, the EEOC filed a complaint be-
fore this ninety-day period had elapsed and before the charging
party had acted. The charging party subsequently sought to in-
tervene. The corporate defendant obtained a dismissal on the
ground that the charging party alone could initiate legal action
during this ninety-day period. The district court viewed the
EEOC's suit as "'duplicitous.' ",53
This issue of multiple actions was previously raised in Crump
v. Wagner Electric Corp.," a case before the Missouri federal
district court. In Crump, the charging party filed an action four-
teen days after the EEOC filed its action. The district court dis-
missed the charging party's suit without prejudice to interven-
tion, which is specifically provided for by Title VII, 55 in the
EEOC's suit. The approach taken in Crump was approved by the
Tenth Circuit in Duval and the dismissal was, therefore, re-
versed."5
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. H 1972). See EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
11 EEOC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 505 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 824 (1975).
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
5' 528 F.2d at 947. Accord, EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71, 75 (8th Cir.
1974).
369 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
528 F.2d at 948-49.
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When confronted with a similar situation,57 the Ninth Circuit
subsequently concluded that multiple actions could be avoided
by consolidation under Rule 42(a), 8 rather than by dismissal with
leave to intervene. When simplicity and the avoidance of possible
confusion are considered, the Ninth Circuit's solution appears
preferable if both the EEOC and the charging party have actually
filed separate suits. However, where one or the other has filed
first, intervention would seem to be the preferable manner for
joining the fray by the remaining litigant since this is expressly
provided for by statute.
The principal issue decided by a divided panel in EEOC v.
Wilson & Co."9 was whether a case was "pending" before the
EEOC when the 1972 amendment to Title VII became effective.
60
In October of 1970 and January of 1971, the charging party, Ber-
nal, filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. In November of
1971, the Commission's Albuquerque office forwarded the file to
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Later Bernal requested a
"right-to-sue" letter which was given to him on January 27, 1972.
Prior to the 1972 amendment, a charging party was given
thirty days to bring his or her private action." The main issue in
Wilson involved the interpretation of a Commission regulation
which required the agency to suspend further action upon the
issuance of a "right-to-sue" letter unless the Commission deter-
mines that it is in the "public interest" to continue or the Com-
mission is requested to continue by the charging party. 2 Neither
of these two contingencies occurred in Wilson and, thereafter,
upon lapse of the thirty-day period during which the charging
party could have filed suit, but did not, the district court con-
cluded that the "suspension" was, in effect, a "termination."
This resulted in the further determination that the case was,
therefore, not "pending" before the Commission on the effective
57 EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1976).
58 "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
" 535 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1976). Judge McWilliams wrote for himself and Judge
Doyle while Judge Barrett filed a vituperative dissent.
6 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
" The trial court relied upon 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a(d) (1971). 535 F.2d at 1215. This
regulation is no longer in force.
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date of the 1972 amendment which gave the Commission the
right to sue. 3 This issue was raised by the lower court sua sponte
and, because of this, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for
further development of the record on the question of whether the
charge was pending before the Commission on March 24, 1972.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit suggested, in rather strong lan-
guage, that, in its opinion, the charge was still pending on that
date."
Judge Barrett, as noted in his dissenting opinion, would have
affirmed the district court's holding for reasons in addition to
those advanced by the trial court. First, the charging party had
not filed his charge with the appropriate state agency before sub-
mitting his charge to the EEOC.5 Second, the Commission did
not file suit until six months after conciliation had failed and
"[tihis 'lapse' constitutes further and utter jurisdictional fail-
ure, even under the 'liberalized' 1972 amendments."" Third,
Judge Barrett concluded that the Commission had not filed suit
in conformance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) as it appeared prior
to the 1972 amendment. The panel majority, however, was unper-
suaded by his arguments.
In EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co. 7 the issue before the court
concerned the timeliness of a complainant's motion for interven-
tion in an EEOC action filed within ninety days after the com-
plainant received a "right-to-sue" letter. 8 Navajo argued that the
ninety-day period within which a complainant could bring suit or
intervene began to run when he received notice that conciliation
efforts had failed. The court held, instead, that the ninety-day
period began to run from the date of receipt of a "right-to-sue"
63 By its express terms the 1972 amendment applies to charges pending before the
Commission on the date of its enactment. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 103, 113. See
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Meyers,
Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).
" 535 F.2d at 1215-16.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1970).
535 F.2d at 1217.
,7 No. 75-1542 (10th Cir., June 16, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. 111972); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1975). The complain-
ant filed a charge with the EEOC on August 18, 1971, and on July 25, 1973, the EEOC
informed him that conciliation efforts had failed, and that, if he desired to bring suit, he
should request a "right-to-sue" letter, which he did. On December 3, 1974, the EEOC
instituted this action, which was based, in part, upon the complainant's charge. On
December 13, 1974, the EEOC issued a "right-to-sue" letter.
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letter, and that therefore the application to intervene was
timely. 9 The Tenth Circuit was advised that the EEOC had dis-
continued the "two-letter" procedure after the controversy in this
case began, so the issue in this case is of marginal significance. 0
III. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970
In two cases the Tenth Circuit reviewed and upheld adminis-
trative orders issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.71 Both the legal construction accorded certain
safety regulations and the constitutionality of those regulations
were reviewed in Clarkson Construction Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission.7" Clarkson Construction
Company sought review of a Commission order73 affirming the
citation and civil penalty imposed against Clarkson as a result of
its violation of a certain safety regulation. The applicable safety
regulation required that trucks on certain worksites be equipped
with an audible backup warning signal or, in the alternative, that
trucks without such a device be permitted to back up only after
the driver received assurance from a lookout that it was safe to
do so." In this case, a truck, owned by one of Clarkson's subcon-
" For cases upholding the two-letter procedure and further holding that the 90-day
period begins to run from the date of receipt of the "right-to-sue" letter, see Williams v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976), and Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
71 No. 75-1542 at 6.
7, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
72 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976).
13 [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEAITH DEC. (CCH) 19,071.
74 29 C.F.R. § 1926.601(b)(4) (1976). This section reads: "No employer shall use any
motor vehicle equipment having an obstructed view to the rear unless: (i) The vehicle
has a reverse signal alarm audible above the surrounding noise level or: (ii) The vehicle
is backed up only when an observer signals that it is safe to do so." Covered employers
must comply with these regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970). These regulations are issued
under the authority of 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). Escalating civil penalties, and ultimately
a criminal penalty, may be imposed for violation of these regulations in proportion to the
willfulness and danger of the violation and whether or not a violation causes death. 29
U.S.C. § 666 (1970). Clarkson was cited for a "serious violation" in which case the Com-
mission could have assessed a penalty of up to $1,000. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1970). Clarkson
was actually assessed only $500. [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
19,071. A "serious violation" is
deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability
that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which
exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or pro-
cesses which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment
unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable
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tractors and operated by the subcontractor's employee, while
being operated in violation of this safety regulation, struck and
killed a workman.
Clarkson challenged the safety regulation on constitutional
grounds alleging that (1) the enforcement procedures were penal
in nature, rather than remedial or regulatory; (2) the enforcement
procedures violated the fifth amendment; (3) the regulatory
scheme denied Clarkson its right to a public trial in accordance
with the sixth amendment which requires, inter alia, the right to
a jury and the right to confront witnesses; and (4) if this regula-
tory scheme were truly civil, it denied Clarkson's seventh amend-
ment rights. The Tenth Circuit apparently viewed Clarkson's
arguments as unfounded and dismissed each of them rather sum-
marily.75
The primary question in this case, the consideration of which
divided the panel, with Judges Doyle and Hill forming the major-
ity and Judge Seth dissenting, was the appropriate construction
of section 1926.601(b)(4) of 29 C.F.R. According to this regula-
tion, "[n]o employer shall use any motor vehicle" in the pro-
scribed manner. More specifically, the court was concerned with
the meaning to be ascribed to the word "use." In other words, was
the statutory scheme intended to incorporate the common law
conception of an employer-employee relationship, as Judge Seth
contended, or the more flexible conception of vicarious liability
and responsibility, as urged by Judges Doyle and Hill. According
to Judge Seth's dissenting opinion, Clarkson would not be
deemed responsible for the operation of the truck in violation of
the regulation because the truck was owned by a subcontractor
and driven by an employee of the subcontractor. Therefore, the
subcontractor, not Clarkson, had a greater amount of direct con-
trol over the driver and, under the traditional common law view,
the driver was not to be considered an employee of the prime
contractor.7"
Although the majority opinion included a lengthy explana-
diligence, know of the presence of the violation.
29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970).
7' 531 F.2d at 455-56. Accord, Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir.
1976). See Note, Due Process and Employee Safety: Conflict in OSHA Enforcement
Procedures, 84 YALE L.J. 1380 (1975).
11 531 F.2d at 459.
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tion justifying the expanded definition of the employment rela-
tionship, the true basis of the decision seemed to be founded in
equity. In the words of Judge Doyle: "We are unable to overlook
the fact that the truck driver who ran over and killed the em-
ployee was serving the objects and purposes of Clarkson.""
To justify legally its decision, the court reasoned that admin-
istrative interpretations of the remedial scope of legislation are
entitled to great weight." In addition, both the Secretary of Labor
and the Commission had interpreted the regulation in the same
manner and, in a case where two specialized administrative bod-
ies are in agreement, a court should be hesitant to impose its own
inconsistent interpretation. Furthermore, in view of the legisla-
tion's remedial purpose of offering protection to workers from
industrial injury, a federal court should not feel bound, when
construing federal statutes, to adhere to the states' common law
conceptions which provide different bases of liability depending
upon how the relationship is defined.80
Against this background, the majority of the court was un-
willing to accept Clarkson's contention that the regulation in
issue should be construed in such a manner as to equate the term
"using" with "operating." Clarkson argued that it, as the prime
contractor, was not "operating" the subcontractor's truck and,
therefore, Clarkson was not the responsible employer within the
meaning of the regulation because it was not "using" the truck.
The majority concluded, however, that, in practical terms, Clark-
son was "using" the truck since the truck was, at the time of the
accident, being operated in furtherance of Clarkson's project. The
court, also, considered the prime contractor to be in a better
position to require the installation of the safety devices or, if
7 Id. at 457.
The majority cited for this proposition Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court
subsequently narrowed the broadest reaches of the rule calling for such difference in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). In Gilbert the Court held that adminis-
trative regulations are less persuasive where they are not expressly authorized and where
they are issued many years after the legislation which they seek to implement and, espe-
cially, where they follow prior inconsistent administrative interpretations of the same
statute. 96 S. Ct. at 410-12.
n 531 F.2d at 457 (citing Budd Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
513 F.2d 201, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1975)).
1" 531 F.2d at 458.
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necessary, to provide the necessary lookouts for those trucks not
equipped with safety devices." This opinion was, in fact, con-
firmed by Clarkson's post-accident conduct which ordered all
trucks to be equipped with the warning devices.2
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Clarkson clearly indicates a
preference for that construction of a regulation which will place
the responsibility for dangerous conditions on the party most cap-
able of guaranteeing worker safety throughout the entire work-
site. For the same reason, i.e., protection of workers, the court
refused to relieve Clarkson of liability even though the accident
occurred on a road immediately adjacent to the worksite, as op-
posed to on the "off-highway jobsite," as required by the literal
terms of the regulation.83 The court refused to apply the regula-
tion literally where, as here, the employees were walking in the
actual construction site, or nearby road shoulder, and the truck
was being used to further the project at the worksite.5 4
In Stockwell Manufacturing Co. v. Usery, the petitioner
sought review of an order of the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission alleging that certain of its constitutional
rights had been violated by the issuance of an administrative
citation. The respondent moved to dismiss the proceeding for lack
of jurisdiction because Stockwell never sought review of the Com-
mission's decision and order.
Stockwell had been cited for nonserious occupational safety
violations. The company contested the citation," and a hearing
was held before an administrative law judge, who affirmed some
of the violations and vacated all proposed penalties. No member
I d.
" Id. at 454. The Fifth Circuit concluded, in Southeast Contractors, Inc. v. Dunlop,
512 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975), that a contractor should not be held responsible for the
conduct of its subcontractor, and therefore, would have reached the same result as Judge
Seth. The Fifth Circuit's decision was per curiam, however, and simply adopted the
dissenting view expressed by Chairman Moran of the Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission in the administrative decision. Id. See [1973-1974] OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 17,787. Chairman Moran dissented from the Commis-
sion's decision for the same reason in the Clarkson case. [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 19,071.
93 29 C.F.R. § 1926.601(a) (1976).
" 531 F.2d at 459.
- 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1976).
8- 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 666(c) (1970).
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of the Commission directed a review of the decision, and Stock-
well did not petition for review. The report of the administrative
law judge then became the final decision of the Commission. 7
The Tenth Circuit declined to consider the Commission's
allegation that Stockwell had failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies,8" finding a more serious jurisdictional defect in Stock-
well's failure to raise the constitutional issues before the adminis-
trative law judge or the Commission." Section 660(a) of 29 U.S.C.
provides that, on judicial review, the court of appeals shall not
consider any objection not urged before the Commission unless
"extraordinary circumstances" excuse the failure. Although
Stockwell contended that the constitutional violations before the
court for review were such "extraordinary circumstances," the
court held that since the alleged constitutional violations were
known to Stockwell at the time of the administrative hearing, its
failure to raise them at that time barred appellate review. 0 The
court went on to add that its review of the record revealed sub-
stantial evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission.
IV. BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT
In 1969, Congress enacted legislation which provides pay-
ments to coal miners who become totally disabled from pneumo-
coniosis, commonly known as black lung disease, and also to
surviving dependents of coal miners whose death is attributable
to the disease.9 The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
was initially responsible for promulgating regulations to aid in
the determination of whether a miner is totally disabled or
whether his death is due to the disease.2 Since proof of death or
total disability due to pneumoconiosis93 is complicated, Congress
established several presumptions to aid potential claimants in
.7 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970).
" See Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51
IND. L.J. 817 (1976).
" 536 F.2d at 1309.
" Id. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.66 (1970) sets forth the duties of a hearing judge in the conduct
of a hearing. These duties include the duty "to adjudicate all issues."
" 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
12 Id. § 921. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare administers claims
under the Act filed prior to December 31, 1973.
" Pneumoconiosis is defined as a "chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of
employment in a coal mine." 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
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meeting their burden." The pertinent regulations reflect this pol-
icy and establish the same or similar presumptions."5
The applicability of two9" of the regulatory presumptions was
at issue in Felthager v. Weinberger.7 The claimant was the widow
of a coal miner who was killed in an accident while employed as
an assistant foreman at a coal mine, a position he had held for
fifteen years." At the time of his death, the miner was suffering
from a severe respiratory impairment." The claimant sought to
establish, by presumption, that the miner's death was due to
pneumoconiosis because he was totally disabled at the time of his
death from the respiratory ailment.'00 The Secretary determined
that the miner was not totally disabled from the ailment, there-
fore precluding the presumption that death was due to pneumo-
coniosis, and accordingly, denied benefits.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit examined the criteria of total
disability established both by statute and by regulation.'0 ' It
Id. § 921(c).
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414, .418, .454, .458, .490 (1976).
" 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414(b), .454 (1976). The first of these two presumptions provides:
(1) Even though the existence of pneumoconiosis is not established . . .
[by medical evidence], if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a
totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary ailment . . . , it may be
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary . . . , that a miner is
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or that a miner was totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis at the time of his death.
20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b). Section 410.454(b) raises the same presumption relative to the
finding that the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis. Both presumptions can be
rebutted by evidence showing that the miner is not, or did not, suffer from pneumocon-
iosis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414(b)(2), .454(b)(2) (1976).
g7 529 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1976).
" While working at his job, the decedent became so exhausted from shortness of
breath that he had to sit down. He sat on the shuttle car tracks in the mine and was
subsequently run over by a shuttle car. He died a few hours later. The immediate cause
of death was listed as a compound fracture of the left leg, fractured pelvis, and pulmonary
edema. 529 F.2d at 132.
:' The Tenth Circuit stated: "There is no doubt the deceased miner suffered from
severe respiratory impairment. ... Id.
'® 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b). See note 96 supra.
"' The statute provides:
The term "total disability" has the meaning given it by regulations of
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, except that such regula-
tions shall provide that a miner shall be considered totally disabled when
pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requir-
ing the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine
or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a
substantial period of time.
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noted that a person could be employed in a mine and yet be
totally disabled from a respiratory ailment if his employment was
characterized by sporadic work or poor performance." 2 The dece-
dent, however, was employed in a job he had held for over a
decade; although he worked with great difficulty, there was no
evidence of sporadic work or poor performance. 03 Also, his job was
not considered to be a "make-work" position offering only mar-
ginal earnings.0 4 Based on the facts in the record, the court felt
that "the fact he [the decedent] was doing his usual work in the
mines at the time of his death, if not conclusive, is at least sub-
stantial evidence in support of the Secretary's finding the de-
ceased was not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.' 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits.' 0
V. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
In Grider v. United States'°7 and Sturgell v. Weinberger,'5
claimants of disability benefits under the Social Security Act' 9
appealed the denial of benefits by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. The issue in both cases was whether the
claimants had established sufficient evidence that they were
"disabled" as defined by the Act. To be disabled, a claimant
30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (Supp. IV 1974). The regulations defining total disability from pneumo-
coniosis promulgated by the Secretary are nearly identical. 20 C.F.R. § 410.412(b) (1976).
"02 "Under the statutory definition, the mere fact of employment does not preclude a
finding of total disability." 529 F.2d at 133.
103 Sporadic work or poor performance were factors that had been instrumental in
findings of total disability. In Dellosa v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
the widow of a coal miner sought black lung disease benefits because her husband, who
was killed in an explosion in a mine, was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Although
the decedent was working at the time of his death, his work had been sporadic for several
years. In addition, the decedent was not able "to adequately perform his mine work." Id.
at 1126. On these considerations, the district court remanded the case to the Secretary
for further findings in light of such factors. Id. The same questions were addressed in
Farmer v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1975), in which the court concluded that
the deceased miner's employment was not so poor or so sporadic that he was totally
disabled.
I0 A miner employed at his death may, also, be found to be totally disabled if the
miner is working at some make-work job not comparable to his usual coal mine work. See
Lawson v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Va. 1975); Rowe v. Weinberger, 400 F.
Supp. 981 (W.D. Va. 1975).
IN 529 F.2d at 135.
IN0 Id.
"" No. 75-1903 (10th Cir., June 2, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
00 No. 75-1933 (10th Cir., July 21, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
101 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1970 & Supp. 11 1972).
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must, inter alia, be unable to perform, and engage in, substantial
gainful activity as the result of a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which is expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months."10 Although the claimants
in both Grider and Sturgell introduced evidence of their disabil-
ity, in both cases the Secretary concluded that the claimants'
burden had not been met."' The Tenth Circuit affirmed both
decisions after finding that the decisions of the Secretary were
supported by substantial evidence. '2
Similarly, a claimant's failure to meet his burden of proof
caused the denial of benefits in Anderson v. Weinberger."' To
qualify as disabled, a claimant must also show that his impair-
ment is of "such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy . . . ."I" Prior to his
disability, the claimant in Anderson had held numerous jobs,
although none on a routine basis."' In the administrative hearing,
the claimant asserted that he had unsuccessfully attempted to
return to his prior activities."' The administrative law judge con-
cluded, however, that the claimant could successfully engage in
work of the general type he had previously performed and that
the claimant was not disabled in terms of the Social Security
"' The Act defines the term disability as "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. ... 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
' Both claimants introduced, as evidence, medical reports of disability and testified
personally as to their pain and disability. The claimant in Grider, however, failed to
establish her disability under the Act "by the required medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techinques .... " No. 75-1903 at 5. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
found in SturgeU that "there was sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to conclude
that appellant failed to meet statutory prerequisites." No. 75-1933 at 4.
"1 According to the Social Security Act, the standard of review for agency decisions
requires that "[tihe findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive .... " 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). This standard is inter-
preted in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
,, No. 76-1270 (10th Cir., Aug. 12, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1970) (emphasis added).
S The claimant lost sight in one eye during a scuffle following an assault. No. 76-
1270 at 2. Prior to the injury, he had been employed as a carpenter, truck driver, construc-
tion foreman, and common laborer. Id.
"' Id. at 3.
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Act." 7 Again, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision after find-
ing substantial evidence to support the determination of the ad-
ministrative law judge.1
8
As in Anderson, the severity of an impairment was also the
dispositive question in Kirk v. Weinberger."9 Unlike the situation
in Anderson, however, the claimant in Kirk was able to establish
that she was unable to perform the work in which she had been
engaged immediately prior to her disability.'20 She failed to prove,
however, that she was unable to work in occupations in which she
had previous experience and training.'2 ' Hence, she did not meet
the statutory burden placed on claimants and was, therefore, not
considered to be disabled. Again, the Tenth Circuit found that
the decision of the administrative law judge was supported by
substantial evidence and affirmed.'
22
The importance of Kirk is the burden of proof required by the
Tenth Circuit to establish statutory disability. The Tenth Circuit
stated:
[Ilf a claimant has any training or experience in a field of employ-
ment other than the one in which she was working prior to disability,
she must not only show her physical disability to continue at her
former occupation, but also that she is physically unable to perform
the other work for which she is qualified.' "
By this statement, the court has clarified the standard it will
require for proving disability in claims for disability benefits
under the Social Security Act.
124
17 The Tenth Circuit noted the administrative law judge's conclusion that "Anderson
was able to perform substantial gainful activity of a light or sedentary nature." Id. In fact,
the claimant conceded that he could probably work in a gas station or drive a pick up
truck. Id. at 4. Thus, the claimant did not establish that he was unable to return to the
general type of work he had been performing prior to his disability.
"' Id. at 3, 4. See note 112 supra.
"' No. 75-1652 (10th Cir., Apr. 27, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 2.
" Id. at 3.
"2 Id. at 6.
121 Id. at 4.
12 In several prior cases, the Tenth Circuit stated that a claimant need only establish
his inability to perform his usual vocation. See, e.g., Gardner v. Brian, 369 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1966); Kirby v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1966). Once this fact was established,
the burden shifted to the Secretary to show that suitable employment opportunities in
the immediate geographical area were available to the claimant. Failure by the Secretary
to meet this burden would thus entitle the claimant to disability benefits.
In Kirk, the court concluded that the claimant must not only prove his disability to
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VI. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Blackett,'2 " the
railway filed suit in district court to set aside an award of addi-
tional wages in favor of a railroad employee, pursuant to the
Railway Labor Act.'20 Although the district court denied the rail-
road's claim that the National Railroad Adjustment Board' 7
lacked jurisdiction to make the award, the court substantially
reduced the amount of the award.'28 As a result, the decision of
the district court was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The dispositive issue on appeal was the reviewability of the
amount of the award made by the National Railroad Adjustment
Board.' 9 The Tenth Circuit considered two factors in deciding the
question. First, the court noted that although the Railway Labor
Act empowers district courts to set aside awards of the Board, the
reviewable aspects of board action are limited only to "lack of
jurisdiction, the Board's acting outside the law or the presence of
fraud or corruption on the Board.' 30 Second, the court inferred,
continue in his usual vocation but, also, must establish his disability to perform any other
kind of work for which he might be qualified. It is only after both facts are established
that the burden shifts to the Secretary either to identify suitable employment opportuni-
ties or, upon failure to identify such opportunities, to award the claimant disability bene-
fits. Thus, the holding in Kirk expands the claimant's burden.
"2 538 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
" Id. The Board is empowered to hear and decide numerous disputes, including
disputes between an employee and a carrier concerning rates of pay. Id. § 153(i).
'2 538 F.2d at 292.
" The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a person suffering legal wrong or
adversely affected by agency action is entitled to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
Such review is not available, however, where either a statute precludes judicial review or
the agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. Id. § 701(a). See Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
11 538 F.2d at 293. The Railway Labor Act limits the scope of review of judicial
decisions and, therefore, provides its own standard of review. See note 129 supra. The Act
states:
The [district] court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the
division [of the National Railroad Adjustment Board], or to set it aside, in
whole or in part, or it may remand the proceeding to the division for such
further action as it may direct. On such review, the findings and order of the
division shall be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of the
division may be set aside . . .for failure of the division to comply with the
requirements of this chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or confine
itself, to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud
or corruption by a member of the division making the order.
45 U.S.C. § 153(g) (1970).
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from both the design and history of the Act, an intent to preclude
judicial review of matters relating to the amount of an award.' 3 '
Consistent with a prior decision on the same question,'32 the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the "district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to thus modify the award,"'1' and, therefore, reversed the
decision.'
34
VII. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In Morton v. Dow,' 35 the Tenth Circuit upheld the authority
of the Federal Aviation Administrator under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958131 to revoke, by emergency order, the petitioner's cer-
tificate of airworthiness. In so holding, the court relied upon (1)
the well-established principle that an agency may take emer-
gency action if the public health, safety, or welfare is endan-
gered' 37 and (2) the Administrator's statutory revocation author-
ity.' 38 The determination of the administrative law judge that the
evidence was sufficient to support revocation' 39 was upheld on the
basis of a finding that the petitioner's aircraft did not conform to
its type certificate.' 0
Although the petitioner also alleged that the statutory provi-
sions providing for review only after the revocation order had been
entered were violative of due process, the court summarily dis-
missed the allegation noting: "Congress recognized that the deci-
,' 538 F.2d at 293.
132 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 370 F.2d 833 (10th Cir.
1966).
" 538 F.2d at 294.
"3 Id. at 295.
"s 525 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1975).
'' 72 Stat. 731 (codified in scattered sections of 14, 15, 16, 31, 40, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
,31 See, e.g., Air East, Inc. v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975) (public safety outweighs licensee's right to pre-revocation
hearing).
lu 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) provides that the Administrator may
suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, any airworthiness certificate, if he determines that
safety in air commerce and the public interest so require.
'1' The administrative law judge held that the Board lacked the authority to investi-
gate and determine that an emergency existed and, thereby, limited his review to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence. 525 F.2d at 1306.
140 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970) requires that an aircraft be in safe operating condition and
conform to its type certificate. Morton had used an identification number and type certifi-
cate which he had obtained from parts salvaged from another aircraft. The plane which
he built from the salvaged parts was not the same type of aircraft as evidenced by the
type certificate. 525 F.2d at 1304-05.
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sion must be determined quickly by persons with expertise in
aviation matters."' 4 '
VIII. COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
In KAKE-TV & Radio, Inc. v. United States,' the petitioner
sought judicial review of the FCC's certification of a cable-TV
franchise. The court considered three basic administrative law
issues under the Communications Act of 1934:11 (1) the scope of
FCC certification proceedings; (2) the necessity of a formal hear-
ing; and (3) the scope of FCC discretion.
KAKE sought review of orders which were granted pursuant
to Aircapital Cablevision, Inc.'s application for certification to
commence cable-TV service in Wichita, Kansas. Aircapital had
been granted a cable-TV franchise by the city of Wichita, pur-
suant to a city ordinance, and the city had advised the FCC that
the franchise was valid." 4 When considering Aircapital's applica-
tion for certification, the FCC applied a presumption that the
franchise was also valid for FCC purposes. In contrast, KAKE
contended that the validity of the franchise should be decided
anew by the Commission, instead of resorting to this presump-
tion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision not to
decide the validity question on the grounds that "[iut is not the
function of the F.C.C. to provide a forum to litigate such an issue,
and, furthermore, the Commission is not a tribunal equipped to
do so.' ' 5 The matter of a defect in the franchise, the court con-
cluded, "can be decided in the Kansas courts between the proper
parties.""'
" 525 F.2d at 1306. See also Air East, Inc. v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d
1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
In addition, the petitioner challenged the admission of certain evidence by the admin-
istrative law judge. The court, however, merely relied upon the standard proposition that
"agencies are not bound by the strict rules of evidence governing jury trials" and upheld
the validity of the admissions. 525 F.2d at 1307.
142 537 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 808 (1977).
"1 48 Stat. 1064 (as amended and codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 46, 47
U.S.C.).
", Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held that cities in Kansas did not have
authority to franchise cable-TV and voided the ordinance. But, the Kansas legislature
then passed an act validating cable-TV franchises theretofore granted. 537 F.2d at 1122.
Id. at 1123.
HA Id. KAKE had pressed legal proceedings in the state courts; however, during the
1977
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The court also affirmed the procedures of the FCC relative
to the certification order. Although the Commission had not held
hearings on Aircapital's application, it had received documents,
statements of position, objections, and other data both support-
ing and opposing the granting of the certificate of compliance.'47
Not only did the court find that there is no statutory requirement
for a formal hearing on cable-TV applications,'48 but it found that
the FCC's bases for decision were sufficiently disclosed to permit
effective court review.'
49
The question of whether Aircapital was in "substantial com-
pliance" with FCC regulations was considered to be solely within
the discretion of the Commission.'"
IX. NATURAL GAS ACT
In the three cases which confronted the Tenth Circuit con-
cerning the Natural Gas Act'"' and the Federal Power Commis-
sion, the court decided the issues by resorting to fundamental
administrative law principles concerning the scope of judicial re-
view.
In Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. FPC,151 the peti-
tioner, after filing for a rate increase, sought review of the Com-
pendency of the FCC proceedings, the Kansas Supreme Court decided that KAKE did
not have sufficient interest in the franchise to enable it to litigate the question and
dismissed the state action. In actuality, KAKE did not have a forum to contest the
validity of the franchise.
",7 Such procedures are in accordance with 47 C.F.R. § 76.27 (1976) which provides
procedures for submission of written objections and replies thereto in certification pro-
ceedings. 47 C.F.R. § 76.7 (1976) provides procedures for submission of written data on
petitions for special relief, but empowers the Commission to request oral argument or
hearing or decide on the pleadings.
1" 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) provides for hearings only when a substantial and mate-
rial question of fact is presented or the Commission is unable to find that public conveni-
ence and necessity would be served by granting an application.
" 537 F.2d at 1122. The court detailed the order of the Commission in order to
demonstrate its conclusion that the Commission adequately disclosed the bases of its
decision, thereby meeting the requirements of Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
1"* 537 F.2d at 1122-23. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(b) (1976) provides the method for determin-
ing a franchise fee. KAKE alleged that the franchise fee to the City was too high to comply
with this regulation. Despite the fact that the court viewed this matter as being within
the discretion of the Commission, it noted that the record showed that the interested
parties planned a downward revision and later review. 537 F.2d at 1123.
Is' 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1970).
152 534 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1976).
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mission's determinations which changed several elements of the
ratemaking process. 5 3 The basic issue was whether the FPC's
decision to depart from the Mcf mile method, proposed by
Kansas-Nebraska, for allocating transmission costs had a ra-
tional basis, particularly since there had been no change in peti-
tioner's circumstances. Kansas-Nebraska also questioned the va-
lidity of the FPC's closing the case on the adjustment of zone
boundaries for cost allocation, in view of the Commission's state-
ment that further hearings were necessary.
54
When considering the argument that the FPC's decision
lacked a rational basis, the Tenth Circuit applied both SEC v.
Chenery Corp. 'S55 standard of review of agency action and the
presumption of agency correctness,5 M and quickly disposed of the
issue. In addition, the court concluded that "[t]he theories used
by the FPC in arriving at the end result are peculiarly within its
discretion"'57 and a departure from the Mcf method was within
the agency's regulatory authority.' Because the Commission had
determined that "'Kansas-Nebraska's method of applying mile-
ages to its allocation of costs results in unreasonable differences
in rates charged to customers' "' the FPC's actions were, indeed,
justified by a change of conditions.
' The FPC issued two opinions "which changed cost allocations in the two zones;
used a different formula for allocating transmission costs; changed the classification of
gathering costs; changed rate design, and excluded some of the capitalization for rate of
return computations." Id. at 229.
"I, The FPC determined that " 'based on the data contained in the record, it would
be most difficult to draw a zone line that would be meaningful and reasonable in this
case.' " 534 F.2d at 230. However, the idea of completing the record was rejected, because
it would have had the effect of prolonging the case for some four years.
'n 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Chenery established the principle that:
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds
are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administra-
tive action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis.
Id. at 196. See also Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960).
"' In Amoco Prod. Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1973), the court held that
"[tihe FPC's interpretation is entitled to great weight, since a presumption of validity
attaches to a Commission's exercise of its expertise." Id. at 921.
1*, 534 F.2d at 230.
Im Id. See also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945), which held
that the Commission had wide latitude in determining allocation formulas.
"1 534 F.2d at 231. Kansas-Nebraska's rate structure formula had been considered
by the Commission in 1961.
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Although the FPC's orders resulted in a refund by petitioner,
the court upheld the orders by reasoning that:
It is apparent that the Commission cannot dispose of all the prob-
lems before it in any one case. As before any administrative body
many issues are decided on a case by case basis, on how the issue
arises, and how the record is developed . . . . [Tibere comes a
point where the record must be closed and the case be decided.8 0
Kansas-Nebraska also alleged that the FPC action had re-
sulted in undercollection in one zone. Although noting that
"[u]nfortunately this is not an unusual happening," the court
held that "the company took the risk that an undercollection as
to one segment might occur."' 6
The Tenth Circuit, in Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,12 clearly ex-
pressed its view that agency decisions on matters of law are sub-
ject to judicial review. In Skelly, Skelly and Lone Star Gas had
entered into a twenty-year contract, which, by amendment, pro-
vided that if the gas pressure from the properties involved should
drop below the point where delivery would be impossible, the
agreement would terminate. Subsequently, after a continuing
pressure drop in the wells, the parties agreed that the contract
had expired,6 3 and entered into a second contract. When Skelly's
application for a rate increase under the second contract was
10 Id. The FPC indicated that the staff method of allocation would be '"adopted
subject to a complete record being developed' in another case." Id. The court interpreted
this statement to mean that the staff's formula would not necessarily be applicable in
future cases.
I Id. at 232. The procedure set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970) provides that when
proposed rate changes go into effect, at the expiration of the suspension period, "the
Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company ... to refund any amounts
ordered by the Commission." Thus, the statute does not provide for any resulting under-
collection. See also FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145, 153 (1962),
wherein the Supreme Court recognized that such an adjustment policy was consistent
with the policy of the Natural Gas Act.
The court found no merit in the petitioner's objection to the FPC determination that
field gathering costs should be treated, for ratemaking, as 100% commodity costs, rather
than as "demand" and "commodity costs." Similarly, the court found no basis for an
objection to the adjustment of Kansas-Nebraska's rate of return on capitalization, inas-
much as "[tJhis is at most a difference in policy or theory, and the FPC determination
was well within its discretion." 534 F.2d at 232 (citing Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424
F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969)).
,62 532 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1976).
10 Id. at 178. After the expiration of the base contract, Lone Star agreed to install
the compression equipment itself and to buy the gas under a new arrangement based upon
compression by the purchaser. Id. at 179.
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denied by the Commission on the basis that it was not a
"replacement contract" because the original contract did not
expire "by its own terms,"" 4 Skelly sought judicial review of this
denial.
In the court's opinion, the question of whether the original
contract expired by its own terms, was governed by "ordinary
contract law, a Williston-Corbin problem," and not subject to the
Natural Gas Act. 65 Moreover, the court found that the record
disclosed no evidence or claim that the parties themselves
brought the pressure clause into operation, but rather the evi-
dence revealed that the clause became operative through objec-
tive, measurable events, which were not within the parties' con-
trol. '6 Since the question was one of law and the determination
of the Commission was, therefore, not entitled to judicial defer-
ence, the court was able to find that the pressure clause was a
"typical condition under the Corbin definition" and therefore did
expire by its own terms.6 7
In McCulloch Interstate Gas Corp. v. FPC,165 McCulloch
sought judicial review of two FPC orders which allegedly would
have permitted "the sale and delivery of gas by Phillips
[Petroleum Company] to Panhandle [Eastern Pipe Line Com-
pany] 'in direct competition with other volumes of natural gas
produced and sold to McCulloch Interstate by other producers of
"I Id. at 178. The replacement contract policy was established in several FPC opin-
ions: Opinion No. 639, 48 F.P.C. 1299 (1972); Opinion No. 699, 51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974); and
Opinion No. 699-H, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974). This policy required that "where a new contract
is executed with respect to an existing interstate sales [sic] where the previous sales
contract has expired by its own terms . . . such gas will be eligible for the R-389-B [base
national] rate." 51 F.P.C. at 2275.
"1 532 F.2d at 179. The court cited several cases supportive of the proposition that
the Natural Gas Act does not alter ordinary contractual relationships between parties.
See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956). In
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 282 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1960), the court had previously
indicated that a decision by the FPC is not entitled to judicial deference when such a
decision is based upon contract law rather than the Commission's special expertise.
"I Because the court found that Skelly and Lone Star had not subjectively agreed to
terminate the contract, the court was able to distinguish Mobile Oil Corp., 49 F.P.C. 239
(1973), wherein the parties had agreed to add additional acreage and the base contract
had no provision for termination.
"1 532 F.2d at 180. The court carefully limited its decision to the question of termina-
tion, refusing to decide how that determination might relate to other issues raised or other
factors.
1" 536 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1976).
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natural gas in the same fields,' ""9 resulting in McCulloch buffer-
ing "' a diminution in its required supplies of natural gas.' "I"7
McCulloch intervened in the proceedings before the FPC
when Phillips sought the FPC's authorization to sell uncommit-
ted gas to Panhandle at the mill compressor station owned by
Panhandle and operated by Phillips. To accomplish the sale,
Phillips proposed to construct approximately thirty-five miles of
pipeline to connect Phillips' wells to the mill station.
The FPC ruled that the proposed pipeline was not within its
jurisdiction because, it concluded, the facilities were gathering
facilities of an independent producer which are not subject to the
requirements of the Natural Gas Act. The FPC, therefore, did not
consider the merits of Phillips' application. When McCulloch's
petition for rehearing was denied, it did not seek judicial review
of the decision.'
7'
In the subsequent FPC hearing, wherein Phillips was granted
a temporary certificate for the sale of gas, the jurisdictional issue
was not considered, inasmuch as the FPC felt that McCulloch's
failure to seek judicial review "effectively forecloses further con-
sideration thereof.' Thereafter, without a hearing, the FPC en-
tered an order granting Phillips a permanent certificate. Again,
when McCulloch's application for rehearing was denied, judicial
review was not sought. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
that "[t]he controlling issue is whether FPC should have exer-
cised jurisdiction over the pipelines . . . .It declined to do so
because they were exempt gathering facilities. Agency decisions
on jurisdiction are subject to court review."'' 3
In spite of the court's recognition of the reviewability of juris-
dictional issues, it found that the procedures for judicial review
prescribed explicitly in the Natural Gas Act were exclusive.
7
Because "[tihe mode of challenging an agency's jurisdictional
"' Id. at 911.
170 Id.
'"' 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1970) sets forth the procedures for judicial review of FPC deter-
minations.
"1 536 F.2d at 912.
'1 Id. at 912-13 (citing Utah Copper Co. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 129 F.2d 358
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 687 (1942)).
"' 536 F.2d at 913.
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decision is by direct attack"'' 5 and "[a] party may not collater-
ally attack the validity of a prior agency order in a subsequent
proceeding,"'' 6 McCulloch was estopped from seeking judicial
review of the jurisdictional issue by his failure to seek court re-
view after the denial of his petition for rehearing. The court also
found that McCulloch's failure to seek court review was disposi-
tive of McCulloch's contention that it was under no compulsion
to seek review until a final disposition was made on Phillips'
certification.' 7 Additionally, the court upheld the informal pro-
ceedings in which the FPC granted Phillips a permanent certifi-
cate on the grounds that the pertinent facts were not contested
and "[nlo evidentiary hearing is required when the proceeding
involves only a question of law."' 7
X. MINERAL LEASING AcT
The petitioners in Hunter v. Morton,"' appealed from deci-
sions and rulings of the Department of Interior which denied
them coal prospecting permits in Utah. The petitioners had pro-
perly filed three applications for such permits, pursuant to the
Mineral Leasing Act'80 and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der. 18 The manager for the Utah State Land Office of the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) rejected one application in its en-
tirety. In a second decision, the manager rejected the other appli-
cations as to part of the acreage and conditioned the issuance of
any permits as to the remaining acreage on the applicants' meet-
ing certain conditions.8 2
The applicants did not attempt to meet the conditions im-
173 Id.
- Id. The principle that a party may not collaterally attack the validity of a prior
agency order in a subsequent proceeding has been often applied to administrative cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Callanan Road
Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507 (1953); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific
Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
These cases also justify the court's contention that "[a]n agency's determination of facts
underlying its conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking must be given effect in subsequent
litigation." 536 F.2d at 913.
1 536 F.2d at 913.
'7 Id. See also Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
," 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976).
30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
"' 43 C.F.R. §§ 3510, 3511 (1976).
529 F.2d at 647.
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posed on that acreage which was not rejected and did not appeal
the manager's decision not to issue permits on such acreage. An
appeal was perfected, however, from the decisions of the manager
insofar as those decisions rejected their applications."s: Before
final action in the appellate process was taken, the Secretary of
the Interior promulgated Order Number 2952 which suspended
the issuance of all such coal prospecting permits until further
notice and rejected all pending applications. 4 Accordingly, the
appeals were rejected and the permit applications were denied."5
The petitioners raised three important questions in an ap-
peal to the Tenth Circuit after the district court rejected petition-
ers' claims to any coal permits.' 6 First, petitioners argued that
they had not received proper notice of "the choices presented in
the administrative appeals when part of the application was re-
jected and part was not."'87 Although the decision stated that the
applicants had a right to appeal such a determination and identi-
fied the procedure to follow,'" the court noted that the decision
left "much to be desired in the way of clarity in the notice of right
to appeal" that portion of the decision conditioning the issuance
of a permit.'8' The court dismissed the argument, however, be-
cause the decision was "sufficient to advise the applicant to take
some action as to the acreage not rejected if he wants to move
toward a perfected application.""'
Secondly, the petitioners argued that they had acquired an
interest or a right by their applications to the extent they were
not rejected, and that rejection of their pending applications pur-
suant to the Secretary's order was erroneous."' Citing ample pre-
"3 Id. at 647-48.
' 38 Fed. Reg. 4,682 (1973).
529 F.2d at 647.
The applicants brought an action in district court seeking a "decree that petition-
ers owned the permits, for mandamus to direct their formal issuance, and to enjoin the
Secretary from advancing claims adverse to applicants' 'ownership."' Id.
", Id. at 648.
t The decisions contained the following clause:
Thirty days from receipt of this decision are allowed in which to meet the
requirements above indicated or appeal to the Director, Bureau of Land
Management. If no action is taken, the case will be closed on the records of
this office, as to the available lands, without further notice.
Id. at 647.





cedent, the court dismissed this argument on the basis that the
applicants acquired no property rights by simply filing their
offer. " Accordingly, the court found that there had been no
wrongful rejection of the applications pursuant to the Order.
In their third argument, petitioners claimed that the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act9 3 was not followed in the issuance and
application of Order 2952."1 The court rejected this argument and
held that such action was an exercise of discretion (by the Secre-
tary of Interior) over public land administration and was there-
fore exempted from the standard rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 95
XI. ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN ESTATES
The same factual setting presented the Tenth Circuit with
two separate questions during the last term.'" Two attorneys had
presented a claim of $8,250 against the estate of an Otoe Indian
for legal services rendered to the decedent during his life.'97 The
"I The provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act give the Secretary discretion to issue
coal prospecting permits: "Where prospecting or exploratory work is necessary to deter-
mine the existence or workability of coal deposits in any unclaimed, undeveloped area,
the Secretary of Interior may issue . . . prospecting permits. ... 30 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1970). The Tenth Circuit concluded that, because the Secretary has discretion to issue
prospecting permits after application, such applications do not create a property right.
This conclusion is consistent with decisions establishing that an application for an oil and
gas lease does not create a vested property right if the issuance of such a lease is also
discretionary with the Secretary. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Hannifin
v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1971); Thor-Westcliffe Dev., Inc. v. Udall, 314 F.2d
257 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951 (1963). See also Woods Petroleum Corp., GFS
(Min) 73 (1973); E.L. Lockhardt, GFS (Min) 74 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 551 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
529 F.2d at 647.
"9 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). This section of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act sets forth procedures to be followed by an agency when promulgating rules and
regulations. The provisions of the section, however, do not apply to the extent that rule-
making is "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." Id. § 553(a)(2). The Tenth Circuit, in Morton, found
that the issuance of Order No. 2952 constituted an exercise of discretion by the Secretary
in administering federal property and "comes well within the exceptions to the application
of the Administrative Procedure Act in that it is a general application of policy and
concerns federal property." 529 F.2d at 649.
it Hill v. Morton, 525 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Hill I]; Hill v.
Morton, No. 76-1164 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication) [hereinafter
cited as Hill II].
" Determination of Heirs and Approval of Wills, Except as to Members of the Five
Civilized Tribes and Osage Indians, 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.200-4.297 (1976).
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Secretary of the Interior determined the reasonable value of the
services to be $1,500 and awarded the claimants that amount., "
The attorneys sought judicial review of the Secretary's deter-
mination in the District Court for the Western District of Okla-
homa. In a two sentence judgment, the district court concluded
that the Secretary's determination was arbitrary and capricious
and ordered the Secretary to pay the full amount of the claim.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment and re-
manded the matter for further proceedings9" because the district
court had not met its "affirmative duty upon. . . reviewing ad-
ministrative action to engage in substantial inquiry of the rele-
vant facts as developed in the administrative record and then to
define, specifically, those facts which it deems supportive of the
agency decision if that is the court's resolution of the matter." 0'
Since the district court had merely stated that the action was
arbitrary and capricious, without further explanation, the Tenth
Circuit did not have an adequate basis for appellate review.10
On remand, the district court, again, held the Secretary's
determination to be arbitrary and capricious. 03 The court rea-
soned that the evidence presented by the attorneys as to the time
spent in representing the decedent, and the rate of compensation
therefor, was binding on the Secretary in the determination of
fees.204 When this decision was appealed, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the Secretary correctly viewed the rate of compensa-
", Hill II, No. 76-1164 at 2.
" Hill 1, 525 F.2d at 327.
Id. at 328.
I0 d.
In reaching this decision, the court relied on both Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d
1389 (10th Cir. 1974), and Heber Valley Milk Co. v. Butz, 503 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1974). In
essence, Hill I somewhat expanded the holding of these cases. Both Nickol and Heber
Valley involved a district court's granting of summary judgment. The court, in each case,
concluded that summary judgment is inappropriate where the question for review is
whether an administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Comment,
The Propriety of Summary Judgment in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 52
DEN. L.J. 46 (1975). Even though Hill I differed procedurally from Nickol and Heber
Valley since the district court did not consider summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit felt
that the "minor dissimilarity is without real significance in this case in view of the
proceedings in the district court which were, for all practical purposes, summary in na-
ture." 525 F.2d at 328. Hill 's extension of the Nickol rule appears to be limited in scope,
however, since it is dependent upon the nature of the review proceedings in the trial court.
I Hill II, No. 76-1164 at 2.
m Id. at 5.
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tion and hours spent in representation as only two of many factors
to be considered in determining the reasonable value of attorneys'
services. 0 5 After reviewing all of the relevant factors, the court
concluded that the Secretary's allowance of only $1,500 for serv-
ices rendered did not constitute an arbitrary disregard of the
evidence so as to render the action capricious. 0 Accordingly, the
court upheld the Secretary's determination.
Carleton L. Ekberg
Kristine A. Hoeltgen
2 Id. Among other factors considered by the court were the "novelty and difficulty
of the issues involved, the amount involved and the results obtained, and the experience,
reputation, and skill of the lawyers performing the services." Id.
'm Id. at 9. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that the reviewing court shall
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law
. .. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).

ANTITRUST*
The Tenth Circuit decided several interesting antitrust cases
this term involving questions of territorial restrictions, tying ar-
rangements,' proof of market power and relevant market, proof
of resultant damages, and the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.'
In World of Sleep, Inc. v. Stearns & Foster Co.,3 the Tenth
Circuit applied the rule "that an essential element for [private]
recovery under the antitrust laws is that the claimant be injured
or damaged, and a violation of the Act without resultant injury
is not enough." 4 Stearns began selling bed products to Denver-
based World of Sleep in 1965 under an informal business relation-
ship, with neither party committed to a formal agreement.
Stearns had a policy, with some exceptions, of selling to only one
dealer in a given locality. In 1968 World of Sleep expanded and
opened a sister store in Atlanta, Georgia. Steams refused to sell
merchandise to the Atlanta World of Sleep store, citing its loyalty
to a local department store. The World of Sleep store in Denver
began transshipping Stearns' products to its Atlanta store, and,
upon learning of this, Stearns terminated all sales to World of
Sleep. World of Sleep instituted a civil antitrust action alleging
that Stearns violated the Sherman Act5 by imposing territorial
restrictions on the resale of Stearns' products. World of Sleep
requested a directed verdict on the issue of liability and asked
that the jury determine only the amount of damages. The trial
court refused this motion; the jury returned a verdict for Steams
finding no antitrust violation.
* In Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court overruled the per se rule of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967). The impact of this decision should be considered on the analyses of World
of Sleep v. Stearns & Foster Co. and Randy's Studebaker Sales v. Nissan Motor Corp.
infra-Ed.
Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976). The case involved a novel, but unsuccessful, attempt to classify the Shell trade-
mark and Shell gasoline as separate products in an illegal tying arrangement. For a more
extended analysis of this decision, see the Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights Overview
infra.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1970) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as the Fran-
chise Act].
525 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 43.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Sherman Act].
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World of Sleep argued on appeal that United States v. Ar-
nold, Schwinn & Co.' should have been controlling on the issue
of whether there had been a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Discussing the holding in Schwinn, the Tenth Circuit stated:
In Schwinn, it was held that where a manufacturer, such as Steams
in the instant case, sells his product to a distributor, such as World
of Sleep, and in connection with such sale, "firmly and resolutely"
subjects the distributor to territorial restrictions upon resale,
whether by "explicit agreement or silent combination or under-
standing with his vendee," a per se violation of the Sherman Act
results.'
The Tenth Circuit held that Steams' discontinuance of sales be-
cause of World of Sleep's transshipping did not necessarily estab-
lish that Stearns had previously imposed territorial restrictions
on the resale of its products; therefore, the issue of liability had
properly gone to the jury.'
The theory of damages proposed by World of Sleep was
firmly rejected by the Tenth Circuit. World of Sleep argued that
when Stearns terminated sales it became necessary to increase
the advertising of its other lines of bedding. The court found that
no direct relationship could be established between Steams' al-
leged territorial restrictions and the increased advertising expen-
ses, especially since World of Sleep's sales and net worth had also
increased yearly. The court noted that the proximate damage
problem alone could have justified the trial court's decision to
deny the motion for a directed verdict
In E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 10 E.J. Delaney
388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn, a bicycle manufacturer assigned territories to each
of its 22 distributors and instructed the distributors to sell only to franchised accounts in
their own territories.
1 525 F.2d at 44 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967)).
1 The trial court had instructed the jury on what constituted a per se violation of the
Sherman Act in accordance with the Schwinn holding. 525 F.2d at 44. Given the admitted
policy of Steams to sell to only one dealer in a locality, the warnings given to World of
Sleep concerning transshipping, and the ultimate discontinuance of all sales to World of
Sleep, query what would constitute a per se violation sufficient to warrant a directed
verdict.
1 525 F.2d at 43. Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages
in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231 (1961).
The court's damages analysis is more convincing than its attempt to distinguish Schwinn
from the present case.
10 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
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Corporation, an advertising-promotional firm, alleged that Bonne
Bell, a manufacturer of cosmetics exclusively endorsed by the
United States Ski Team," had violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act'" by conspiring to prevent the distribution of
"skier's paks" containing cosmetics.'3 At trial, the jury awarded
damages to Bonne Bell.'4 The Tenth Circuit found on appeal that
the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that section 1 had
been violated, but held that a prima facie showing of a section 2
violation had not been made. Because the jury had returned a
general verdict, the case was reversed and remanded for a new
trial.'5
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the facts supporting the allega-
tion of a section 1 violation: Bonne Bell had initiated a "total
involvement" program in the ski cosmetic market; by 1970,
Bonne Bell believed it had a "hold" on that market; Bonne Bell
was opposed to all competition within that market; and although
the USSA was initially enthusiastic about Delaney's proposal,
after Bonne Bell's objections were raised the USSA refused the
proposal." The court held that, although Bonne Bell's exclusive
" Bonne Bell entered into a contract with the United States Ski Association [USSA]
in which the United States Ski Team [Ski Team] exclusively endorsed Bonne Bell's
cosmetic products, with Bonne Bell designated the official cosmetic of the Ski Team.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " Id. (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) provides in part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ... Id. (emphasis added).
1 E.J. Delaney Corporation [Delaney] was organized to bring advertising from na-
tional advertisers to the market in ski resort areas. Delaney began distributing its advertis-
ers' products in a "skier's pak" which included cosmetics and toiletries; a set fee was paid
to Delaney by each supplier for every "pak" sold. In 1970, the USSA was contacted by
Delaney, and initial approval, subject to final approval by the USSA auditors, was given
to a plan which provided that each "pak" sell for one dollar and that 40% of the total
receipts be given to the Ski Team.
11 The trial court trebled the damages and awarded attorneys' fees as authorized
under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
11 525 F.2d at 301. See Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Village Theater, Inc., 228
F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1955).
IS 525 F.2d at 301. Bonne Bell's objections were premised on the concept that the
distribution of the "paks" and the advertisement of the Ski Team's receipt of net proceeds
would be suggestive of USSA's endorsement and not in accord with the exclusive endorse-
ment contract.
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endorsement contract with USSA was not illegal per se, 17 the jury
could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that Bonne
Bell utilized the endorsement contract in an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade violative of section 1.
The trial court had proceeded on the theory that the jury
could find a section 2 violation based upon a finding of "a danger-
ous probability of monopolization . . . even absent specific proof
of Bonne Bell's market power."'" The Tenth Circuit disagreed,
stating:
[ln the absence of any showing by the plaintiff as to where the area
of competition existed, or what clout the defendant corporation had
therein, it was error for the trial judge to submit the §2 issue to the
jury. No facts were before it upon which to base a verdict, and no
facts from which inferences could properly be drawn."
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of the section 2 claim
by reviewing the cases setting forth the established liberal rule for
accepting minimal proof of damage in an antitrust case, quoting
the United States Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc. :20 "[The] burden of proving the fact of dam-
age . . .is satisfied by proof of some damage flowing from the
unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes
only to the amount and not the fact of damage."
12'
Despite this language in Zenith and an admission by the
court that Delaney had "incurred some sales and distribution
losses, ' 22 the Tenth Circuit was able to distinguish the present
issue from that discussed in Zenith:
The critical problem here does not involve a question of proof
of damage made at trial or how the damages may be proved. Rather,
it is a basic matter of proof of a cause of action, or, more particu-
larly, proof of a prima facie case to go to the jury.Y
17 Id.
" Id. at 300. Attempting to monopolize is a violation of section 2. The "attempt"
clause has produced interpretation problems for the lower federal courts not found in
section 2's monopolization and conspiracy prohibitions. For an excellent discussion of the
exact problem presented in this case, see Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sher-
man Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1451 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1451].
" 525 F.2d at 306.
395 U.S. 100 (1969) (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 114 n.9.




In so formulating the issue, the Tenth Circuit required two
elements of proof to establish a prima facie case for attempted
monopolization violative of section 2: (1) proof of specific intent
to monopolize; and (2) proof of market power or market position
(with a definition of the relevant market).4 The Supreme Court
has long required proof of specific intent to monopolize,25 but has
not yet expressly recognized the necessity of proving a defen-
dant's market power. The Tenth Circuit joined a growing num-
ber of lower federal courts which now require proof of market
power in a section 2 claim for attempted monopolization. 7
The Tenth Circuit commented on the lack of evidence con-
cerning Bonne Bell's market power:
z' Id. at 305-06.
E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
26 For a discussion of the need for clarification by the Supreme Court, see 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1451. The author suggests:
Given the premise that attempt to monopolize should include a broad cate-
gory of single-firm coercive activity, the focus should be on economic rather
than market power. Any and all forms of economic power are relevant here,
for the concept of attempt does not necessarily require a degree of market
power in the field where monopolization is sought. . . . Relevant considera-
tions might include: a deep pocket, either defendant's or a parent corpora-
tion's; control over demand, distribution or supply; a dominant position in
a separate market; reciprocal arrangements with a sibling in a conglomerate
family; or patents, copyrights or exclusive contract rights. All are capable of
giving a defendant firm sufficient leverage to implement a predatory scheme,
and all are analytically independent of market power in the area of competi-
tion in which injury is inflicted.
Id. at 1474 (footnotes omitted).
The Tenth Circuit noted that Delaney had established that:
Bonne Bell had the economic power to become the official cosmetic of the
U.S. Ski Team; that it had the economic power to pay the USSA over
$180,000.00 in minimum retainers . . . [and] that it believed that it had
the economic power to develop a "hold" on the skiers' cosmetic market in
the United States ....
525 F.2d at 306-07 (emphasis added). However these facts were found insufficient to
establish defendant's requisite market power.
" The court cited cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
as supporting the view that proof of market power is necessary to establish a prima facie
claim for attempt to monopolize. 525 F.2d at 305. The Third Circuit, in Coleman Motor
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975), has also adopted this requirement.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be split in its view as to whether market power is important
in attempt cases. Compare Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (relevant market held irrelevant) with Cornwell Quality Tools
Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971) ("sufficient market power to come danger-
ously close" to monopolization was an element of proof in an attempt claim).
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The record, as to this element, shows only that there were at the
time some five million skiers in the country who were affluent and
youthful; that the market was sought after, and that there were
unique marketing problems. This was all that was shown as to the
market as such. There was no evidence offered as to the corporate
defendant's sales volume in the "skier's cosmetic market" nor the
sales volume therein of anyone else. There was no evidence as to the
total sales in the market. There was no evidence as to the corporate
defendant's power as to pricing or as to any other party's power.n
This lack of evidence was a fatal defect in the establishment of a
prima facie case against Bonne Bell for attempted monopoliza-
tion.2
Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp.0 in-
volved allegations by an automobile dealer in Salt Lake City
[Randy's] against the distribution of Datsun vehicles [Nissan]
for violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 3' and for
violations of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.32 Randy's al-
leged that Nissan refused to renew the franchise because Randy's
would not follow Nissan's resale price maintenance policies.
Randy's also argued that Nissan deliberately attempted to drive
Randy's out of business by supplying an insufficient number of
Datsun vehicles. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Randy's
under the Franchise Act, but found in favor of Nissan on the
Sherman Act claims.
In upholding the jury verdict, the Tenth Circuit noted that
"[tihe Franchise Act gives to an automobile dealer a federal
cause of action against an automobile manufacturer who fails to
act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms
or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not
renewing the franchise. '33 The Franchise Act defines "good faith"
as the duty of the dealer and manufacturer "to act in a fair and
equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion
" 525 F.2d at 306 (emphasis in original).
2 The trial judge's instruction on relevant market was held to be a correct statement
of the law. However, since there was no evidence on relevant market, the issue should not
have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 308.
533 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1976).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
' The act is also popularly known as the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act.
11 533 F.2d at 514 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970)).
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or intimidation from the other party. ' 34 The Franchise Act also
provides "[tihat recommendation, endorsement, exposition,
persuasion, urging or argument shall not be" considered lack of
good faith.35 Noting that the line between normal recommenda-
tion and coercion may indeed be thin, the Tenth Circuit exam-
ined the cases interpreting good faith under the Franchise Act
and found that Nissan's actions constituted bad faith. The court
cited a Second Circuit case 3 and held that coercion and subse-
quent termination for failure to adhere to a manufacturer's sug-
gested resale price constituted bad faith. The court cited Junikki
Imports, Inc. v. Toyota Motors37 for the proposition that bad faith
also exists when a manufacturer supplies an insufficient number
of cars in an attempt to drive a dealer out of business. With the
aid of these holdings the Tenth Circuit found "Nissan used the
nonrenewal weapon to coerce the dealer into a program of retail
price fixing. '38 Sufficient evidence was present to show that Nis-
san curtailed the supply of automobiles in order to bring about
price maintenance and suppression of competition. Additionally,
Nissan tried to force Randy's to make major capital improve-
ments, which could be deemed an effort to force Randy's to raise
its prices to meet expenses .3 The court held that projection of lost
profits over a ten-year period for loss of the franchise was not too
speculative for jury determination."
Nissan objected to the use of questionnaires submitted into
evidence by Randy's to show how the customers felt about the
quality of Randy's service. The court noted the recent tendency
to admit surveys of this kind if properly conducted4' and held that
the surveys "were properly admitted to reflect the then existing
state of mind of the customers as to the quality of Randy's service
generally." 2
533 F.2d at 514 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1970)).
15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1970).
3, Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
37 335 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
533 F.2d at 516.
31 Id.
,o Id. at 518-19. See Note, The Elusive Measure of Damages for Wrongful Termina-
tion of Automobile Dealership Franchises, 74 YALE L.J. 354 (1964).
" 533 F.2d at 520.
42 Id.
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In Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 3 the Tenth
Circuit upheld a jury verdict against Olson Farms, an egg distrib-
utor. The plaintiffs, fourteen egg producers some of whom were
also distributors, charged Olson Farms with conspiring with other
distributors to fix and depress the prices paid to producers. Plain-
tiffs also alleged that Olson Farms conspired with others to fix the
wholesale price for eggs. The jury was presented with a special
verdict form which set forth the three causes of action under the
Sherman Act: (1)a restraint of trade violation of section 1; (2) a
conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2; and (3) an
attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2.11
On appeal, Olson Farms first argued that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant submission of the case to the jury,
suggesting that the only possible evidence showing price fixing
was the existence of price parallelism between the prices paid by
Olson Farms to egg producers and the prices paid by its named
coconspirators. The court agreed that price parallelism alone
would not establish a conspiracy to fix prices.45 However, price
parallelism becomes significant when it is accompanied by evi-
dence of behavior to fix prices." There was sufficient evidence of
a course of conduct to fix prices to submit the issue to the jury.
Olson Farms also argued that there was insufficient evidence
to establish the relevant geographical market. The court noted
there was a difference of opinion as to what constituted the rele-
vant geographic market47 and held that in this case it was best
for the trial judge to submit the issue to the jury. 8 The Tenth
43 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976).
,1 The jury found defendant violated all three claims. Damages were awarded to four
of the plaintiffs under claim (1). The remaining ten plaintiffs were awarded damages
under claim (2). No damages were awarded under claim (3). The plaintiffs also originally
alleged violations of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 13-13c,
12a (1970) and the antitrust laws of Utah. However, these claims were withdrawn prior
to trial.
, 541 F.2d at 245.
,' Id. The court pointed to numerous telephone calls and meetings between Olson
Farms and the coconspirators, and to intracompany correspondence which permitted the
inference that Olson Farms was acting in concert with others to depress the prices paid
to the egg producers.
11 Id. Olson Farms urged inclusion of Southern California in the market because from
time to time it served as a source of eggs when there was a shortage in Utah. Plaintiffs
argued that Utah and the southern part of Idaho constituted the geographic market.
1 It is interesting to note the ease with which the court was able to handle the
problem of relevant geographic market given the problems encountered in Delaney. How-
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Circuit also rejected Olson Farms' contention that there was no
damage to the egg producers. 9 The voluminous record from the
two month trial was such as to allow the jury to find and infer
that plaintiffs suffered legal injury. 0
Mark Wolfe
ever, the court seemed to imply that, during the two month jury trial in Olson Farms,
much evidence had been introduced by the parties concerning the relevant geographic
market, in stark contrast to what the court characterized as a total lack thereof in
Delaney.
4 The court held:
[Piroof of economic damage to their "business or property" is a necessary
precondition to their recovery of treble damages under the Clayton Act. ...
We think there was sufficient evidence of the fact that the plaintiffs did
sustain some damage since there was ample statistical data and expert testi-
mony describing depressed producer prices and the necessary concomi-
tant-lost profits. As to the quantum of damage, the plaintiffs were under
no burden to establish it with mathematical precision so long as the extent
of such damage was not left to jury speculation.
541 F.2d at 246 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
1 The opinion also resolves an apparent inconsistency in the verdicts returned by the




This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey is devoted to those
decisions involving bankruptcy, banking, government contracts,
debtor-creditor, and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) ren-
dered by the Tenth Circuit during the 1975-76 survey period.
Discussion of each case is limited in length and is not intended
to be exhaustive. It is the author's desire that this section serve
as a research tool for the practicing lawyer, and it is written with
this intent.
Few of the decisions in the survey period presented major
developments or changes in the law. However, a large number are
noteworthy because of either the isolated application of the law
or the facts of the case. In addition, a case comment concerning
banking law follows this overview.'
I. BANKRUPTCY
A. Scope of Rule 401(a)
On October 1, 1973, Rule 401(a) of the Bankruptcy Court
became effective. 2 This rule provides that the filing of a petition
for bankruptcy shall operate as an automatic injunction prohibit-
ing either legal actions or the enforcement of judgments founded
on unsecured provable debts.' Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Phillips Food
Corp.,' dealt with the operation of Rule 401(a) in a situation
where both service of a garnishee summons and adjudication of
the debtor's bankruptcy occurred prior to the effective date of the
rule.
Zestee had obtained a judgment in excess of $60,000 against
Phillips. Subsequently, on November 24, 1972, a petition was
The comment discusses Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221 (10th
Cir. 1976), and Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
Rule 401(a) provides:
Stay of Actions-The filing of a petition shall operate as a stay of the com-
mencement or continuation of any action against the bankrupt, or the en-
forcement of any judgment against him, if the action or judgment is founded
on an unsecured provable debt other than one not dischargable under clause
(1), (5), (6), or (7) or § 17a of the Act.
Bankruptcy R. 401(a), 11 U.S.C. App. R. 401(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
Id.
536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976).
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filed in involuntary bankruptcy against Phillips. On December
12, 1972, Zestee caused a garnishment summons to be served on
a party indebted to Phillips. Phillips was adjudicated a bankrupt
six days later.'
The garnishee sought adjudication as to whether the trustee
of the bankrupt's estate or Zestee was entitled to the funds owed.
However, the case remained dormant until 1975, at which time
the trustee moved to dismiss the garnishee summons. The motion
was granted and Zestee appealed, asserting that Rule 401(a)
could not affect an adjudication of bankruptcy occurring prior to
its effective date.'
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Doyle, held that Rule 401(a)
applied to all bankruptcy proceedings and legal actions not com-
pleted as of the effective date: "The Rule declares that the stay
is in effect during the continuation of any action of the enforce-
ment of any judgment. The . . . submission of the garnishee
summons is part of the enforcement efforts of Zestee. By the
specific terms of the rule the automatic stay takes effect. ' ' 7 Since
Phillips was adjudicated bankrupt, Rule 401(b) applied to make
the stay continuous.
Two other reasons were advanced for upholding dismissal of
the garnishment summons. First, the court noted that, notwith-
standing the automatic stay provided in Rule 401(a), the bank-
ruptcy court had expressly enjoined the garnishment on Novem-
ber 5, 1973.1 Further, the court determined that the garnishment
summons could not be effective since title to the assets affected
Id. at 335.
Id.
7 Id. See note 2 supra.
' Rule 401(b) provides:
Duration of Stay-Except as it may be deemed annulled under subdivision
(c) or may be terminated, annulled, or modified by the bankruptcy court
under subdivision (d) or (c) of this rule, the stay shall continue until the
bankruptcy case is dismissed or the bankrupt is denied a discharge or waives
or otherwise loses his right thereto.
Bankruptcy R. 401(b), 11 U.S.C. App. R. 401(b) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis
added).
1 536 F.2d at 335. Under Rule 401(e) the bankruptcy court has the authority to
expressly grant appropriate injunctive relief. Bankruptcy R. 401(e), 11 U.S.C. App. R.




had legally passed to the trustee under section 70(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act" as of the date the petition was filed."
Zestee is a reminder that proceedings in bankruptcy are sub-
ject to both present and future regulations until the proceedings
are terminated. Therefore, it is imperative that all parties to a
bankruptcy proceeding note with a watchful eye all changes in
the rules and evaluate the effect of those changes throughout the
proceedings.
B. Post-Petition Interest
Ordinarily, unsecured creditors are not entitled to recover
interest accruing on a debt after the filing of a petition for bank-
ruptcy. In Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.
First National City Bank (In re King Resources Co.) 3 the Tenth
Circuit grappled with the rights of a senior creditor to recover
post-petition interest under a subordination agreement with
other creditors.
As a condition to a loan, Continental required King Re-
sources to provide for the subordination of certain outstanding
debentures. King Resources subsequently underwent Chapter X
reorganization. Continental asserted the right to post-petition
interest out of the shares of the subordinated creditors, basing its
claim on general subordination provisions contained in inden-
tures dealing with the subordinated debt. The trustee denied
recovery of the post-petition interest. 4
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's disallowance of
post-petition interest.' 5 Following the rules established in In re
Kingsboro Mortgage Corp.' and In re Times Sales Finance
" 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
" 536 F.2d at 336. Zestee argued that service of the garnishee summons resulted in
the creation of a preferential transfer and that the trustee had failed to file suit to set aside
the transfer within the two year statute of limitations. Id. See Bankruptcy Act § 11(e), 11
U.S.C. § 29(e) (1970). The court found that even if it were assumed that service of a
garnishee summons was capable of transferring property, there was no preferential trans-
fer here; the summons was served after the petition was filed and therefore the property
had vested in the trustee. 536 F.2d at 336.
11 Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re King
Resources Co.), 528 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1976).
*3 528 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1976).
* Id. at 791.
' Id. at 792.
514 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Corp.,' the court held that a subordinate agreement will not give
a senior unsecured creditor the right to post-petition interest ab-
sent explicit language in the agreement to that effect. 8
C. "Fiduciary Capacity" under Section 17a(4)
Allen v. Romero (In re Romero)"5 represents a possible expan-
sion of the concept of fiduciary capacity under section 17a(4) of
the Bankruptcy Act. 0 Allen hired Romero, a licensed contractor
in New Mexico, to build three four-plexes at a stated price. Allen
then advanced funds to Romero with the understanding that
these funds would be used to pay subcontractors, materialmen,
and laborers as payments became due, thus avoiding the imposi-
tion of liens on the properties. Romero did not use these funds as
agreed and liens were filed on the structures. The bankruptcy
court found that Romero owed a sum in excess of $54,00021 to
Allen, and further concluded that this debt was non-
dischargeable under sections 17a(2) and (4) of the Act.
2
The Tenth Circuit affirmed this judgment on the basis of
section 17a(4) .23 Noting that section 17a(4) required the existence
of a fiduciary relationship and further noting that this fiduciary
capacity was limited to "technical" and not implied trusts, the
court held that the provisions of the New Mexico contractor's
licensing statute created the necessary relationship. 4 The statute
17 491 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1974).
" 528 F.2d at 792. Cf. Allen v. Romero (In re Romero), 535 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1976)
(which reaffirms that post-petition interest is always recoverable on a non-dischargeable
debt).
" 535 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(4) (1970). Subsection (a)(4) makes non-dischargeable those debts
that "were created by [the bankrupt's] fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defal-
cation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." Id.
2 Although the judgment of the bankruptcy court against the bankrupt was affirmed
on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reduced the award from $54,708.30 to $53,143.43. This
reduction was ordered due to a finding by the Tenth Circuit that the amount in question
was either an error in mathematical computation or an improper award for mental suffer-
ing.
22 535 F.2d at 621. Bankruptcy Act §§ 17(a)(2), (4), 11 U.S.C. 535(a)(2), (4) (1970).
" 535 F.2d at 621. The Tenth Circuit selected 17(a)(4) as the appropriate provision,
although the court might have been able to affirm the judgment on section 17(a)(2) which
makes non-dischargeable "liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations .... " See note 14 supra.
24 535 F.2d at 621-22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-35-1 to -67 (1953) provides for the
licensing of persons involved in the construction industry.
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provided that a license was subject to revocation or suspension in
the event that the licensee wrongfully diverted such advances."
The implication arising from this case is that section 17a(4)
may be applied to all licensed practices if the terms of the license
provide some duty or condition which can be construed as creat-
ing a statutory obligation on the licensee. Accordingly, the terms
and conditions of any license should be carefully considered dur-
ing investigation of any section 17a(4) claims.
D. Comity in the Bankruptcy Court
HT v. Lam (In re The Colorado Corp.)26 involved a contested
provisional disallowance of certain alleged creditors prior to the
election of a trustee.27 Appellants, IT and Venture Fund,2" had
been declared in liquidation by courts in Luxembourg and the
Netherlands Antilles prior to this proceeding. Liquidators ap-
pointed in the foreign proceeding filed substantial claims against
the Colorado Corporation, the bankrupt. The Tenth Circuit
found that the bankruptcy court's disallowance was an abuse of
discretion based on an erroneous denial of comity. 21
The appellees argued that the foreign court orders appointing
the liquidators should not be recognized in American courts and
therefore the liquidators had no authority to represent IT and
Venture Fund in the proceedings. This argument was based on
the assertion that Canadian courts had not given comity to Colo-
rado bankruptcy court orders and the claim that Canadian citi-
zens had procured the foreign decrees involved. The Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that reciprocity has been a consideration in granting
or withholding comity but held that "[d]enying comity to the
Netherlands Antilles order because of lack of reciprocity in Can-
ada is such a misdirected use of the reciprocity consideration as
2 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-35-26 (1953) provides for the revocation or suspension of a
license on the grounds of diversion of funds received for the prosecution or completion of
a contract. The Tenth Circuit viewed this section as imposing "a fiduciary duty on con-
tractors who have been advanced money pursuant to construction contracts." 535 F.2d at
6 2 1 .-21 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Because their claims were provisionally disallowed, petitioners were not allowed to
vote in the election of a trustee in bankruptcy. Id. at 466.
" IT and Venture Fund were part of Robert Vesco's 10S operation. The Colorado
Corporation was part of the John King empire. Id. at 464.
" Id. at 469.
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to constitute an abuse of discretion.""0 Comity is withheld when
recognition of the foreign law would prejudice the forum's citi-
zens. Allowing foreign creditors to vote for a trustee who is subject
to American law could not prejudice American citizens.3
The court went on to hold that the filing of a claim is prima
facie evidence of the claim and its validity." Therefore, the bur-
den of proof rests upon the party seeking provisional disallowance
of the claim, which burden was not carried in this case.3
E. Preferential Transfers
Boyd v. First National Bank (In re J & J Sales, Inc.)34 empha-
sizes the need to affirmatively prove some aspect of insolvency
before a transaction may be voided as preferential or fraudulent
under the Bankruptcy Act. 5 The trustee petitioned for a turn-
over order claiming that the bank illegally transferred $8,012.98
from the account of a bankrupt corporation and applied it toward
the personal indebtedness of individual stockholder officers. The
bankruptcy judge and the district court denied the petition and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. and Mrs. Tilley were the sole stockholders and officers
of J & J Sales, Inc., the bankrupt. Over a considerable period of
time the bank had been in the practice of making personal loans
to the Tilleys of funds needed to operate the business. The Tilleys
would loan these funds to the bankrupt and periodically repay
themselves when money was available. On October 25, 1972, a
large check was deposited in the business account and, on Mrs.
Tilley's direction, $8,012.98 of the proceeds was applied by the
bank to satisfy an outstanding loan of the Tilleys' that had been
in default. J & J Sales filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition
about five weeks later.
The Tenth Circuit found that a turn-over order could not be
3" Id. at 468.
31 Id.
312 Id. at 467, 469.
Appellants also objected to the claims on the grounds that iT and Venture Fund
no longer had any legal existence, and therefore the liquidators had no right to press claims
on their behalf in the United States. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, holding
that the orders of the court in Luxemburg were sufficient to grant the liquidators authority
to pursue the claims. Id. at 469.
" No. 74-1364 (10th Cir., Oct. 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
31 Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107 (1970).
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based on the preference theory" because there was no evidence
that the transfer was made while the bankrupt was insolvent. An
essential element of a preference is that the transfer was made by
the debtor while insolvent and within four months of filing the
petition. 7 The burden of proving insolvency on the date of the
transfer rests with the trustee. 8
Nor would the evidence support an order based on the fraud-
ulent transfer theory.3" There was no evidence that the debtor
was, or would be, rendered insolvent by the transfer 0 or that the
property remaining in the debtor after the transfer was unreason-
ably small capital.4 Similarly, there was no proof that the trans-
fer was intended to hinder or defeat creditors42 or that the transfer




First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Sand Springs State Bank"
dealt with the jurisdictional parameters of the bankruptcy court.
Two creditors contested title to certain assets of the bankrupt.
The trustee conceded that one of the two was entitled to the
assets, and that the determination of the dispute would not affect
the bankrupt's estate. Under these circumstances the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to resolve
the dispute,4 5 because the determination did not materially affect
the administration of the estate."6
Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), (b), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)(1), (b) (1970).
'7 Bankruptcy Act § 60(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970). See Moran Bros., Inc. v.
Yinger, 323 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1963) for an explanation of section 60.
38 Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390-91 (10th Cir.), appeal
dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1955).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2), (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2), (3) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(a), (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a), (3) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(b), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(b) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(c) (1970).
528 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 353-54. Although the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the parties on
appeal, the court raised this issue on its own motion. Id. at 353.
" See generally Bankruptcy Act §§ 1, 2, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11 (1970). Under the facts
of this case the resolution of the conflict between the creditors had no effect upon the
remaining overall debts of the bankrupt and the distribution of assets to the creditors.
Obviously, it had a direct effect on determining which creditor was entitled to receive the
secured assets, and therefore full payment, in contrast to the general creditors' shares of
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Booker v. Booker (In re Booker)47 serves as a reminder that a
property settlement is dischargeable in bankruptcy whereas an
alimony judgment is not.8 Since the court order in question was
ambiguous the court construed the order from its terms, conclud-
ing that it was intended as a property settlement and was there-
fore dischargeable.
4
In Adams Chevrolet Co. v. Bollinger (In re Bollinger),50 the
bankrupt bought a car, falsely claiming that a trade-in car was
unencumbered. The court found the debt to be nondischargeable
under section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act" notwithstanding
lack of ill-will of the bankrupt. 52 The court noted that the require-
ment that a conversion be "willful" and "malicious" was satisfied
by the performance of an intentional act, absent just cause or
excuse, which necessarily produces harm.
53
II. BANKS AND BANKING
In Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors," the Tenth Circuit
refused to interfere in a federal decision to create a federally-
chartered bank pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act,
55
even though the Colorado banking authorities had reviewed and
denied an identical application for a state bank. This case is the
subject of a comment immediately following this Overview.
United Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 5 is nota-
ble because of its construction of language contained in a banker's
blanket bond. The bond covered losses that occurred while funds
the remaining assets. It would appear that if one creditor's claim against the bankrupt
materially differed from the other's as to priority or amount, then the bankruptcy court
might have had jurisdiction.
, No. 75-1733 (10th Cir., May 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
, Under 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970), alimony judgments are nondischargeable in
bankruptcy.
" In construing the ambiguous order, the court considered the presence of indemnifi-
cation, acceleration, and lien provisions to enforce the debt as some evidence that the
order was a property settlement and not an alimony judgment.
No. 76-1221 (10th Cir., July 28, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1970). See note 16 supra.
" No. 76-1221 at 4-5.
" Id. See McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916); Bennett v. W.T. Grant Co.,
481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
" 535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1850 (1970).
' 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976).
VOL., 54
COMMERCIAL LAW
were in transit, prior to "delivery at destination."57 The court
determined that the purpose of the blanket bond was to provide
coverage in the event of loss while funds were in transit but not
in the custody of an insured carrier.58 In light of this purpose and
the language of the bond, the court held that the bond covered
the loss of a cash letter which was delivered to an employee of the
recipient bank at a bus station and stolen from the employee
while in the bank's outdoor mall, but prior to entering the build-
ing.5
9
Finally, in Colorado ex rel. State Banking Board v. First
National Bank, 0 the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and
held that electronic banking facilities were "branch banks"
within the meaning of the federal laws prohibiting branch bank-
ing.' The district court had held that the use of these facilities
to receive deposits was branch banking under state and federal
laws, but that use for withdrawal and transfer of funds was not.,2
Since the district court decision, other circuits had con-
cluded that electronic banking facilities were branch banks when
used for these other purposes as well. 3 The Tenth Circuit adopted
the rules of these cases, concluding that although the technology
and services differed somewhat from the statutory definition, the
intent and purpose of the Act 4 mandated the inclusion of these
5 The exact language of the bond placed in dispute provided for insurance coverage
[wihile the Property is in transit anywhere in the custody of any of the
Employees or partners of the Insured or of any other person or persons acting
as messenger, except while in the mail or with a carrier for hire other than
an armored motor vehicle company for the purpose of transportation, such
transit to begin immediately upon receipt of such Property by the transport-
ing Employee or partner or such other person, and to end immediately upon
delivery thereof at destination.
529 F.2d at 493 (emphasis omitted).
:A Id. at 494.
I d. at 494-95.
' 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
62 In reaching this construction, the district court had relied heavily on the use of the
definitional terms of "checks paid" and "money lent" in 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970). Colorado
ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 983-85 (D. Colo. 1975).
This restrictive view of the terms has since been criticized. 11 TuImA L.J. 85 (1975).
" Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 184 (1976).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the overriding purpose of 12 U.S.C. § 36 was to place
national and state banks on a level of "competitive equality" regarding branch banking.
1977
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services and facilities within the definition of branch banking."
M. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Burgess Construction Co. v. M. Morrin & Son Co.6" involved
a suit by a subcontractor against a government contractor for an
alleged breach of an implied obligation under the subcontract.6"
Morrin, the subcontractor, agreed to perform concrete work for
Burgess according to a contractual schedule dependent upon Bur-
gess providing access to the sites on certain dates. Various delays
prevented access on the specified dates, and as a result the work
was not completed on time. Both parties brought separate suits
under the contract which were consolidated for trial. Morrin as-
serted that Burgess was contractually bound to provide access on
the specified dates and, therefore, had breached this express and
implied covenant.
The Tenth Circuit construed the contract as not including an
express covenant to provide access." However, the court noted
that an implied covenant not to hinder or delay access might
nonetheless exist in the absence of a contractual clause contem-
plating and excusing the delay. The court held that a contractual
provision allowing extensions of time for the subcontractor's per-
formance in the event of delay demonstrated some evidence of the
intent of the parties to allow delay. Therefore, no implied obliga-
tion existed."'
540 F.2d at 499-500. The Colorado law on branch banking, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6-101(1)
(1973), would prohibit state banks from maintaining banking machines under similar
circumstances. Accordingly, prohibition of federal use of these machines served to pre-
serve this equality in Colorado. 540 F.2d at 500. A question arises whether the same
reasoning would have been applied had Colorado state authorities permitted the use of
these machines, or had merely not yet made a determination.
0 540 F.2d at 499-500. The Tenth Circuit found the proper construction of 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(f) (1970) to be that the statute provided examples, but not limitations, of what
constituted branch banking. In any event, the withdrawal of funds and the transfer of
funds from one account to another were traditional banking functions "well within the
prohibition of the statute." 540 F.2d at 500.
- 526 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 176 (1976).
" The subcontractor's action was based on the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1970),
which allows suits on government contractors' bonds to be brought in federal district
courts. 526 F.2d at 110 n.1. See generally 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1970).
11 526 F.2d at 113. Reading the contract as a whole the court concluded that the
parties did not intend that Burgess be absolutely required to provide access on the speci-
fied dates. Id.
" On this theory, the Tenth Circuit harmonized the cases of George A. Fuller Co. v.




A. U.C.C.C.70 and the Truth in Lending Act 7'
In Hinkle v. Rock Springs National Bank, 2 the Tenth Circuit
reaffirmed the rule that a bank and a credit seller who fail to
disclose the necessary financing information as required by the
Truth in Lending Act are jointly liable for the statutory penalty.73
Since the lack of disclosure violated both U.C.C.C. and Truth in
Lending Act requirements, it was argued that penalties under
both statutes could be recovered. The Tenth Circuit rejected this
argument because Wyoming credit transactions had been de-
clared exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act following the state's adoption of the U.C.C.C. 4 The
exemption, however, only served to replace the federal require-
ments with the almost identical requirements of the U.C.C.C.75
and did not affect concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.7' The
court concluded that the federal courts had subject matter juris-
diction, but there could only be one cause of action and one
recovery for a non-disclosure."
B. Effect of U. C. C.C. on Negotiable Instruments
Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.78 presented questions con-
cerning the effect of U.C.C.C. remedial provisions9 on the U.C.C.
definition of negotiability. 0 The plaintiffs had bought homes
329 U.S. 64 (1946), concluding that an implied obligation only exists in the absence of a
contract clause contemplating the delay. 526 F.2d at 114.
In addition, the court noted that even if there were an implied obligation it would
not be breached by good faith delay: "Breach of an implied promise not to hinder or delay
the other party's performance is not established merely by proving there was delay. The
delay must be unnecessary, unreasonable or due to defendant's fault." Id. at 115. Morrin
had successfully objected to the introduction of any evidence of good or bad faith at the
time of trial, but other evidence indicated that Burgess had acted in good faith and that
the delays were not unreasonable. Id.
,0 Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
71 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1681s (1970).
72 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1976).
71 Id. at 297. Both were creditors under the act and responsible for the disclosures.
Id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(s), 226.6(d) (1976).
1, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1968). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (1976).
,5 538 F.2d at 298. U.C.C.C. § 2-301(2); Wyo. STAT. § 40-2-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
7' See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1976).
'7 538 F.2d at 298.
78 535 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1976).
7' U.C.C.C. § 5-202.
- U.C.C. § 3-104(l).
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from the defendant, signing negotiable notes to cover the mort-
gage debt, in violation of the U.C.C.C. 81 The trial court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims for refund of the finance charge and for the
statutory penalty; the Tenth Circuit reversed.2
The principal issue on appeal was whether the U.C.C.C. pro-
vision prohibiting the use of negotiable instruments in consumer
transactions made the notes nonnegotiable. The Tenth Circuit
read U.C.C.C. section 2-403 as plainly indicating the intent not
to render the notes nonnegotiable. 3 This conclusion followed from
the fact that under section 2-403 a holder could not be a holder
in due course if he took the instrument with notice that it was
issued in violation of the section. This was the sanction imposed
on the use of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions;
therefore, the notes in question remained negotiable.84
It was also argued that the prepayment and rebate provisions
of the U.C.C.C.85 rendered the sum of the note uncertain and,
therefore, nonnegotiable." The court found that the note itself
did not allude to anything creating uncertainty but was simply
an unencumbered promise to pay a definite sum. 7 The court
stated: "Even if a holder in due course were subject to the prepay-
ment rebate provision, it could operate only as a defense; it would
not render the original instrument non-negotiable..""
A final point covered by the court involved plaintiffs' right
to bring a class action. The trial court denied the right because
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a class action was a superior
method for conducting the litigation. The Tenth Circuit disa-
greed, finding that a single suit where one party was awarded
damages and where the court ordered one negotiable instrument
changed into a nonnegotiable one would not solve the problems
of the other members of the class. 0 Here the class was large but
91 U.C.C.C. § 2-403 prohibits the seller from taking a negotiable instrument other
than a check as evidence of the buyer's obligation.
12 535 F.2d at 585, 589.
11 Id. at 586.
I d.
U.C.C.C. §§ 2-209, 210.
U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 106.
'7 535 F.2d at 588.
' Id. at 587 (emphasis in original).
'5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
535 F.2d at 589.
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not unmanageable and if all the parties were before the court
"complete justice" could be accomplished in one action." Fur-
thermore, it was error for the district court to refuse to certify the
class action on the ground that the damages would be prohibi-
tively high.2
C. Brief Mention
In Surveillance Corp. v. Sentry Insurance,3 a mortgagee had
the right under the mortgage to collect attorney's fees in the event
of default and foreclosure. However, at the time of foreclosure this
sum was not presented as part of the claim. The foreclosure pro-
duced more funds than expected, and the mortgagee filed a sepa-
rate claim for attorney's fees. The court held that the mortgagee's
claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.11 The court noted
that the mortgagee was in error when it claimed that the two
actions were divisible: one for debt and one for contractual obliga-
tion to pay attorney's fees. Both claims gave rise to a single in-
debtedness, and therefore the enforcement of one barred an ac-
tion for the other.95
In United States v. Immordino,6 the Tenth Circuit reaf-
firmed the general rule that joint guarantors of an indebtedness
are entitled to demand proportionate contribution from each
other in payment of the debt. 7 However, in Immordino this right
was waived by a written clause in a Small Business Administra-
tion (S.B.A.) guaranty form that allowed the S.B.A. to settle
claims against such guarantor without affecting liability of the
others. 8
V. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Forward Contracts
Following the trend in the Fifth Circuit,99 the Tenth Circuit,
"1 Id.
92 Id.
,3 538 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 300.
Id.
I 534 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976).
'? Id. at 1381.
" Id. at 1382.
" E.g., Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975); Hohen-
berg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in Bradford v. Plains Cotton Cooperative Association,0 held that
forward contracts' 0' for the sale of cotton were enforceable even
though "unconscionable" at the time of performance. In 1973 the
Association made numerous forward contracts, at the then cur-
rent price, with numerous cotton growers in Oklahoma. However,
at the time for delivery the market price of cotton had more than
doubled and the growers brought suit to invalidate the contracts.
The trial court found the contracts invalid.' Reversing, the
Tenth Circuit held that the great increase in price had nothing
to do with unconscionability: "The test is the character of the
contract at the time of its making."'0 3 Nothing showed unfairness
at the time of execution. The Association's expertise in the cotton
market did not result in an inequality of bargaining power that
would make the contracts unconscionable. The Association had
immediately sold seventy-five percent of the cotton it purchased
under each contract; therefore, its "expertise" was not used to
predict the price increase.104
B. Proceeds of Security
In McConnico v. Alliance Business Investment Co. (In re
Rose Homes, Inc.), 105 the trustee in bankruptcy sought return of
certain bank funds taken by Alliance after the bankrupt's insol-
vency and within four months of the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings.'10 Alliance claimed these funds as proceeds of secu-
rity held in a bank account;0 7 the trustee, however, contended
that it was instead an invalid security interest in an account. 08
Alliance had loaned money to the bankrupt, Rose Homes,
Inc., on the condition that the loan amount be placed in an in-
come trust account controlled by Alliance.0 9 These monies were
'0 539 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
"I A forward contract is a contract whereby a grower agrees to sell crops grown on
designated acreage during a certain crop year for delivery after harvesting. Id. at 1251.
Id.
" Id. at 1255. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1.
539 F.2d at 1255.
'05 No. 75-1178 (10th Cir., Nov. 19, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
I" The trustee asserted that there had been a preferential transfer in violation of
section 60(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
'" See U.C.C. § 9-306.
,09 U.C.C. § 9-104(k).
' The loan agreement required Rose to deposit all its corporate receipts in the in-
come trust account. Furthermore, Rose executed a security agreement and financing
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transferred to the bankrupt's checking account as needed and
constituted the sole source of funds for that account. After the
bankrupt became insolvent, it transferred $19,450 to Alliance
from the checking account as payment on the loan.
The issue was whether a secured party loses its security inter-
est in identifiable proceeds if the proceeds are deposited in the
debtor's checking account. The Tenth Circuit, reversing the
bankruptcy and district courts, held that the funds were covered
proceeds of the security trust account, and therefore were not
preferential transfers."0 The court noted that the fact that the
entire bank account was proceeds did not mean that the bank
account itself was security. Rather, it merely made identification
of the proceeds simpler.
Thus, one way of insuring that cash proceeds of a loan will
remain identifiable "proceeds" under the U.C.C. is to require a
debtor to establish special accounts to hold these funds separate
from others."' This will not create a prohibited security interest
in a bank account, but would tie the funds to the original source
for identification.
Percival Construction Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers,
Inc. ' involved the right to proceeds from an auction sale of con-
struction equipment. The P&A Construction Company (P&A)
"leased" heavy equipment from the Percival Construction Com-
pany (Percival) under an agreement that included an option to
purchase at a stated price and provided that ninety-three percent
of all monthly payments were to be applied toward the purchase
price." 3 After obtaining possession of the equipment P&A bor-
rowed from the Stock Yards Bank (Bank), giving security inter-
ests in all its accounts receivable and certain listed equipment as
statement covering all of its current and after-acquired inventory, equipment, accounts
receivable, contract rights, and general intangibles. Proceeds were specifically covered in
the agreement and financing statement, and the parties agreed that the security interests
created were properly perfected. No. 75-1178 at 2.
. Id. at 5-6.
"I U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) covers cash proceeds of security so long as they are identifia-
ble.
112 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976).
"I Percival did not file a financing statement covering the equipment. 387 F. Supp.
at 884.
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collateral."' Included by mistake in the list of equipment in-
tended as collateral were two backhoes covered by the P&A-
Percival lease.
P&A became financially distressed and, in conjunction with
the Bank and Percival, arranged to have Miller & Miller Auc-
tioneers, Inc. (Miller) sell the equipment involved. During this
same period the United States filed two liens against P&A for
unpaid taxes. When the equipment was sold, Percival, the Bank,
and the United States each demanded a portion of the proceeds
from Miller, but because the claims exceeded the sale price no
disbursements were made. Percival brought a diversity action
against Miller for the proceeds. Miller counterclaimed and inter-
pleaded the other claimants and deposited into the court the
gross proceeds of the sale, less expenses and commissions.
The trial court found that the P&A-Percival lease was ac-
tually a conditional sale with the reservation of an unperfected
security interest by Percival and, recognizing the Bank's priority,
granted a partial summary judgment against Percival in favor of
the Bank."' Verdicts were directed in favor of Miller, the Bank,
and the United States; Percival and the United States appealed
to the Tenth Circuit."
' 6
Percival first argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the interpleader action because Miller had not deposited
into the court the entire sum in his possession as required by
federal statute."7 Miller's counterclaim, however, was not based
on the statute but on Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure."'8 The Tenth Circuit found that the entire sum requirement
did not apply to actions under the Rule"9 and that Miller had
acted properly under the Rule. Compliance with the statutory
requirements for jurisdiction was not required because the court
" The bank perfected its security interests by filing financing statements. 532 F.2d
at 169.
,, 387 F. Supp. at 887. See also 532 F.2d at 170.
" 532 F.2d at 170.
117 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
I, 532 F.2d at 170.
"' In interpleader actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 22 the amount that must be deposited
is left to the court's discretion. 532 F.2d at 171. See also Emmco Ins. Co. v. Frankford




had already assumed jurisdiction based on diversity.' 0
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's determination
that the P&A-Percival lease was actually a sale with the reserva-
tion of a security interest in Percival.'"' The U.C.C. definition of
a security interest provides that while the inclusion of an option
to purchase in a lease does not necessarily make the lease one
intended for security, when the agreement provides that the les-
see may purchase at the end of the term for little or no considera-
tion then the lease is intended as security.' 2 The determinative
factors are the consideration necessary to exercise the purchase
option and the percentage the consideration bears to the list price
of the items leased.'
2 3
Percival also argued that it was error to grant a directed
verdict in favor of the Bank because they had entered into an
informal subordination agreement regarding the Bank's interest
in the proceeds from the sale. The Tenth Circuit held that the
motion was properly granted because the agreement was based
upon a. mutual mistake that went to the essence of the contract
and, under Oklahoma law, was therefore unenforceable.'
24
On appeal the United States challenged the trial court's find-
ing that the Bank had a perfected security interest, as accounts
receivable, in the proceeds from the sale of equipment that was
not listed as collateral on the security agreements between the
Bank and P&A.' 25 The Bank argued that it had a perfected
"2 532 F.2d at 171.
2 Id. at 171-72.
,2 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
22 532 F.2d at 171. The leading case on this issue, Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic
Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969), held that if the percentage is less than
25% it shows the parties' intention to make the lease serve as security. In the instant case
the purchase option price was 10.6% of the list price. Furthermore, 93% of the "rent"
payments were applied toward the purchase price. 532 F.2d at 174. See also In re Royer's
Bakery, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963). There is an indication that a lease
is intended to create a security interest if under the terms of the agreement the only
sensible alternative at the end of the term is to exercise the option. 532 F.2d at 172.
24 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 53, 62-64 (West 1972); Watkins v. Grady County
Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 438 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1968). The mutual mistake was that
Percival owned the equipment. 532 F.2d at 172. The court used the same analysis to
uphold a directed verdict against Percival and in favor of Miller on the issue of an agree-
ment regarding disbursement of the sale proceeds. Id. at 173.
' The government conceded that the Bank had a prior perfected security interest in
the P&A equipment specifically identified in the financing statement, i.e., the two back-
hoes. 532 F.2d at 173.
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security interest in all of P&A's accounts receivable which in-
cluded the auction sale proceeds because P&A had a right to
payment for the goods sold by Miller as auctioneer. The Tenth
Circuit applied Oklahoma law and determined that Miller was
acting as P&A's agent. Since payment had been made to the
agent, P&A had no further right to receive payment from the
buyer and, therefore, the proceeds were not an account receiva-
ble. For this reason the directed verdict in favor of the Bank was
reversed.2 6
C. Commercially Reasonable Sale of Collateral
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Division
of the Rucker Co. 127was an interpleader action' 8 in which Mrs.
Bailey, the holder of a subordinate security interest in an oil rig,
claimed that the Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. (Liberty)
had sold the rig in a commercially unreasonable manner.'29
Liberty had no previous experience with selling oil rigs and
therefore made inquiries regarding the method by which such
sales were usually conducted. Liberty was advised that ordinarily
the rig was moved to a convenient location, cleaned, painted, and
sold by a professional auctioneer. Generally, interested persons
were notified and advertisements placed in trade journals and
newspapers. 
30
Liberty did not follow any of this advice but rather had a
bank attorney who had no experience with oil drilling equipment
conduct the auction. The rig was not cleaned, painted, or moved
to a convenient site. Furthermore, the sale was conducted during
a snowstorm.' 3' The rig had been appraised at $60,000 to $80,000
but the final sale price was $42,000.32 In this state of affairs the
Tenth Circuit found that the trial court's ruling that the sale was
commercially unreasonable was supported by the evidence.' 33
Gilbert Porter
, Id. at 173-74.
'!? 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
,2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
I" Liberty had a prior security interest in the rig which belonged to Tarus, an oil
drilling company. Tarus agreed that Liberty should sell the rig and apply the proceeds
toward the debt owed to Liberty. Liberty, however, had notice of Mrs. Bailey's interest.
540 F.2d at 1377.
"3 Id.
"I Id. at 1377, 1382.
,"2 Id. at 1377.
11 Id. at 1382.
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NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS AND THE BANK HOLDING
COMPANY ACT
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d
1221 (10th Cir. 1976)
INTRODUCTION
Within the last two years, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit has decided two major cases involving
applications for a national bank charter where the proposed bank
was to be part of a bank holding company: Bank of Boulder v.
Board of Governors' and Bank of Commerce v. Smith.2 These
cases and the Tenth Circuit's understanding of Whitney National
Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,I the National Bank
Act,4 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 19561 are the subject
of this Comment.
I. SUMMARY OF FACTS
A. Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors'
Bank of Boulder arose out of the efforts of Westland Banks,
Inc., a bank holding company (Westland), to establish a subsidi-
ary bank in the vicinity of the Bank of Boulder. The Bank of
Boulder was a state bank which opened for business only a year
before in the spring of 1972. Westland filed an application with
the state banking authorities to move its subsidiary state bank
to the new Boulder location.7 After a public hearing in which the
Bank of Boulder appeared as a protesting witness, the Colorado
State Banking Board voted to deny Westland's request.' The
state board found that the proposed service area of Westland's
subsidiary overlapped the primary service area of the Bank of
Boulder and held that to grant Westland's application "would
1 535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
379 U.S. 411 (1965).
'12 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1970).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1970).
535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
The procedures for application for a Colorado state banking charter are outlined in
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-3-109, -110 (1973).
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1222 (10th Cir. 1976).
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result in the creation of two weak and unprofitable banks in the
Boulder area." 9
The state board's decision was made October 26, 1973. On
November 5, 1973, before the final order was entered, Westland
applied to the United States Comptroller of Currency (Comptrol-
ler) for a nationally chartered bank in the identical location. 0 The
Comptroller granted preliminary approval of the proposed na-
tional bank conditioned upon the approval by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve Board (Board of Governors) of
Westland's acquisition of the controlling shares of the new bank."
The Board of Governors approved Westland's application to ac-
quire the controlling shares.
The Bank of Boulder appealed the Board of Governors' deci-
sion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
which upheld the Board of Governors' decision approving West-
land's application. 3 Thus, a bank holding company was denied
a banking charter in a state procedure but was granted a charter
under the same circumstances in a federal procedure. 4
I Id. at 1223.
10 Id.
1 In order to acquire a national bank charter, associations must follow the procedures
of formation outlined in the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1970), and apply to
the Comptroller who may grant the charter application pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27
(1970). The Comptroller's regulations provide that he may condition his final approval
upon the fulfillment of conditions specified by him which in this situation is the approval
of Westland's acquisition of the controlling shares of the new bank by the Board of
Governors. 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) (1976). The Comptroller conditions his final approval on the
Board's approval of the application to acquire the controlling shares because the Bank
Holding Company Act provides that it is
unlawful, except with prior approval of the Board, ... (3) for any bank
holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any
voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will di-
rectly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting
shares of such bank ....
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1970).
" Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 1225. Any party aggrieved by an order of the Board may appeal the Board's
decision to a federal court of appeals. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970). A party who would become
a competitor of the applicant has the right as an aggrieved party to obtain judicial review
as provided in section 1848. 12 U.S.C. § 1850 (1970).
11 For a comprehensive discussion of competitive equality between national and state
banks, see Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB.
749 (1966). This apparent inequality will not be discussed in this Comment. However,
such a decision may have an effect on the dual banking system which provides for national
and state banks to exist side by side essentially in competition since both have the power
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The Tenth Circuit held that in charter application cases in-
volving bank holding companies, the decision of the Comptroller
is not subject to independent court review, and the only review
is that of the Board of Governors' decision. 5 The court noted the
discretionary authority of the Board to hold hearings and, follow-
ing the authority of other circuits, held that there is no constitu-
tional or statutory right for a protesting bank to have a hearing
before the Board." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
granting of the national charter to Westland, holding that the
findings of the Board were supported by substantial evidence.
7
B. Bank of Commerce v. Smith"
Bank of Commerce was decided nearly a year before Bank of
Boulder. '" In Bank of Commerce, a protesting state bank sought
judicial review of the Comptroller's actions in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming. The protesting bank
asserted that political influence had prompted the Comptroller to
grant approval for a national charter to a proposed subsidiary of
a bank holding company.20 The district court determined that it
to grant charters. Congress has chosen to maintain a "competitive equality" between state
and national banks by refusing to exercise its power to preempt the field. The Bank
Holding Company Act contains several provisions calculated to preserve the position of
the states. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970) provides that the state supervisory authority should
be consulted about an application for acquisition and section 1846 provides that states
may exercise powers and jurisdiction over bank holding companies.
15 Since both agencies consider the same factors and since it is the
"exclusive function of the Board to act in such cases," Whitney Bank, the
decision of the Comptroller is not subject to independent review. Instead
review of the proceedings under the Bank Holding Company Act is limited
to the actions of the Board of Governors.
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 1224-25. If the application for approval to acquire shares is disapproved by
the Comptroller, the Board must hold hearings. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970). However,
where the Comptroller does not disapprove, the Board in its discretion may allow oral
argument or hold hearings for the purpose of taking evidence. Bank of Commerce v. Board
of Governors, 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975). Commercial Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v.
Board of Governors, 451 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1971), held that where the Comptroller rec-
ommends approval of the application, it is established that a protestant has no constitu-
tional right to a hearing before the Board. Northwest Bancorporation v. Board of Gover-
nors, 303 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1962) held that there is no statutory right to a hearing.
" "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive." 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970).
IN 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
10 Bank of Commerce was decided in March 1975 and Bank of Boulder was decided
in June 1976.
" 513 F.2d at 169.
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lacked jurisdiction to review the actions of the Comptroller in
bank holding company situations and the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed.2' Relying on Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans & Trust Co., 2 the Tenth Circuit held that there is no
independent court review of the Comptroller's decision in bank
holding company applications; that review of the proceedings
under the Bank Holding Company Act is limited to the Board of
Governors' decisions; and that only the court of appeals may
review those decisions.?
In both Bank of Commerce and Bank of Boulder, the Tenth
Circuit held that review of the Comptroller's actions is different
when an independent bank is applying for a national charter than
when a bank holding company is involved .2  The Tenth Circuit
arrived at this conclusion on the basis of Whitney Bank and the
requirement under the Bank Holding Company Act that the
Board must grant approval of the acquisition of shares of a new
bank by a bank holding company.2 5 An examination of the perti-
2, Id. at 168-69.
379 U.S. 411 (1965).
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 1976); Bank
of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 169 (10th Cir. 1975).
The Overview of the Commercial Law section of the Second Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey reviews Bank of Commerce and two other cases involving bank holding companies:
American Bank v. Smith, 503 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1974), and Bank of Commerce v. Board
of Governors, 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975). 53 DEN. L.J. 55-56 (1975). Bank of Commerce
v. Board of Governors is a companion case to Bank of Commerce v. Smith which is
discussed in the text.
" In Bank of Commerce, the court said:
The standard of review of the Comptroller's action upon an application of
an independent bank is set forth in Camp, Comptroller v. Pitts . . . . How-
ever, it is obvious that this issue is not reached because of the dual approval
required here of the new bank as a subsidiary of a holding company, and by
reason of the Supreme Court's decision as to the proper sequence in the much
cited case of Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans.
513 F.2d at 169 (citations omitted).
In Bank of Boulder, the court discussed its decision in Bank of Commerce saying,
"This court first noted that the case of Camp, Comptroller v. Pitts outlined the applicable
standard of review of the Comptroller's action upon application for charter by an indepen-
dent bank. But we recognized the different role of the Comptroller in proceedings involv-
ing the Bank Holding Company Act." 535 F.2d at 1224 (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court in Camp v. Pitts held: "The appropriate standard
for review was, accordingly, whether the Comptroller's adjudication was 'arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' as specified in 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) [the Administrative Procedure Act]." 411 U.S. 138, 142.
" See note 24 supra. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) provides that the Board must approve the
acquisition of shares of a new bank by a bank holding company.
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nent provisions of the National Bank Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act in light of the facts of Whitney Bank indicates that
the Tenth Circuit's decision represents an unwarranted extension
of bank holding company procedures to applications for a na-
tional charter.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The National Bank Act" governs application procedures to
establish an independent bank and to establish a subsidiary of a
bank holding company. The applicant first files a charter appli-
cation with the Comptroller. 7 If the Comptroller determines that
the association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of
banking, he grants a certificate to commence business.28 The
Comptroller may condition final approval on fulfillment of condi-
tions specified by him. 29 Judicial review of the Comptroller's deci-
sion is available in the federal district court."
Another step in the procedure is added when the applicant
is to be controlled by a bank holding company. The Bank Holding
Company Act 3' makes it unlawful for a holding company to form,
acquire, merge, or consolidate with another bank without the
prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board. 2 The holding com-
pany must submit an application for approval to acquire the
controlling shares of the new bank to the Board of Governors. 3
Therefore, the Comptroller may condition his final approval of
the charter application upon the approval by the Board of Gover-
nors of the holding company's application to acquire controlling
interest in the newly chartered subsidiary. 34 The Bank Holding
Company Act provides that review of the Board's decision may
be had in the federal court of appeals.
3
1
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1970).
2 Id. § 21.
2 Id. 88 26-27.
12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) (1976).
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973). See note 24 supra.
31 12 U.S.C. 88 1841-1850 (1970).
2 Id. § 1842(a).
- 12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (1976).
12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) provides: "If preliminary approval is granted, the Comptroller
may, if he determines that such action is necessary or desirable for the protection of public
interest, at any time withdraw such approval or provide that final approval shall be
subject to the fulfillment of conditions specified by him."
12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970).
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The distinction between the charter application and the ap-
plication to acquire the controlling shares of the new bank is
extremely important. Bank holding companies have to file both
a charter application and an application to acquire controlling
shares, while an independent bank only has to file a charter appli-
cation. The Tenth Circuit did not distinguish the two kinds of
applications stating that: "It is apparent that this two-track ap-
proach by appellant is derived from the fact that separate agen-
cies and statutes are involved, but the arguments are foreclosed
by the Supreme Court's opinion in the Whitney Bank case herein-
after referred to."
'36
The.Bank Holding Company Act was apparently intended to
supplement the already existing National Bank Act. The Bank
Holding Company Act deals with only the holding company's
application for acquisition of controlling interest and not the
charter application itself.37 The Board of Governors is required to
forward a copy of the application for acquisition to the Comptrol-
ler for his recommendation.3 If the Comptroller disapproves the
application, the Board must hold a hearing;3 9 otherwise, the
Board is not required to conduct a hearing." The Comptroller is
a consultant with regard to the application for acquisition,
whereas he is the decision maker in the charter application.4
These procedures are so distinct that even the identity of the
applicant parties may differ; in Bank of Commerce, the individ-
ual organizers of the proposed subsidiary filed the charter appli-
cation with the Comptroller, and the bank holding company, a
Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 168 (10th Cir. 1975).
3' This conclusion is reached because the Bank Holding Company Act does not cover
charter application procedures and the National Bank Act clearly outlines the procedure
for charter applications.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970).
31 Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.3(c) (1976).
, See note 39 supra.
" This section is a compromise between the position that the Comptroller should
have the authority to veto the application to acquire shares and the position that the
Comptroller should have only an informal consulting role which would not necessarily be
heeded. The compromise provides for input from the Comptroller whereby he recommends
approval or denial of the application, but retains the final decisionmaking authority to
approve the application to acquire shares with the Board. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [19561 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2482, 2490.
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separate entity, filed the application for acquisition with the
Board of Governors.
42
In the Bank Holding Company Act, Congress intended to
regulate the growth of bank holding companies in order to dis-
courage monopolies and to confine holding company activities to
the management and control of banks.43 It does not appear that
this Act was intended to remove bank holding companies from
the purview of the National Bank Act; instead, it was designed
to regulate the one aspect of bank holding companies which dis-
tinguishes them from independent banks: that these subsidiary
banks are part of a bank holding company and thus are able by
this affiliation to exercise greater influence in the banking mar-
ket.44 Thus, an applicant for a national bank charter files his
application with the Comptroller under the National Bank Act
whether the bank is to be an independent bank or a subsidiary
of a bank holding company. A bank holding company must take
the additional step of filing under the Bank Holding Company
Act with the Board of Governors for approval of acquisition.
It is this dual function of the Comptroller and the two rele-
vant statutory provisions that are the basis of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's apparent misunderstanding of these application proce-
dures. The Tenth Circuit has held that some aspects of the Na-
tional Bank Act apply to bank holding company applications and
others do not; specifically, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the
charter application is made to the Comptroller as prescribed in
the National Bank Act but held that review of the Comptroller
in bank holding company applications is precluded by the Bank
Holding Company Act.45
III. Whitney National Bank v. Bank of
New Orleans & Trust Co.
46
In light of the statutory background, Whitney Bank should
be distinguished on its facts from the Tenth Circuit cases. In
1 Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir.
1975).
13 S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2482.
I /d.
'5 Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 168-69 (10th Cir. 1975); Bank of Boulder
v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
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Whitney Bank, the protesting banks were challenging the acqui-
sition of a new national bank in the adjoining county by a holding
company created for the purpose of circumventing the laws of
Louisiana prohibiting branch banking. 7 Whitney National Bank
of New Orleans (Whitney-New Orleans) wanted to establish an-
other national bank in an adjoining parish.48 Louisiana law pro-
hibits the opening of branch offices by banks in other than their
home parish. 9 State branch banking laws are applicable to na-
tional banks by 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1970).10 In order to avoid the
branch banking laws, Whitney-New Orleans organized a bank
holding company. "The net result of the maneuver would be that
the original stockholders of the old Whitney-New Orleans would
own the holding company which in turn would own and operate
both banks, i.e., the new Whitney-New Orleans and Whitney-
Jefferson."'" The Board of Governors approved the plan May 3,
1962.52 Louisiana subsequently passed a law, effective July 10,
1962, prohibiting the opening of subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies within the state. 3 The protesting banks sought judicial
review of the Board's decision in the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit on June 30, 1962, as provided in 12 U.S.C. § 1848.
That case was pending when this Supreme Court case was de-
cided. 4
In this suit taken up to the Supreme Court, the protesting
banks were attacking the authority of the Comptroller to issue a
certificate. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1846, reserved to the states final authority to prohibit the open-
ing of subsidiaries within their borders and, even though Loui-
siana adopted such a law after the Board's approval, the Comp-
troller should be enjoined from issuing the certificate. The
Board's approval was not final because the decision was being
reviewed in the court of appeals. On appeal from the district
court, the court of appeals upheld the district court decision,





5Z Id. at 416.
Id. at 414 & n.4.
Id. at 413 & n.2.
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concluding that the proposed Jefferson Parish bank would be but
a branch of Whitney-New Orleans which was prohibited by the
Act. The Supreme Court held:
We have concluded that the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia had no jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the holding company
proposal; that appropriate disposition of the controversy cannot be
made without further consideration of the case by the Federal Re-
serve Board, where original exclusive jurisdiction rests; and that
since the application for review of its decision is now pending in the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reasonable time should be
allowed for that court to act."
The Supreme Court made the distinction that its decision
was a response to a complaint attacking the propriety of the
holding company arrangement itself, not an attack on the Comp-
troller's decision to create a new national bank:
We think it clear that the thrust of respondents' complaint goes
to the organization of Whitney-Jefferson by the holding company
rather than merely the issuance of authority to Whitney-Jefferson
to do business. Respondents' chief contention is that Whitney-
Jefferson would be but a branch bank of Whitney-New Orleans. But
this would not follow simply by virtue of the issuance of authority
for the opening of the new bank. Such a situation would occur, if at
all, when the Board approved the holding company plan including
the organization of Whitney-Jefferson as its subsidiary. Thus, it is
the plan of organization by the holding company which lies at the
heart of respondents' argument ...
The respondents also argue that the operation of Whitney-
Jefferson is barred by a valid state law prohibiting any subsidiary
of a bank holding company from opening for business "whether or
not, a charter, permit, license or certificate to open for business has
already been issued." Here, as with their first argument, respon-
dents' quarrel is in actuality not merely with the opening of the
bank, but rather with its opening as a subsidiary of Whitney Hold-
ing Corporation. m
Id. at 414-15. The Court went on to say:
Again, the Board could not approve a holding company arrangement involv-
ing the organization and opening of a new bank if the opening of the bank,
by reason of its ownership by a bank holding company, would be prohibited
by a valid state law.
We therefore conclude that respondents' complaint tenders issues cog-
nizable by the Federal Reserve Board, and we turn to the question of whether
such objections must first be raised there.
Id. at 418-19.
1' Id. at 417-18.
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The Supreme Court explored the legislative history of the Bank
Holding Company Act in order to buttress its conclusion that the
Board is the sole means by which the organization of a new bank
may be tested. It is this author's opinion that the Court was
referring to questions pertaining to the holding company arrange-
ment itself, but not to the issuance of a certificate to do business,
i.e., to the application for acquisition of the controlling shares
made to the Board, but not to the application for a national
charter made to the Comptroller. For instance, the Court said:
That action by Congress [to provide review in the court of appeals]
was designed to permit an agency, expert in banking matters, to
explore and pass on the ramifications of a proposed bank holding
company arrangement. To permit a district court to make the initial
determination of a plan's propriety would substantially decrease the
effectiveness of the statutory design.7
There would be no reason for Congress to change the procedure
for reviewing the actions of the Comptroller simply because a
bank holding company was making the application for a charter.
The Bank Holding Company Act provisions deal only with the
intricacies of bank holding company arrangements which are to
be reviewed by a board of experts and thereafter subject to judi-
cial review in the court of appeals.
Thus, Whitney Bank was limited to a controversy concerning
the propriety of the bank holding company's application for
acquisition. Controversies concerning the Comptroller's actions
in response to a charter application by an independent bank or
by a bank holding company were not reached by Whitney Bank.
The Tenth Circuit has, therefore, extended the Whitney Bank
decision by holding that it is the "exclusive function of the Board
to act" in all cases involving bank holding companies, not merely
those instances where the acquisition arrangement is challenged
as was the situation in Whitney Bank. 5
In Bank of Commerce, the protesting banks challenged the
propriety of the actions of the Comptroller in granting the charter
because of alleged political influence.59 Similarly, in Bank of
7 Id. at 420.
5' Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1976) (quot-
ing Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 419 (1965)).
(1965)).
11 513 F.2d at 169.
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Boulder, the actions of the Comptroller in deciding to grant a
charter were challenged by the Bank of Boulder.'" Yet, the Tenth
Circuit held that Whitney Bank controlled in both cases even
though the issue was the Comptroller's actions in response to the
charter application and not a question of the organization of the
holding company or its acquisition of the subsidiary bank which
by statute is limited to the Board.
Whitney Bank was distinguished by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia in 1973 in First National
Bank of Homestead v. Watson."' In Homestead, the protesting
banks challenged the Comptroller's approval of a bank holding
company charter application in the district court on the basis of
his failure to comply with the provisions of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).62 The court distinguished
Whitney Bank on its facts by pointing out that the issues in
Whitney Bank were clearly those reserved to the Board and that
plaintiffs were in reality challenging a decision of the Board by
collaterally attacking the Comptroller.13 In contrast to Whitney
Bank, the complaint in Homestead was clearly against the ac-
tions of the Comptroller. 4 The court held that the actions of the
Comptroller are independently reviewable even when bank hold-
ing companies are involved if the complaint concerns the Comp-
troller's granting of the charter and not the Board's approval of
the application for acquisition. 5 Homestead thus rejected the
contention that Whitney Bank precluded district court review of
the Comptroller in bank holding company cases and distin-
guished between claims against the Board as in Whitney Bank
and claims against the Comptroller.
In Bank of Commerce, the Tenth Circuit considered the deci-
sion in Homestead but said that "the considerations there were
entirely different as the only issue was the claim under the
NEPA."6 Yet, the issue in Homestead was also whether the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction to hear complaints made against the
535 F.2d at 1223.
363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
363 F. Supp. at 471.
I d.
" Id. at 468-71.
" 513 F.2d at 169.
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Comptroller in bank holding company cases or whether all com-
plaints made with respect to bank holding company charter ap-
plications must be resolved by the Board and reviewable only in
the court of appeals." It seems that the issue of whether the
Comptroller followed the proper procedure as prescribed by
NEPA in making his decision to grant a charter in Homestead is
parallel to the issue of whether the Comptroller was persuaded by
political considerations as alleged in Bank of Commerce.6" Both
complaints are solely with the propriety of the Comptroller's ac-
tions in response to charter applications by bank holding compa-
nies.
The Tenth Circuit should have distinguished the claims
against the Board from the claims against the Comptroller as the
court did in Homestead. Instead, in Bank of Commerce, where
the principal claim challenged the Comptroller's considerations
in granting preliminary approval of the bank charter, the Tenth
Circuit held that Whitney Bank controlled:
There the Court held that the proper place to challenge the organi-
zation of a new holding company owned bank was in the proceedings
before the Board of Governors. . . .The Court considered the prob-
lems which would be caused by a challenge of the Comptroller's
action as an independent matter, and the duplication which would
result. The Supreme Court thus decided that the opposition must
". .. first attack the arrangement before the Board." 6
Yet, in Whitney Bank, the Court was talking about the duplica-
tion which would result if the protesting banks collaterally at-
tacked the Board's determination in the district court by a suit
against the Comptroller, not whether there was a suit against the
Comptroller for his own actions.7" Whitney Bank did not reach
the issue of a claim solely against the Comptroller. Likewise, in
Bank of Boulder, the court relied on Whitney Bank even though
the claim was against the Comptroller and not against the Board.
The protesting banks brought before the Board the case against
the Comptroller and got review of the decision in the court of
appeals because they were foreclosed from bringing the issue be-
fore the district court against the Comptroller directly based on
7 363 F. Supp. at 471.
Id. at 472; 513 F.2d at 169.
513 F.2d at 169.
379 U.S. at 421-22.
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the Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Bank of Commerce. Never-
theless, the court reconfirmed its stand with respect to distin-
guishing between claims against the Comptroller and claims
against the Board saying:
Since both agencies consider the same factors and since it is the
"exclusive function of the Board to act in such cases," Whitney
Bank, the decision of the Comptroller is not subject to independent
review. Instead, review of the proceedings under the Bank Holding
Company Act is limited to the actions of the Board of Governors.7'
IV. EFFECT OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
Based on the Tenth Circuit decisions, protestant banks have
two very different procedures to follow in order to challenge a
national charter application filed by an independent bank as op-
posed to one filed by a bank holding company: approval of chart-
ers for independent banks is challenged by review of the Comp-
troller's decision in federal district court; approval of charters
involving bank holding companies are reviewed in the court of
appeals based on the Board's decision.
There are several problems which arise from this situation.
One problem lies in the confusion that has arisen over these con-
flicting procedures.72 Another, more severe, problem is that in
bank holding company cases the decision of the Comptroller to
approve the charter is not reviewable. The Comptroller grants
preliminary approval of the charter application, conditions it
upon approval by a separate agency of a separate application for
acquisition, and then grants final approval of the charter applica-
tion. The only reviewable decision is the narrow one of whether
the bank holding company conformed to the provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act. Neither the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act nor the National Bank Act gives the Board the author-
ity to review the decision of the Comptroller; the statutes only
provide the Board with the authority to review the acquisition
arrangement.73 Therefore, it is possible that no review of the
11 535 F.2d at 1224.
72 See note 77 infra.
7' 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970) discusses the role of the Comptroller with regard to the
application filed with the Board by the bank holding company to acquire the controlling
shares of the bank. No other section of the Bank Holding Company Act discusses the
Board's authority to review the Comptroller's decision on the charter application.
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Comptroller's decision to grant a charter will be available in bank
holding company cases.
The results of the two cases in the Tenth Circuit demonstrate
these problems. In Bank of Commerce v. Board of Governors,"
the protesting bank filed its application for a state charter with
the state authorities a few months before the applicant bank filed
its application with the Comptroller. The Comptroller granted
preliminary approval to the applicant before the protesting state
bank received its approval.7 5 The protesting state bank wanted to
attack the actions of the Comptroller, but was precluded from
doing so." The protesting state bank also failed to appear before
the Board and, therefore, was foreclosed from protest or review
in that forum as well.77 There, the state bank was not challenging
the Board's approval of the acquisition plan but the charter ap-
proval of the Comptroller. The result was that the protesting
bank was deprived of access to a forum empowered to grant relief.
In Bank of Boulder, the protesting bank did not try to chal-
lenge the Comptroller's actions directly in the district court in
light of the Bank of Commerce decision. Bank of Boulder ap-
peared before the Board, but was denied relief without a hear-
ing.79 It then appealed the Board's decision to the court of appeals




The most significant problem apparently created by the de-
cisions of the Tenth Circuit is that the decisions of the Comptrol-
ler in response to charter applications by bank holding companies
are not reviewable. In the future, the application to the Comptrol-
ler for a charter and the application to acquire shares made to the
74 513 F.2d 164, 165 (10th Cir. 1975). This is a companion case to Bank of Commerce
v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975), and the facts are the same.
513 F.2d at 165.
7 Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 169 (10th Cir. 1975).
Bank of Commerce v. Board of Governors, 513 F.2d 164, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1975),
held that since the protesting banks failed to assert their claims against the Comptroller
before the Board, they were barred from getting review in the court of appeals. Yet, the
reason protesting banks did not attack the application before the Board was that their
claim was against the Comptroller, not against the Board.
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Board should perhaps be more clearly differentiated so there is
less confusion in interpreting the relation of the National Bank
Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. Another approach
would be to distinguish Whitney Bank on its facts and recognize
that, although the language in Whitney Bank appeared broad, it
was limited to the narrow situation of an issue solely cognizable
by the Board. And last, perhaps the Bank Holding Company Act
itself could more clearly define the relationship of bank holding
companies to the Comptroller with respect to the charter applica-
tions and the extent to which the National Bank Act reaches





Constitutional law has assumed a new, personalized dimen-
sion for American citizens in recent years as litigants increasingly
have availed themselves of federal statutes designed to provide
remedies for infringements of constitutionally based guarantees.,
This trend toward vindicating civil rights in the courts reflects
the evolving socio-legal consciousness of the country and its con-
current emphasis on the protection of individual liberties. It is
not surprising then that approximately half of the cases consid-
ered herein are statutory claims for the enforcement of civil
rights. These cases are discussed in sections II and III below.
While there is a growing tendency to assert equal protection
claims by means of statutorily based actions, the Tenth Circuit
also had occasion to decide several claims of a more traditionally
"constitutional" nature. The decisions reviewed in section I all
deal in some way or another with due process claims based di-
rectly on the fifth or fourteenth amendments.' Finally, cases
which consider the application of constitutional principles to
"specially situated"3 groups of litigants are discussed in section
IV.
I. DIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Due Process-Obscenity Trials: United States v. Friedman'
In 1970 Friedman was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970)
with transporting an obscene book' in interstate commerce for the
purpose of sale and distribution. Three years later the defendant
appealed his conviction and the case was remanded to the trial
court.' Retried under constitutional guidelines newly articulated
See note 46 infra.
The issue of state immunity from suit in federal court under the eleventh amend-
ment was raised in Green v. Utah, 539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this
case and the eleventh amendment claim raised therein, see the Securities Overview infra.
See note 130 infra.
528 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1976).
The dominant theme of the book, The Animal Lovers, was sexual relations between
human beings and animals.
, United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1973). See 52 DEN. L.J. 81, 81
n.4 (1975).
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by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California,7
Friedman was reconvicted and again appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Friedman claimed that, since the offense charged occurred
before the Supreme Court decision in Miller, he should have been
retried under the standard existing prior to that decision.8 ,
The Tenth Circuit rejected the appeal on two grounds. First,
the court held that Friedman had in effect been convicted by two
juries-one utilizing the old obscenity standard, and another
employing the Miller test. Therefore, the court reasoned, this
defendant had been accorded more than the requisite due pro-
cess.' Second, the court questioned whether Friedman had ever
been entitled to be tried under the old standard since the test
enunciated there had been formulated by a mere plurality of the
Court. The Tenth Circuit noted that plurality opinions are not
binding on lower courts. 0 The court concluded that Friedman
therefore never had a right to expect that he would be tried under
7 413 U.S. 15 (1973). On June 21, 1973 the Supreme Court decided four cases in
addition to Miller, all dealing with the issue of obscenity: Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973). Led by Miller, these cases established a new standard by which to judge obscenity.
See note 8 infra.
The pre-Miller standard that Friedman urged the court to apply developed out of
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth held that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id. at 485. Nine years later in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), the Court "clarified" its position by attempting to
articulate a definition of obscenity. A plurality opinion held that for something to be
obscene:
[Ilt must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.
383 U.S. at 418.
In Miller the Court specifically rejected this test, and adopted the following formula-
tion:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
528 F.2d at 788.




the old standard. Noting that the book in question "would be
considered obscene under any standard. . . even those of ancient
Sodom and Gomorrah,"" the court affirmed the conviction.
B. Due Process-Property Rights
1. "Welfare" benefits: Ryan v. Shea
2
This class action, 3 brought on behalf of certain recipients of
Colorado Aid to the Needy Disabled (AND), challenged on due
process grounds the constitutionality of procedures whereby wel-
fare benefits were terminated. Under an act passed by Congress
in 1972 and later amended," state AND recipients who were re-
ceiving benefits in December 1973, and who had comenced receiv-
ing such benefits before June 1, 1973, would presumptively be
eligible for benefits under an analogous federal program that was
designed to replace the individual state programs beginning Jan-
uary 1, 1974.'1 Plaintiffs were individuals who were receiving state
AND benefits in December 1973, but who had not commenced
receiving these benefits by June 1, 1973. Realizing that limiting
presumptive eligibility in this manner might result in overly
harsh consequences, Congress amended the law to provide that
pending individual eligibility determinations, recipients in plain-
tiffs' class would continue to receive presumptive benefits for up
to one year after the effective date of the federal program.'"
The program became effective and plaintiffs began receiving
presumptive benefits. Later, an eligibility determination was
made upon the basis of a "paper review" of records maintained
under the state AND program. 7 If ineligibility was established by
1 528 F.2d at 789 (citing United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975), where
the Sixth Circuit similarly held that a film was obscene under both the Memoirs and
Miller test).
1 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975).
'" For a discussion of the class action elements of this law suit see Federal Practice
and Procedure Overview infra.
' Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. I, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C. §
1381 (Supp. II 1972), as amended by Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 9, 87 Stat.
957, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (Supp. IV 1974). Both the Act and its amendment became effective
January 1, 1974.
"3 The federal program was Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and
Disabled (SSI).
' Act of Mar. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 1, 88 Stat. 52.
* This review was conducted without plaintiffs being given notice or an opportunity
to be heard. 525 F.2d at 271.
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this review, benefits were summarily terminated. Then and only
then were individuals who had been terminated given the oppor-
tunity to have a full hearing on the question of eligibility. The
question raised was whether plaintiffs were constitutionally enti-
tled to a hearing before their presumptive benefits could be termi-
nated.
The court, reaching the merits,'8 determined that the con-
trolling issue was whether plaintiffs' interest in the presumptive
payments fell within the protection of the rule announced in
Goldberg v. Kelly. "9 There the Supreme Court held that under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, state welfare
benefits could not be terminated before the recipient had been
accorded an "adequate" evidentiary hearing. 20 The interest that
a recipient had in his benefits was, therefore, held to merit proce-
dural safeguards under the due process clause. Defendants
argued that plaintiffs' interest in presumptive benefits was not as
great as that of a recipient whose individual eligibility had al-
ready been established.2' After examining the legislative history
and applicable administrative procedures in depth, the court re-
jected defendants' argument and held that the constitutional in-
terest involved was substantially similar to the one discussed in
Goldberg. 2 2 Noting that the majority of federal courts which have
considered this issue have reached the same conclusion, 23 the
Tenth Circuit affirmmed the district court's order granting plain-
tiffs a permanent injunction against the administrators of the SSI
program.
2. Athletics: Albach v. Odle 
4
The central issue in this case was whether participation in
interscholastic public high school athletics is a constitutionally
protected civil right. Appellant Albach attacked certain rules
11 For a discussion of the jurisdictional questions raised by this case, see Federal
Practice and Procedure Overview infra.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 261.
525 F.2d at 272-74.
' Id. at 274.
Id. See, e.g., Buckles v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Brown v.
Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1974) (citing unpublished opinions), aff'd per
curiam, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
24 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
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adopted by the New Mexico Activities Association. Under these
rules Albach was automatically barred from interscholastic com-
petition for one year. 5 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal on the ground that the case failed to raise a
substantial federal question. In doing so, the court found control-
ling its earlier decision in Oklahoma High School Athletic Asso-
ciation v. Bray.26 There, the Tenth Circuit had held that a contro-
versy between a public school and a state athletic association over
the question of whether the school might compete in interscholas-
tic athletics did not present a justiciable federal question.
The court in Albach conceded that under certain circum-
stances public high school athletic regulations might have to
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Such might be the case where
a regulation operated to deprive a student of a specific right guar-
anteed by the constitution.27 However, the court refused to hold
that mere participation amounted to a constitutionally protected
property interest. 8 The court ruled that since no specific consti-
21 The pertinent rule barred from competition "any student who transferred from his
home district to a boarding school or from a boarding school to his home district." Id. at
984.
" 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963). Accord, Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic
Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1973).
27 See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (alienage discrimina-
tion); Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1968) (racial discrimination); Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
(invasion of marital privacy); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258
(D. Neb. 1972) (sex discrimination).
' The court considered and rejected the argument that Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1974), in some way overruled Bray. In Goss the Supreme Court held that under Ohio law
a student had a property interest in his public education sufficient to require a due process
hearing before he could be suspended. 419 U.S. at 574. In Goss the Court spoke in terms
of the "educational process." Id. at 576. The Tenth Circuit, seizing upon the phrase, read
Goss as protecting only against a deprivation of the whole "educational process." Athletic
participation was characterized as only one of the innumerable components, not in itself
protected, which made up such a process. 531 F.2d at 985.
The position taken by the court in Albach was recently cited with approval by the
federal district court in Colorado Seminary [University of Denver] v. NCAA, 417 F.
Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976). There the university, a member of the NCAA, refused to
abide by an NCAA ruling which declared certain students ineligible to play hockey. The
NCAA thereupon placed all university teams on probation. The university contended that
it had been denied due process. Attempting to distinguish Bray, the university argued that
the relationship between a college athlete and his institution was fundamentally different
than the one between a public high school and its student athletes. The court noted that
while withdrawal of a previously granted collegiate scholarship might invoke due process
protections, no such deprivation had been shown. Id. Further, in accord with Bray, the
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tutional right was at stake, "supervision and regulation of high
school athletic programs remain within the discretion of appro-
priate state boards, and are not within federal cognizance under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .... 29
C. Due Process-Procedural Rights: United States v. Marines
3
At the trial level, Marines 3' pled guilty to a charge of posses-
sion of marijuana and was sentenced to one year imprisonment.
On appeal of his sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed and Mar-
ines petitioned for rehearing. On rehearing Marines raised two
constitutional issues: (1) whether disposition of his appeal pur-
suant to Rules 8(d) and 9(d), Rules of Court for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, 32 denied him his fifth amendment right to due process; and
district court rejected the contention that participation in college athletic programs, be-
cause of its relationship to later employment in professional athletics, was sufficient to
give plaintiffs a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Id. See also Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975).
However, not all courts agree with this position. At least as far as college athletics
are concerned, one federal district court has specifically held that before athletes can be
suspended from a team they must be afforded a due process hearing. Behagen v. Intercol-
legiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972). That
same court had stated that "the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate basketball
...is a property right entitled to due process guarantees because it may . . . lead to a
very remunerative career in professional basketball and, because . . . it is an important
part of the student athlete's educational experience." Regents of Univ. Minn. v. NCAA,
No. 4-76-Civ.-468 at 7 (D. Minn., filed Dec. 2, 1976) (order granting temporary injunc-
tion). See McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Hunt v. NCAA, No.
G-76-370-CA (W.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 1976). Compare the language in Goss, 419 U.S. at 576
("educational process") with the court's formulation in Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. 4-
76-Civ.-468 at 7 ("educational experience"). Therefore, it would seem that while partici-
pation in public high school athletics does not in itself rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected right, there is some question as to whether that is the case when participation
in collegiate athletics is at issue.
" 531 F.2d at 985.
- 535 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 The criminal law aspects of Marines are discussed in the Criminal Law Overview
infra.
S10TH Cm. R. 8 provides:
(c) The appellant shall have 15 days from the date of receipt of the motion
to dismiss or affirm within which to file a response opposing the motion,
addressing the merits. Such response, together with three copies and proof
of service, shall be filed with the clerk. Upon the filing of such response, or
the expiration of the time allowed therefor, the record on appeal, together
with the motion and response, shall be distributed by the clerk to the court
for its consideration. The time for filing briefs shall be tolled pending the
disposition of the motion to dismiss or affirm.
(d) After consideration of the papers distributed pursuant to the foregoing
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(2) whether designating the opinion which affirmed Marines' con-
viction as "not for routine publication," pursuant to Circuit Rule
17,33 violated his rights under the fifth and sixth amendments, as
well as denying him equal access to the courts.
The court summarily dismissed the latter claim, stating that
the court was "aware of no constitutional right to have an opinion
published. Counsel for Marines is apparently laboring under a
misapprehension that opinions designated 'not for routine publi-
cation' may not be cited."'" Of somewhat more interest, however,
was Marines' final claim-that assignment of his appeal to a
court calendar providing for summary review based on written
memoranda and without oral argument violated his due process
rights under the fifth amendment.3 5 The court met this objection
paragraph, or on its own motion after notice to the parties, the court will
enter an appropriate order.
Whenever the court, after reviewing an appeal, concludes that manifest
error requires reversal or vacation of a judgment or order of the district court,
or remand for additional proceedings, the court may enter an appropriate
order after notice to the parties.
10TH Cm. R. 9(d) provides:
Calendar D cases shall consist of those cases in which a motion to affirm
or dismiss has been filed pursuant to Rule 8(a) of these Rules and those in
which notice has been given pursuant to Rule 8(d) of these Rules that the
court is considering summary action on its own motion.
(1) Within 15 days after receiving notice that the court is considering sum-
mary action pursuant to Rule 8(d) on its own motion, the appellant may file
in quadruplicate and serve on all parties to the appeal a memorandum
addressing the merits, opposing such summary action.
(2) The appellee may simultaneously file in quadruplicate and serve on all
parties to the appeal a memorandum addressing the merits supporting sum-
mary action.
(3) The same procedure and form as the preceding two paragraphs will be
followed in those cases where manifest error is noted by the court pursuant
to Rule 8(d), except that the appellee may oppose and the appellant may
support summary action.
10rH CIR. R. 17 provides in pertinent part:
(c) The court or a panel thereof will determine when an opinion shall be
published and will direct the clerk accordingly. The direction will appear on
the face of the opinion. Unpublished opinions, although unreported and not
uniformly available to all of the parties, can nevertheless be cited, if rele-
vant, in proceedings before this or any other court. Counsel citing same shall
serve a copy of the unpublished opinion upon opposing counsel.
31 535 F.2d at 555.
1 The court commented that the most noteworthy consequence of assignment to the
"summary calendar" D related to briefing. Full briefing is allowed under any other court
calendar, whereas parties whose cases are assigned to calendar D may only submit memo-
randa which must be filed within 15 days after receipt of notice that the case has been
1977
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by reciting the well-established rule that dispensing with oral
arguments does not violate due process.36 Therefore, the petition
was denied since it failed to allege that the defendant had been
prejudiced by any time strictures which the rule placed on his
attorney.37
D. Due Process-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: United
States v. Hansen Niederhauser Co.38
The primary constitutional question presented by this case
was whether, based upon the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, a corporate officer could refuse to comply with
an administrative summons requesting him to produce corporate
records. Additionally, the court considered whether appellant
Niederhauser was denied due process of law when the district
court held him in contempt for refusing to produce the records in
question.
Niederhauser had been issued a summons by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), 31 which was seeking corporate records to
determine tax liability. In reply, Niederhauser stated that he did
not know where the records were, and that even if he did, he
would refuse to produce them. On appeal of the contempt order,
the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the principle that neither a corpora-
tion nor a corporate officer could assert a privilege against self-
assigned to that calendar. However, these memoranda are not limited with respect to
either length or content. 535 F.2d at 555-56.
1 Id. at 556 (citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. WJR, The Good Will Sta-
tion, Inc., 337 U.S. 265 (1949); United States v. Smith, 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)). See also George W.B. Bryson & Co. v. Norton Lilly & Co.,
502 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Local 42, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & F.I. & A. Workers,
476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 466 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973).
" Had Marines asserted prejudice due to any time limitations arbitrarily placed on
his attorney, he might have been able to state a sixth amendment claim based on denial
of effective assistance of counsel. See Fields v. Payton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967);
Garland v. Cox, 311 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Va. 1970). However, no such claim was made
here.
522 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1975).
" The court noted that the validity of such a summons has consistently been upheld
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1039. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971);
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Similarly, in the recent case of Elliot v. Bratton, No. 75-
1713 (10th Cir., April 16, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit upheld,
against a fourth and fifth amendment-based attack, the validity of an IRS summons
ordering the production of bank records.
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incrimination relative to corporate records."° The privilege
against self-incrimination has historically been considered a per-
sonal privilege, applicable only to an individual's words or per-
sonal papers." The other circuits considering this question have
reached the same conclusion.'"
Niederhauser's due process argument was based on his al-
leged inability to produce the records. He reasoned that the court
could not hold him in contempt for failing to perform an impossi-
ble act.43 The IRS had offered to make a showing at the contempt
hearing of the existence of the requested documents. However,
the district court elected to proceed without this evidence. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that to satisfy the requirements
of due process there had to be at least "some showing regarding
the existence of the records."" The case was remanded for the
required evidentiary hearing.
I1. STATUTORY CLAIMS: STATE ACTION
AND 42 U.S.C. § 19830
A. Essential Elements- Generally
In recent years section 1983 has become a frequently used
weapon in the arsenal of civil rights plaintiffs who have litigated
their constitutional claims in the federal courts.' 6 During the pe-
522 F.2d at 1039 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
' See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (collecting cases).
,7 See, e.g., Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968); Hair Indus., Ltd.
v. United States, 340 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
,1 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) announced the frequently cited rule
that one charged with contempt for failing to comply with a court order makes a complete
defense by proving that he is unable to comply. However, if the one so charged is responsi-
ble for the unavailability of documents in question, he cannot invoke the general rule in
his own behalf. Id. at 330-31.
522 F.2d at 1040.
,5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Although enacted by Congress more than a century ago, section 1983 was infre-
quently invoked until relatively recent times. From 1871 to 1920 claims under section 1983
were raised in only 21 reported cases. 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABR & N. DORSEN, PoLmCAL
AND CIVL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1447 (3d ed. 1967). Then, in Monroe v. Pape, 365
1977
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riod covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit had occasion to
dismiss two appeals by cursorily reviewing the necessary ele-
ments of a section 1983 claim. These cases state the minimum
requirements for a section 1983 action.
In Ward v. Baca47 appellant Ward brought a section 1983
action alleging that a United States marshal had acted to deprive
him of his constitutional rights to counsel, bail, and a prompt
arraignment. The Tenth Circuit, reviewing the district court's
dismissal, held: "It is axiomatic that for an action brought pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be valid, two elements are necessary:
1) constitutional rights must be violated and 2) the constitutional
deprivation must be caused by actions of those acting under color
of state law.""' The sole defendant in Ward was a federal officer
acting under federal law. Therefore, the second essential element
was not present and the trial court's order accordingly was af-
firmed.
In Block v. Schaefer" the question of state action was again
at issue. Appellee Schaefer had reperfected a prior lien upon
Block's truck and had sold the truck to satisfy the lien. Block
brought a section 1983 action alleging that she had been deprived
of her property without due process of law. Without reaching the
question of whether Block's due process rights had been violated,
the court affirmed the district court's order for summary judg-
ment in favor of Schaefer on the ground that no state action was
involved. The court noted that before an individual can be
deemed an agent for purposes of fulfilling the state action require-
U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court held that a claim under section 1983 was stated when
plaintiffs alleged that Chicago police officers wrongfully broke into their home. Since that
time section 1983 has seen continued growth in its importance as a basis for litigation. In
1960, approximately 300 "civil rights" actions were filed, while in fiscal 1972 approxi-
mately 8,000 such actions were brought. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3573, at 487 (1975). See Kates, Liability of Public Entities
Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972); McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Protections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 250 (1974); Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School
Context, 46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971); Note, Civil Rights Act Section 1983: Abuses by Law
Enforcement Officers, 36 IND. L.J. 317 (1961); Note, Developing Governmental Liability
Under 42 US.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201 (1971); Note, Constitutional Torts: Section
1983 Redress for the Deprived Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1973).
No. 75-1818 (10th Cir., June 24, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 2.
" No. 75-1836 (10th Cir., July 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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ment under section 1983, the party must have the authority to act
officially for the state.50 The Tenth Circuit held that Schaefer had
been advancing only his own private interest, and had in no way
been representing the state.'
The four cases discussed below present somewhat more deli-
cate variations on the questions raised in Ward and Block. They
demonstrate that while the essential elements of a cause of action
under the provision may appear obvious, subtle and ofttimes
complex questions arise when the stated requirements are applied
to differing fact situations.
B. School Annexation: Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 53 v. Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 5252
School District No. 53 (Crooked Oak) brought a section 1983
action against adjoining School District No. 52 (Midwest), chal-
lenging the validity of a 1971 deannexation election. The election,
held valid in two Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions,53 resulted
in the transfer of certain territory in Crooked Oak to Midwest.
Crooked Oak asserted that it had an affirmative constitutional
obligation to protect its integrated school system, and that the
transfer had dismantled that system and had created a segre-
gated one. Examining the facts, 4 the court of appeals ruled that
the system was integrated both before and after the transfer, and
could be operated as such on a continuing basis. The mere fact
that certain "college preparatory" courses had to be eliminated
10 Id. at 5. While the requirement for state action in a section 1983 case has generated
a large body of law, the particular standard used by the court in Block is known as the
"badge of authority" test. It developed from Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) where
the Court said: "Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some
capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." 365 U.S. at
171-72 (emphasis added). See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. Mai"a, & E. CooPaa, supra note 46, §
3573, at 491.
" No. 75-1836 at 5.
' 532 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 Austin v. State Bd. of Educ., 497 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1972) (directing Oklahoma school
officials to implement the deannexation); Haller v. Austin, 487 P.2d 1360 (Okla. 1971)
(approving the election procedures used).
' Rejecting the contention, the court noted that prior to the transfer Crooked Oak
had a black enrollment of approximately 20%. After the deannexation this figure increased
to approximately 42%. Numerically, Midwest had received 1,361 students of whom 70
were black. 532 F.2d at 732.
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from the curriculum in Crooked Oak did not raise the problem
to a constitutional level. However, the outcome might have been
different had it been shown that students who desired these
courses had been denied transfers to other districts where such
courses were available.55
Ruling that no constitutional right had been infringed, the
Tenth Circuit went on to hold that the transfer had not resulted
from any state action. The court found that the election had been
brought about solely by the efforts of codefendants-appellants
Austin and Parker, who were private parties. They alone had
circulated petitions calling for the election. The court acknowl-
edged the principle that one need not be a state officer to act
"under color of law" if one willfully participates in a joint activity
with the state or its agent." Yet here the state had not fostered
the election. Indeed, county officials had fought (and lost) court
battles in attempts to invalidate the elections." Under these
facts, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Midwest.
C. Election Filing Fees: Gallagher v. Evans"
Appellants, who were candidates for various state offices in
a 1972 New Mexico election, brought suit under section 1983
seeking restitution of primary election filing fees which they had
paid under protest. The issue presented to the court was the
constitutionality of a New Mexico statute"9 requiring certain can-
Id. at 733. The only analogous case seems to be Hart v. Community School Bd.,
383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). There, the district court was faced with the task of desegregating
an identifiably black school. Judge Weinstein held that such a school's curriculum "must
be arranged so that pupils transferring into the school have at least as good an education
as they would have been afforded without the change." Id. at 757. The Tenth Circuit has
skirted the issue of decreased quality in education addressed in Hart by implying the
possibility of transferring students interested in taking courses now unavailable at
Crooked Oak.
" 532 F.2d at 733.
' See Austin v. State Bd. of Educ., 497 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1972); Haller v. Austin, 487
P.2d 1360 (Okla. 1971).
- 536 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1976).
1969 N.M. Laws, ch. 240, § 176 (repealed 1973) (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-8-26 (Supp. 1975). The current version sets an across-the-board fee of $50 for all
candidates, except those for county offices, who pay $5. The repealed provision proved a
fertile source of litigation. See, e.g., Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972);




didates to pay filing fees determined by a percentage of the salary
of the particular position sought. In 1972 a federal district court
had held part of that statute unconstitutional as applied to candi-
dates for the United States Senate 0 In Gallagher, the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily on that decision, holding that "[t]he con-
struction of a constitutional provision must be uniform. . . . All
the candidates should be treated the same."'" Thus, the court
ruled that treating other candidates differently from United
States Senatorial candidates would in itself amount to a denial
of equal protection."2
D. Teacher Firings: Mogle v. Sevier County School District
63
Mogel brought this civil rights action when the school at
which he had been employed refused to renew his contract. The
trial court granted summary judgment against Mogle on the
' Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972). The court struck down the
provision as violative of equal protection. Under the contested provision, the filing fee
required of a United States senatorial candidate was $2,550. Id. at 730.
" 536 F.2d at 902. While the result in Gallagher is arguably correct, the analysis is
questionable. The court here was dealing with a statutory provision. The "uniform appli-
cation" argument advanced in the majority opinion, while not often employed, relates in
theory to constitutional provisions. See 1 T. CooLEY, CONSTIrTTONAL LImrrATIONS 123-24
(8th ed. 1927). The mere fact that the statute had previously been found unconstitutional
as applied does not necessarily require the law to be voided in all subsequent cases.
Further, the court held that the 1972 federal district court decision in Fiorina constituted
a "change in conditions" justifying the outcome reached in Gallagher. 536 F.2d at 902.
The court implied that because of this "change" the statute, which might have been valid
at one time, was now invalid. Id. While the doctrine of "changed conditions" has at times
been invoked when economic and social realities have shifted, no case cited by the Tenth
Circuit in Gallagher supports the extension of the doctrine to the point where a prior
decision of a court in a different case could serve as a changed condition justifying a later
holding. "Changed conditions" such as these are more correctly called "precedents."
62 The court was therefore able to ignore whether the filing fee requirement was
reasonable. This issue, as the concurring opinion points out, may not have been so easy
to decide given the rather unusual history of New Mexico election practices. Judge Bar-
rett, quoting a prior New Mexico election case, wrote:
New Mexico political history and legislative attempts to regulate elec-
tions are fascinating subjects. Three percent filing fees have been tried but
found wanting. The modest expenditure was not sufficient to preclude the
filing of "stooge" candidates. In New Mexico parlance, a "stooge candidate"
is one who is filed by, or whose filing is caused or procured by a candidate
or his adherents with a view to dividing the vote which would presumably
be garnered by his opponent. Such efforts often developed along ethnic lines.
536 F.2d at 902-03 (Barrett, J., concurring)(quoting State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 495
P.2d 1379, 1382 (N.M. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 935 (1974) (upholding the validity of
the percentage fee system)).
-3 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976).
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ground that no substantial federal question was raised. On appeal
the Tenth Circuit held that a substantial federal question was
presented, but that on the facts summary judgment was nonethe-
less proper. Hence, the judgment was affirmed.
Mogle had accepted a position as counselor at North Sevier
High School in Utah for the 1969-70 school year. At the time,
Mogle lived outside of the school district. Upon being hired, he
was told that at some time he should move closer to the school.
However, this was not stated as a condition precedent to his
employment. Mogle did not move, and when contracts were being
negotiated for the 1972-73 school year he was notified that his
contract would not be renewed unless he were living in the North
Sevier area by the first day of school. Despite a good faith effort,
Mogle was unable to find housing. The school, requiring teachers
to be residents of the school district in which they taught, refused
to renew the contract. After mediation efforts proved fruitless this
action was brought."
Two constitutional issues were raised. First, Mogle asserted
that imposing a residency requirement on only one class of em-
ployees denied him equal protection. Second, he argued that the
residency requirement violated his right to due process by creat-
ing a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption that he could not
satisfactorily perform his job unless he was a resident of the
school district.
Discussing the equal protection claim, the court first consid-
ered what standard of review was to be applied to the residency
requirement. The court reasoned that strict scrutiny was inappro-
priate and the "continuing residency" requirements should be
subjected to the less demanding standards of the traditional ra-
tional relationship test. 5 The court's decision in this regard was
" The action was brought under not only section 1983 but also 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1970), which provides in pertinent part that an action will lie against
two or more persons in any State or Territory [who] conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
law ....
The conspiracy element of this provision was not reached by the court in Mogle as the
case was decided on the issues of whether Mogle had been deprived of either equal protec-
tion or due process of law.
Recent Supreme Court holdings differentiate between requirements of "continuing
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based primarily upon the Supreme Court's holding in McCarthy
v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission."5 There, in a per cur-
iam opinion, the Court applied a rational relationship test and
upheld a municipal regulation requiring city employees to reside
within city limits.
Having decided upon the appropriate standard of review, the
court in Mogle found the residency requirement did not violate
the equal protection clause. The court noted the justifications
advanced for the policy and held that they were "not wholly
unsubstantial."" With this holding the Tenth Circuit went a long
way towards suggesting that almost any continuing residency re-
quirement for public employment will withstand an equal protec-
tion attack."
Turning to Mogle's due process claim," the court took pains
to distinguish the facts here from the two leading cases on the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, Cleveland Board of Educa-
residency" (where to keep a job an individual must reside in a defined locale) and "dura-
tional residency" requirements (where one must reside in a defined area for a certain
length of time before being able to do an act or receive a benefit). McCarthy v. Philadel-
phia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam). See Detroit Police Officer's
Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972), dismissing for want of substantial federal
question 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971). Only measures involving "durational
requirements," affecting the fundamental right to interstate travel, have been held subject
to strict scrutiny. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). One circuit
court under facts almost identical to those in Mogle has gone so far as to flatly declare
that cases involving the right to intrastate travel do not require the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Warwell v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
540 F.2d at 484. School superintendents, in affidavits, sought to justify the policy
on the grounds that counselors above all other school employees should be readily accessi-
ble to students, parents, community and school officials; that certain services were not
being provided students because the counselor lived outside the attendance area; that it
was difficult for students and parents to become personally acquainted with the coun-
selor under such conditions; that because of "folkways and mores" it was more difficult
for a counselor living outside the district to become acquainted with the community where
his students lived; and that career opportunities were not as readily discoverable by one
living outside the school district. Id. at 485-86.
0 See note 65 supra.
" After Mogle had been filed, the Tenth Circuit decided Weathers v. West Yuma
School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976). There, the court held that a non-tenured
teacher did not have a property or liberty interest in his employment protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. After Weathers was decided Mogle
dropped some of his due process claims, but the court still chose to note the irrebuttable
presumption argument-perhaps because it had never been addressed in this context. See
540 F.2d at 483 n.4.
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tion v. LaFleur7" and Vlandis v. Kline.7 The court noted that in
LaFleur and Vlandis the presumptions involved were
"unwarranted and a denial of due process" whereas in Mogle it
had not been shown that the residency requirement involved a
presumption against the plaintiff "on any particular point. ' '1 2
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the recent Supreme Court case of
Weinberger v. Salfi3 for the proposition that the doctrine con-
cerning irrebuttable presumptions should not be applied when it
would clash with a formal policy developed through the legisla-
tive process.7' Evidently the court thought that even an informal,
unwritten school board policy should be able to include
"reasonable" conclusive presumptions regarding residency.
E. Access to the Courts: Silver v. Cormier75
This case presented a novel claim under section 1983. The
gravamen of the complaint was that Cormier, acting under color
of state law, had deprived Silver of his due process right of free
access to the courts. Silver had sold land to the Denver Urban
Renewal Authority (DURA), which had announced its intention
to demolish a building located upon the property. Contrary to
this announcement, however, DURA resold the property for a
substantial profit. When Silver informed DURA that he was
going to bring suit based on these facts, Cormier threatened to
withhold from Silver a $10,000 going-out-of-business allowance to
which Silver was statutorily entitled. Due to these threats, Silver
delayed in enforcing his right to the monies due. Finally, he
brought suit under section 1983. In addressing the constitutional
claim, the court stated:
Access to the courts of the United States is a constitutional right
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
70 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school board requirement that all pregnant teachers take
forced maternity leave by fourth month held unconstitutional).
" 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (irrebuttable presumption that college student who had main-
tained out-of-state address at any time during previous year was out-of-state resident for
tuition purposes held unconstitutional).
72 540 F.2d at 485.
422 U.S. 749 (1976).
7, 540 F.2d at 485. However, the evidence in Mogle would suggest that the presump-
tion established there was not the result of a thorough legislative process, but rather was
an ad hoc informal determination made by a single individual-the school superintend-
ent. Id. at 484.
'5 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976).
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amendments. This right of access to the courts cannot be infringed
upon or burdened. A public official's threats to a citizen to withhold
monies due and owing, should legal proceedings on an independent
matter be instituted, burdens or chills constitutional rights of access
to the courts. 6
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: TITLE Vii
AND RELATED CLAIMS7"
During the period covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit
considered a number of cases involving charges of racial discrimi-
16 529 F.2d at 163. The only cases which the Tenth Circuit cited as authority for its
holding were criminal cases which had never previously been extended into the civil area.
These criminal cases generally rest upon the principle that "prison officials may not un-
reasonably hamper inmates in gaining access to the courts." Evans v. Mosley, 455 F.2d
1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1972). See Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973); Harbolt
v. Alldredge, 464 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); Sigafus v.
Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966); Hatfield
v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961). However, in Silver, the Tenth Circuit took a
giant step in extending this rationale into the civil area. Such an extension is unprece-
dented, for the criminal cases are all linked by the fact that plaintiffs were inmates under
virtually total control of prison officials. In Silver, the plaintiff was a sophisticated, unin-
carcerated businessman, free to communicate with lawyers, and to bring as many law suits
as he desired.
There are some "free access" cases in the area of civil litigation. Yet they deal literally
with free access. The landmark case of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), allowed
indigent divorce litigants to file their case without paying the regular court fees. Some
courts interpreted Boddie to presage an evolving rule favorable to indigents wishing to
press civil claims. See, e.g., Bacon v. Graham, 348 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ariz. 1972); O'Brien
v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972). However, in United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973), the Supreme Court made it clear that Boddie was to be narrowly con-
strued and applied only in the few situations where (1) only a court could resolve the
conflict involved; and (2) where the issue in dispute was found to be "fundamental." Id.
at 444-45. Thus, neither Boddie and its progeny, nor the line of criminal cases in the free
access area seems to support Silver.
" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), was specifically
drafted to provide a remedy for those who had suffered the effects of discrimination in
employment. However, Title VII is not an exclusive remedy. Facts which give rise to a
claim under Title VII may also state a cause of action under other statutory provisions
relating to the protection of civil rights, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). But see text accom-
panying note 100 infra. Plaintiffs frequently base claims on these other statutory provi-
sions in addition to Title VII because the scope of remedies available under Title VII is
narrower than that available under other civil rights statutes. Under Title VII, the general
rule is that neither punitive nor consequential damages may be awarded. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Howard
v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Yet under other civil rights
statutes, punitive or consequential damages may be awarded. See, e.g., Sabol v. Snyder,
524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975) (punitive damages awarded in section 1981 claim); McCrary
v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) aff'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
(damages for embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish granted in section 1981
claim).
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nation, primarily in employment practices. Approximately one-
third of these suits,78 however, was concerned mainly with narrow
procedural questions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.11 Of the remaining cases, five are of particular interest and
are discussed below.
80
A. Hiring: Sabol v. Snyder"'
Plaintiff Sabol, a black practical and registered nurse, ap-
plied for an open position with the Kansas State Board of Educa-
tion. Despite the fact that plaintiff was the only qualified 2 indi-
vidual to submit a timely application, a less qualified white male
who had submitted a late application was offered the job. There-
upon Sabol brought this suit charging racial discrimination in
employment. At the trial level plaintiff was sucessful on her sec-
tion 1981 claim.8 3 On appeal, appellant Snyder's primary conten-
tion was that in light of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,"' a
Supreme Court decision handed down after Sabol had been
argued, plaintiff had failed to state a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation.
"' These cases, dealing principally with the question of time limits within which Title
VII plaintiffs must file suit, are discussed in the Administrative Law Overview supra.
n 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
14 In addition to those cases discussed in the text, the Tenth Circuit disposed of three
further actions solely on evidentiary grounds: Love v. Philco-Ford Corp., No. 75-1138 (10th
Cir., Aug. 20, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication); Buckley v. Coyle Public School Sys.,
No. 75-1143 (10th Cir., Feb. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication); Collins v. Martin
Marietta Corp., No. 75-1447 (10th Cir., Jan. 21, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
Stanley v. Continental Oil Co., 536 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1976), was dismissed because
of failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant Stanley to prosecute. Stanley had alleged a
violation under Title VII. Continental moved for summary judgment and submitted sup-
porting affidavits. Stanley did not file counter-affidavits as required by court order and
FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The trial court's dismisal was sustained on appeal.
81 524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 In addition to testimony concerning plaintiff's work experience and educational
background, workshop evaluations of plaintiff were admitted into evidence over defen-
dant's objection. These records were admitted under the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, and their admission as such was upheld on appeal. 524 F.2d at 1012.
93 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and no other.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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McDonnell specified the elements needed to establish a
prima facie case in a Title VII action.Y A plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifi-
cations."
The Tenth Circuit concentrated on the last two elements since
the first two were obviously met. Stretching the logic in
McDonnell, the court found that the acceptance of an application
after the announced cutoff date amounted to a rejection of Sabol
even though cutoff dates were not strictly enforced. This
"rejection," coupled with the subsequent hiring of the white male
applicant, satisfied the court that the last two elements of the
McDonnell test had been met. 7 The Tenth Circuit rejected as a
sham appellant's business judgment defense that the white male
was better qualified, and affirmed the trial court judgment grant-
ing Sabol not only actual, but also punitive damages and attor-
ney's fees. 8
B. Hiring and Promotion: Chicano Police Officer's Association
v. Stover"9
The Chicano Police Officer's Association and some of its
members brought this civil rights action 0 alleging discrimination
in both the hiring and promotion procedures used by the Albu-
querque, New Mexico Police Department. The complaint alleged
that the Department utilized discriminatory procedures based
upon criteria not substantially related to job performance, with
" The Tenth Circuit applied the McDonnell-Douglas Title VII standard to Sabol's
section 1981 claim noting that it had previously been so applied. 524 F.2d at 1012. How-
ever, this technique can no longer be used. See text accompanying note 100 infra.
, 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted).
', 524 F.2d at 1012. The Tenth Circuit could have avoided this step in the analysis,
holding that prior rejection was not required in all cases, by relying on a footnote in
McDonnell, where the Court noted that "[tihe facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802
n.13.
524 F.2d at 1012-13.
U 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
* Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 (1970).
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the result that a disproportionate number of Spanish-speaking
and Spanish-surnamed Americans were excluded from employ-
ment and promotions. On appeal, the Association contended that
the trial court had erred in ruling that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing, and that they had not made a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in promotion procedures.
After holding that the plaintiffs had standing,9 the Tenth
Circuit addressed the question of Whether a prima facie case had
been established. The court cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,92 a
leading Title VII case,93 for the proposition that a plaintiff can
make a prima facie case of discrimination by merely showing that
the challenged procedures have a discriminatory result. 4 In light
of Griggs, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the Association should
have been allowed to introduce evidence of promotion test results
from prior years, and the trial court's refusal to admit such evi-
dence was error. 5 Further, as to test results which were admitted
into evidence but which the trial court held insufficient to make
out a prima facie case, the Tenth Circuit held that the size of the
group tested was large enough to provide meaningful statistical
data.96
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit
judgment97 and remanded for consideration in light of
Washington v. Davis." In Washington, unsuccessful black appli-
cants for employment as police officers alleged that the use of a
"1 The Tenth Circuit held that because approximately 70% of the Chicano officers in
the Department were members of the Association, the group had the requisite "direct
stake" in the outcome. 526 F.2d at 436. In ruling that the individual members of the
Association had standing, the court likened the officers' position to that of the plaintiffs
in Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969), where it
was held that the secondary effects of discrimination on patients gave them standing to
challenge staff hiring procedures. 526 F.2d at 436-37. See also Lee v. Macon County Bd.
of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S.
215 (1967).
22 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11 The Tenth Circuit adopted the view that "the measure of a claim under the Civil
Rights Act is in essence that applied in a suit under Title VII .... " 526 F.2d at 438
(citing Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), and Sabol v. Snyder,
524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975)). But see text accompanying note 100 infra.
', 526 F.2d at 438.
" Id. at 439.
"Id.
'7 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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particular written personnel test resulted in racial discrimina-
tion. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment." The Court held that
the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of racial dis-
crimination is not identical to standards applicable under Title
VII.' 00 The decision emphasized that when Title VII is not in-
volved,'01 challenges to facially neutral practices which have a
discriminatory impact will not succeed absent some showing of
intent to discriminate.''
C. Promotions-Sex Discrimination: Olson v. Philco-Ford 0 3
This case involved a charge of sex discrimination in promo-
tion procedures in violation of Title VII.' 0 Olson, a female em-
ployee, applied along with three male employees for a position at
a higher job classification within her company. One of the male
applicants was selected, and Olson brought suit. The trial court
dismissed at the end of plaintiff's evidence. Appealing to the
Tenth Circuit, Olson asserted that she had made out a prima
facie case of discrimination and that dismissal was, therefore,
error.
The Tenth Circuit found that Olson and the male employees
selected for promotion were equally qualified. Backing away from
the "prima facie case" standard argued by Olson, the court
phrased the question as whether the "selection of a qualified man
over a qualified woman, standing alone, makes out a prima facie
case of sex discrimination."''05 The court's statement of the issue
implied the result-such a selection is not an act of discrimina-
tion.
" A claim also was stated under a District of Columbia Code provision. Id. at 233.
'® Id. at 239. But see Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
,0 The Court noted that in Title VII litigation discriminatory purpose need not be
proven. 426 U.S. at 246-47. The Court declared that "[wie are not disposed to adopt this
more rigorous standard [of Title VII] for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this." Id. at 247-48.
102 Id. at 239-40, 246.
103 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976).
,0' The section relied upon was 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ..
' 531 F.2d at 478.
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Important in the above quote are the words "standing
alone." Olson had presented certain statistical evidence, but the
court found that it did not bear on promotions. While the court
noted that statistics can be useful in uncovering discrimination,
they must be "closely related to the specific issues presented."''0
Olson's statistics went solely to the issue of the number of women
holding positions at a grade equivalent to, or higher than, the one
for which she had applied. Given these circumstances, the court
limited the language of its recent decision in Rich v. Martin
Marietta, 07 under which Olson theoretically could have stated a
case.'18 In Rich there had been a substantial showing of the differ-
ences in promotions between minority and non-minority employ-
ees, whereas Olson had failed in this regard.
D. Firing
1. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.'5
Taylor, a black, was hired in 1968 to work at Safeway's frozen
food warehouse in Denver. Three weeks later he was fired, osten-
sibly because of inadequate job performance. Taylor subse-
quently brought a class action"0 on behalf of virtually all black
Safeway employees in Colorado, alleging discriminatory employ-
ment practices in violation of both section 1981 and 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1970). After narrowing the class and dismissing the section
1981 action for failure to exhaust Title VII remedies, the trial
court ruled on the merits that Taylor had stated an actionable
charge of discrimination based on his firing. Taylor was awarded
back pay and attorney's fees on his individual claim, but the
court found no merit in the class action. On appeal, Taylor
argued inter alia that (1) his class claim had stated a prima facie
case of discrimination; (2) that trial court had abused its discre-
IN Id. at 477 (quoting Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 272 (10th Cir.
1975)).
,o 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
lOI Rich held that "[o]nce a plaintiff has shown that he is qualified, he need only
show a discriminatory impact and that he was among the class of employees who could
have been considered for promotion." Id. at 348. Therefore, if promotion of a qualified
male over a qualified female can be said to possibly establish a "discriminatory impact,"
Olson would have stated a case. 531 F.2d at 478. The court found, however, that under
the facts of the case, Olson had suffered no "discriminatory impact."
524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
,o The considerable importance of this case vis-a-vis class action requirements is
discussed in the Federal Pratice and Precedure Overview infra.
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tion in determining the amount of the awards for back pay and
attorney's fees; and (3) failure to exhaust Title VII remedies did
not bar the section 1981 claim.
a. Prima facie case
Taylor had alleged that three of Safeway's practices violated
Title VII. The court noted that should any one of these practices
either presently discriminate against blacks, or, while neutral on
its face, maintain the vestiges of past discrimination, a violation
could be found."' First, Taylor asserted that an employee referal
system used to fill job openings perpetuated past discrimination.
The court held that this was true only when an employer both
primarily relies on this method, and when the use of such a sys-
tem results in a pattern of discrimination. Here, the court found
that while the referral system accounted for fifty percent of ware-
house hirings, there was no statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion."'
Secondly, Taylor argued that a company rule prohibiting
interdepartmental transfers worked to discriminate against
blacks by locking them into manual labor jobs. The court rea-
soned that unless Taylor showed an actual pattern of discrimi-
nation resulting from this policy (which applied equally to all
employees), no violation could be found. Again, examining the
statistics, the court determined that there was no showing of
past discrimination."'
Finally, Taylor asserted that a company hiring policy which
gave preference to applicants with warehouse work experience
discriminated against blacks because they were less likely to have
su'ch experience. Other jurisdictions have previously held that
work-experience requirements may violate Title VII."4 However,
the Tenth Circuit held that when there is no evidence of a dis-
criminatory effect from such a requirement, no violation is estab-
524 F.2d at 271.
,, Id. at 272. Blacks make up 4.1% of the Denver metropolitan area population. Of
the employees hired at Safeway's Denver warehouse during the relevant time period,
blacks accounted for an average of 18% per year. Id.
"I Blacks constituted 4.27% of warehouse employees, whereas they comprised only
2.01% of the total number of employees. The court found the difference statistically
insignificant. Id.
" E.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
1977
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lished."15 Since no discriminatory effect was shown, no case was
proven.
b. Remedies-back pay and attorney's fees
The trial court determined that Taylor's own firing was ra-
cially motivated and, therefore, awarded $3,256 in back pay and
$3,000 for attorney's fees. The back pay period commenced some
time after the firing, and ended eight months later when Taylor
became a fulltime college student. Taylor contended that enter-
ing school should not have rendered him ineligible for back pay.
The court, noting that an award of back pay is discretionary,",
stated that once Taylor returned to school he was not "ready,
willing and available for work," and, therefore, he was not enti-
tled to back pay."'
As for Taylor's argument that the award for attorney's fees
was inadequate, the Tenth Circuit noted that prior awards in
Title VII litigation had been as small as $12 per hour. Taylor's
award amounted to $17 per hour and was therefore not an abuse
of discretion."18 The court nevertheless pointed out that the award
was "modest," and suggested that the trial court reevaluate the
amount."9
524 F.2d at 272.
11 Id. at 267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 422
U.S. 405 (1975). Taylor also asked for reinstatement. However, the court ruled that rein-
statement was a discretionary remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), which in the
trial court's discretion could be (and was) refused. 524 F.2d at 268.
" 524 F.2d at 267. This holding reflects the rule that an act of the discriminatee can
sometimes cut off the applicable back pay period. However, it is unclear as to what acts
so operate. See Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegland Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D.
Utah 1971). The case relied on by the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal
Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), indicates that if a wrongfully dis-
charged employee later enrolls full time in college, a back pay award should terminate
only if the individual cannot show that while in school he was "ready, willing and avail-
able" for work. Id. at 443-44. Therefore, what was a factual question under Metal Lathers
has been transformed into a rule of law by the Tenth Circuit.
"I As authority for its position, the Tenth Circuit cited, inter alia, Barela v. United
Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149, 155-56 (10th Cir. 1972). 524 F.2d at 268. The court's reliance
on Barela is misplaced. There, the court upheld a $25 per hour fee, which if applied in
Taylor would have resulted in an award more than 50% higher.
"1 524 F.2d at 268. See also Carreathers v. Alexander, No. C-5082 (D. Colo., Sept.
29, 1976) (order awarding attorney's fees).
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c. Exhaustion of Title VII remedies and section 1981
The trial court ruled that no claim could be raised under
section 1981 until all Title VII remedies were exhausted. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a claim under section 1981
was completely independent from a Title VII action and could be
brought concurrently.'20 The court thus adopted what was, even
at the time of the trial court decision, the majority rule.'' The
Supreme Court finally laid to rest what was left of this question
with its decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,'
holding that an "aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of
other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his
search for relief."'
' 23
2. Smith v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.
2 4
This case raised the question of whether racial or other class-
based "discriminatory animus" must be alleged and proven be-
fore an individual may recover under section 1985(2).121 While
plaintiff-appellant Smith had attempted to allege a conspiracy
aimed at hindering the enforcement of his rights, he did not allege
or prove that such a conspiracy was racially motivated. The
Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Griffin v. Breckenridge,2 1 which
1" 524 F.2d at 274.
121 Id.
12 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
'" Id. at 459.
124 536 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1976).
,25 The section provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United
States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending
therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his
person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to
influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror
in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account
of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or
of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire
for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any
manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to
deny to an citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his
property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any
person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
1- 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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interpreted section 1985(3)'1 on the same issue.' 5 The court fol-
lowed the rule that a claim under section 1985(2) requires the
same "discriminatory animus" as one under section 1985(3).111
Therefore, the trial court's dismissal was affirmed.




1. Kehrli v. Spinkle'
3'
Colonel Kehrli sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court, challenging his conviction by general court-martial
on several charges of marijuana use, transfer, and possession.
32
The petition was denied, and on appeal Kehrli advanced several
constitutional claims.'1 First, he argued that Article 134 was im-
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
In Griffin the Supreme Court held that although section 1985(3) was meant to
reach private conspiracies, it was not intended to "apply to all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others," but only those motivated by "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus ... " 403 U.S. at 101-
02. "Animus" is distinguished from "scienter," or "specific intent." As Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court in Griffin, noted: "The motivation aspect of § 1985(3) focuses not
on scienter but on invidious discriminatory animus." Id. at 102 n.10.
.9 536 F.2d at 1323.
"' Prisoners, mental patients, and military personnel are groups generally associated
with diminished constitutional protection. See N. DoRSEN, P. BENDER, and B. NEUBORNE,
EMERSON, HABER & DoRsEN's POLrTCAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1320-433
(4th ed. 1976). While this survey does not have occasion to examine a decision concerning
the constitutional rights of mental patients, the Tenth Circuit did recently decide the case
of Strano v. Giron, No. 75-1598 (10th Cir., July 14, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication),
which held that neither equal protection nor due process guarantees are violated by
different treatment of voluntary, as opposed to involuntary, hospital patients.
Also included in this section is a case involving Indian affairs. While Indians are not
traditionally linked with the above groups, they are however accorded special judicial
treatment because of their particular status. See text accompanying notes 155-57 infra.
131 524 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976).
"' Kehrli had been convicted under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970). It provides:
[AiII disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this
chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or
summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense,
and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
" In addition to the constitutional issues discussed in the text, Kehrli raised a ques-
tion as to the proper scope of judicial review in court-martial cases. Relying on Burns v.
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permissibly vague and overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional
on its face. However, this argument was fatally undermined when
the two circuit court decisions upon which it rested were over-
ruled by the Supreme Court while Kehrli's appeal was pending.'34
Kehrli further contended that the conviction and sentence vio-
lated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, his right
of privacy, and the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
Kehrli's equal protection argument was based on the fact
that Article 134 is supplemented by a provision which makes it
"a violation of this article [134] wrongfully to possess or use
marijuana or a habit forming narcotic drug."' 35 Kehrli argued
that to place marijuana in the same class as habit-forming nar-
cotics violates equal protection. The Tenth Circuit held that since
the maximum penalty for marijuana use or possession differed
from that for violations involving habit-forming drugs, the classi-
fication did not violate equal protection.
The court summarily dismissed Kehrli's privacy and eighth
amendment claims. Kehrli had argued that since marijuana pro-
duces only mild, harmless effects, government regulation con-
cerning it violated his constitutional right to privacy. The court
held that on balance, the military's interest in regulating mari-
juana use among service personnel in combat zones, and on or
near military installations, outweighed any right to privacy which
Kehrli might otherwise possess.'36 In regard to his eighth amend-
ment argument, Kehrli urged that his sentence of three years at
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the Tenth Circuit stated that the scope of review in military
cases was narrower than in civil habeas corpus proceedings, and that the courts' function
was to "determine whether the military gave fair consideration to each of the petitioner's
constitutional claims." 524 F.2d at 331 (quoting King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732 (10th Cir.
1970)). Additionally, Kehrli urged that off-duty marijuana use could not be prosecuted
under Article 134. The court, citing no cases, found to the contrary. Id. at 332-33. See
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); United States v. Rose, 19 C.M.A. 3, 41
C.M.R. 3 (1969). But see Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Redmond v. Warner,
355 F. Supp. 812 (D. Hawaii 1973). Finally, rejecting Kehrli's claim that he had been
denied sufficient access to counsel, the court found that his case had been given "full
consideration," and that there had been no showing of actual prejudice resulting from any
alleged defects. 524 F.2d at 333.
'" Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974), reversing 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), reversing 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
' U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 213(b) (rev. ed. 1969).
' ' 524 F.2d at 332.
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hard labor plus a $15,000 fine was excessive and constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. The court stated that while severe, it
was within the "authorized maximum sentence.' 37 Thus, the
eighth amendment claim was held to have no merit.
13
1
2. Moore v. Schlesinger"'
Appellant Moore, an Air Force Captain, was relieved of his
teaching duties at the Air Force Academy in 1973 and reassigned
to overseas duty. Thereupon, Moore resigned his commission and
brought this suit alleging, inter alia, that his transfer had been
punishment for writing letters to various Congressmen concern-
ing certain Academy policies. Moore contended that the Air Force
action in reassigning him violated his first amendment right to
freedom of expression. Damages were sought.40
The court recognized the principle that "citizens in uniform
may not be stripped of basic rights because they have doffed their
civilian clothes."'' However, the court held that military inter-
ests had to be balanced against individual interests, and that the
court had jurisdiction to review a case like Moore's only when the
military action was so restrictive of a serviceman's fundamental
rights as to "deny them altogether and thus constitute an abuse
of the broad discretion granted to military officers . . ,. . Not-
ing the longstanding policy of judicial non-interference in the
military duty assignment area,4 3 the court found no abuse of
discretion. Since there was no jurisdiction, the case was dis-
missed.
137 Id.
"' Cases are legion which hold that, regardless of severity of length, penalties within
legislatively set bounds are constitutional. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 407 F.2d 356
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 966 (1969); Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121 (10th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964); Lindsey v. United
States, 332 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1964).
No. 74-1882 (10th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
Originally Moore also sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, manda-
mus, a writ of habeas corpus, and an order reinstating him at the Academy. However, the
court held that only the damage claim survived and that all other claims were mooted by
his voluntary act of resignation. Id. at 4-5.
"' Id. at 5 (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
181, 188 (1962)).





1. Marchesani v. McCune'
Marchesani was a federal prisoner who had been classified in
the records of the Bureau of Prisons as a "special offender."' 45 On
appeal from the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, Marches-
ani alleged that classifying him as such, absent a prior hearing,
violated his right to procedural due process. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the prisoner's classifica-
tion was based upon the nature of his previous convictions,
whereas in the cases relied upon by Marchesani the classification
rested upon "unsupported allegations in presentence reports."' 46
Analyzing the due process claim, the court noted the wide
latitude that the government has traditionally been afforded in
the conduct of its internal affairs, especially within the context
of prison management.'47 Given this principle, the Tenth Circuit
held that actions taken by prison officials, affecting what would
normally be constituted a right in a non-prison environment,
violate due process only when such actions constitute a clear
abuse of an official's discretionary powers.'48 Finding no such
abuse of discretion, the court dismissed the petition.
2. Clark v. Leach'49
Appellant Clark, a prisoner, originally brought suit in state
court alleging that the prison's refusal to provide surgery for a
cataract constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment. The New Mexico Supreme Court af-
firmed a lower court decision which held that while prisoners are
entitled to adequate medical care, the operation was "elective
531 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
"Special Offenders" require "greater case management supervision" than usual
offenders. 531 F.2d at 461. The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1970) as placing a duty
upon prison officials to classify inmates. 531 F.2d at 461.
"I Id. at 460. Marchesani had relied on Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346
(D. Conn. 1974), and Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973).
"1 531 F.2d at 461. The court cited with approval Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974), where Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for the majority: "[l]awful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Id. at 822 (citations omit-
ted).
531 F.2d at 462.
No. 76-1022 (10th Cir., Aug. 25, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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surgery." Failure to provide such surgery did not constitute viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. 50
Clark did not petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
but instituted this action based on the same facts in federal
court. '' The Tenth Circuit held that the principle of res judicata
applied to suits brought under section 1983 where there had al-
ready been a prior state court adjudication on the same constitu-
tional claim. 5 ' The court held that the eighth amendment claim,
and a due process claim which the court found was included
within the eighth amendment claim, had already been fully liti-
gated at the state level.'53 Hence Clark was barred from reassert-
ing these claims in federal court.
C. Indian Affairs:'54 Potts v. Bruce'
This case arose when the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) took
action to withdraw approval of the Tribal Business Committee of
the Prairie Band of the Pottawatomi Indians, and their Tribal
Constitution. The BIA acted after the committee, torn by an
internal dispute, reached a stalemate and was unable to conduct
tribal business. A BIA-sponsored resolution was adopted whereby
approval of the constitution and the committee was withdrawn,
and a new group was formed to draft another constitution. Mem-
bers of the defunct committee sued, alleging that their rights
under the first and fifth amendments had been violated by the
BIA.
The Tenth Circuit held that an individual tribal member
had a vested right "in any particular law or in the Tribal Consti-
tution."'56 Thus such laws could always be changed, providing
that the means used were permissible. Finding that the contro-
versy was completely intratribal, the Tenth Circuit applied the
1 Id. at 2. Cf. Prins v. Bennett, No. 75-1616 (10th Cir., March 8, 1976) (Not for
Routine Publication) (failure of unlicensed prison physician to examine inmate held nei-
ther abuse of discretion nor violation of prisoner's eighth amendment rights).
'5' The federal action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
52 No. 76-1022 at 3.
"' Id. at 3-4.
"5 See the case comment following this overview for a discussion of Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the Indian Civil Rights Act).
533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
'5 533 F.2d at 529.
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general rule that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide
such disputes. '57
David H. Miller
SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS IN TRIBAL ORDINANCES
AND THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039
(10th Cir. 1976)
By RUTH CASAREZ-ANDERSEN,* LESLIE M. LAWSON** AND
DAVID H. MILLER***
INTRODUCTION
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo' is one of the few decisions
to date which has set out to define the substantive limits of a right
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act 2 (ICRA). At issue was
"I Id. at 530 (collecting cases). This rule, however, is not absolute, and when intratri-
bal disputes act to deprive tribal members of certain enumerated rights guaranteed by
either federal law or the Constitution, an action will lie. See the case comment following
this overview.
* Clinical Education Supervisor and Instructor of Law, University of Denver College
of Law; B.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; J.D., 1973, University of Denver.
** Attorney, Feiger & Lawson; B.A., 1969, University of Wyoming; J.D., 1972, Uni-
versity of Wyoming.
*** B.A., 1973, Duke University; J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1070 (1977).
2 In 1924 Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act which extended United States
citizenship to all American-born Indians. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1970). Since that time
Indians have been invested by law with all of the constitutional rights enjoyed by other
citizens in their dealings with state and federal governments. Until 1968, however, the
relationship between individual Indians and their tribal governments was generally held
to be outside of federal judicial cognizance. See note 16 infra and accompanying text. The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970)), was the first piece of legislation by which Congress inter-
jected substantive constitutional principles into intratribal relationships. See note 15 infra
and accompanying text. Section 202 of the Act conferred specific constitutional rights on
Indians in their dealings with tribal governments. The equal protection clause of the Act
appears in subsection (8):
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
1977
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whether the equal protection clause of the Act was violated by a
tribal ordinance3 which denied Pueblo membership to children
born of marriages between female Pueblo members and male
nonmembers, but granted membership to children born of mar-
riages between male Pueblo members and female nonmembers.'
In answering this question, the Tenth Circuit struck down
the ordinance and articulated a novel test which may be broadly
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue war-
rants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensa-
tion;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy
and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unu-
sual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense
any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six
months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprison-
ment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) (emphasis added) [the ICRA equal protection clause is herein-
after referred to in text and footnotes as § 1302(8)].
1 Appellants also alleged that the ordinance violated their due process rights under
the ICRA. 540 F.2d at 1040. However, the court did not address this issue.
' The ordinance, enacted December 15, 1939 by the Council of Pueblo of Santa Clara,
New Mexico, reads:
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
2. All children born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
under any circumstances.
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1041 n.2 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
429 U.S. 1070 (1977). Appellants challenged subparagraphs 2 and 3.
VOL. 54
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
applicable to similar issues that may arise under the Act.' This
comment will define and analyze the parameters of that test in
part II, and in part III will take a critical look at its application
to the present case. Initially, however, it is necessary to examine
some important jurisdictional issues raised by the case.
I. IMMUNITY AND JURISDICTION UNDER THE ICRA
The Martinez litigation was initiated when female members
of the Pueblo brought a class action' challenging the Pueblo's
1939 membership ordinance on the ground that it discriminated
against them. These women had married men who were not mem-
bers of the Pueblo. In particular, appellant Martinez had married
a full-blooded Navajo in 1941, and since that time the couple had
lived continuously on the Santa Clara Pueblo with their children.
Beginning in 1946, Mrs. Martinez attempted to enroll her chil-
dren in the Pueblo. She continued in this effort until the time of
the suit. Despite her use of all available tribal procedures, her
children were consistently denied enrollment.'
The Pueblo advanced two grounds as to why the court lacked
jurisdiction. First, the tribe argued that the ICRA did not provide
a jurisdictional basis for the action. Second, it urged that sover-
eign immunity barred the suit. The court dealt briefly with these
objections, dismissing both within a single paragraph. Relying
heavily on one of its earlier decisions, Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
United States,' the court held that a statute which gives district
courts jurisdiction over actions brought to protect civil rights
granted by Congress' provided a jurisdictional basis for suits
brought under the ICRA.10 Noting further that the ICRA was
designed by Congress to protect individual Indians from tribal
See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
Appellants' children, who were disenfranchised, were also members of the class.
The courts have generally required plaintiffs to exhaust their tribal remedies before
beginning litigation. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976);
McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700
(8th Cir. 1973); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction in civil
suits brought "[tlo recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
"* 540 F.2d at 1042. For the trial court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue raised
in Martinez, see Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975) (decided
without benefit of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Dry Creek Lodge).
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abuses, the court found clear Congressional intent to allow "civil
rights" suits against a tribe."
While this jurisdictional analysis represents the current
trend, 12 it is of rather recent vintage. Before enactment of the
ICRA, Congress traditionally took a cautious approach when
dealing with Indian civil rights. There are, of course, many trea-
ties and statutes relating to Indians, 4 but the ICRA stands vir-
tually alone in affecting fundamental intratribal relationships.'
Prior to the passage of the ICRA, the courts likewise exercised
restraint. Courts were reluctant to impose traditional constitu-
tional standards on social structure they knew little about.'
When federal courts were asked to assume jurisdiction under
the newly enacted ICRA, their response was mixed. Some courts
refrained from taking jurisdiction, 7 while others were not so reti-
* 540 F.2d at 1042.
* See notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text.
11 For a discussion of pre-ICRA aspects of tribal sovereign immunity, see Note, The
Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1343, 1346-53 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Indian Bill of Rights].
" See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 485-608 (1971) for a list of all
federal statutes and treaties relating to Indian affairs from 1789-1938.
'" There are limited exceptions to this principle. For example, The Major Crimes Act,
23 Stat. 385 (1885), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970), gave jurisdiction to United
States territorial courts to hear serious criminal cases involving Indian victims and defen-
dants. The Act and its amendments, however, are not so much intrusions into intratribal
relationships as definitions of tribal authority.
The Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1970)) might, on its face, be interpreted as affecting intratribal political
rights. The Act set out procedures by which tribes could organize and adopt constitutions.
Cases interpreting this Act emphasize, however, that its purpose was to restore self-control
to the tribes and not to define individual political rights. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton, 499 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). See
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).
" The landmark case of Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), firmly established at
an early date the principle that Indian tribes were not subject to the same constitutional
restrictions as were federal and state governments. Starting with Mayes, this concept of
tribal sovereignty-that Indian tribes could do what they pleased, as they pleased, unless
Congress had expressly indicated otherwise-continued to be observed by the overwhelm-
ing majority of courts until passage of the ICRA. See Burnett, An Historical Analysis of
the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 557, 559-74 (1972).
"7 The much-cited case of Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971), pro-
vides a typical example of early judicial self-restraint under the ICRA. In Groundhog
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the original appointment and subsequent election of
a tribal chief violated section 1302(8). The court held that the allegations merely evi-
denced an internal dispute over which the court did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 682-83.
In Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971), the court applied
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cent. In Dodge v. Nakai,'5 decided less than a year after enact-
ment of the ICRA, it was held that when a plaintiff asserts a right
"purportedly guaranteed" by the ICRA a federal court has juris-
diction to hear the case.'9 The first court of appeals case to adopt
this expansive view was Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe.20 There,
the sole question was whether the district court had jurisdiction
to decide if a provision of a tribal constitution conflicted with the
ICRA and the United States Constitution. The court stated: "To
hold there to be a lack of jurisdiction. . . would, in effect, destroy
the efficacy of the Indian Bill of Rights [ICRA]."2 '
In Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States,2 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the broad rule of Nakai and Luxon,'23 supporting its
decision with an impressive array of cases.24 The court's exclusive
reliance on Dry Creek reaffirms its acceptance of the broadest
statement of the jurisdictional rule. In essence, the court has held
that there is federal jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff alleges that
his rights under the ICRA have been infringed.
2 5
the methodology of Groundhog and held the allegations "insufficient to bring into play
the Indian Bill of Rights." Id. at 282. And in Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D.
1973), the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a claim that plaintiff Indian had
been denied due process when his tribal court refused his request for a jury trial. Citing
Groundhog, the court held that the ICRA was not meant to substitute a federal forum for
tribal courts. Id. at 622.
" 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
" Id. at 25. For further discussion of this case see Tenth Circuit Survey, 53 DEN. L.J.
158-61 (1976).
- 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 700.
22 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 933. Several other cases had already employed this logic. See, e.g., Crowe v.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1234 (4th Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1973).
21 In stating its rule, the court cited over 15 cases. 515 F.2d at 933 n.6. However,
almost half of the court of appeals' decisions relied on were tribal election cases which
had been decided under a narrower rule than the one stated in either Nakai or Luxon. In
the election cases, the courts articulated a special rule for situations in which tribes had
adopted procedures analogous to those found in Anglo-American culture. For example, in
Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held that it had jurisdiction
solely because plaintiffs alleged that a tribal apportionment scheme violated the one-man,
one-vote principle incorporated into tribal practices. See also Brown v. United States, 486
F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973). The
rationale behind these cases seems to be that to accept jurisdiction where tribes have
adopted Anglo-American practices would not force an alien culture upon the Indians. See
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1976). Yet in neither
Dry Creek nor Martinez had the tribe incorporated any Anglo-American practices.
21 However, allegations must be sufficient to state a claim under the relevant law. See
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II. ICRA EQUAL PROTECTION
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis in Martinez by examin-
ing the legislative history of the ICRA. The court noted that
Congress had been presented with conflicting testimony as to how
the Act would affect tribal sovereignty." While acknowledging
that Congress had intended to recognize the cultural autonomy
and integrity of the Indian tribes, the court also emphasized Con-
gressional "intent to extend broad constitutional protections to
individual Indians."27 Faced with this conflict the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the legislative history dictated the use of a balanc-
ing test:
About the only way to resolve this conflict is to recognize the
necessity to evaluate and weigh both of these interests. Thus the
scope, extent and importance of the tribal interest is to be taken
into account. The individual right to fair treatment under the law
is likewise to be weighed against the tribal interest by considering
the clearness of the guarantee together with the magnitude of the
interest generally and as applied to the particular facts.2"
The court then proceeded to examine prior cases which had
presented related questions involving section 1302(8). First, the
court distinguished a well-established line of cases holding that
tribes may set a minimum blood quantum requirement for tribal
membership without violating the equal protection clause of the
Potts v. Bruce, 533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976) (allegations
insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
540 F.2d at 1044.
Id. See generally Burnett, supra note 16, at 577-89. The court noted that the Act,
as originally drafted, "would have made tribal governments fully subject to all constitu-
tional restraints and requirements." 540 F.2d at 1044. Congress rejected that version,
however, because of the difficulties which would have resulted from attempting to recon-
cile certain culturally based tribal practices with basic constitutional principles, e.g.,
blood quantum requirements for tribal membership and voting, and the existence of tribal
theocracies. Id. The version which Congress ultimately adopted selectively incorporated
specific constitutional guarantees. Id. See Burnett, supra note 16, at 589-92.
1 540 F.2d at 1045 (footnote omitted). This standard is similar to the "sliding scale"
approach to equal protection articulated by Justice Marshall in Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970): "[Cloncentration must be placed upon the character of the classifi-
cation in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state
interests in support of the classification." Id. at 520-21 (dissenting opinion). See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).




ICRA. 9 These cases were found to be inapposite:
The fact that the blood quantum requirement has been sus-
tained furnishes little basis for upholding the discrimination in the
case at bar because [in the blood quantum cases] there is some
semblance of [a] basis for the classification. This is in terms of
ancestral lines and in maintaining the integrity of the membership.30
Turning to other cases wherein plaintiffs had relied upon
section 1302(8), the Tenth Circuit found that "[ilnvariably the
courts look to the Fourteenth Amendment. . . as a guide." '3' The
court ended its discussion of the precedents by acknowledging
decisions which had stressed the importance of recognizing tribal
traditions and cultural values.32 Thus, by the court's analysis,
both the legislative and the case history of the ICRA indicated
that a court should adopt a balancing test, administered in the
context of constitutional equal protection,33 to determine the va-
lidity of tribal laws challenged under section 1302(8) .31
The court was undoubtedly correct in refusing to apply a
See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); Slattery v. Arapahoe
Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
540 F.2d at 1046.
31 Id.
32 Id. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); Means
v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
" The court characterized the fourteenth amendment equal protection standard as a
"persuasive guide." 540 F.2d at 1047. The Tenth Circuit's standard is thus a combination
of two tests-a balancing test intermingled with traditional fourteenth amendment analy-
sis. Application of this standard would seem to require that the court first define what
individual interests were at stake in the litigation. Next the court would look to the
established mode of fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis which would nor-
mally apply when such an interest was involved. If, for example, the traditional approach
when dealing with a particular interest would require a mere "rational relationship"
between the tribal interest and the tribal action at issue, the court would consider the
factors to be balanced and determine whether the tribal interest merely outweighed the
private interest, since any preponderance of tribal interest over individual interest would
provide a rational basis for upholding the tribal action.
However, if under traditional fourteenth amendment analysis the private interest at
stake required strict judicial scrutiny of the challenged tribal action, a tribe would have
to show, on balance, that its interests so outweighed the individual interest as to satisfy
this stricter application of the balancing test. Seen in this light, the Tenth Circuit's
statement that it will use fourteenth amendment standards as a "persuasive guide" in the
application of its balancing test relates to the degree to which tribal interests will have to
predominate over individual interests on application of the court's balancing test. See
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
1 In the remaining discussion, the phrase "tribal law" will be used to denote any
tribal action subject to scrutiny under section 1302(8).
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purely constitutional standard of equal protection. The language
of the Act-prohibiting a tribe from denying "the equal protec-
tion of its laws" 35-contrasts with the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of the protection of the laws. This in itself seems to
support the application of a different standard in cases arising
under the ICRA. 31 Further, earlier cases interpreting section
1302(8) pointed out persuasive legislative history which indicated
that "in some respects the equal protection requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment should not be embraced in the Indian
Bill of Rights.
3 7
While it is true that many cases have looked to the four-
teenth amendment as a guide in interpreting the ICRA, it is not
true that the courts "invariably" do So.3 In fact, courts have been
singularly unsuccessful in formulating anything approaching a
broadly acceptable model of equal protection under the Act. 39
Typically, judicial theories as to the meaning of ICRA equal pro-
tection have varied with the type of classification made, or nature
of the rights affected, by tribal laws.40 Martinez is thus unusual
in its statement of a general approach that may be applicable to
a broad variety of factual settings.4'
u 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (emphasis added).
See Comment, Equal Protection Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 627, 632 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
17 Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Wounded Head
v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975); White Eagle v. One
Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
u See, e.g., Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.S.D. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975).
E.g., in Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
applied a balancing test in light of strict scrutiny equal protection because a tribal resi-
dency requirement affected fundamental rights. Yet in Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d
700 (9th Cir. 1973), the court held that a blood quantum requirement, affecting what could
be characterized as fundamental rights, would be valid if uniformly applied.
,0 Should tribes adopt Anglo-American practices they will generally find their laws
subject to constitutional equal protection analysis. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.
1973).
1 Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976), employed a
balancing test much like the one used in Martinez. In Howlett, however, the court specifi-
cally held that it was not formulating a general rule. Id. at 238-39.
One author has suggested a bifurcated model. Under this analysis a court would
merely require equal application of tribal laws which were found to be culturally based
and consistent with tribal standards of equality. Conversely, if a law had no cultural basis,
fourteenth amendment equal protection standards would apply. Equal Protection, supra
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The Supreme Court has declined to adopt a single model of
constitutional equal protection'" -a position which is consistent
with the approach suggested by the Tenth Circuit in Martinez.
3
The legislative history of the ICRA, and specifically section
1302(8), seems to mandate a flexible judicial response." Use of a
balancing test superimposed upon traditional constitutional
analysis would enable the courts to weigh more sensitively the
competing interests which will generally be present in these
cases.' 5 Yet, while the Tenth Circuit purported to engage in this
technique, an examination of the decision demonstrates that the
court did not adhere very strictly to its own formula.
note 36, at 633-34. This scheme, however, might allow a tribe to go to extreme lengths in
effectuating culturally based classifications. The courts' inability to reach certain tribal
action under this model could easily frustrate Congress' intent in enacting section 1302(8).
See Indian Bill of Rights, supra note 13, at 1362. While the author observes that British
courts have applied a standard similar to the one suggested in dealing with certain African
tribal cultures, Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 634, the analogy is inappropriate, for
British courts have no equivalent to the ICRA to influence their decisions. Further, the
legislative history of section 1302(8), and its incorporation of constitutional terms of art,
evidence congressional intent to extend greater protection to American Indians than is
contemplated by British statutes which give courts the power to invalidate African tribal
laws that are "repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience." Id. at 634 n.54.
See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1976).
,2 "Old equal protection" and "new equal protection" have been joined in recent
years by "newer equal protection." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). The "sliding-scale" approach sug-
gested by Justice Marshall, see note 28 supra, has never been supported by a majority of
the Court. See Note, Equal Protection: Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN.
L.J. 687, 715-19 (1976).
" The approach suggested in Martinez would not result in the application of one
identifiable "test" in all ICRA equal protection cases. Rather the courts would utilize a
flexible balancing test applied in the light of constitutional principles. See notes 28 and
31 supra and accompanying text.
" Cf. Indian Bill of Rights, supra note 13, at 1360-68 (outlining the different types of
problems to which courts will have to respond).
," While such an elastic standard might arguably be subject to judicial abuse, cases
decided under the ICRA strongly suggest that the courts will zealously safeguard tribal
prerogatives and will refrain from intervention in intratribal matters unless absolutely
necessary. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976) (upholding
a tribal residency requirement in the face of a balancing test requiring a compelling tribal
interest). Cf., e.g., Potts v. Bruce, 533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002
(1976) (no jurisdiction although plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations); but see Equal
Protection, supra note 36, at 629 (suggesting that the Tenth Circuit decision in Martinez
did not give enough weight to tribal interests).
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III. MEASURING THE ORDINANCE AGAINST THE ICRA
In defining the elements in Martinez which were to go into
its balancing test, the Tenth Circuit minimized the importance
of tribal interests in the ordinance. In brief, the court found that
the ordinance was not logically related to the cultural survival of
the Pueblo.4" Nor did tribal history support the Pueblo's argu-
ment that the ordinance embodied traditional patrilineal, patri-
local, or patricultural tribal values. 7 Rather the court concluded
that the ordinance was adopted in 1939 merely as an economic
and pragmatic response to an unprecedented increase in mixed
marriages which threatened to swell the Pueblo population and
deplete per capita resources. 8 While acknowledging the import-
ance of tribal power to define its own membership, the Tenth
Circuit characterized this particular ordinance as an arbitrary
solution to what was essentially a tribal economic problem and
not a matter of tribal integrity."9 In contrast, the court empha-
sized the individual's interest in tribal membership. This interest
was found to include "living in a particular cultural setting in
close relationship with fellow members, inheriting tribal rights,
and enjoying federal and other incidental benefits." 50 Moreover,
,1 The court is correct in the sense that the ordinance is not related to maintaining a
tribal blood quantum requirement. 540 F.2d at 1046. A hypothetical dramatically demon-
strates this: If a full-blooded Santa Claran female member (F') married a male non-
member (M') whose mother had been full-blooded Santa Claran but whose father was only
half-blood Santa Claran, all on his mother's side, the offspring of F' and MI, although of
more than 3/4 Santa Clara blood, would not be eligible for Pueblo membership under the
challenged ordinance. On the other hand, if a female nonmember with no Santa Clara
blood (F') married a male Pueblo member (MI) whose mother had no Santa Clara blood
but whose father was half-blooded Santa Claran, all on his father's side, all of their
offspring, although of only 1/4 Santa Clara blood, would qualify for Pueblo membership.
Repeating the above pattern through nine generations, the descendents of F' and M' would
still possess more than 3/4 Santa Clara blood yet would be ineligible for membership;
while descendants of F2 and M1, possessing less than 1/2000 Santa Clara blood, would
qualify for membership.
" 540 F.2d at 1047. The court noted that, before enactment of the ordinance, prob-
lems such as the one raised in Martinez were dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Id.
0 Id. The district court accorded more weight to the Pueblo's "economic" interest in
the ordinance, noting that "[t]he ability of the Pueblo to control the use and distribution
of its resources enhances its ability to maintain its cultural autonomy." Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 16 (D.N.M. 1975) (upholding the ordinance).
' 540 F.2d at 1048.
Id. at 1047 (footnote omitted). The district court specified three types of tribal
rights associated with membership: (1) political rights-to vote, to hold office, and to raise
matters before the Pueblo Council; (2) rights to Pueblo resources-land, water, hunting,
and fishing rights; and (3) residential rights-to live on the Pueblo. 402 F. Supp. at 14.
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those who faced exclusion under the terms of the ordinance were
not cultural outsiders to the Pueblo. They were "culturally, for
all practical purposes, Santa Clara Indians."
5'
Having indentified the interests at stake, the court applied
its balancing test in light of an equal protection standard calling
for strict scrutiny of the classification involved. The court clearly
adopted as its "persuasive guide '52 the essentials of an equal
protection analysis based on strict scrutiny. First, the court
placed upon the tribe the burden of justifying the ordinance; 53
this burden was not met. 5' Second, the court noted that the tribe
could have solved its problem in a manner less restrictive to the
rights of the affected individuals. 5 Finally, the court used the
familiar rhetoric of strict scrutiny analysis, holding that the tribal
interest in the ordinance was not "compelling.""
The Tenth Circuit is not the first court to approach section
1302(8) in this manner. In Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai
Tribes57 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a tribal residency
requirement violated ICRA equal protection. The court first as-
sumed that the challenged provision abridged certain fundamen-
tal rights protected by the Act." The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the trial court had been correct in subjecting the provision
to the compelling interest test. 9 Balancing the tribal interest at
stake against the plaintiffs' interest, the court upheld the provi-
sion, noting that "compelling interests justify the imposition of
[the] . . . residency requirement . . .,,0
1, 540 F.2d at 1048 (quoting Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18
(D.N.M. 1975)). This finding related only to the Martinez children. The ties of the other
class members to the Pueblo were not discussed.
52 See note 33 supra.
-" 540 F.2d at 1047. Once a court decides that governmental action should be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny, the Government has the burden of justifying its classifications.
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
1, 540 F.2d at 1047.
Is Id. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
" 540 F.2d at 1047. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
57 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
At issue were the right to travel and the right to seek office. Id. at 235.
' Id. at 242.
o Id. at 244. Application of strict scrutiny has usually signalled doom for the chal-
lenged governmental action. See Note, The Mandate for a New Equal Protection Model,
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In Howlett the court used strict scrutiny as its guide where
facts indicated that plaintiffs had been deprived of a basic consti-
tutional right traditionally associated with such a standard. In
Martinez the court preferred to look primarily at the classifica-
tion involved (sex) and not the rights affected.' By viewing sex
as a classification which invoked strict scrutiny-based analysis
the Tenth Circuit went farther than the Supreme Court had yet
gone, or indicated that it is likely to go.2 Moreover, a case arising
under the ICRA would seem to be a particularly inappropriate
place to extend the rule concerning sex-based classifications .
3
In light of the conflicting goals of the ICRA-to protect the
civil rights of individual Indians while preserving the quasi-
sovereign nature of the Indian tribes-it seems appropriate that
a court would engage in a balancing test when measuring a tribal
law against section 1302(8). However, to apply such a test in the
context of strict scrutiny is ill-considered when dealing with a
classification never before accorded such treatment. The better
course would be for the courts to adopt the approach suggested,
but not followed, by the Tenth Circuit in Martinez. That is, when
a challenged law is rooted in tribal tradition and cultural values,
a court would apply a balancing test in light of established four-
teenth amendment equal protection analysis. 4 However, when no
tribal cultural interest is involved, engaging in a balancing pro-
cess would be superfluous. This is essentially the reasoning un-
derlying those cases wherein tribes had adopted Anglo-American
practices.65
24 CAm. U. L. REv. 558, 559 (1975). However, Howlett is joined by a small number of
Supreme Court cases which have also upheld governmental action in the face of strict
scrutiny. See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
11 540 F.2d at 1046-47. While the court approached the case as a classification prob-
lem, in the balancing process it became clear that the court was also deeply concerned
with the nature and extent of the rights affected. Id. at 1047.
" None of the sex discrimination cases cited by the Tenth Circuit support application
of the strict scrutiny standard. 540 F.2d at 1047. Indeed, recent decisions emphasize that
the Supreme Court has no intention of requiring that sex-based classifications satisfy a
compelling interest test. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 97 S. Ct. 1192 (1977); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
0 See Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 629-30.
" See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 2172 (1977). See also note 33 supra.
11 E.g., Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Thus, a bifurcated standard is proposed." In each case the
court should first look to see whether a tribal law would violate
constitutional equal protection. If no tribal cultural interst is in-
volved, the court will apply the appropriate constitutional stan-
dard and end its analysis there. But if a tribal law is found to be
rooted in the tribal culture, and the tribal law would normally be
violative of constitutional equal protection, the court will proceed
to apply a balancing test in light of established equal protection
analysis.6
CONCLUSION
Having accepted a broad interpretation of federal jurisdic-
tion under the ICRA, the court in Martinez was faced with the
difficult task of giving substantive meaning to the Act's equal
protection clause. The Tenth Circuit purported to balance tribal
interests and cultural values against the individual interests af-
fected in light of established constitutional standards. Adopting
strict scrutiny analysis as the applicable constitutional model,"
the court overturned the ordinance, minimizing tribal arguments
that the sex-based distinction was culturally rooted. While the
Tenth Circuit was arguably correct in its result," utilization of
the hallmarks of strict scrutiny was inappropriate given the na-
ture of the classification involved.
" See Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 633-34 (suggesting the different bifurcated
model set out supra note 41).
" This bifurcated approach was implicitly adopted by the court in its treatment of
the case. Initially, the ordinance was measured against constitutional requirements. 540
F.2d at 1046-47. Only after it was found lacking under fourteenth amendment standards
did the court proceed to balance the interests according to its newly articulated test. Id.
at 1047. See note 33 supra.
" See note 33 supra.
" Had the Tenth Circuit applied its balancing test using established equal protection
principles as a guide, the same result might have been reached. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (sex discrimination), the Supreme Court held: "A classification 'must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated
are treated alike."' Id. at 76 (citation omitted). In Martinez the court concluded that the
ordinance was arbitrary, 540 F.2d at 1048, and unrelated to the tribal objective. 540 F.2d
at 1046 (by implication).
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RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ON
TERMINATION: RECENT TENTH CIRCUIT CASES
INTRODUCTION
When a government assumes the role of an employer, ques-
tions inevitably arise concerning an employee's rights when the
decision is made not to renew his employment contract or to fire
him. The employee may be entitled to procedural or substantive
protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' Last term the Tenth Circuit faced the issue of a govern-
mental employee's rights upon termination in several cases.'
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided two cases, Board of Re-
gents v. Roth3 and Perry v. Sindermann, 4 which set out a frame-
work for defining the liberty and property interests of government
employees that are protected by the fourteenth amendment.'
Roth concerned a professor who was hired for a one-year term to
teach at a state college; he had neither tenure nor a contractual
right to continued employment. Following the Board of Regents'
decision not to renew his contract for the following school year,
Roth brought a section 19836 action alleging infringement of lib-
erty and property interests. The Supreme Court held that to have
a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment a
"legitimate claim of entitlement" to the teaching position must
exist.7 Regarding liberty interests, the Supreme Court noted that
the failure to renew a contract was not, alone, a deprivation of
liberty within the scope of the amendment. The Court added that
a showing of serious damage to an individual's standing or asso-
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
I In addition to the cases commented upon herein, see Mogle v. Sevier County School
Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976); Sluder v. Dyson, No. 75-1589 (10th Cir., Aug. 9, 1976)
(Not for Routine Publication).
3 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
4 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See Shulman, Employment of Non-Tenured Faculty: Some
Implications of Roth and Sindermann, 51 DEN. L.J. 215 (1974).
5 Conceptually, these two cases have a basis in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
where the Court held that the requirements of procedural due process prohibited termina-
tion of welfare payments without a prior evidentiary hearing. See generally Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245
(1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 16 infra.
408 U.S. at 577.
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ciations in the community, or to an individual's opportunity to
gain further employment was required to prove the violation of a
liberty interest.'
In Sindermann, a companion case, the Court attempted to
define further the parameters of protected property interests.
Sindermann arose out of a Board of Regents' decision not to
renew the contract of Robert Sindermann, who had taught at
various state colleges for ten years, the last four of which had been
at a junior college under a series of one-year contracts. The college
had no formal provision for tenure; however it had established a
policy concerning the hiring of professors.' The Supreme Court
made it clear that the mere lack of a contractual or tenurial right
does not defeat an individual's property interest in his employ-
ment. The Court held that if a legitimate claim of entitlement to
continued employment existed then a proper due process hearing
must be held.'0 Additionally, the Court noted that a teacher, even
if not tenured, could not have the nonrenewal of his contract
based on exercise of first amendment freedoms."
Since 1972, courts have attempted to establish more pre-
cisely the type of liberty and property interests protected and the
manner in which that protection should be provided. When ana-
lyzing this complex problem it is important to note that courts
are generally reluctant to enter into the arena of government
personnel problems. While there is strong policy to afford a hear-
ing," the general consensus of the federal judiciary is that "the
Id. at 573.
The official publication for teachers provided:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administra-
tion of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he
displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and
as long as he is happy in his work.
408 U.S. at 600. Furthermore, guidelines issued by the Coordinating Board of the Texas
College and University System provided some form of job tenure for teachers who had
been employed in the state school system for seven years or more. 408 U.S. at 600 & n.6.
" Id. at 601-03.
Id. at 598. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
11 Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 530 F.2d 1335, 1341 (10th Cir.
1976) (quoting Jefferies v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974);
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir. 1974)).
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federal court is not the appropriate forum to review the multitude
of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies."' 3
I. THE FACTS AND FINDINGS
A. Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976)
In August, 1974, Governor Bruce King of New Mexico re-
moved John Mitchell from the Board of Regents of the Museum
of New Mexico. Mitchell had held this position since his appoint-
ment by King for a six-year term in 1971. King claimed that
Mitchell was removed for "neglect of duty and malfeasance."' 4
Mitchell alleged that the removal stemmed from an exercise of
his right of free speech. 5
Mitchell filed an action under section 1983's claiming that he
had served "faithfully, competently and with integrity" and that
the defendants had acted "willfully, maliciously, and intention-
ally" to deprive him of rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments. 7 The federal district court granted a
motion to dismiss, finding that Mitchell had no protected prop-
erty interest in the office, that no liberty interest had been in-
fringed, and that Mitchell's first amendment right had to be
balanced against "the state executive's interest in effectuating
his policy decisions.' 8 Mitchell appealed."
13 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1976). Accord, Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d
279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976);
Kalme v. West Va. Bd. of Regents, 539 F.2d 1346, 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Powers v. Mancos
School Dist. RE-6, 539 F.2d 38, 44 (10th Cir. 1976).
" King was acting under authority of N.M. CONST. art. 5, § 5, which provides that
the Governor "may remove any officer appointed by him for incompetency, neglect of duty
or malfeasance in office ....
"s The removal was related to a disagreement Mitchell had with King concerning who
should be elected president of the board. The removal came after Mitchell refused King's
request for his resignation. 537 F.2d at 387.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under the color of any statute. . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . .to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to any party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
" 537 F.2d at 387. See note 15 supra.
"' 537 F.2d at 388.
" On appeal, Mitchell alleged that removal violated his right to free speech, and
deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law. Since the trial court had
granted defendant's motion to dismiss, on appeal the factual allegations of the complaint
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Judge Barrett wrote the opinion for the Tenth Circuit and
both Judges Breitenstein and Doyle concurred in separate opin-
ions."0 To determine the existence of a property interest, Judge
Barrett looked to New Mexico law. Analyzing the New Mexico
Supreme Court's construction of state law, the court determined
that no property interest had been created." The court went on
to hold that injury to reputation was not a sufficient deprivation
of a protected liberty interest so as to invoke due process protec-
tion.2 Finally, the court held that Mitchell's first amendment
claim was without merit since limitations on speech are permissi-
ble to protect a substantial governmental interest."
B. Weathers v. West Yuma County School District R-J-1, 530
F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976)
Donald Weathers brought action under sections 1983 and
1985 2 seeking reversal of a federal district court decision2 1 that he
was not denied due process by the nonrenewal of his teacher's
contract. After a school board meeting in February, 1972,
had to be taken as true and all reasonable inferences had to be drawn in favor of the
complainant. Id. at 386.
" Judge Breitenstein concurred in the result, but could not concur in "much of the
supportive reasoning." Id. at 391. He took special exception to the court's reliance on Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), arguing that the court overstated that case's import. For a
discussion of Davis, see text accompanying notes 80-84 infra. In his concurring opinion,
Judge Doyle expressed similar concern about the court's reliance on Paul v. Davis and
"the apparent tendency of the [court's] opinion to expand and exalt the state's role in
defining federally protected rights." 537 F.2d at 392.
1, 537 F.2d at 390. The court relied upon the Governor's power under the New Mexico
Constitution to remove individuals from public office. Id.
22 Id. The court also held that injury to reputation was not deprivation of a protected
property interest. Id.
1 Id. at 391. The court held that the Governor could remove policymaking appointees
for political reasons, which include expressions made by the appointee in contravention
of the Governor's policy goals. Id.
' 530 F.2d at 1336. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) provides:
[Ilf one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) is quoted in note 16 supra.
2 Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo.
1974). After a court trial, the district judge held that Weathers had shown neither the
objective expectancy required for a property interest nor the infringement of a liberty
interest. Id. at 559-60.
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Weathers was informed by the principal that his contract might
not be renewed. At this time Weathers was given a copy of notes
taken at the meeting by the principal which stated several rea-
sons for not renewing Weathers' contract.26 At a meeting the next
day, the school board president refused to disclose the complain-
ants' identities to Weathers. In March the board voted unani-
mously not to renew Weathers' contract; no reasons were given
for nonrenewal.2 In his complaint, Weathers alleged that he was
deprived of liberty and property without due process of law and
that the board's action was arbitrary and unreasonable. 8 Weath-
ers did not allege that nonrenewal of his contract resulted from
the exercise of free speech or another constitutional right.
Judge Hill, writing for the Tenth Circuit, found that a school
board procedure concerning the manner in which citizen com-
plaints were to be handled by the board was not connected with
employment procedures in such a way as to give rise to the legiti-
mate expectancy necessary for a property interest. 2 The court
also held that evidence presented to establish foreclosure of op-
portunities for other employment was not sufficient to show the
violation of a protected liberty interest.?0 Regarding the question
of arbitrary and capricious state action, the Tenth Circuit held
that substantive due process protection was not greater than the
protection provided by procedural due process.3 Since no liberty
or property interest was found to exist, no substantive due process
protection was afforded.32
21 The copy of the note that was given to Weathers read as follows:
Swore or called a boy a bad name after the Brush game
Has too much busy work in class that doesn't figure into grade
Student prepared a 3-page assignment, handed it in and wasn't look[ed]
at
In group contest discussion, total group gets the same grade, regardless of
degree of participation by individuals.
530 F.2d at 1336 (footnote omitted).
"Id.
Id. at 1337-40.
Id. at 1338. Parental complaints regarding Weathers were not referred to the super-
intendent of schools as required by the policy. Weathers argued that the policy created
"an objective expectancy that he would not be denied renewal because of parental com-
plaints without a prior administrative effort to adjust such complaints." Id. The procedure
in question is set out in note 63 infra. Additionally, the board had a policy that it could
terminate nontenured teachers "without cause." 530 F.2d at 1338.
530 F.2d at 1339-40.
" Id. at 1340.
I d. at 1340-42.
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C. Powers v. Mancos School District RE-6, 539 F.2d 38 (10th
Cir. 1976)
Ronald Powers was a nontenured teacher employed by the
Mancos School District in Colorado. 31 In his third year of teach-
ing, Powers' principal did not recommend that his contract be
renewed and advised the school board that a better teacher could
be hired. The school board voted unanimously not to renew Pow-
ers' contract. No reasons for nonrenewal were given, nor were any
reasons ever publicly stated.3" After trial, the district court held
that Powers had not sustained the burden of showing that his
contract was not renewed for a constitutionally impermissible
reason, nor had he proven the existence of a protected liberty
interest."
Powers alleged on appeal that nonrenewal of his contract
violated his "academic freedom" as protected by the first amend-
ment, that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law,
and that he was dismissed, in part, for a constitutionally imper-
missible reason .3 No property interest, as such, was alleged.
Judge Barrett wrote the Tenth Circuit opinion, with Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Seth concurring.37 Judge Barrett, relying
3 Absent agreement to the contrary, a teacher in Colorado does not acquire tenure
until his fourth year. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-112(1) (1973). In his second year of teach-
ing, Powers became President of the Mancos Education Association. The following year
he was a candidate for mayor of Mancos. 539 F.2d at 40.
3, 539 F.2d at 41.
" The lower court decisions are Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 391 F. Supp.
322 (D. Colo. 1975) and Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 369 F. Supp. 648 (D. Colo.
1973). The first cite is the trial court's decision to dismiss with prejudice Powers' case since
he has not sustained his burden in showing that a liberty interest had been infringed or
that his contract had not been renewed for exercise of his first amendment rights. 391 F.
Supp. at 326. The latter cite refers to the trial court's determination, upon defendant's
motion to dismiss, that Powers' claim that his first and fourteenth amendment rights had
been infringed stated a claim for which relief could be granted. 369 F. Supp. at 649.
11 Powers felt that the decision not to renew his contract was based on criticisms he
had aimed at the board, his actions while president of the local teachers' association and
his use of "Jesus Christ Superstar" as a teaching device. 539 F.2d at 43.
11 Chief Judge Lewis felt that the case presented "no new nor novel question of law"
and therefore no long dissertation was necessary. Id. at 44. Judge Seth agreed that there
was neither a liberty interest nor dismissal for a constitutionally impermissible reason,
but disagreed with Judge Barrett's analysis of the case. Judge Seth felt that since no
liberty or property interest was found, the case was well within Roth and Sindermann.
Additionally, he found the trial court's decision that the nonrenewal of Powers' contract
was not in response to exercise of Powers' first amendment rights was supported by the
record. Id. at 45.
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on Weathers, decided that no protected liberty interest existed,
and upheld the trial court's determination that Powers had failed
to prove he was dismissed for exercising first amendment rights. 8
D. Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976)
Billy Prebble was informed during his third year as a profes-
sor at the University of Wyoming that he had not been awarded
tenure, and therefore, according to university policy, had a final
year in which to seek other employment. Prebble apparently
missed some eight days of teaching during the fall semester of his
final year, and in January, 1973, he was conditionally relieved of
all teaching duties for the spring semester. At that time the dean
of the college where Prebble taught recommended to the presi-
dent of the university that Prebble be terminated. A hearing was
held before the Tenure and Promotion Committee in February,
1973. There was some dispute concerning the procedures followed
at this hearing, but Prebble was afforded an opportunity to ex-
plain his absences on the days in question. Prebble asserted that
he "taught every class, although he was physically absent"' 9 at
times due either to job interviewing or to elk hunting.
At trial Prebble contended that he was discharged for exer-
cising his first amendment rights of free speech and association. 0
Additionally, he alleged that the procedures used at the hearing
did not meet the requirements of procedural due process." A jury
returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants. On appeal,
Prebble claimed that certain procedures at the trial level were
handled incorrectly 2 and that the proof clearly demonstrated
that he was denied due process at the hearing. Further, he argued
that he was terminated for the exercise of first amendment rights.
3' Id. at 42-43.
535 F.2d at 608.
Prebble alleged that his support of a department head who was about to be re-
placed, his outspokenness at faculty meetings, and his different teaching philosophies
were the reason for his dismissal. Id. at 609.
" Prebble objected to the fact that at the hearing he was neither given the names of
students whose statements were used as a basis for his dismissal nor permitted to cross-
examine them. Id. at 616.
12 Prebble argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the case against the univer-
sity, in directing a verdict for the trustees, in submitting an interrogatory on "neglect of
duty," in placing the burden of showing malice and lack of good faith on him, and in
selecting the verdict form. Id. at 609.
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Assuming the existence of a property interest,'3 the Tenth
Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Holloway, looked to the
issue of what process was due. The court found that Prebble had
been given notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard."
Possible objections to the hearing procedures were not persuasive
because Prebble personally had admitted the absences which
formed the basis for the discharge." Further, the court held that
Prebble had not carried the burden of proving that he was dis-
charged for exercising first amendment rights."
II. PROPERTY INTERESTS
A. Existence of Property Interests
Property interests arise not only from the traditional con-
cepts of property but also from legitimate claims of entitlement.,'
An entitlement may take the form, for example, of a lawyer's
license or a social security pension."8 To be protected by proce-
dural due process, an entitlement must be more than a mere
subjective expectancy in the mind of the claiming party; instead,
there must be a reasonable expectation to the entitlement."
When a claimed property interest is outside the scope of
"traditional property," the inquiry focuses upon the existence of
"rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
'3 The court assumed this point because it was not briefed. Id. at 614. The theory is
that since the teacher is hired for the school year, he thus has a legitimate expectancy
that he would complete the year. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952); Jefferies v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974).
" 535 F.2d at 616.
SId.
A Id. at 617.
,T Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
' See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8
(1970); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1, 3 (4th
Cir. 1973). In determining the presence of an expectancy, no distinction may be drawn
between a right and a privilege. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). Accord Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) where the dissent notes: "[Tihe Court's approach is a
resurrection of the discredited rights/privileges distinction, for a State may now avoid all
due process safeguards attendant upon the loss of even the necessities of life . . . merely
by labelling them as not constituting property." Id.
1977
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."50 These rules or
understandings must find a basis in some source independent of
the Constitution, such as state law.
51
To determine if a property interest existed in Mitchell, the
Tenth Circuit looked to the applicable state law as construed by
the New Mexico Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit relied heav-
ily upon State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez5 which held that the
Governor had the power to remove government officials ap-
pointed for a term of years. 3 The Tenth Circuit used this case as
the basis for deciding that under New Mexico law Mitchell, like
the government employees in Ulrick, could be removed at the
discretion of the Governor.
In interpreting Ulrick, the New Mexico Supreme Court had
said that when the Governor, as head of the executive branch,
assigns a reason for his action which is within the purview of the
New Mexico Constitution, that statement of reasons is conclusive
upon the courts.5 Essentially, the New Mexico court saw the
issue as one of separation of powers. Although action by the exec-
utive branch of a state government may be binding on that state's
judicial branch, that action is not binding on a federal court."
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
" Id. Accord, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Gotkin v. Miller, 514 F.2d
125, 128 (2d Cir. 1975). Bishop v. Wood involved a police officer who was dismissed for
cause. In the ordinance providing for dismissal for cause, certain procedures were outlined
which the city manager had to follow. The majority of the Court held that these proce-
dures determined the extent of the property interest involved. 426 U.S. at 344-45. In
dissent, Justice White argued that this view was incompatible with Roth, and having
granted a petitioner a right to his job unless there is cause to fire him, "it is the Federal
Constitution, not state law, which determines the process to be applied in connection with
any state decision to deprive him of it." Id. at 360-61. Further, he noted that the Court
had rejected the majority view in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In a separate
dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that there was a federal dimension to a property right.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 353. He also read Roth as not limiting the "independent
source" of property rights to state laws. Id.
52 32 N.M. 265, 255 P. 1077 (1927).
53 Id. at 291, 255 P. at 1087.
" In a subsequent case, Ulrick was cited for the proposition that the right to hold
public office is not a property right. Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 385, 362 P.2d
771, 774 (1961). It is unlikely after Roth and Sindermann whether such a proposition,
without more, could suffice to explain whether a reasonable expectation to entitlement
existed. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
Hutchens v. Jackson, 37 N.M. 325, 336-37, 23 P.2d 355, 365-66 (1933) (interpreting
N.M. CONST. art. 3, § 1).




The executive department of a state is not a coequal of the federal
judiciary and the federal judiciary is not bound by state executive
action. Since the ascription of reasons by the Governor is not
binding upon a federal court, in theory such a court is not pre-
cluded from finding a property interest in this situation.57
In a federal court, not bound by state executive action, the
determination of what construction of state law to apply might
focus upon whether a New Mexico court, without the limitations
imposed by separation of powers, would find a property interest.
In this context Eyring v. Board of Regents" may limit Ulrick. In
Eyring, the New Mexico Supreme Court construed a state statute
providing that a university president could only be removed "for
cause." The court held that the statute required formal charges
to be made and opportunity to be heard afforded. Failure to fol-
low these procedures voided an attempted removal. 9 Mitchell
also concerned the dismissal of a public official "for cause."
Therefore, in theory, under Eyring Mitchell should have been
formally charged and given an opportunity to be heard.
B. Effect of Policymaking Official Status
In Mitchell, the Tenth Circuit drew a distinction between
employees in policymaking positions and employees mainly in-
volved in day-to-day administrative activities of a government
agency. 0 The fact that an individual occupies a policymaking
position does not necessarily preclude a finding that he has a
protected property interest in continued employment.' However,
an executive, at least arguably, should have more power to re-
move employees in policymaking positions than he has with re-
spect to general employees, because making policy is one of the
functions and responsibilities of the executive. 2 The Tenth Cir-
'" However, the argument could be made that because the federal court must define
the property interest in terms of state law, the federal court should bind itself as would
the state court. It seems more likely that a federal court would not find itself so precluded.
See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" 59 N.M. 3, 277 P.2d 550 (1954).
" Id. at 8, 277 P.2d at 552-53.
537 F.2d at 391.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
62 The theory is that the Governor is responsible for the executive function and so
those who exercise similar functions should be responsible to the executive. Conversely,
the six-year term of museum regents theoretically might operate as a limit on the exercise
of executive power. Similarly, a "for cause" provision may have the same purpose.
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cuit did not make an in-depth analysis of this issue; rather, it
merely stated that policymaking appointees could be removed by
the Governor for political reasons, and that notice or a hearing
was not required." The court failed to discuss whether the term-
of-years provision or the "for cause" provision created a restric-
tion on the Governor's powers sufficient to create a reasonable
expectancy amounting to a protected property interest.
C. The Effect of Additional Procedures
A government may be able to dismiss an employee without
affording him procedural safeguards, but once such procedures
are established, they must be followed." In Weathers it was
argued that a school board policy concerning the handling of
complaints" gave Weathers the expectancy that those procedures
would be followed. Weathers argued that this expectancy rose to
the level of a protected property interest and the failure of the
" 537 F.2d at 391. The Governor's power to remove for political reasons "encompasses
removal for expressions made by the appointee in contravention of the policy goals of the
governor." Id.
" The theory is that once procedures are established, they raise an expectation that
the procedures will be followed. This expectation creates a property right that cannot be
taken without due process of law. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
The procedure reads as follows:
Individuals or groups often confront a single board member with issues
which usually should be handled by the Superintendent of Schools. In those
instances of apparent exception, it is suggested that the board member with-
hold an expression of opinion or commitment until the matter has been
presented to the Board of Education. It is often wise for the board member
to postpone the formulation of his own opinion until he has had the benefit
of hearing the issue discussed by the Board of Education where other aspects
of the problem are considered. A board member should not obligate other
members of the Board of Education by predicting how they will vote on any
issue.
In carrying out the policy for the handling of complaints the Board will,
therefore, observe the following procedure. Neither the Board of Education
as a unit nor any individual member will entertain or consider communica-
tion or complaints from teachers, parents, or patrons, until they have first
been referred to the Superintendent of Schools. Only in those instances
where satisfactory adjustment cannot be made by the Superintendent and
his assistants, shall communications and complaints be referred to the
Board. After hearing evidence submitted by the Superintendent, in such
event, the Board of Education will, if it deems advisable, grant a hearing to
the parties interested. Such a hearing may be held during executive session
of the Board.
530 F.2d at 1337-38.
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school board to comply with the procedures amounted to a viola-
tion of procedural due process. 6 The Tenth Circuit found that the
procedure was not related to decisions as to whether an individual
would be rehired, nor did it involve in any way the rehiring pro-
cess."7 Furthermore, the court stated that a "without cause"
clause in Weathers' contract negated any objective expectancy
that such procedure would be followed exclusively. 8
III. LIBERTY INTEREST
Due process also protects against state deprivation of liberty
interests. The initial criterion for judging whether a protected
liberty interest exists was stated in Roth: "Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him, notice and opportunity to be
heard are essential." 9 The Court in Roth made it clear that a
government does not infringe upon a liberty interest by the mere
failure to rehire an employee. 0 The Court focused on two basic
areas for determining the scope of protected liberty interests: the
protection of good name, reputation, honor or integrity; and the
ability to take advantage of other employment opportunities.7'
A. Foreclosure of Employment Opportunities
It is difficult to ascertain the standard that should be applied
to determine whether future employment opportunities have
been so impaired as to constitute infringement of a protected
liberty interest. In Roth, the Court felt that "[m]ere proof, for
example, that his [petitioner's] record of nonretention in one
job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclo-
sure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty.' "72
" The argument was that since the prescribed procedures were not followed, action
by the board in contravention of this policy would be void. See id. at 1338.
7 Id.
U Id. The talisman "without cause" seems to serve the function of negating any
procedures established. Although this concept may not be necessary to the analysis in
Weathers, the court seems to indicate that a gcvernmental agency may negate any proce-
dure established-no matter how essential to the decision involved-by merely ascribing
the term "without cause" to a contract. This seems a dangerous and unnecessary exten-
sion.
" 408 U.S. at 573 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
408 U.S. at 573.
I ld.
12 Id. at 574 n.13.
1977
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The concern is with the type of "stigma" which would seriously
damage the opportunity to obtain other employment."3 From this
stigma, a tangible loss of liberty may be implied. 4 The Tenth
Circuit in Weathers adopted a "practical test" to determine
whether a stigma of sufficient magnitude resulted from the gov-
ernment's action.15 This test looks not only to whether the charges
are of the type that would likely stigmatize someone but also to
whether an individual's opportunity for future employment has,
in fact, been foreclosed. In this context, evidence of attempts to
obtain other employment becomes important."
While reiterating the principle that mere proof of nonrenewal
was insufficient to invoke the protection of procedural due pro-
cess, the Tenth Circuit in Weathers clarified the extent of foreclo-
sure necessary to violate a liberty interest. The court held that
more than a "disadvantage in obtaining other employment"
must be shown; instead, the plaintiff must show the type of
stigma that seriously damages the opportunity for other employ-
ment.'
The difficulty with a practical test for determining whether
opportunities are so foreclosed as to give rise to a protected liberty
11 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 659
(8th Cir. 1976); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th
Cir. 1975); Brouillette v. Board of Directors of Merged Area IX, 519 F.2d 126, 127 (8th
Cir. 1975); Lake Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community Col-
lege, 518 F.2d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976); Buhr v. Buffalo
Pub. School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1974); Abeyta v. Town of Taos,
499 F.2d 323, 327 (10th Cir. 1974).
" See Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1976).
, 530 F.2d at 1339. See also LaBorde v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 510 F.2d 590 (5th
Cir. 1975); Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Blair v. Board of
Regents, 496 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1974); Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973); Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972). But see
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974).
,1 Theoretically, a demonstration that a significant number of job opportunities had
been foreclosed and that this was directly related to the reasons for termination of the
employee would give rise to an inference that a protected liberty interest had been in-
fringed.
530 F.2d at 1339.
Id. See Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir.
1975). The court in Weathers held that the evidence of two unsuccessful attempts to
obtain other employment was insufficient to demonstrate an infringement of a liberty
interest in theory or in fact. 530 F.2d at 1339. Drawing upon the Weathers precedent the
court in Powers accented the fact that no reasons were given to Powers for his nonrenewal.
This arguably made the claim less substantial than the one made in Weathers where the
reasons were "not substantial" or "denied or explained." 539 F.2d at 42-43.
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interest centers upon the fact that the evidence of foreclosure will
generally be available only after-often a long time after-the
nonrenewal of the employment contract. If this evidence is suffi-
cient to require a due process hearing, the fact that the hearing
must necessarily be held some time after the nonrenewal could
work a hardship for either side of the controversy. Under some
circumstances it may become impossible to provide a full due
process hearing because a requisite element of due process is that
the hearing be held at a meaningful time,79 and this may be
impossible under the circumstances. On the other hand, the
practical test more closely reflects actual events, which is in line
with the theory that due process must be flexible in order to
protect the individual. 0
B. Protection for Good Name, Reputation, Honor, and Integrity
In Paul v. Davis' the Supreme Court narrowed the area of
due process protection against government infringement of a per-
son's good name or reputation. The case concerned the distribu-
tion by police of a notice to local merchants identifying Davis as
a "known shoplifter."" The Court, over a vigorous dissent, held
that although a "classic case of defamation" had been estab-
lished,83 defamation was not sufficient to invoke the guarantees
of procedural due process "absent an accompanying loss of gov-
ernment employment.
84
Paul v. Davis is the basis of the Tenth Circuit's discussion
of liberty interests in Mitchell. The court ignores the distinction
made in Davis between injury to reputation and injury to reputa-
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McGrath, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
" Davis was arrested and charged with shoplifting. He pleaded not guilty and the
case was filed away with leave to reinstate, which left the charge outstanding. Subse-
quently, the police distributed the flyer and shortly afterwards the shoplifting charge was
dropped. Id. at 695-96.
'0 Id. at 697.
" Id. at 706. The case did not deal with the problem of remarks which might cause
harm to reputation made in connection with the nonrenewal or firing of an individual. Id.
at 709. The Supreme Court went on to note that an injury to reputation which is uncon-
nected with government employment or which does not deprive an individual of a right
previously held under state law is protected by state tort law and is not a protected interest
under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 712.
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tion when it relates to government employment.8 5 Arguably,
Mitchell's stature as a nonsalaried policymaking official altered
his status as a mere government "employee," and made him more
susceptible to an injury to reputation. The court, however, by
failing to make the injury-related-to-employment distinction
does not reach this question.
The Tenth Circuit relied on Adams v. Walkere6 as additional
support for its finding that no violation of Mitchell's liberty had
occurred. In Adams the Seventh Circuit held that "use of the
talismanic phrase 'incompetence, neglect of duty and malfeas-
ance in office' in effecting the plaintiff's discharge was plainly to
satisfy the state Constitution and did not take liberty without due
process of law." 7 The Tenth Circuit applied this idea to Governor
King's use of the phrase "neglect of duty and malfeasance." The
phrase was the official basis for removing Mitchell from the
Board of Regents and served merely as the means by which King
satisfied the New Mexico Constitution. By using the phrase King
was able to remove Mitchell without infringing upon a protected
property interest.8 Furthermore, no liberty interest was infringed
" The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Davis must be read in light of the separate
concurring opinions of Judges Breitenstein and Doyle which limit the sweep of the court's
opinion, especially since Judge Barrett expressed agreement with Judge Breitenstein's
analysis of Davis. 537 F.2d at 392. Referring to a footnote in Davis, Judge Breitenstein
noted that section 1983 protects not only against governmental actions which deprive an
individual of rights having a genesis in state law, but also protects those interests guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 391-92. Judge Doyle expressed similar concern in "the
apparent tendency of the opinion to expand and exalt the state's role in defining federally
protected rights." Id. at 392.
None of the opinions in Mitchell refers to the distinction drawn in other circuits
between injury to reputation alone and the same injury when connected with employment.
Huntley v. Community School Bd., 543 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Cir. 1976); Colaizzi v. Walker,
542 F.2d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1976); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361,
365 (9th Cir. 1976).
- 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974). In Adams, the Governor of Illinois removed a member
of the Liquor Control Commission for "cause" and "for incompetence, neglect of duty and
malfeasance." Id. at 1004.
,1 Id. at 1007. The charge made in Adams was considered to have less effect upon an
individual's freedom to secure other employment than allegations relating to immorality
or dishonesty. Id. at 1008. Judge, now Justice, Stevens in his concurring opinion counseled
that the concept of "malfeasance" depends upon its context. Id. at 1010.
m If Governor King had removed Mitchell without using this phrase he would have
infringed a protected property interest because Mitchell had a legitimate expectancy that
he would not be removed from his position absent "neglect of duty and malfeasance." See
text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
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since in that context the words used have no further meaning and
no inference can be drawn to reflect upon Mitchell's good name.89
As a result of the Tenth Circuit's application of Adams in
Mitchell, words that would normally result in the infringement
of a liberty interest (because of their opprobrious meaning to the
community at large) do not do so because of the context in which
they are used. The words must be used to avoid violation of a
property interest.
C. Disclosure
An accusation that would injure a person's good name would
probably also lessen or foreclose his opportunities to find other
employment, especially when these reasons are disclosed to the
public or prospective employers. That disclosure is a crucial fact
where liberty interests are concerned was illustrated by the recent
case of Bishop v. Wood,9" where the Supreme Court held that
false reasons can be the basis for discharge or nonrenewal as long
as they are not broadcast.' Similarly, the Second Circuit has held
that the manner in which personnel records were disclosed, cou-
pled with procedures whereby employees were given neither rea-
sons for dismissal nor hearings, encouraged the very harm that
Roth and Sindermann meant to prevent.2
Since disclosure problems do not occur until the state has in
Arrelano v. Lopez, 81 N.M. 389, 391-92, 467 P.2d 715, 717 (1970). See Adams v.
Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1015 (7th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion). It should be noted that
the New Mexico Supreme Court has determined malfeasance to be something done wholly
wrongfully or without authority. Additionally, if an act is discretionary, it needs to be done
with an improper or corrupt motive. This definition does not affect the finding of a liberty
interest since that is defined by context of federal constitutional law. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975). Accord Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355 (1976) (White, J., dissenting);
Thurston v. Deckle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976).
-0 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
" Id. at 348.
," Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 427 U.S. 904
(1976). Retired Justice Tom Clark, sitting by designation, wrote for the court:
The appellees could change their disclosure procedures to prevent the dis-
semination of derogatory and possibly stigmatizing allegations unless notice
of the charges and a hearing are first afforded to the dischargee. Otherwise,
rudimentary procedural due process requires that such notice of charges and
a hearing be afforded before a dismissal can be effective.
525 F.2d at 337. See Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 1976); Greenhill v. Bailey,
519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1199
(8th Cir. 1974).
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some way published the reasons for nonrenewal, 3 in theory, a
hearing may be required where one would not be absent disclo-
sure. This results from the fact that disclosure might injure the
employee's reputation or foreclose other job opportunities. Again,
the hearing might not be held for some time after the alleged
incidents occurred, harming either or both parties. Even though
the disclosed reasons are not of the type which would normally
be considered stigmatizing, the fact that these reasons may be
false could be sufficient to require a hearing. 4
There are, however, limitations on the protection afforded
after disclosure. If the reasons for nonrenewal of a contract are
disclosed after an injury to reputation has allegedly occurred,
those reasons cannot serve retroactively to support the claim. 5
Furthermore, the reasons disclosed at a public hearing held on
the request of the person cannot serve as a basis for a claim.
In Powers, where no reasons had been disclosed for the nonre-
newal of the plaintiffs contract, the court had the opportunity to
discuss whether some future disclosure of a stigmatizing nature
would be grounds for a hearing. The court decided that there was
no need for a predisclosure hearing,97 but did not address the
question of whether a hearing should be held on disclosure of the
stigmatizing reasons, or in what circumstances a hearing would
be appropriate. In Weathers, the court looked to the reasons that
were given for nonrenewal, and, although they were either ex-
plained or denied, held that a due process hearing was not re-
" See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 352 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" This could be likely when specific factual incidents or objective characteristics are
the basis for not renewing a contract or firing an employee, rather than some subjective
conclusion as to the ability of an individual. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th
Cir. 1975) (hearing required where denigration of ability and not just performance); Lake
Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College, 518 F.2d 1091,
1096 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976) (hearing required where honesty or
integrity is at question); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (charge
of mental instability grounds for a hearing); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319-20 (4th
Cir. 1973) (accusation of fraud impinged upon a liberty interest). But see Stretten v.
Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1976) (incompetence not suffi-
cient); Blair v. Board of Regents, 496 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1974) (failure to meet
minimum standards not sufficient).
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
" Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 1976).
,7 539 F.2d at 42.
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quired since the plaintiff had not demonstrated the stigmatizing
nature of the charges."
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Due process as embodied in the fourteenth amendment pro-
vides not only procedural protection of individual rights against
governmental intrusion but substantive protection as well. Ac-
cording to one theory, substantive due process is a specific consti-
tutional protection in itself, provided by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and is invoked when the government acts in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.99 The more predominant theory is that
substantive due process protection is conditioned on the infringe-
ment of a specific constitutional right. 00 In the latter case, the
rights protected are not confined to those enumerated in the Bill
of Rights. 10
A. Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Right of Its
Own Accord
In Weathers and Powers, the Tenth Circuit faced the ques-
tion of whether substantive due process operates as a constitu-
tional restriction in its own right on arbitrary and capricious state
action. In Weathers, the court adopted the view that substantive
due process does not afford more protection than that provided
by procedural due process.0 2 The basic rationale behind this view
was expressed by Judge, now Justice, Stevens in the following
manner: "[C]ertainly the constitutional right to substantive due
process is no greater than the right to procedural due process.
Accordingly, the absence of any claim by the plaintiff that an
" Id.
At one time, substantive due process by itself was thought to be a strong source of
protection against the intrusion by the government into economic affairs. Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Supreme Court, however, later adopted the present view
that such regulations are valid if reasonably related to valid legislative purposes. West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist.,
451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971).
11 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976); Mescia v. Berry; 406 F. Supp. 1181,
1194 (D.S.C. 1974).
"I St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has
extended the scope of specific constitutional rights to include such things as the right to
travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
"2 530 F.2d at 1342.
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interest in liberty or property has been impaired is a fatal defect
in her 'substantive' due process argument."'0 3 Under this view,
substantive due process protection is provided against depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property, and, necessarily, the lack of a
liberty or property interest precludes any substantive due process
argument. Under this theory, if a state may dismiss an employee
for no reason at all and thereby prevent the expectancy required
for a property interest from arising,0 4 the state may premise its
action upon reasons unsupported by facts'' or in circumstances
where discharge of the employee "was a mistake and based on
incorrect information."'0 6 In Weathers, the Tenth Circuit found
that there was no property or liberty interest,07 and in Powers
that there was no protected liberty interest. 08 Consequently, no
substantive due process protection was available in either case.' 9
B. Substantive Due Process Protection Against an Infringement
of a Constitutional Right
Substantive due process may, however, protect against in-
fringement of a right guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion. Even though no cognizable property or liberty interest exists
"0 Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974). Accord
Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist.
No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1974); Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658
(7th Cir. 1974). Contra, Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir.
1971), which expresses the opposing view that an individual should be protected against
arbitrary and capricious state action regardless of the property and liberty interest in-
volved.
"0' A property interest, of course, requires that an individual have a reasonable ex-
pectancy to an entitlement; if dismissal can be for no reason, it obviates such an expect-
ancy. See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
"I Compare Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974)
with Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir. 1971).
" Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
101 530 F.2d at 1338-40.
1" 539 F.2d at 42-43. The court found that there was no protected liberty or property
interest although there was no allegation of infringement of a property interest. Id. at 41-
42. The finding that no property interest existed was required because of the way the court
analyzed the substantive due process issue. The court determined that if no liberty or
property interest exists, no substantive due process protection is afforded. Id. at 43.
* Essentially substantive due process, as a protection in and of itself, may not be
sufficient since a decision need not be based upon reasons supported by the facts. Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). However, where the government discloses these unsup-
ported reasons, substantive due process may be relevant since the scope changes from
reasons for dismissal to reasons which may be considered to carry the government's asser-
tion that these facts are true. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
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in the employment relationship, a state may not fire an employee
or fail to renew his contract for a constitutionally impermissible
reason-especially where first amendment rights are concerned."'
Where an employee is discharged for exercising a constitutional
right-such as a teacher speaking publicly against a school board
position"'-the action is considered arbitrary and capricious and
the employee is protected by substantive due process.2
Mitchell, Powers and Prebble all involved first amendment
claims. In Mitchell, the court held that the plaintiffs assertion
that he was dismissed for exercising his first amendment rights
was without merit,"3 and therefore no substantive due process
protection was available. The court relied upon the fact that re-
gents occupied policymaking positions, and from this reasoned
that expressions made in contravention of a policy goal set by the
Governor were within permissible grounds for removal." 4 Thus,
the political context and status of the speaker change the nature
of the protection. Arguably, then, removal was not for the expres-
sion, per se, but rather for the political differences evidenced by
those expressions.5
C. Burden of Proof
In both Powers"' and Prebble,"7 the Tenth Circuit stated
"' Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976); Prince
v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1976); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171
(10th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th
Cir. 1975); Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Gieringer v. Center
School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 857
(5th Cir. 1970); Comment, Teachers' Speech and First Amendment Rights, 53 DEN. L.J.
95 (1976).
"' See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
"I Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4-5 n.12 (7th Cir. 1974);
Mescia v. Berry, 406 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.S.C. 1974).
537 F.2d at 391.
"' Id. See Indiana State Employees Ass'n v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974).
"' The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, holding that attitude was insepara-
bly intertwined with protected first amendment expression, reversed a lower court deci-
sion upholding the dismissal of probationary employees based not on the statements
made, but rather on the attitude evidenced by those statements. Tygrett v. Washington,
543 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revg 346 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1972).
539 F.2d at 41.
, 535 F.2d at 617.
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that the plaintiffs failed to establish the fact that they were dis-
missed for exercising their first amendment rights. The Tenth
Circuit, among others, has determined that the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to show that he was dismissed for a constitu-
tionally impermissible reason."18 Where no claim is made that
termination was due to the exercise of a constitutional right, a
presumption of regularity cloaks official action."9 However, where
such a claim is made it must be examined to insure that the
termination of employment is not in retaliation for the exercise
of rights protected by the Constitution.'20
The Supreme Court recently indicated that where plausible
and valid claims of infringement of a constitutionally protected
interest exist, the burden of proving that nonrenewal was not
based on an impermissible reason may shift to the Govern-
ment.'2 ' In the recent case of Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,'22 the Court addressed the problem
of whether an individual could be dismissed for reasons only some
"' Prince v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell County
School Dist. No. 1, 511 F.2d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1975); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist.
No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1974); Callahan v. Price, 505 F.2d 83, 87 (5th
Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 513 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975);
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339 (10th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974); Calvin v. Rupp, 471 F.2d 1346, 1350 (8th Cir. 1973); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1971).
"I Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976). See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495
F.2d 658, 666-68 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol.
School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Illinois State Employees Union v.
Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
I" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1177
(10th Cir. 1975). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 562, 575 n.14 (1972).
' The Court has made it clear that where plausible claims of racial discrimination
in the termination of employees have been made, the burden of proof shifts to the Gov-
ernment to prove that the action was not premised on this constitutionally impermissible
reason. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209-11 (1973). See also Roper v. Ef-
fingham County Bd. of Educ., 528 F.2d 1024, 1025 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1973).
In Keyes, the state was required to show that segregative intent was not among the
factors that motivated its action "to any degree." 413 U.S. at 210-11. In some cases the
clear and convincing standard has been placed on the Government to show that the
termination of a teacher was not racially motivated. McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of
Educ., 541 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Chesterfield County School
Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1973). Arguably, substantive due process should be applied
to the exercise of free speech to the same extent as racial discrimination.
1 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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of which were constitutionally impermissible. The Court held
that if, without consideration of constitutionally protected ac-
tions, the individual would be terminated from employment,
then no protection is afforded.1 3 The Court stated that the bur-
den was properly placed on the claimant to demonstrate that his
conduct was protected and that this conduct was the "motivating
factor" in the decision to terminate his employment.' 4 Once a
prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the
Government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have decided without reference to the protected
activities that the employee's contract should not be renewed., 5
The question remains, of course, what establishes the prima
facie case that shifts the burden of proof to the government?
Inquiry and proof might be quite difficult in cases like Powers
where the Tenth Circuit asserted that the exercise of Powers' first
amendment rights "was not shown to have played a part in the
Board's decision" not to renew his contract,' 6 while also stating
that no reasons have ever been stated publicly for the nonrene-
wal.'27 By not requiring some reasons to be given for the nonrene-
wal of a contract, courts place the individual in the difficult posi-
tion of ascertaining whether they have been dismissed for a con-
stitutionally impermissible reason or not.
CONCLUSION
In determining whether property interests exist, the Tenth
Circuit has looked to applicable state law. It is not clear whether
separation of powers between branches of state governments will
preclude federal courts from findings of property interests. Addi-
tionally, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that the existence of
property interests may depend upon the policymaking status of
the individuals involved. The closer the function of the individual
comes to that of the executive, the more leeway the executive will
have in removing that individual without infringing a property
interest. The court has also found that while property interests
may be created by additional procedures, in order to create the
I2 Id. at 285.
' Id. at 287.
125 Id.
539 F.2d at 43.
'" Id. at 41.
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requisite expectancy such procedures must relate in some way to
the employment process.
A liberty interest may be infringed if injury is done to an
individual's good name or if opportunity for future employment
is foreclosed as a result of some stigma that the government has
created. Injury to reputation usually must be accompanied by
some other deprivaton. In determining whether future employ-
ment has been foreclosed, the Tenth Circuit will apply a practical
test. This test depends upon an actual showing that opportunities
have been significantly lessened by what the government has said
about an individual. Additionally, where reasons for termination
of an employee are not disclosed until some time after the termi-
nation, questions arise as to whether a hearing is then required.
The Tenth Circuit has determined that, absent a finding of
a liberty or property interest, substantive due process does not
protect the individual from governmental action. Substantive
due process does protect the individual from termination for a
constitutionally impermissible reason. However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has placed the burden of proof on the employee to demon-
strate that he was so removed.
Recent cases indicate that the Tenth Circuit echoes the gen-
eral feeling that federal courts should be reluctant to step into
intragovernmental personnel problems. A finding that some form
of due process is to be afforded, whether it be because a liberty
or property interest is involved or because of substantive due
process, would not dictate the form of the hearing. Some rudi-
mentary form of due process would provide a more appropriate
forum than the court's to air personnel grievances, serve as an
incentive to employers to more fully analyze their decision, amel-
iorate any problems that future disclosure might present, and




CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Search and Seizure
1. Standing
In United States v. Smith, I the Tenth Circuit refrained from
determining its position on an issue that had been specifically
reserved by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United
States,2 i.e., whether the holding in Simmons v. United States3
precludes a case by case analysis, rendering the "automatic
standing" rule of Jones v. United States unnecessary.4 Appellant
Smith, who had been convicted at a second trial of possession of
527 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1975).
411 U.S. 223 (1973). In order to have standing under Brown, defendants must (1)
be on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (2) allege a proprietary
or possessory interest in the premises; and (3) be charged with an offense which includes,
as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure. Id. at 229. As to the third criterion, the Supreme
Court stated: "But it is not necessary for us now to determine whether our decision in
Simmons . . . makes Jones 'automatic' standing unnecessary. We reserve that question
for a case where possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is 'an essential
element of the offense . . . charged.'" Id. at 228.
390 U.S. 377 (1968). The Supreme Court in Simmons held that concessions made
by a defendant in order to establish standing to move to suppress cannot be used by the
Government in its case-in-chief against him or her at trial. Id.
A 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones the Supreme Court held that in the case of a defendant
who had been convicted of possession of narcotics seized from the apartment of another
person, (1) the defendant need not make a preliminary showing of an interest in the
premises searched or the property seized and (2) because the defendant was lawfully in
the other person's apartment, he had made out a sufficient interest in the premises to
confer standing to contest the search. Id. at 263, 265. The Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1975), expressed the
following view of "automatic standing":
Automatic standing ordinarily comes into play where the search has not
intruded upon the privacy of the defendant but where that which has been
seized nevertheless can be used against him. In such cases if he is to have
standing to object to the seizure as the product of an unreasonable search
he must show that some recognizable interest of his has been offended by
the seizure-a showing that prior to Jones was highly embarrassing.
510 F.2d at 37-38.
The Government in Smith, however, suggested "that under Brown there is no doubt
about the continued validity of the automatic standing rule of Jones." United States v.
Smith, 527 F.2d at 695.
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stolen United States Postal Service money orders, 5 sought on ap-
peal to establish his standing to challenge an automobile search
and subsequent seizure of the money orders. The record indicated
that Smith, while in the process of moving from his apartment,
threw a brown sack containing the money orders into the unoccu-
pied vehicle of a person who was helping him move.' Smith's
actions were observed by a police officer who subsequently
searched the unoccupied vehicle and seized the brown sack.'
In its analysis, the court reiterated the criteria articulated in
Jones v. United States' for standing to contest a search and sei-
zure, stating: "Jones . . . suggests three alternatives which may
be used to establish standing, (1) substantial proprietary or pos-
sessory interest in the thing seized, (2) a similar interest in the
premises searched, and (3) legitimate presence on the premises
searched." ' After determining that only the first criterion was
applicable,'" the court concluded that the evidence "clearly es-
tablishes that as of the time of the seizure Smith had abandoned
the money orders"" and, therefore, did not have a substantial
proprietary or possessory interest in the thing seized at the time
of the seizure. 2 In side-stepping the "automatic standing" issue
left open in Brown, ' 3 the Tenth Circuit pointed out the similarity
I Appellant's first conviction was reversed and remanded with directions that an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress be held prior to retrial. See United States
v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974).
527 F.2d at 694-95.
Id. at 695.
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
527 F.2d at 695.
" The record indicated that Smith was not in the unoccupied car when it was
searched nor did he have a possessory or proprietary interest in the helper's vehicle since
Palmasano, the helper, was a stranger to Smith. In addition, the court pointed out that
even if Smith had permission to put some of his belongings into Palmasano's car, he did
not do so. His belongings were placed in his own vehicle. Only the money orders were
"thrown" into Palmasano's vehicle. Id.
I Id. at 695-96. In disposing of the money orders, Smith testified that he "just wanted
them away from me." Id. at 695.
" Id. at 696.
" See notes 2 through 4 supra and accompanying text. Other circuit courts of appeal
have confronted the problem and avoided it in a number of ways. See United States v.
Lang, 527 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1975) (possession at time of search not essential element of
crime charged); United States v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1974) (possession not
essential element of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute); United States v.
Dye, 508 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1974) (even though defendants charged with possession as
an essential element of the offense charged, the Sixth Circuit found no evidence of posses-
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between Brown and its decision in Smith:
[Tihe Government's case against Smith does not depend upon
Smith's possession of the stolen money orders at the time such were
taken from [the helper's] automobile. As a matter of fact, the
"possession" relied on by the Government in the instant case to
support the conviction is necessarily "possession" occurring prior to
Smith's abandonment of the money orders, because a finding of
"abandonment" connotes a lack of possession." '
Thus, the court held that Smith was without standing be-
cause he had no proprietary or possessory interest in the money
orders at the time they were seized by the police. 5
2. Probable Cause for Warrantless Search
In United States v. Rodriguez6 the issue addressed by the
Tenth Circuit was whether border guards had probable cause to
search the luggage of passengers on a commercially operated van-
trailer combination passing over the border. Appellant Rodri-
guez, one of the paying passengers, was ordered from the van by
sion at the time of the contested search and seizure); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendants not charged with physical possession at the time of the
seizure); United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant in conspir-
acy prosecution not charged with possessory crime); United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236
(6th Cir. 1974) (possession not an essential element of the conspiracy offense charged);
United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant never had actual or
constructive possession of his customers' suitcases at the time of the seizure). See also
United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 866-67 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975).
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Boston, framed the issue as follows:
What is left after Simmons to outrage one's sense of fairness-when there is
no intrusion upon a defendant's privacy and his claim of possessory right to
that which has been seized no longer has its devastating effect-is the matter
of "prosecutorial self-contradiction." The question is as to the degree and
quality of governmental inconsistency that suffice to create that condition
and, on balance, to trigger "automatic" standing. In such cases, as we read
Brown, it is not the facts as developed at trial or the prosecutor's theory of
guilt that controls. Rather, it is whether the defendant has been charged with
possession-whether possession is an essential element of the crime for which
he has been indicted.
510 F.2d at 38 (emphasis in original). See United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir.
1974).
1, 527 F.2d at 696.
ts Id. It should be noted that this analysis tends to eviscerate the "automatic stand-
ing" rule since a defendant charged with a possessory offense may arguably be said always
to have a "possessory interest" in the subject matter, regardless of whether he or she is in
actual physical control. This would afford such a defendant the "automatic standing" to
contest the seizure of the evidence alleged to be illegally possessed.
" 525 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1975).
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border agents'7 and directed to open his luggage which had been
taken from the trailer hitched to the van.' He was subsequently
convicted of unlawful possession of heroin with the intent to dis-
tribute.'9
In determining that the discovery of marijuana in the trailer
was insufficient in and of itself to establish probable cause to
search the defendant's luggage, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the warrantless search in this instance violated the defendant's
fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.20 Although the Government contended that Rodriguez
"voluntarily" opened his suitcase,2 ' the court noted that the Gov-
ernment failed to sustain its burden in showing that consent had
been freely and voluntarily given for the warrantless search.2 The
court also resolved that the search could not be upheld as a search
incident to a lawful arrest.2 3 Finally, placing particular reliance
" Passengers, including Rodriguez, were ordered from the van after a border guard
located marijuana in the precise place where an informant had said it would be. Id. at
1315-16. Although there was a noted absence of prior dealings between the agent and this
particular informant, the court "assumed" that the agent had probable cause to believe
there was marijuana in the trailer since he had inquired of others who had had prior
dealings with this informant, thereby satisfying himself that the informant was reliable.
The court also made note of the fact that the border agent was not required to obtain a
warrant before searching the trailer for marijuana due to the automobile exception to the
search warrant requirement. Id. at 1316.
" Id. at 1315.
Rodriguez was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
525 F.2d at 1316-17. Although Rodriguez' suitcase contained a large amount of
heroin (25 pounds), the court stated that "[s]uch fact, however, does not validate a
search that was invalid in its inception." Id. at 1315.
11 The court noted that the border patrol agents were armed and in full uniform and
that the passengers were ordered from the van and "told" to open their luggage. The mere
fact that Rodriguez, who understood little English, did so, does not mean that he voluntar-
ily consented to the search. Id. at 1315-16.
22 "[T]his burden is not met by merely showing acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority." Id. at 1316 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United
States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973)). See also United States v. Biswell, 442 F.2d
1189, 1191 (10th Cir. 1971).
" "The fact that marijuana was discovered in the trailer was not sufficient to justify
the arrest of Rodriguez for possession of marijuana." 525 F.2d at 1316. See United States
v. Castillo, 524 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1975). Castillo was the companion case to Rodriguez.
As driver of the van, Castillo was arrested for possession with intent to distribute the
marijuana found in the trailer. His conviction was subsequently overturned due to the fact
that he merely drove the van/trailer without having loaded or ever looked into the trailer.
Hence, the court determined he could not have been in possession.
The court in Rodriguez further noted that, even if the appellant had been subject to
a lawful arrest, "the scope of any permissible search incident to such arrest would not have
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on United States v. Di Re,2' the court concluded that the right to
search a vehicle for contraband does not carry with it a concomi-
tant right to search the person of an occupant of such vehicle and,
by extension, the occupant's suitcase.25
3. Airline Freight Inspections
The airline freight inspection 2 of a package shipped from
San Francisco, California, to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, pre-
sented the Tenth Circuit with a question as to the reasonableness
of the search and seizure of the package's contents and the corol-
lary question of the protection afforded by the fourth amend-
ment, if any, where there is a private as opposed to a governmen-
tal search.2 In United States v. Ford21 an airline agent in San
Francisco opened a package addressed to the defendant in Okla-
homa City where the apparent nervousness of the sender alerted
the freight agent that the package might contain contraband or
another substance ineligible for air freight 20 After determining
extended to his suitcase in the trailer" since the presence of a weapon or the possibility
of destruction of the evidence by the arrestee and his proximity to his suitcase were not
present as to Rodriguez. 525 F.2d at 1316-17. The court further hypothesized that, even if
"Rodriguez' suitcase had merely been under his seat in the bus, instead of in the trailer,
it could not be said that there was probable cause to search Rodriguez' suitcase." Id. at
1317 (citing United States v. Day. 455 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Collins,
439 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
2, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
1 525 F.2d at 1317. The Government relied on United States v. Medina-Flores, 477
F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1973), for the lawfulness of the search in Rodriguez. The Tenth Circuit,
however, distinguished the two cases on their facts, i.e., whether the driver and occupants
were total strangers, as in Rodriguez, or companions in crime, as in Medina-Flores. See
also United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 283 n.2 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v.
Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955).
" The right of freight shippers to inspect all packages is established by tariffs filed
by carriers with the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970). See
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1309 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing ATP Tariff CAP No.
96, Rule 24). "The practical effect of [the tariff] is that the person shipping goods
consents to the inspection of his goods by entering into the contract of shipment." United
States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 449 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973).
27 The Tenth Circuit stated:
[We must] consider the validity of the search, arrest, and seizure process
in San Francisco and Oklahoma City. It seems to us that the events which
occurred in California and Oklahoma were one episode and must be consid-
ered together for Fourth Amendment purposes. Illegality in either place
would be fatal to the government's case.
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 1975).
See United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).




that the substance in the package was heroin, local police officers
called to the scene proceeded to mark, reseal, and place the pack-
age aboard the plane for Oklahoma City. Thereafter, enforcement
officers in that city were informed of the situation.3 ' Upon claim-
ing the package, the defendant was immediately arrested.2
Reiterating the language of United States v. Harding,3 the
Tenth Circuit concluded that "the events which occurred in San
Francisco did not amount to a government search; rather, it was
a private inspection .. .not violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment. ,,34 In addition, the court determined that the seizure in San
1' Id. at 1309-10.
32 Ford was charged and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970). On appeal, the
defendant-appellant invoked her fourth amendment protection as to the contents of the
package. 525 F.2d at 1310.
475 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. ), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 964 (1973). The Tenth
Circuit, in Harding, held that the inspection was authorized by tariff regulations and was
thus a private search in the absence of "collusion with federal officers." 475 F.2d at 483.
See 5 L. ORFLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs § 41:25 (1967).
m 525 F.2d at 1312. All of the cases relied upon by the Tenth Circuit to support its
position seem to have entailed the following general fact pattern: Airline officials become
suspicious as to the contents of a package because of the demeanor of the sender or because
of the contents marked on the package; the package is opened by the airline agents who
determine that the package contains a suspicious narcotic substance or obscene materials;
and law enforcement officers, either local or federal, are then called to verify the contents
before the package is resealed. United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States v. Harding, 475 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1973).
The threshold question facing the Tenth Circuit, in determining whether information
obtained as a result of an airline freight inspection is usable by the Federal Government
at trial, is whether or not the Government participated in the initial search. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975), wherein the test appeared to be whether the
"initial opening of one of the trunks [was] by the freight agent." 508 F.2d at 994. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that the focus of inquiry should
be on whether the airline search was "made on the carrier's own initiative for its own
purposes." United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d at 398. The Tenth Circuit noted, in Ford,
that "[iun our case, as in Pryba and apparently in Issod, the government agents were
called in after completion of a privately motivated and authorized inspection by airline
officials .... " 525 F.2d at 1312.
Other cases have held that "an inspection by a carrier is not a governmental search.
United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972)." United States v. DeBerry, 487
F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1973). See United States v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973); United
States v. Tripp, 468 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910 (1973); Clayton
v. United States, 413 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). If the
search is conducted in the presence of or at the behest of government law enforcement
officers, then the evidence obtained may be inadmissible unless probable cause for the
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Francisco was reasonable and necessary where based upon proba-
ble cause under exigent circumstances. 5 Following the analysis of
the Second Circuit in United States v. DeBerry,31 the Tenth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the Oklahoma City officers were merely
reasserting dominion and control over the package and its con-
tents as part of one continuous episode and that the constitu-
tional rights of the appellant had not been violated thereby. 7
B. Arrest Without Probable Cause and Effect Upon Confession
The Tenth Circuit was confronted with a case "at the cross-
roads of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments"" in Stevens v.
Wilson.3" Appellant Stevens sought appeal from a judgment of
the federal district court which had denied habeas corpus relief
from a conviction affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court.40
Appellant Stevens "alleged that her arrest was unlawful and that
it tainted her subsequent confession since the confession was the
product of the invalid arrest . . . ."" The Tenth Circuit noted
search is present. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). For other cases
supporting this proposition see authorities cited in United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d at
398 n.41. See also United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975).
1 525 F.2d at 1313. It appears that the Tenth Circuit went one step beyond DeBerry
(no warrant required at the suitcase's destination) in that it required exigent circumstan-
ces where there was no search warrant at the package's place of dispatch, i.e., San Fran-
cisco. The court pointed out that if the officers had detained the substance until a magis-
trate could issue a warrant to seize it: "The time delay required to obtain a warrant...
might very well have warned the parties to the crime of the government's presence and
prevented their apprehension. If the contraband had not been shipped immediately, the
Oklahoma City addressee probably would have become suspicious and remained aloof."
Id.
36 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
37 525 F.2d at 1312-13. Under the DeBerry analysis, the seizure of the contraband by
a Los Angeles officer was legal where the carrier, under a legal inspection, put the mari-
juana in the officer's plain view; the marijuana could then be seized upon sight without a
warrant. The officer was deemed to have made the seizure by removing one of the bricks
of marijuana, marking it, and marking its container with his initials. Thus, when police
in New York removed the bag from the back seat of the defendants' car, they were not
making an initial seizure, but were merely reasserting dominion and control first exercised
by the government in Los Angeles over the suitcase. United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d
at 451.
31 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 591 (1975).
- 534 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1976).
,0 People v. Stevens, 183 Colo. 399, 517 P.2d 1336 (1973). The appellant was convicted
in the state court of possession of marijuana, in violation of CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 48-5-2
(1963), and of introducing contraband into the Colorado State Penitentiary, in violation
of CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-7-58(2) (Supp. 1967).
" 534 F.2d at 869.
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the chain of events leading up to the challenged confession to be
as follows: Stevens entered a restroom on the grounds of the Colo-
rado State Penitentiary; the restroom was searched after her exit
and marijuana was subsequently found; she and a companion
followed an investigator, at his request, to a room in the maxi-
mum security area where they were arrested and given their
rights under Miranda v. Arizona;42 and she was detained in the
room for interrogation during which time she made an inculpa-
tory statement.
4 3
The Tenth Circuit was in accord with the district court ruling
that Stevens' arrest was not a mere detention or preliminary in-
vestigation within the framework of Terry v. Ohio." However,
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
,' 534 F.2d at 869-70. The Tenth Circuit referred to the opinion of the Colorado
Supreme Court for this summary of the essential facts.
4 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In accordance with its reasoning in Stone v. People, 174 Colo.
504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971), the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction on
the ground that the alleged arrest was in the nature of a field investigation. In Stone such
detention was justified by something less than probable cause. Id. See People v. Stevens,
183 Colo. at 404, 517 P.2d at 1339. Thus, the supreme court concluded that removal of
petitioner from the prison lobby was a reasonable and sensible manner in which to investi-
gate criminal activity, and that a one-half hour detention for the same was reasonable
under the circumstances. Id. at 406-07, 517 P.2d at 1340. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
34-35 (White, J., concurring) (favors temporary detention on streets if pertinent questions
are asked). See also People v. DeBour, 19 Cmia. L. REp. (BNA) 2289 (N.Y. Ct. App., June
15, 1976), wherein the court held that an officer with a lesser degree of suspicion than that
necessary for a forcible stop under Terry may approach a private citizen on the street for
the purpose of requesting information; however, the officer must have an articulable
reason for doing so. It should also be noted that the Colorado Supreme Court in Stevens
pointed out that the record before it would not support the extent of an intrusion which
would be justified by probable cause to arrest. 183 Colo. at 406, 517 P.2d at 1340.
The federal district court disagreed with the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion
that the "arrest" was within Terry, ruling instead that there had been an arrest for the
purpose of interrogating Stevens. Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d at 870. The Tenth Circuit
agreed that the appellant's arrest was not a detention or preliminary investigation due to
the fact that "the appellant was confined within a room in the penitentiary; ...she was
confronted with the marijuana which had been discovered in the restroom following her
visit; .. . she was questioned thoroughly and a confession was obtained." Id. Judge
Barrett, in his concurring opinion, preferred to premise the finding that there had been
an arrest on the fact that the defendant had been told she was under arrest. Id. at 873.
Note the hypothetical effect of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), on Stevens'
habeas corpus claim in Stevens v. Wilson. In Stone the United States Supreme Court held
that, after a defendant has been afforded an opportunity for the full and fair litigation of
fourth amendment claims by the state, he may not thereafter obtain federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that illegally seized evidence was introduced at his trial. 428 U.S. at
494. It would appear that Stevens presents just the type of case where the appellant should
not be afforded habeas corpus relief since she raised the issue of no probable cause for
the arrest at the state level. 183 Colo. at 403, 517 P.2d at 1338.
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given the fact that there was an arrest, the court concluded that
the federal district court had failed to consider whether there was
probable cause to arrest based upon the seizure of the mari-
juana.' 5 In remanding for findings on this issue, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the presence or absence of probable cause was a
crucial question in the case'" and concluded "that the trial court
erred in merely determining the voluntariness of the confession
as a Fifth Amendment problem in failing to come to grips with
the illegality of the arrest and its effect upon the validity and
competency of the appellant's confession."' 7
The Tenth Circuit further instructed that if it was found that
an arrest had been made without probable cause,' 8 then the valid-
ity and competency of the confession would have to be considered
in light of Wong Sun v. United States" and Brown v. Illinois.2
11 The court stated that an independent determination of whether probable cause
existed for the arrest pursuant to the fourth amendment is "the crucial issue in a habeas
corpus case" and "entirely permissible and ... called for under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254."
534 F.2d at 870.
" Id. at 871. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) [A] determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made
by a State court of competent jurisdiction . . . , shall be presumed to be
correct, unless. . . that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual
determination, is produced. . . and the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination
is not fairly supported by the record.
, 534 F.2d at 872. The federal district court had concluded that a violation of the
appellant's fourth amendment rights was not a controlling consideration since voluntari-
ness of the confession was the crucial issue of the case and, under standards set by the
Tenth Circuit, the confession had been voluntary. Id. at 870 n.1.
" The court noted that "[clonceivably the total evidence amounted to probable
cause [to arrest]" but that "the issue would be at least a close question demanding
careful scrutiny" by the trier of fact. Id. at 871. For additional cases dealing with the
necessity of determining probable cause to arrest prior to determining the voluntariness
of confessions, see United States v. Rose, 526 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 905 (1976); Logan v. Capps, 525 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v.
Burnett, 526 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1976).
, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
422 U.S. 590 (1975). The Tenth Circuit does not view Brown as extending or enlarg-
ing Wong Sun but merely views it as a recognition by Illinois of the Wong Sun doctrine.
534 F.2d at 872. See United States ex rel. Mungo v. LaVallee, 522 F.2d 211, 218 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1975). For this reason, the Tenth Circuit found the state's argument that Brown was
to be applied retroactively as nonmeritorious. 534 F.2d at 872 n.3. In its analysis, the
Tenth Circuit noted certain criteria from Brown for determining whether a confession was
the fruit of an illegal arrest, e.g., whether Miranda warnings had been given; or the
1977
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On the other hand, if the federal district court concluded that the
arrest was valid, then the criteria of Miranda v. Arizona would
have to be examined to determine whether or not the confession
had been voluntary.5
II. FwrH AMENDMENT
A. Grand Jury Setting
1. Use of Privileges
In Thompson v. United States52 witness Thompson, as secre-
tary and representative of the Phillips Petroleum Co., asserted
the attorney-client and work-product privileges as defenses to a
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)53 contempt citation for failure to produce
certain corporate documents subpoenaed by a grand jury. At the
request of the Government, and in response to appellant's motion
to quash, the trial court examined the disputed documents54 in
camera. After conducting an ex parte hearing at which govern-
ment counsel was present, the court held that the Government
had met its burden in establishing a prima facie need for the
documents.5 5 On appeal, Thompson challenged the ex parte hear-
ing, asserting that a determination as to whether the documents
contained communications in contemplation or furtherance of
illegal activities required an adversary hearing."
presence of intervening circumstances. Id. at 872. See Santos v. Bayley, 400 F. Supp. 784,
789 (D.C. Pa. 1975) (held that the confession was an intervening independent act of free
will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest). The court also reiterated
that the burden of showing admissibility of a confession after an illegal arrest (that it was
the product of an accused's free will) rests upon the State. 534 F.2d at 872. See United
States v. Shavers, 524 F.2d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 1975).
11 534 F.2d at 871.
52 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976).
This subsection reads as follows:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court
or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply
with an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including
any book, paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court,
upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may
summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the
witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information.
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (emphasis added).
11 The Tenth Circuit also examined all of the disputed documents in camera and
determined that 28 of them involved the claims of attorney-client privilege and 7 made
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In rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit began with the
proposition that Thompson's attorney-client privilege was gov-
erned by common law.57 The court then noted that previous deci-
sions interpreting the privilege had held that the privilege must
give way when illegal activities on the part of the client are in-
volved. 5 Recognizing that this determination of existing or in-
tended criminal activity can be made during an ex parte hear-
ing,59 the court determined that the burden of demonstrating
some relationship between the subpoenaed documents and the
charges under investigation rests upon the Government. 0 The
Tenth Circuit then concluded that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion in conducting an ex parte hearing and that the
Government had met its burden in showing prima facie need.6'
As to Thompson's claimed work-product privilege, the court
followed the Hickman v. Taylor2 rule and the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Natta v. Hogan. 13 In light of these decisions, the court
was resolved to find that, in the absence of a claim by the appel-
lant that the documents had been prepared for pending litigation,
the Government had met its burden in showing "adequate rea-
son" for the production of the documents. 4 The Tenth Circuit
further stated that "[t]he question of the work-product privilege
5 Id. at 736-37. See FEn. R. EvID. 501.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir.
1965), aff'd 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); United States v. Weinberg, 226 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1955).
11 On the basis of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Thompson argued
that an adversary hearing was required. In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
those cases where an adversary hearing is required due to the witness' claimed defense of
illegal electronic surveillance by the government and the instant case where there is a
noted absence of such a defense. 532 F.2d at 737. See United States v. Vigil, 524 F.2d 209
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 425 U.S. 927 (1976). The court expressed the concern that
to allow an adversary hearing on Thompson's claimed privilege would turn the hearing
into a mini-trial on the merits and subvert the expeditious functioning of the grand jury.
532 F.2d at 737.
532 F.2d at 737.
I Id. at 738. See United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d at 1086. See also Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. at 14.
62 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The rule states that the proponent seeking an attorney's
documents must establish "adequate reasons" to justify production. Id. at 512.
392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968) (discovery does not apply to documents prepared
by an attorney in preparation for impending litigation).
1 532 F.2d at 738.
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is one for ultimate determination at the trial. We will not give an
anticipatory answer."'
In the case of In re Vigil," witness Vigil contended that her
marriage to a prospective defendant in a case under investigation
by the grand jury constituted "just cause" under 28 U.S.C. §
1826(a)"7 for her refusal to testify before the grand jury.1
8 Vigil
was served with a subpoena on July 22, 1975, directing her to
appear before the grand jury on August 19, 1975. On August 18,
1975, defense counsel filed various motions, memoranda, and affi-
davits, none of which sought to raise the marital relationship
privilege as a defense.69 On the following day a hearing was held
on Vigil's motions to quash the subpoena. After the denial of each
motion, she appeared before the grand jury and refused to tes-
tify.70 She was subsequently granted "use" immunity under 18
U.S.C. § 60021' and was ordered by the trial court to testify.72 On
the afternoon of August 19th Vigil again refused to testify, for the
first time mentioning her alleged marital relationship as one
ground for her refusal.73 Although the Government made a re-
0Id.
524 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1975).
,7 See note 53 supra for the text of the subsection.
* 524 F.2d at 217.
" Id. The court's decision indicates that these motions raised such issues as grand
jury selection, Vigil's right to have an attorney present in the grand jury room, and her
right to compel disclosure of electronic surveillance. Id. at 212. See notes 82 through 99
and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the electronic surveillance defense to
contempt proceedings.
7o 524 F.2d at 212.
An example of "use" immunity in this case would be to prohibit the use of any
specific answer she gave before the grand jury from being used against her in a subsequent
prosecution. However, it does not prohibit the use of evidence discovered from leads
supplied by that testimony.
11 254 F.2d at 217. As an additional ground for appeal, the appellant claimed that
the immunity granted was not broad enough. Id. at 219. Following the Supreme Court
decision in Kastizar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Tenth Circuit held that
the trial court did not err in refusing to issue protective orders. But see Justice Douglas'
dissent in Kastizar:
When we allow the prosecution to offer only "use" immunity we allow
it to grant far less than it has taken away. For while the precise testimony
that is compelled may not be used, leads from that testimony may be pur-
sued and used to convict the witness. My view is that the framers put it
beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes.
Id. at 466-67. For a recent criticism of "use" immunity and the grand jury system in
general, see Goldenberg, Congressional Reform of Grand Juries Expected, Rocky Moun-
tain News, November 15, 1976, at 3, col. 1, and at 14, col. 2.
71 524 F.2d at 217.
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quest that Vigil be held in contempt after her second refusal to
testify on August 19th, the trial court continued the matter until
August 22, 1975, in order to give Vigil another opportunity to
answer those questions for which she had been granted immun-
ity.74 Appellant appeared before the grand jury on August 22nd
and again refused to answer questions, asserting as one ground
the husband-wife privilege. Another hearing was held at which
time the trial court adjudged Vigil "to be in civil contempt" and
ordered her confinement until she complied with the orders of the
court .
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the merits of Vigil's claim
of a marital privilege," disposing of the issue on the ground that
it was not timely raised.77 In addition, the court determined that
the appellant's affidavit78 in support of the privilege was not
timely filed with the trial court. 9 In view of this failure to comply
with procedural requirements, the Tenth Circuit held that an
" The court's opinion indicates that 14 written questions were submitted to Vigil at
her first grand jury appearance. Id. at 212. It further indicates, without explanation as to
the contents, that Vigil was granted use immunity as to three questions. Id. at 217. When
the trial court continued the proceeding until August 22, 1975, it "broadened the immun-
ity order to include additional questions." Id. Throughout the entire proceeding it appears
that Vigil steadfastly refused to answer any question other than her name. Id. at 212 n.1.
Id. at 217-18.
7 The court gave some indication that it questioned whether the marital relationship
had been alleged in good faith, citing Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
Appellant Vigil relied on In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1974), to support her
claimed marital privilege. The Tenth Circuit, however, distinguished Snoonian on its facts
since the "husband-wife relationship was not in dispute and the court reached the merits
of the claimed privilege." 524 F.2d at 218.
" As indicated, Vigil first raised the husband-wife privilege at her first appearance
before the grand jury after pre-appearance hearings on her motions to quash the subpoena.
See text accompanying note 73 supra. The Tenth Circuit spoke of "the rather tardy
manner in which the marital relationship issue was sought to be injected into the proceed-
ing." 524 F.2d at 218.
The appellant's affidavit read as follows:
I, VERONICA VIGIL being duly sworn, depose and say that I am the wife
of Ray Otero. Ray and I began to live together in Boulder, Colorado in
October, 1973. In December, 1973, we became man and wife by mutual
consent in Boulder, Colorado. We continued to live together until April,
1975. I believe Ray Otero to be the target of the Grand Jury investigation.
Id.
79 Appellant's August 22nd hearing occurred at 11:00 a.m., at which time her counsel
sought to file an affidavit of "Veronica Vigil re her Marriage." This affidavit was not given
to the trial judge before or during the contempt hearing but was apparently filed with the
clerk of court at 2:54 p.m. on August 22, 1975. Id. at 217.
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evidentiary hearing on the marital relationship was not required
by the trial court.80 Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that Vigil's unsupported assertion of her marriage to a
prospective defendant was not "just cause" for her refusal to
testify before the grand jury.8
2. Illegal Electronic Surveillance
In support of her refusal to answer questions propounded by
the Government before the grand jury, Veronica Vigil further
alleged illegal electronic surveillance as a "just cause" under 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a).82 She claimed that the Government's denial of
such electronic surveillance was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. §
3504(a)(1) to sustain its position.83 In affirming the lower court,
the Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Gelbard v. United States.4 In Gelbard
the Court held that if there has been prior illegal electronic sur-
veillance and it can be shown that the interrogation of the witness
before a grand jury would be based upon such illegal interception,
then just cause not to answer exists under section 1826(a).1 The
Tenth Circuit then bifurcated its analysis, discussing issues
" By analogy to an untimely claim of illegal electronic surveillance in In re Lewis,
501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975), the Tenth Circuit concluded
that "the late filing of a bare claim of common-law marriage should not be permitted to
impede the work of the Grand Jury." 524 F.2d at 218.
524 F.2d at 218.
See note 53 supra for the text of the subsection.
3 This section provides:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority
of the United States-
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was ob-
tained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall
affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act.
18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
The evidentiary prohibition found in Gelbard is premised on the fact that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515 prohibits the presentation to grand juries of the compelled testimony of a witness
which was intercepted in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). 408 U.S. at 47. In a subsequent case
the Supreme Court narrowed the application of Gelbard, stating that the Court's conclu-
sion rested exclusively on its interpretation of Title 1I, i.e., that it was simply an effort
by Congress to afford special safeguards against the unique problems posed by the misuse
of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 n.ll
(1974).
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which were not considered by the Supreme Court in Gelbard:s1 (1)
The sufficiency of the witness' claim of illegal surveillance which
will trigger an evidentiary hearing on the existence or absence of
surveillance, 87 and (2) the sufficiency of the Government's denial
of surveillance under section 3504(a)(1)."'
As to the claim of electronic surveillance, counsel for Vigil
filed one affidavit by the appellant personally89 and two by her
counsel. 0 The court concluded that the information contained in
Vigil's affidavits were "grossly lacking" and, thus, insufficient to
establish the existence of electronic surveillance.9 The Tenth Cir-
cuit expressed the opinion that the affidavits did "no more than
describe the ordinary experiences which are encountered by the
telephone user from time to time in his daily life.
'9 2
Although the appellant's evidence of illegal surveillance was
insubstantial, the court focused on the sufficiency of the Govern-
524 F.2d at 213.
" The Supreme Court, in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969), held
that an adversary hearing was required in order to determine if evidence supporting
defendant's convictions was the product of an illegal electronic surveillance.
See also United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court held
that the witness' affidavits were sufficiently concrete and specific to make a prima facie
showing of electronic surveillance which shifted the burden to the Government to affirm
or deny under 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1). See also United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709
(2d Cir. 1973), where the court interpreted the language of § 1826(a), "without just cause
shown," to place on the witness the burden of coming forward with "just cause." But see
notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
0 See note 83 supra.
"' From her analysis of the questions asked at her first appearance before the grand
jury, appellant stated "her belief" that the questions were "directly or indirectly" based
upon illegal electronic surveillance. 524 F.2d at 214.
90 Id. The affidavits of appellant's counsel set forth general difficulties with Vigil's
phone, e.g., inability to get connections, substantial delay before the connection was
made, problems in dialing, a "double beep," and a "hollow sound" when there was rapid
dialing. See In re Freedman, 529 F.2d 543, 550 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
524 F.2d at 214.
92 Id. See also In re Freedman, 529 F.2d at 550; United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d at
1024-25; In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1972).
As to the affidavits filed by appellant's counsel in Vigil, neither appellant nor the
court squarely raised the issue of whether electronic surveillance of third parties conceiva-
bly could have been the basis for any of the questions propounded. See United States v.
Fitch, 472 F.2d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1973), where the Government did not specifically re-
spond to the allegation that the attorney had been subjected to surveillance. See also
United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975);
United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466,
468 (1st Cir. 1971).
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ment's denial, i.e., how far must the Government search for evi-
dence of illegal surveillance93 and what quality of evidence is
necessary to support the denial?9' The trial court heard testimony
from the two law enforcement officers conducting the investiga-
tion of the case, both of whom testified that there was no elec-
tronic surveillance. 5 In addition, the trial court was advised by
an Assistant United States Attorney that he had been assured by
11 The First Circuit has stated that "Itihe dominate [sic] weight of authority has
rejected a conclusory statement as an appropriate response [by the government]." In re
Hodges, 524 F.2d 568, 570 nn.1-5 (1st Cir. 1975). See In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 806
(1st Cir. 1974). But see In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1974), as interpreted by the
First Circuit in In re Hodges, 524 F.2d at 570 n.6. Other courts have taken the approach
that the Government's response may match the claim of surveillance, e.g., a general denial
in response to nonspecific allegations. See In re Freedman, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d
1257 (9th Cir. 1974); Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973). Still other
circuit courts have required some search of the relevant government agencies which may
be involved in the investigation, differing only in the number of agencies which should be
checked. In re Millow, 529 F.2d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77, 79
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Aloi, 511 F.2d 585, 602 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170,
1173 n.10 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d 1193, 1194 (2d Cir. 1973);
Bufalino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 473 F.2d 728, 734 (3d Cir. 1973); In re
Womack, 466 F.2d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 469 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972);
In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119, 120 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971). See Judge Okes' dissent in United
States v. Grusse, 515 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1975), where he would require the so-called
eight agency search of the FBI; Secret Service; IRS; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms; Customs; DEA; and Postal Service.
'" Some circuit courts have required that evidence of the search be in affidavit form
submitted by those government agencies which have searched or by those government
officials in charge of the investigation. In re Freedman, 529 F.2d at 549; In re Millow, 529
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Grusse, 515 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring); In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d
471 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); Korman v.
United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1973); Bufalino v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d
1193 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1972). See also In re Grumbles,
453 F.2d at 120 n.4. Other courts have found letters of a search acceptable. United States
v. Aloi, 511 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Womack, 466 F.2d
555 (7th Cir. 1972). And some courts have stressed the importance of oral testimony, under
oath, as acceptable evidence of the search. In re Jurney, 410 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971). See note 95 infra and accompanying
text. But see United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grumbles, 453
F.2d at 120 n.4. The First Circuit sidesteps what it considers to be the minimum standard
for an adequate government response under § 3504 because "the necessary facts and
circumstances are not presented [in the instant case]." In re Hodges, 524 F.2d at 570.
" In re Vigil, 524 F.2d at 215.
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''every agency of the United States which had had anything to do
with the case . . . that there had not been any electronic surveil-
lance either by court order or otherwise to the best of their knowl-
edge.""6 In holding that such denial by the Government satisfies
the requirements of section 3504(a), the court expressed its pref-
erence for testimony in court as opposed to denial by affidavit. 7
The court further stated its preference for the balancing approach
in determining the sufficiency of the Government's denial98 and
noted that its approach "is in harmony with that employed in the
other cases." 99
B. Trial Setting
In United States v. Smith"0 the appellant challenged his two
convictions for criminal contempt which had arisen out of his
refusal to testify in successive criminal trials. His argument was
twofold: (1) That the proceedings granting him immunity were
defective, 0' and (2) that the second contempt charge subjected
g1 Id. The Tenth Circuit stressed the fact that the Assistant United States Attorney
"also has assured this court that there has been no electronic surveillance." Id. (emphasis
in original).
7 Id. at 216.
Id. The court rejected Vigil's reliance on United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th
Cir. 1973), where the Ninth Circuit held the Government to greater specificity in what
agencies were elected and what was the substance of their responses. Id. at 1027. Instead
the Tenth Circuit stated that "[w]e consider a quest for certainty in this kind of inquiry
futile and regard a balancing or weighing evaluation to be more helpful because each case
presents individual demands." 524 F.2d at 216. Although the Tenth Circuit was not
specific as to what was to be balanced or weighed, it would appear from the above that
the court was referring to the facts presented by each particular case. Other courts have
spoken of the balancing test in terms of weighing the right of the witness to be free from
unwarranted surveillance against the right of the Government to operate grand juries in
an effective manner. See United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975);
Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d at 752 (5th Cir. 1972).
534 F.2d at 216-17, 220-22.
00 532 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1976).
101 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970) provides that:
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under sub-section (a) . . .when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination.
Appellant argued that it was error for the First Assistant United States Attorney to
sign the application for an immunity order under § 6003. He further argued that the trial
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him to double jeopardy.'"2
Smith had been granted immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6003103
as the result of his claimed privilege against self-incrimination
when he refused to testify at the first bank robbery trial.'0 4 A
mistrial was subsequently granted when Smith persisted in his
refusal to testify despite this grant of immunity. In addition, the
prosecution commented upon Smith's prospective testimony in
its opening statement.' 5 At the second trial on the bank robbery,
Smith again refused to testify when called as a witness. This
resulted in the reinstatement of his grant of immunity. His per-
sistence in refusing to testify gave rise to the charges of and sub-
sequent convictions on the two counts of criminal contempt now
challenged. '
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "there is no merit what-
soever to the contention that 18 U.S.C. Section 6003 was not
complied with," since the United States Attorney may designate
any assistant to carry out his or her functions under section
6003.07 In addition, the court pointed out that the authorization
under section 6003 covered both of Smith's refusals to testify,
stating: "It is unreasonable to compel the Justice Department to
apply for immunity with a related review of the record each time
a problem of this kind comes up. To so hold would be to approve
court erred in accepting the general application and order granting immunity for the first
trial insofar as applying it to the second effort to obtain the appellant's testimony. 532
F.2d at 160. Following the authorization for immunity under § 6003, counsel was ap-
pointed for Smith when he claimed a lack of understanding of immunity. Although it is
unclear whether this appointment of counsel occurred before or after the immunity hear-
ing, the absence of counsel at the time immunity is granted is not a deprivation of any
constitutional right. United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1973). In addition,
the witness must demonstrate some prejudice caused by the absence of counsel at the
immunity hearing. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973).
0 532 F.2d at 160-61. Smith argued that he could be convicted of only one offense of
criminal contempt, citing the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
"1 See note 101 supra for the language of 18 U.S.C. § 6003. See also 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1970) which provides as follows:
[Tihe witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order . . . may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.
532 F.2d at 159.
105 Id.
10 The trial court brought contempt proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
,01 532 F.2d at 160. See note 101 supra.
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legal maneuvering by an accused. This we refuse to do."' 8 The
court then determined that Smith's two convictions were not dou-
ble jeopardy' 9 since they were distinct and successive acts of
contempt punishable as separate offenses." '0 The court also took
note that Smith was not prejudiced due to the fact that he re-
ceived identical concurrent sentences."' Expressing the courts'
general disfavor for multiplying contempt penalties where a de-
fendant has made his or her position clear,"' the court concluded
that the case did not evidence an attempt to multiply offenses
since the Government had reason to believe that Smith would
testify the second time and was therefore justified in calling him
a second time."3
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v.
California"' required extensive interpretation by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in the past year. In Faretta it was determined that a defen-
dant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right under the
sixth amendment"5 to proceed without counsel when he or she
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so." 6 An analogous issue
arose in United States v. Hill"7 and United States v. Bennett"'
as to whether a defendant charged with a federal crime has a
532 F.2d at 160 (citing In re Weir, 520 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1975)).
,o0 "Double jeopardy is a defense which, since it seeks to bar a second prosecution, is
ordinarily raised prior to trial." 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.07[1], at 8-51, -52 (2d ed.
1970).
"1 532 F.2d at 160, and cases cited therein. See also Lufman v. United States, 500
F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1974).
"1 532 F.2d at 160-61, and cases cited therein. See United States v. Abigando, 439
F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1971).
,,1 532 F.2d at 161, and cases cited therein. See People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166
N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.07[1], at 8-51, -52 (2d ed. 1970). The First Circuit uses a "single subject" test to
determine if the prosecution is attempting to multiply offenses. The court, however, noted
problems with the test because it may be too open-ended, i.e., there are infinite ways to
categorize information in terms of time, place, incident, transaction, and people involved.
See Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382, 390 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972).
"1 532 F.2d at 161.
" 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
The Supreme Court held: "Although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so
many words, the right to self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is
• . . necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment." Id. at 819.
" Id. at 834-35.
117 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976).
"1 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976).
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statutory"9 and/or constitutional right ° to represent him or her-
self with the assistance of counsel.'
2'
In United States v. Hill the defendant moved by both written
and oral motion to ask questions of jurors and witnesses at trial
while at the same time taking advantage of the assistance of
counsel. 1 2 The trial court denied both motions and the
defendant-appellant appealed, claiming that his right to repre-
sent himself had been denied.
2 3
Surveying the pre-Faretta decisions of other circuit courts of
appeal,2 4 the Tenth Circuit noted a trend indicating that a person
could either represent himself or be represented by counsel. How-
ever, a person does not have a right to hybrid representation.
5
I' 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) (emphasis added) provides: "In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein."
l2 See note 115 supra.
121 526 F.2d at 1024; 539 F.2d at 49. The argument advanced in Bennett proposed that
the right of self-representation under § 1654, the sixth amendment, and Faretta sustains
a defendant's right to hybrid representation, i.e., self-representation with the aid of coun-
sel. Id.
"1 The court's opinion contains the following colloquy between the trial court and
Hill:
THE DEFENDANT: Well, at this point, I would ask if-again I could be
allowed to assist in my defense.
THE COURT: You mean ask questions of jurors and ask questions of
witnesses?
THE DEFENDANT: To a certain extent, yes.
THE COURT: No. The Court is not going to grant you that request. I have
already ruled on it.
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, I didn't say that I wanted to dismiss them
[his attorney]. I said that I wanted to represent myself and I want to have
my attorneys assist me.
526 F.2d at 1024 n.3.
"I Id. at 1024. The record indicates that prior to the noon recess, defendant addressed
the court with reference to the absence of blacks on the jury. "[His] statements .. .
deteriorated to the point that defendant was finally physically removed from the court-
room." Id. at 1023. After the noon recess, and out of hearing by the jury, defendant again
addressed the court and requested permission to question jurors and witnesses. Id. It was
appellant's position that the court should have inquired to determine the exact nature of
his claim. Id. at 1024.
21 526 F.2d at 1024, and cases cited therein. See also United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d
82, 86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964); Manson v. Pitchess, 317 F. Supp. 816 (C.D. Cal. 1970). But see
Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974).
"1 526 F.2d at 1024.
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The court then determined that Faretta did not alter the estab-
lished rules concerning hybrid representation, 2 ' taking cogniz-
ance of the fact that the sixth amendment fails to address hybrid
representation as a right of constitutional dimensions.'2 Concom-
itantly, the court suggested that there is not any statutory right
of such representation since 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is written in the
disjunctive. 8 After concluding that Hill's request was in fact for
hybrid representation, the Tenth Circuit held there was no abuse
of discretion in the denial of his motions. 12
The defendant, in United States v. Bennett, 130 was convicted
in a first trial 131 of one count of forcibly interfering with a prison
hospital administrator in the performance of his duties. 32 During
a hearing on a pretrial motion, Bennett requested that he be able
to assist in his own defense by making the opening and closing
statements to the jury and by cross-examining particular govern-
ment witnesses. 33 The trial court ruled that Bennett could cross-
"' Id. The court cites to a post-Faretta decision, United States v. Swinton, 400 F.
Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), wherein it was held that a criminal defendant has no sixth
amendment right to act as her own counsel where she is also represented by an attorney.
See United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976); Stiner v. Oklahoma, 539 P.2d 750, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). See also United
States v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1265 (4th Cir. 1975).
It can be argued that Swinton seems to require some showing on the part of a defen-
dant seeking co-counsel status that his or her traditional representation is inadequate or
inappropriate. The defendant's allegations that she should take "personal responsibility
for the conduct of a trial whose outcome may seriously affect her life for many years";
that "citizens should participate in social institutions"; and that her cross-examination
of former associates would be more effective than that of her attorney were apparently
not sufficient. United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. at 807. The court stated that the
defendant was represented by "able counsel who have had ample experience and a thor-
ough acquaintance with the matters in litigation." Id.
'7 526 F.2d at 1025. See United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. at 806.
" 526 F.2d at 1025. See note 119 supra.
" 526 F.2d at 1025. See United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d at 49; United States v.
Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1265 (4th Cir. 1975).
The court in Swinton gave some indication of the test to be used by trial judges in
determining whether or not to allow a defendant to proceed pro se: a "balancing [ofn
considerations of individual freedom of choice against the need to ensure the orderly
proceedings essential to a fair trial." 400 F. Supp. at 806.
" 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976).
' For an understanding of the court's decision in Bennett, it is important to realize
that Bennett had two separate trials.
"2 The defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).
11 539 F.2d at 49. The court noted that throughout the first trial Bennett was assert-
ing only his right to represent himself with the assistance of counsel. Id.
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examine certain witnesses but that he could not argue the evi-
dence to the jury. In so limiting Bennett's personal participation,
the trial court determined that matters of argument should be
conducted by the defendant's court-appointed attorney. 34 Ben-
nett appealed his conviction on the ground that he had a statu-
tory and constitutional right to such hybrid representation. The
Tenth Circuit rejected Bennett's claim of a right to appear as co-
counsel, 131 primarily relying on its decision in United States v.
Hill. I The court determined there was no abuse of discretion in
denying such participation to Bennett and in limiting his per-
sonal activity to that of cross-examination of several witnesses.
37
Prior to his second trial, Bennett again requested that he be
allowed to make an opening and closing statement and be permit-
ted to cross-examine certain witnesses. As in his first trial, the
trial court informed him that he would be allowed to cross-
examine witnesses but not to make arguments. Bennett moved to
defend pro se.3 8 After denying a second motion by the defendant
to conduct his own defense, 9 the court appointed counsel on his
" Id. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1958).
" See note 121 supra.
31 See notes 124 through 128 supra and accompanying text.
539 F.2d at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
'9 At a second pretrial hearing the following dialogue occurred:
THE DEFENDANT: . . . I know I am not a qualified attorney to conduct
a full trial, but there are certain aspects of the trial that I feel that I am
competent to proceed with . . . . And because of this [denial of hybrid
representation motion] I was placed in the position of conducting my com-
plete trial, which I will do if the Court still denies me limited assistance of
counsel.
THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, you are just playing fox with the Court. I can't
understand what you want . ...
THE COURT: What do you want [Shaw, Bennett's attorney] to do?
THE DEFENDANT: Everything else that takes place in this trial.
THE COURT: You mean you want him to conduct your trial except the
part you want to do?
THE DEFENDANT: That is right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Shaw, the Court is going to direct that you conduct
this trial . . ..
THE DEFENDANT: I renews [sic] my Motion to be allowed to conduct
my own defense.
Id., Appendix at 56-57.
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behalf. 40 Thus, the Tenth Circuit was faced with yet another
interpretation of Faretta: How soon in the criminal process must
a defendant decide to proceed by counsel or pro se?'4
In holding that the right to self-representation "is one which
the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert before
trial,"'' the court noted that such assertion on the defendant's
part is necessary because the trial court must ascertain whether
the accused has made an understanding waiver of his right to
counsel.'43 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's conclu-
sion-Bennett "forfeited his right to self-representation by his
vacillating positions which continued until just six days before
the case was set for trial.""' Thus, there was no error in the trial
court's denial of self-representation."
United States v. Smith' and United States v. Montgo-
mery' raised several interesting issues relating to the effect
of Faretta upon pretrial plea bargaining. In Smith, the defend-
ant was arrested on June 8, 1974,148 and charged with a violation
of the Dyer Act.'49 On both June 10 and 11, while still in custody,
he requested an opportunity to speak with authorities, signing
waivers on both days.5 0 During the course of the interview 5'
'~' 539 F.2d at 50.
' Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Faretto, indicated some of the procedural
questions left open by the majority's decision:
If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still
have a constitutional right to the assistance of standby counsel? How soon
in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by
counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial?
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Stiner v.
State, 539 P.2d at 753, where the Oklahoma Court of Appeals directed attention to the
majority's opinion in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46, allowing standby counsel for the
accused in certain circumstances.
142 539 F.2d at 50.
"' Id. For a pre-Faretta treatment of this type of issue, see United States v. Shea,
508 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 539 F.2d at 51.
145 Id.
' 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1975).
529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
525 F.2d at 1017.
18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970).
525 F.2d at 1018.
S The court's opinion is unclear as to whether the defendant made his inculpatory
statements at both interviews or only at the June 11, 1974, interview. The court spoke only
of "the conversation" as being in the nature of plea bargaining. Id. at 1019 n.1.
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Smith made an inculpatory statement as to the Dyer Act viola-
tion. His principal reason for requesting the interview was to offer
to plead guilty to all charges if he could be assured of being sent
to a federal penal institution.'52 The Government introduced
these statements made by Smith during his personal attempt at
bargaining as part of its case-in-chief.'5 3 He was subsequently
convicted and sentenced;'54 this appeal followed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the follow-
ing issues: Whether it was error to admit, as part of the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, inculpatory statements made by the defen-
dant during plea bargaining; and, considering the precedents in-
dicating that plea discussions and agreements pursued by an at-
torney are privileged and inadmissible, of what importance is the
fact that Smith was not represented by counsel when he engaged
in these negotiations? Citing various authority'55 for the general
proposition that plea discussions conducted by a lawyer have
been recognized as privileged and inadmissible, the court ad-
dressed the policy reasons behind the protection of plea bargain-
ing.' 6 The court then concluded that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Faretta'57 and the given inadmissibility of
attorney-conducted plea bargaining discussions, 58 there should
be no distinction when a defendant, who is not represented by
, I Id. at 1018. In its analysis, the court concluded that Smith's purpose in requesting
the two interviews was "to work out an arrangement, whereby he would serve federal time
and thus avoid the state robbery charge." Id. at 1020.
The court indicated that the officer dealing with Smith knew that the purpose of both
interviews was to allow him to bargain. This knowledge was underscored by the fact that
the officer brought an FBI agent to the June l1th interview in connection with the bank
robbery charge. Id.
' Id. at 1019. It was the Government's position in the case that the statements were
confessions made after Smith was advised of his rights under Miranda and that he had
chosen to waive them. Id. at 1019-20. The Tenth Circuit, however, was not persuaded that
"[the signing of a Miranda waiver] effectively negates the legal consequence of the plea
bargaining," since he was seeking an agreement and not making a confession. Id. at 1020.
525 F.2d at 1017.
"' United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Burke v.
Mancusi, 425 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1970); State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 453 P.2d 22 (1969)
(dictum). See also AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY §
3.4 (Approved Draft 1968); FED. R. EvID. 410; FED. R. Civ. P. 11(e)(6). 525 F.2d at 1020-
21.
156 525 F.2d at 1020. To allow plea bargaining discussions to be admissible in evidence
"would effectively thwart the effort." Id. at 1021.
,., Id. See notes 114-28 supra and accompanying text.
525 F.2d at 1020.
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counsel, is seeking to plea bargain on his own behalf.'59 Thus, in
reversing and remanding, the Tenth Circuit held that it was error
to receive into evidence inculpatory statements made during plea
bargaining."'
United States v. Montgomery'' presented a somewhat differ-
ent issue than Smith in the area of plea bargaining. Defendant
Montgomery, who had been charged with federal offenses under
a two count indictment," 2 was represented at his omnibus hear-
ing and arraignment by an assistant federal public .defender.
6 3
Before entering his plea at the arraignment, Montgomery "stated
in no uncertain terms that he wished to be represented by some-
one other than a public defender."'' 4 This request was denied and
he "requested that he be allowed to represent himself."'' 5
This request was likewise denied. One month after his arraign-
ment, another federal public defender filed a motion for a con-
tinuance, indicating in the motion that plea bargaining had been
undertaken on Montgomery's behalf.'66 The defendant eventually
entered a guilty plea to a lesser included offense6 7 and was subse-
quently represented by a public defender at the sentencing.6 8 On
appeal, Montgomery alleged error in the trial court's refusal to
allow him to represent himself, citing Faretta. "9
"I Id. at 1021. "Such efforts [plea bargaining on his own behalf] are to be considered
on the same bases as they would be considered if [the defendant] had a lawyer." Id. The
court noted that Smith was considered as a case of first impression. Id. The writer has
been unable to find any cases subsequent to Smith which utilize the same attorney
privilege and Faretta analysis in an instance where defendant bargains on his own behalf.
525 F.2d at 1021-22.
529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
162 Montgomery was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1792 (1970).
1" 529 F.2d at 1405.
164 Id.
Id.
ea Montgomery was arraigned on December 9, 1974, and the motion for continuance
was filed on January 9, 1975. Id.
"' The defendant entered a plea of guilty at a hearing conducted in accordance with
FED. R. CraM. P. 11. At a Rule 11 hearing the trial court must determine that the defen-
dant understands the charges against him or her, that there has been no undue influence
upon the defendant to plead, and that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea. 529 F.2d
at 1405-06.
" 529 F.2d at 1406.
As to Montgomery's Faretta argument, the court stated:
Mr. Justice Stewart made clear [in Faretta] that in federal courts the right
of self-representation has always been recognized and that indeed specific
provision was made for it in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which is currently
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Concluding that his plea was voluntary, the Tenth Circuit
held that appellant Montgomery was "precluded from asserting
that his right to represent himself was infringed."'' 0 The court
deferred to those decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which have consistently held that a voluntary plea of guilty
blocks out any previous constitutional defects in the case 7, and
precludes any efforts to set aside such a plea on constitutional
grounds. "' In affirming Montgomery's conviction, the court
stated that "the voluntary plea of guilty by Montgomery is the
independent intervening act which renders ineffectual the prior
failure to allow appellant to represent himself at a trial.' ' 3
Where there was a twenty-seven-month delay between the
time of indictment and trial, the Tenth Circuit applied a Barker
v. Wingo'71 analysis to determine if the appellant in United States
v. Hay'75 had been prejudiced by such a lengthy delay. 76 Hay, an
codified in 28 U.S.C. Section 1654. Since, then, the federal law has always
recognized the right, it follows that a violation of this guarantee could be
claimed by the defendant regardless of whether Faretta carries retroactive
force.
Id. See Stiner v. State, 539 P.2d 750, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
7 529 F.2d at 1407. The Tenth Circuit determined that Montgomery's guilty plea
was voluntary and that he waived his right of self-representation when he permitted a
public defender to plea bargain for him. The court noted that Montgomery accepted the
benefits of the bargain by pleading to a lesser included offense. Id.
"I The court cites Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). But see Justice Marshall's dissent in Tollett:
[Elven where counsel does not consider and present to his client the possi-
bility of a challenge to the composition of the grand jury, the client is none-
theless held to have made an "intelligent" guilty plea.
If plea bargaining is to be constitutionally acceptable, it must rest upon
personal choices made by defendants informed about possible alternatives;
at least, they should know what options are open to them [for an intelligent
and knowing act within Brady].
Id. at 270, 273.
,"I The court cites Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The other two cases
in the trilogy are McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
,7 529 F.2d at 1407.
407 U.S. 514 (1972). In deciding whether a defendant has been denied a speedy
trial, the Supreme Court has suggested four factors to be considered: "Length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant." Id. at 530.
,75 527 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
'' The court's opinion indicated that the Government first learned of criminal activ-
ity involving Hay in January 1969. Following a lengthy investigation, the appellant was
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engineer employed by a prime contractor in the construction of a
public works system in Saigon, South Vietnam, was convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371.t 77
Balancing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice to
the appellant, the court first concluded that the relevant period
for determining whether there had been a denial of a speedy trial
was the period of time from the appellant's arrest to the time of
his trial, i.e., seventeen months."' The court then examined at
great length the reasons advanced by the government "for two
identifiable periods of delay": 179 (1) A deposition procedure in a
foreign country 80 and (2) the unavailability of a witness. 8, Prefac-
indicted by a grand jury on August 18, 1972. At the time of his indictment, however, Hay
was in Mali, Africa. Mali finally revoked his visa, and he was arrested on May 18, 1973,
when his plane landed in New York. He was subsequently convicted at his trial on October
13, 1974. Id. at 993-94.
The court noted the appellant's prejudice claim, "in addition to the anxiety and
concern usually attendant to pending criminal charges, is that he was unable to pursue
his occupation as an engineer because that required him to work overseas. The terms of
his bond restricted him to Colorado and his passport had been lifted." Id. at 996. See
United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir. 1974).
'7 The court's decision indicated that Hay, as the supervisor of a sub-contractor's
work (a French corporation, Les Establissements Eiffel), conspired with employees of
Eiffel to exert efforts to obtain the highest possible allowance on Eiffel's cost overrun claim
to the government of South Vietnam. The United States, through the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, loaned South Vietnam monies for the construction project. 527 F.2d
at 992-93.
"I' The court did not consider the time between appellant's indictment and trial
because he was not available for prosecution. Id. at 993-94. See note 66 supra.
'7, 527 F.2d at 994.
' The court noted that it was necessary to depose bank officials in Switzerland in
order to authenticate appellant's bank account in which he held the monies paid for his
services in the conspiracy. The trial court found that the circumstances of the case justi-
fied the delay, and the Tenth Circuit agreed that the Swiss deposition procedure was
"extraordinary and presented both legal and diplomatic problems." Id.
'" The trial court, however, found that the witness' testimony at trial was not essen-
tial. Id. at 995. The Tenth Circuit disposed of this problem by opining that "[wie do not
believe . . . that a witness must be absolutely indispensable to justify reasonable delay."
Id. But see Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 which, the court noted, might
be more stringent due to § 3161(h)(3)(A) which allows for a delay caused by the unavaila-
bility of an "essential" witness. 527 F.2d at 995 n.8. Although the writer has been unable
to find any recent case law interpreting this particular section of the Speedy Trial Act
Judge MacKinnon of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has written: "TheN
[of which (h)(3)(A) is one] are perfectly reasonable interpretations of excusable delay in
court proceedings and generally follow sound law in the United States." United States v.
Brown, 520 F.2d 1106, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (MacKinnon, J., Statement of Reasons in
Support of Sua Sponte Motion to consider the Case En Banc).
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ing its analysis on language from Barker v. Wingo, i.e., that "the
delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is consid-
erably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge,"' 82 the
court concluded that, given the reasons for the delay in a complex
case such as this,8 3 seventeen months was not long enough to be
so prejudicial as to justify reversal.8 4 The Tenth Circuit thus
determined that the appellant was not denied a speedy trial. 181
IV. TRIAL MATTERS
A. Pretrial Motions to Suppress
In United States v. Kay8 ' and United States v. Cassidy,'87
the Tenth Circuit reversed trial court decisions granting motions
to suppress evidence. In Kay there was a noted absence of any
witnesses sworn or any evidence received at the "hearing" despite
the fact that the defendant's fourth amendment issue was
"largely factual and sharply contested."' 8 Recognizing that "the
statements and argument of counsel are not a substitute for a
proper evidentiary hearing," the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the action was
improper at that time. 8 '
In Cassidy the trial court found that the defendant had not
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights' 8 since he had been under
considerable "pressure" at the time.'' Finding this to be "pure
speculation" unsupported by the evidence,' 2 the Tenth Circuit
407 U.S. at 531.
1 See notes 180 and 181 supra and accompanying text.
"" The court concluded that the 17-month delay did not prejudice Hay in the prepa-
ration of his defense. 527 F.2d at 996.
". Id. at 997.
,, No. 76-1299 (10th Cir., June 23, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' No. 76-1137 (10th Cir., Mar. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 76-1299 at 2.
,, Id. See United States v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1974).
'" No. 76-1137 at 3. There was evidence introduced at trial that the defendant was
fully apprised of his Miranda rights and that he understood these rights. However, he
chose to give a statement to the agent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"' The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial judge had taken into consideration, among
other things, evidence introduced in a companion case in reaching his determination that
the statement was involuntary. No. 76-1137 at 3.
192 In holding that the trial court's findings in this matter were totally without merit,
the Tenth Circuit stated: "The observation by the trial court that Cassidy had been under
'pressure' during the time he was holding hostages and brandishing firearms in his escape
efforts and therefore could not thereafter 'voluntarily' give a statement is pure speculation
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reversed: "[Cilaims of instability, employment difficulties, psy-
chiatric treatment, fear of policemen and being tired and hungry
will not serve to overcome confessions given after proper Miranda
warnings with no evidence of force, threats or promises being used
to obtain the confessions."'' 3
B. Prejudicial Joinder of Offenses
In United States v. Kinard"4 the Tenth Circuit rejected the
appellant's argument that he had suffered substantial prejudice
due to the joinder into a single trial of six separate substantive
charges and a conspiracy charge.'95 Referring to the principles laid
down in United States v. Burkhart, " the court found determina-
tive the fact that proof of the various offenses would have been
admissible even if separate trials had been ordered.'97
In United States v. Day98 the defendant appealed denial of
and insufficient to support the trial court's findings." Id. at 4. See United States v.
Adams, 470 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1972), where the Tenth Circuit held that the determination
of "whether a waiver is understandingly and voluntarily made may be established by the
circumstances of the case." Id. at 251.
"I No. 76-1137 at 4 (quoting United States v. Ritter, 456 F.2d 178, 179 (10th Cir.
1972)).
' No. 75-1066 (10th Cir., July 14, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
Citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 and 13, the Tenth Circuit concluded that such joinder
was procedurally proper. No. 75-1066 at 11.
458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972). Articulating the general rule applicable to receiving
the evidence of other crimes, the Tenth Circuit, in Burkhart, held:
Such evidence in the first instance is inadmissible. There are, however,
several exceptions which allow such evidence to be received in special cir-
cumstances and for limited purposes. It may be received for the purpose of
proving a common plan, scheme or design to commit the offense charged or
for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity
or absence of mistake, inadvertence or accident.
Id. at 204. See DeVore v. United States, 368 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1966); Mills v. United
States, 367 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1966); Woodland v. United States, 347 F.2d 956 (10th Cir.
1965); Weeks v. United States, 313 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1963); Berry v. United States, 271
F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1972);
Moran v. United States, 404 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1968); Morgan v. United States, 355 F.2d
43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1025 (1966).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the defendant not only neglected to request a sever-
ance of the charges, but a claim of prejudicial joinder was not asserted at the trial court
level until the defendant made his motion for a new trial. Although it was recognized that
a "[flailure to request severance by a pretrial motion generally constitutes a waiver," the
Tenth Circuit refrained from deciding whether his objections should be heard as raised in
his motion for a new trial. Instead, it chose to proceed on the grounds that it was a
nonmeritorious claim of prejudice. No. 75-1066 at 12.
" ' 533 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1976).
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his motion to require the Government to elect between a homicide
charge and a charge of accessory after the fact."99 The appellant
argued that since he could not be convicted on both charges, there
was a legal bar to trying him on both counts. In determining that
this argument was fallacious, the Tenth Circuit noted that it
could have based its holding on the grounds that it was a proper
joinder in the absence of prejudice.00 However, in view of the
appellant's failure to make any pretrial motions with regard to
prejudice and his subsequent acquittal on the homicide charge,
the court determined that the proper grounds for affirmance of
the accessory after the fact conviction was that "acquittal on one
misjoined count cures a misjoinder. ' '2 1'
"I The Tenth Circuit acknowledged FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 as the proper remedy when
a defendant is prejudiced by a joinder. The rule provides the trial court with machinery
to require an election if, in its own sound discretion, it finds prejudice.
2"n The Tenth Circuit referred to the FED. R. CalM. P. 8(a) which allows joinder if the
offenses "are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan." See United States v. Van Scoy, 482 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1973),
where the Tenth Circuit held: "Although Van Scoy could not be convicted of both bank
robbery and being an accessory after the fact, it is clear the offenses are based upon
transactions constituting parts of a common scheme and thus fall within Rule 8(a) juris-
diction." Id. at 349.
11 533 F.2d at 526. The Tenth Circuit chose to base its holding upon the general
principle stated in Gornick v. United States, 320 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1963), where the
court refused to find prejudice in the denial of a motion to grant a separate trial on each
count when the appellant was found not guilty on one of the counts. See United States v.
Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1941); Culjak v. United States, 53 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1931);
Latses v. United States, 45 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1930); Weinhandler v. United States, 20
F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1927); Morris v. United States, 12 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1926); Beaux-Arts
Dresses v. United States, 9 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1925). But see Cross v. United States, 335
F.2d 987, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The Tenth Circuit noted, however, that the general rule is not applicable where there
is a multiplicity of charges so as to "make it difficult for the jury to sort out the evidence
pertaining separately to each charge, and the subsequent related problems with the in-
structions." 533 F.2d at 526-27. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
In his appeal, the appellant in Day also made a "belated expression" of his desire to
testify as to only one of the counts. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument as being
too late. However, it has been recognized that under some circumstances "[pirejudice
may develop when an accused wishes to testify on one but not the other of two joined
offenses." Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1964). For the appli-
cable standard in such cases see Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968),"
where the court held:
[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing
showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count
and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. In making such a
showing, it is essential that the defendant present enough informa-
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C. Jury Selection
Although the problems encountered in empaneling the jury
were "perhaps regrettable," the Tenth Circuit upheld the convic-
tion in United States v. Johnson.'20 At the time jury selection was
to commence, there was a noticeable absence of blacks in the
group of prospective jurors.103 After the jury array had been ex-
hausted, the United States Marshal was directed to get prospec-
tive jurors off the streets within the vicinity of the courthouse.
This was the manner in which the jury was finally selected. The
Tenth Circuit cited defense counsel's failure to make a motion to
challenge the array under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) as determinative. 104
A similar challenge to strike the petit jury was made in
United States v. Bennett 05 where there was only one black avail-
able on the jury panel. The appellant argued that an improper
selection of prospective jurors had been made in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 1861,200 because lists of actual voters were used in lieu
of voter registration lists. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the
grounds articulated by the court in Leggroan v. Smith"7 where it
tion-regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count
and his reasons for not wishing to testify on the other-to satisfy the court
that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh
the considerations of "economy and expedition in judicial administration"
against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testi-
fying.
Id. at 977.
2 No. 74-1666 (10th Cir., Oct. 31, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I Counsel for the defendant made a motion for a continuance (which was subse-
quently denied) but failed to make any motion challenging the array pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1867 (1970). See note 19 infra.
"I' The court noted that compliance with this section "is the exclusive means by
which a person accused of a federal crime may challenge a jury array on the grounds that
it was not selected in conformity with the provisions of the Jury Selection & Service Act
of 1968." No. 74-1666 at 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e).
539 F.2d 45 (1976).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970) requires "that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to
trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."
21 498 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974). In Leggroan the entire jury panel was challenged on
the grounds that it was selected from tax assessment rolls thereby effectively "excluding
nonproperty owners and prejudicially reducing the number of women, young people, poor
people and members of minority races." Id. at 169. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "no
rational basis exists for such a discriminatory exclusion and that the jury selection method
used was constitutionally improper." Id. at 171. See also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.
320 (1970) (reiterates the states' freedom in confining selection of prospective jurors to
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was recognized that a mode of jury selection must be upheld when
the proof offered failed to show "that a recognizable, identifiable
class of persons, otherwise entitled to be jury members, has been




In United States v. Trujillo °9 a sixth amendment challenge
was raised against the jury composition where the defendant ob-
jected to six of the jurymen who had previously served in narcot-
ics cases. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that "service on
prior juries in cases having similar issues does not of itself exclude
a juror from serving." 10
those citizens meeting qualifications such as age, education, good intelligence, sound
judgment, and fair character); United States v. King, 492 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1974) (the
court summarily held that the Jury Service and Selection Act of 1968 was not violated by
the use of voter registration lists); United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C.
1974) (court rejected complaint that a juror wheel, which was composed from the voter
registration list exclusively, consequently resulted in an improper representation of the
community as to race, economic status, or age); Overview, Criminal Law and Procedure,
52 DEN. L.J. 133, 148-49 (1975).
"1' 498 F.2d at 170. The Tenth Circuit, in Bennett, also noted that the statistics
offered by the defendant did not show that the proportion of blacks to whites actually
voting was any less than the proportion registered to vote in the counties from which the
array was drawn. The defendant had based his proof on national figures. 539 F.2d at 55.
2" No. 74-1834 (10th Cir., Sept. 17, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication). See also
United States v. Jasper, 523 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1975) (court rejected the claim that jurors
who had been challenged in a kindred case immediately preceding this one were ineligible
to serve on this jury).
10 No. 74-1834 at 9 (citing Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963)). See Virgin Islands v. Williams, 476 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1973),
where the Third Circuit stated:
[Federal courts have uniformly held that, absent some evidence of actual
partiality, a juror is not disqualified merely because he previously sat in a
similar case arising out of a separate and distinct set of circumstances even
though the offenses charged in the cases are similar and some of the same
prosecution witnesses testify in each case.
Id. at 773.
For courts upholding a jury panel despite the fact that some of the jurors had pre-
viously served in a similar case and/or heard testimony of the same prosecution witnesses,
see United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974);
United States v. Salazar, 480 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Estrada, 441 F.2d
873 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1120 (1968); United States v. Cooper, 332 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1964); Casias v. United States,
315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963); Calderon v. United States, 269
F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1959); Harbold v. United States, 255 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1958); Cwach
v. United States, 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1954); Belvin v. United States, 12 F.2d 548 (4th
Cir. 1926); Haussener v. United States, 4 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1925); Wilkes v. United States,
291 F. 988 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 719 (1923). But see United States v. Stevens,
444 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1971), where the Sixth Circuit held that "whenever avoidable,
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The absence of procedural safeguards necessitated by
pretrial and trial publicity provided the basis for appeals in
United States v. Hall"' and United States v. Coppola.2" The
Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant's contention in Hall that the
trial judge's voir dire of prospective jurors was inadequate in light
of the alleged prejudicial pretrial publicity. In determining that
there was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that, although the trial judge's questions were
not as numerous or detailed as those submitted by the appellant,
they contained the import of his inquiry."'
The Tenth Circuit likewise rejected the argument that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow counsel to ask the questions.
In averring to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, the court held that either the court or counsel is permitted
to conduct the voir dire."'
jurors should not be called to serve in cases involving witnesses or parties who participated
in cases in which they were previously impanelled."
2 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1976).
212 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1975).
213 The appellant also alleged error by the trial judge due to his refusal to ask all of
the questions offered by the appellant. 536 F.2d at 324. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409
U.S. 524, 527 (1973), where the Court held that a trial judge "was not required to put the
question in any particular form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the
subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner." See also Brundage v. United
States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) provides:
The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the
defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or
their attorneys as it deems proper.
For the scope of review of a trial court's discretion under this rule see Brundage v. United
States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966), where the Tenth Circuit held that "[tihe court's
discretion under this rule will not be disturbed, unless it appears from the record that its
voir dire was inadequate to properly test the qualifications and competency of the prospec-
tive jurors to sit on trial of the case." Id. at 618. See also United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d
1019 (10th Cir. 1975); Goosman v. A Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); Alvarez
v. United States, 282 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th
Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961); Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d
433 (4th Cir. 1951); Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1947).
The appellant also alleged error in the trial judge's failure to question each juror
individually. While the Tenth Circuit recognized that it may have been better practice
to conduct an individual voir dire of each prospective juror due to the publicity prior to
the trial, the failure to do so was not error. The court distinguished Silverthorne v. United
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In Coppola the appeal was based on the failure to admonish
jurors at the end of each day's session to refrain from reading
newspapers, watching television, or listening to radio accounts of
the trial. Although the Tenth Circuit recognized that it is better
practice to repeat this warning throughout the trial,"' the court
determined that there was no prejudice where the trial judge
relied on his preliminary admonition which had been given gener-
ally to all of the prospective veniremen prior to empaneling of the
jury.
216
D. Admissibility of Evidence
The question of hearsay as to the testimony of a prosecution
witness was confronted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Coppola.217 The appellant was convicted of first degree murder
and conspiracy to commit the murder of a fellow inmate, one
Willard Hardaway.2 1 The facts support the conclusion that Har-
States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968), where the defendant's conviction was reversed and
remanded when, in view of the voluminous and highly inflammatory publicity prior to the
trial, the court failed to conduct individual questioning of the prospective jurors. The
Ninth Circuit expressed its preference for the following rule: "Whenever there is believed
to be a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because
of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the examination of each juror with respect
to his exposure shall take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective
jurors." 400 F.2d at 639 n.1 5 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS §
3.4(a) (Tent. Draft 1966) (selecting the jury-method of examination)). The Tenth Circuit
distinguished Silverthorne due to the essentially factual newsreporting in Hall rather than
opinions as to guilt. It was felt that this newsreporting was neither inflammatory nor
prejudicial. 536 F.2d at 326. See United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1971)
(following the Ninth Circuit's rule). See also Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961).
2' 526 F.2d at 775-76. See Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961), where the court reversed the conviction because the trial
court permitted the jury to separate overnight and for a long weekend without cautioning
them prior to each separation against reading anything about the case:
And in all criminal cases whenever jurors are permitted to separate, the court
should invariably admonish them not to communicate with any person or
allow any person to communicate with them on any subject connected with
the trial, and not to read published accounts of the course of the trial.
272 F.2d at 507 (citing Brown v. United States, 99 F.2d 131, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1938)).
2I" The Tenth Circuit based its affirmance on the harmless error rule as articulated
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24.
217 526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir, 1975).
21 Id. at 766.
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daway was killed when he failed to deliver a requisite amount of
heroin to the appellant, who had arranged for it to be delivered
inside the walls of Leavenworth."'
The prosecution witness, Killian Joe Herman, worked as an
orderly in the segregation area of Leavenworth. Herman testified
that he was to deliver heroin to one Molina as compensation for
killing Hardaway at defendant-appellant's behest. In this testi-
mony he related to the court certain responsive comments made
by the defendant-appellant to Herman in reaction to inculpating
statements that had been made by Molina to Herman regarding
Molina's payoff. 20 The import of these statements by the appel-
lant directed Herman to assure Molina that due payment would
be forthcoming and that he would keep Molina in heroin "'as
long as they was [sic] together and had the stuff available
. . ' '221 Herman's testimony regarding the statements of Mo-
lina to which the defendant-appellant had responded was admit-
ted into evidence despite considerable objection by the defense
that such testimony was hearsay.
22
The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the appellant's challenge to
admittance of this testimony, chose to view the hearsay state-
ments as adoptions by the appellant wherein "it appear[ed] the
accused understood and unambiguously assented to those state-
ments. 223 In conclusion, the court held that Herman's recounting
of Molina's statements and the defendant-appellant's comments
in response to them were properly admitted under the party ad-
missions exception to the hearsay rule.
"I Id. There had been evidence introduced at trial which indicated that the appellant
was the major supplier of heroin at the penitentiary. Id. at 776.
211 Id. at 768.
121 Id. at 769.
2 Id.
Id. n.2. See Naples v. United States, 344 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 4 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1069, 1071-72 (Chadbourne rev., 1972). See also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pear-
son, 194 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1952) (information given by the driver of the car regarding his
employment by the insured was sufficiently acquiesced in by the insured when he failed
to deny the statement made in his presence, rendering it an admission that the driver was
insured's employee at the time of the accident).
For cases holding that a statement made in the presence of an accused, which state-
ment necessarily calls for his denial if untrue, may be relevant as an adoptive admission,
due to his failure to deny the statement, see Ishler v. Cook, 299 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Arpan, 260 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Alker, 255 F.2d
851 (3d Cir. 1958); Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943).
1977
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In United States v. Jones224 and United States v. Swain2 1 the
Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of tape recordings over the
appellants' objections. In Jones the appellant was convicted on
the basis of tape recordings made contemporaneously with his
sale of cocaine and heroin to a government informant."' The
tapes were challenged on the grounds that they were "inaudible,
susceptible to misinterpretation and highly prejudicial."", The
appellant also argued that it was error to permit the informant
to corroborate his own testimony through use of these tapes.
2
1
Noting that the admissibility of a tape recording is "within
the sound discretion of the trial judge,"2 2 the Tenth Circuit held
that the discretion exercised here was without error where there
was also substantial corroboration for the informant's testimony
from the Drug Enforcement Administration agent who had made
the tapes in question. 230 The court, in assuming that the two tapes
were played in their entirety at trial, concluded that the record,
taken as a whole, showed no prejudicial error in connection with
the tapes.231 However, despite the court's acquiesence in the trial
"' 540 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1976).
" No. 75-1387 (10th Cir., Dec. 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
22 540 F.2d at 467.
22 Id. It should be noted that the Government admitted, prior to trial, that parts of
the two tapes were incomprehensible, other parts were incomplete, and still others were
totally inaccurate. Due to these problems, the Government assured that no use would be
made of the transcripts at trial. Id. at 469.
22 Id. The trial court permitted the informer to testify in the presence of the jury on
the contents of the inaudible tapes, despite objections from the defense that this was
extremely prejudicial and inflammatory. Id. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the flagrant
insufficiency of the recordings, noting that the court reporter was unable to decipher and
record what portion of the tape was being played or whose voices were being heard. Id.
I" Id. at 470. See United States v. Clements, 484 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974); United States v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229 (loth Cir. 1973);
United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); United
States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); United
States v. Madda, 345 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1965); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962); Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
2" 540 F.2d at 470. The Tenth Circuit stated that "[uinless the unintelligible por-
tions are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy, it may be
admitted; this is especially so where a witness who heard the statements also testifies and
the recording gives independent support to his testimony." Id. See Monroe v. United
States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
"1 540 F.2d at 469.
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court's action, the Tenth Circuit did provide the prosecution with
a caveat:
To avoid danger of reversal for an inadequate record and possi-
ble prejudice, some means should be used to identify clearly those
portions of the tapes played at trial. These tapes, or transcribed
portions of them, should be included in the record on appeal. In the
trial court's discretion the use of tapes may be conditioned on ad-
vance preparation of an accurate transcript . .. .
A similar issue arose in United States v. Swain33 where the
appellant based his challenge on the admission of a tape which
had been recorded contemporaneously with the attempted rape
for which he was now on trial. The appellant argued that portions
of the tape were inaudible and the admittance thereof constituted
prejudicial error. 234 Reiterating the importance of the trial judge's
discretion in these matters, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ad-
missibility of the tape:
It is well settled that a recording is admissible unless there are
inaudible portions which are so substantial that the recording as a
whole is not trustworthy . . . . Whether or not the inaudible por-
tions are so substantial that the recording is not trustworthy has
repeatedly been held to be a determination for the trial judge acting
within his discretion. m
The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial court had conducted an
in camera hearing wherein the tape had been reviewed in its
entirety and the court had subsequently determined that the in-
audible portions were not so substantial or untrustworthy so as
to require the tape's exclusion.23
E. Scope of Direct and Cross-Examination
The scope of cross-examination by defense counsel was ad-
dressed by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Brooks, 237 United
States v. Logan,25 and United States v. Estell.2 39 In these cases
In Id. n.3.
m No. 75-1387 (10th Cir., Dec. 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
23 Id. at 5.
''Id.
'' Id. at 6. See United States v. Clements, 484 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 437 (2d Cir. 1972); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641,
651-52 (1st Cir. 1963); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1961); Monroe
v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2" No. 75-1638 (10th Cir., Aug. 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
2' No. 75-1693 (10th Cir., Aug. 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
- 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976).
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the defendants-appellants argued that it was error for a trial
judge to restrict defense counsel's inquiry into the misdeeds of
government witnesses.2 1 In affirming the appellants' convictions,
the Tenth Circuit emphasized that "[tihe scope of cross-
examination is broad, but it is not unlimited. '24 ' Recognizing that
this determination is within the "sound discretion" of the trial
court,'2 12 the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court ruling would
not be disturbed where "Itihe matters sought to be inquired into
do not appear to be relevant or in anywise germane to the central
issue in the case .... ,,243
240 The same government witness testified in all three cases. The unrelated criminal
activity of the witness included the theft of government meat, forging checks, concealing
weapons, and a possible homicide. In his cross-examination of the government witness,
defense counsel sought to inquire into the witness' background in an attempt to bring out
these past criminal acts as evidence of his "evil character." No. 75-1693 at 6-7.
241 No. 75-1638 at 8. The Tenth Circuit agreed that such inquiry into the prosecution
witness' alleged misdeeds were irrelevant in that they had no connection with the charges
then pending against any of the defendants, namely, knowing possession of heroin with
the intent to distribute the same. Id. at 9. See No. 75-1693 at 6-7; 539 F.2d at 700. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in con-
cluding that such inquiry was "not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness." 539 F.2d
at 700.
242 No. 75-1693 at 6; No. 75-1638 at 8-9; 539 F.2d at 700. See United States v. Spivey,
508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Whitlock v. United States, 429
F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1970); McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1964);
Darby v. United States, 283 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1960); Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d
222 (10th Cir. 1960).
2I No. 75-1638 at 9. See No. 75-1693 at 6-7; 539 F.2d at 700. See also United States
v. Jones, No. 75-1338 (10th Cir., Mar. 25, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), where the
Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court for refusing to admit testimony bearing upon the
character for veracity of a prosecution witness. The Tenth Circuit adopted the language
used in Atkinson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 197 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1952), where it was
held that "[tihe credibility of the witness is always relevant in the search for truth
." Id. at 246. In Atkinson it was recognized that the trial court's duty is only to
protect [the witness] from questions which go beyond the bounds of rele-
vancy merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him. . . . Evidence challenging
directly the truth of what the witness has said about matters material to the
issue on trial, cannot be called collateral and immaterial to the issue of the
credibility of the witness, and it is admissible for that purpose.
Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also FED. R. EvID. 608(a); 3A WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 981, 983 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
It is curious why the Tenth Circuit did not affirm the trial courts' action in these three
cases on the grounds articulated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Pennix, 313
F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1963), where the court stated that "witnesses ... may, for purposes of
impeachment, be questioned as to prior convictions . . . . But it is clearly established
that the cross-examiner may not go further and inquire of a defendant concerning only
his prior arrest or indictment for a crime." Id. at 529 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit, in Brooks, noted that there was nothing in the record to indicate that
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In United States v. Larry "' direct examination of the defen-
dant's expert witness was wrongfully restricted by the trial court
where the defendant sought to rebut the trustworthiness of testi-
mony given by an expert government witness. The government
witness had testified to his conclusions concerning a chemical
analysis that had been conducted to detect the existence of her-
oin. The Tenth Circuit, commenting upon the trial court's mis-
conception of the answers called for by the questions, recognized
that the questions did not call for the opinion of one expert as to
the qualifications of another expert, but would only indicate disa-
greement as to the conclusions drawn by the other expert.245 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit concluded that this error did not require
reversal 242
F. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In United States v. Stricklin 2 7 the appellants' appealed their
respective convictions of possession of 2,250 pounds of marijuana
with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1).2 41 The defendants were apprehended while riding in a
pickup behind a vehicle and trailer which contained 2,250 pounds
of marijuana. Two bricks of marijuana were found in the pickup
and these were "similar or identical in appearance" to those in
the vehicle and trailer.24 The defendants contended that this
the government witness had ever been charged with murder, that there was evidence that
he had been arrested on a concealed weapons charge, but no evidence on a conviction,
and that he had allegedly stolen government meat and forged checks. No. 75-1638 at 8.
The Fourth Circuit, in Pennix, recognized that the probative value of this type of evidence
is "overwhelmingly outweighed by its inevitable tendency to inflame and prejudice the
jury .... " 313 F.2d at 529. See United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1970).
24 522 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1975).
245 Id. at 266. The court distinguished United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970), wherein the Tenth Circuit held that
it was improper to direct questions to one expert as to the qualifications of another expert.
'" 522 F.2d at 266.
247 534 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 831 (1976).
24K 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) states, in part: "[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-(1) to ... possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance .... " The defendants were also charged with and
convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1970).
"1g 534 F.2d at 1390. The search of the pickup was proper where nightime hunting
tools were in plain view of the officer, giving him probable cause to believe that appellants
were engaged in illegal hunting. Id.
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evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for posses-
sion of the marijuana in the trailer. 5 ' Concluding that this cir-
cumstantial evidence certainly supported the inference that the
two bricks of marijuana came from the trailer, 5' the Tenth Cir-
cuit characterized the situation as amounting to constructive
possession where "the appellants were all engaged in some joint
activity relative to the marijuana . ".2..52
Similarly, the sufficiency of the evidence connecting the ap-
pellant with the theft of a tractor and two trailers was the basis
for appeal in United States v. Wofford.25 3 The appellant argued
that evidence tending to show that he had "possession" of the
property subsequent to the theft was insufficient to prove that he
actually was in possession or that he committed the offense as
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 659.214 The Tenth Circuit, acknowledg-
1 534 F.2d at 1390. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), where the
Court held that although evidence should be viewed by circuit courts in a light most
favorable to the Government, the conviction must be supported by "substantial evi-
dence."
251 Id.
152 Id. See Amaya v. United States, 373 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1967), where the Tenth
Circuit defined "possession," as the term is used in the federal narcotics laws, to include
both actual and constructive possession:
[Tihat constructive possession meant that although the narcotic may be in
the physical possession of another, the defendant knowingly had the power
of exercising control over it; that possession was not limited to manual touch
or personal custody; that it was sufficient to constitute possession under the
statute if the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the narcotic and
control over it ....
Id. at 199. See also United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Cox, 277 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Malfi, 264 F.2d 147 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
In addition to the "constructive possession" rationale, the circuit courts have also
used language rejecting a distinction between the weight to be accorded direct evidence
of possession and that of circumstantial evidence of possession in supporting a conviction.
See United States v. Pinna, 229 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1956), where it was contended by the
appellant that direct proof of possession is essential in order to give rise to the presumption
of importation. In denying the validity of this argument, the Seventh Circuit held: "We
know of no reason . . . why possession proven by circumstantial evidence should be
treated any differently from possession proven by direct evidence." Id. at 218. See also
United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974); Sewell
v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1969); Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114
(9th Cir. 1962); Eason v. United States, 281 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1960); Wilson v. United
States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1951).
2m No. 75-1185 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
- 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970) defines the offense, in part, as follows: "Whoever ... steals,
or unlawfully takes, carries away . . . with intent to convert to his own use any goods or
VOL. 54
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
ing that the evidence received had established the defendant's
"dominion over" the stolen property,255 affirmed the conviction on
the following grounds:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had possession
of property recently stolen gives rise to the inference that the ac-
cused knew the property was stolen and also to the inference that
the defendant participated in the theft of the property. There is no
requirement that the possession need be exclusive in the accused
... . [Plossession can exist on a joint basis with another actor.'"
G. Trial Judge Conduct
The conduct of the trial judges was at issue in United States
v. Sporcich257 and United States v. Hill. 8 In Sporcich the appel-
chattels ... which constitute an interstate ... shipment of ... property; ... Shall in
each case be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both
2" There was testimony placing the defendant-appellant as one of three men attempt-
ing to drive the equipment onto the witness' rural property. In addition, the witness
testified that the defendant-appellant remained behind to watch the truck while the
others went to seek assistance in moving the vehicles. No. 75-1185 at 3.
256 Id. at 4. The Tenth Circuit cited Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.
1969) in support of this proposition. It should be noted that the trial court in Sewell was
careful to instruct the jury that they should acquit if possession was at all consistent with
innocence. In Wofford the Tenth Circuit stressed the instruction that possession had to
be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the inference of theft to be drawn.
No. 75-1185 at 5. See Rugendorg v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964), where Mr. Justice
Clark stated:
In Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, Chief Justice Fuller held for a
unanimous Court that "[plossession of the fruits of crime, recently after its
commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession,
and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight
unless explained by circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent
with innocence."
Id. at 536-37. See United States v. Lang, No. 75-1263 (10th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975) (Not for
Routine Publication); United States v. Prujansky, 415 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Riso, 405 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1968); Avon v. United States, 382 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.
1967); Minor v. United States, 375 F.2d 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967);
Gregory v. United States, 364 F.2d 210 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 962 (1966);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1960); Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d
252 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 921 (1960); Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d
681 (6th Cir. 1951).
A strong dissent in Wofford suggests that the Tenth Circuit allowed an impermissible
"inference upon an inference" to be made in this case when it held the proof sufficient to
sustain the conviction. The dissent points out that the witness' testimony placing the
defendant in the truck and later assisting in moving the equipment off of the highway and
onto the witness' property, etc. was too "meager" an association with the stolen property
to make this inference applicable. No. 75-1185 at 8-10 (Hill, J., dissenting).
No. 74-1569 (10th Cir., Dec. 5, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975).
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lant argued that she was denied a fair trial due to the deprecatory
remark by the trial judge as to the ethics of her counsel.259 Recog-
nizing that an allegedly prejudicial comment must be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis,2  the Tenth Circuit concluded that this
comment was indeed unfortunate, but it was "not so prejudicial
as to deny [the appellant] a fair trial.
2'
In Hill the appellant's claim of prejudice was based upon the
judge's order to have him removed from the courtroom due to his
endless "harangue" and the judge's subsequent smile during the
removal.262 In light of the neutralizing instruction given to the
151 In the presence of the jury, the court stated to defense counsel: "Mr. Wallace, there
are adequate remedies for that. This is not the time to try them out. Ethical counsel would
know better than to do it in a trial such as this. Now, if that's what you have in mind,
quit it." No. 74-1569 at 8 (emphasis in original).
"' See United States v. Roell, 487 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1973). In Roell the judge made
comments where counsel was a bit "overzealous" in questioning a witness. The Eighth
Circuit stated that "this court is required to view these comments from the perspective
of the proceedings as a whole." Id. at 403.
"I1 No. 74-1569 at 8. See United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 892 (9th Cir. 1974)
(citing Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962)).
In Smith the Ninth Circuit stated:
[Flew, if any judges can altogether avoid words or action, inadvertent or
otherwise, which seem inappropriate when later examined in the calm clois-
ters of the appellate court. But unless such misadventures so persistently
pervade the trial or, considered individually or together, are of such magni-
tude that a courtroom climate unfair to the defendant is discernible from the
cold record, the defendant is not sufficiently aggrieved to warrant a new trial.
305 F.2d at 205. See also United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1974) (while judge's
comments were improper, they did not approach the level of harshness or contempt for
the defense); United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 972 (1974) (trial court may "reprimand or rebuff" counsel if necessary to maintain
control); United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1973) (where court's comments
did not suggest guilt, comments were directed at counsel only, remainder of court's rulings
were evenhanded between both sides, and strong curative instructions were made in an
attempt to erase prejudice to the defendant, the Second Circuit concluded that a new trial
was not necessary); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 970 (1973) (conviction was reversed where the cumulative effect of the court's
remarks deprecating defense counsel was to prejudice the jury against the defense case);
Whitlock v. United States, 429 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1970) (rebuffing counsel as to several
points and objections did not interfere with a fair trial); United States v. Gleeson, 411 F.2d
1091 (10th Cir. 1969) (admonishing of counsel in regard to examination of exhibits did not
deny defendant a fair trial); Cooper v. United States, 403 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1968) (where
it was not reversible error for the court to refer to counsel's arguments as ridiculous).
20 After asking the defendant several times if he was finished with his outrageous
conduct, which included personal attacks on the court, the judge had him removed from
the courtroom by marshals. The judge admitted that he had difficulty in restraining
himself from smiling because of the magnitude of appellant's conduct.
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jury immediately following the defendant's removal,1 3 the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the trial judge's conduct did not prevent
the appellant from receiving a fair trial .2  The court noted that
these actions did not approach the conduct condemned by the
Second Circuit in United States v. Nazarro,211 where the trial
judge had participated in the trial to such an extent that a
"partisan purpose" on his part could be inferred.216
H. Closing Arguments
The prosecutor in United States v. Bishop26 7 remarked, in his
summation to the jury, that "the evidence in this case is uncon-
tradicted [as to the the defendant's passing of counterfeit
bills] ."265 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
this statement could be interpreted as a comment on his failure
to testify. 2"1 In affirming the denial of the defendant's motion, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the test articulated in Knowles v. United
States: 1 "Whether the language used was manifestly intended or
was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessar-
ily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to tes-
tify. ' " In applying the Knowles test, the Tenth Circuit empha-
sized the fact that there were witnesses other than the defendant,
63 The court stated to the jury, in part: "This is not evidence. Ignore what he has
said. He is highly emotional this morning . . . .It is not proper and you will not allow
yourselves to be influenced by his conduct or by what he says." 526 F.2d at 1025.
" The Tenth Circuit, acknowledging that the trial judge should not have smirked,
chose to recognize that the "appellant was entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
Id. (citing Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)). In Lutwak the Court
supported this proposition by citing Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure: "(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id. at 619-20, 620 n.4.
2- 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973).
266 In Nazarro the judge participated extensively in examining witnesses. It was noted
that he continuously rehabilitated prosecution witnesses and designed questions to inject
doubt as to the credibility of defense witnesses. He also frequently interrupted the testi-
mony of defense witnesses. The Second Circuit concluded that the only remedy for the
prejudice suffered here was to reverse and remand for a new trial. The court stated, "even
if a judge's interjections are not motivated by a partisan purpose, 'he must not. . . permit
even the appearance of such an interference."' Id. at 310 (citing United States v. Curcio,
279 F.2d 681, 682 (2d Cir. 1960)).
267 534 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1976).
I Id. at 219.
21 Id. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
-0 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955).
"1 534 F.2d at 220 (citing Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d at 170).
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Bishop, who could have been called to testify as to her lack of
knowledge and intent. Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that it was not error for the prosecutor to comment "that
the evidence against the defendant [was] uncontradicted, espe-
cially where the facts in issue could have been controverted by
persons other than the defendant." '72
In United States v. Adcox 2 3 the Tenth Circuit reacted with
strong disapproval to the prosecutor's closing argument wherein
he made an emotional appeal to the jury that the people of the
town in which the crime was committed were watching them (the
jury) to see if they were going to condone it or condemn it.27 ' The
Tenth Circuit interpreted this argument as placing the task of
enforcing the law on the jury which had the effect of implying
that what they did in this case would determine whether there
would be law or lawlessness.25 In spite of its recognition that the
prosecutor's closing argument was invalid, the Tenth Circuit af-




The failure to give a cautionary instruction on accomplice
testimony was held to be reversible error in United States v.
Holland, 277 where the only evidence against the defendant was the
testimony of accomplices. The Tenth Circuit found this to be
M 534 F.2d at 219. See United States v. Williams, 479 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Follette, 418 F.2d at 1266 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Desmond v. United
States, 345 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1965), where the First Circuit held that a comment concern-
ing the "lack of contradiction" is improper "unless it is apparent on the record that
there was someone other than himself whom the defendant could have called." Id. at 227
(emphasis added).
v' No. 75-1400 (10th Cir., Apr. 7, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I' Id. at 8.
vs Id.
171 Id. at 9. In support of its holding, the Adcox court cited United States v. Worth,
505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975), and United States v.
Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1971), wherein the Tenth Circuit affirmed both convic-
tions, despite its avid disapproval of the prosecutor's closing statements. The court noted
that "there was no infringement of appellant's substantial rights within the meaning of
Rule 52 FED. R. CraM. P." in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. No. 75-1400 at
9. See Overview, Criminal Law and Procedure, 53 DEN. L.J. 109, 120-21 (1976).
27 No. 75-1556 (10th Cir., Apr. 8, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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plain error "affecting substantial rights" and a reversal was re-
quired despite the fact that the defendant failed to request such
an instruction."
Faced with a similar situation, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
jury instructions on accomplice testimony in United States v.
Carpenter.'7 The court emphasized that the trial court had gone
even further than had previously been required by Butler v.
United States,2 80 since the trial court instructed the jury: "You
should never convict a defendant upon the unsupported testi-
mony of an accomplice unless you believe the unsupported testi-
mony beyond a reasonable doubt.
'28'
2. Defendant's Theory of Defense
A refusal by the trial court to instruct the jury as to the
defendant's theory of defense was the basis for challenge in
United States v. Swinton5 2 and United States v. Robison.283 In
Swinton the defendant contended that he was merely a
"procuring agent" and was not "engaged in the business of deal-
ing in firearms." The Tenth Circuit held that this request to have
a "procuring agent" instruction submitted to the jury was non-
meritorious in view of the fact that the defendant had chosen not
to testify and had also neglected to present any evidence that he
was acting only as such an agent.24
" Id. at 2. The rule of law regarding an instruction on accomplice testimony was
articulated in Butler v. United States, 408 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1969), where the Tenth
Circuit held: "[Iln federal courts the testimony of an accomplice need not be corrobor-
ated, but the court must instruct the jury as to the manner in which such testimony should
be considered." Id. at 1105. See United States v. Webb, 466 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Birmingham, 447
F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lujan, 444 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Reid, 437 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1971).
'7 535 F.2d 1218 (10th Cir. 1976).
408 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1969). The instruction given by the Tenth Circuit in Butler
was as follows: "The mere fact that a witness is an accomplice does not mean that he is
an incompetent witness or that he can't tell the truth, but it does mean that testimony is
to be weighed with great care and received with caution." Id. at 1105.
" 535 F.2d at 1219 n.2. See Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1968).
22 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 75-1494 (10th Cir., Mar. 31, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
521 F.2d at 1260. "While a defendant is entitled to instructions on any theory of
defense finding support in the evidence presented and the law . . . , a trial court is not
required to instruct on a defendant's theory of the case when such an instruction has no
foundation in evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
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A similar conclusion was reached in Robison where, indicted
for refusing and resisting arrest, the defendant based the theory
of defense on his apprehension as to the identity of the officers
who stopped him. Although the defendant testified as to this, the
Tenth Circuit held that there was no evidence to "reasonably
support" such a theory32
J. Post-trial Matters
1. Sentencing
In United States v. Murdaugh26 the trial court rejected the
defendant's "Motion for Jail Time" on the basis that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider the matter. The defendant appealed,
seeking credit for time spent in state custody on a related charge.
His motion was based on 18 U.S.C. § 3568, which states: "The
Attorney General shall give any such person [convicted of an
offense] credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent
in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sent-
ence was imposed.12 7 Acknowledging that giving credit is an
n, The Tenth Circuit's rationale for affirming the refusal to give the defendant's
instruction was based upon a series of events leading up to the willful injury of government
property. These included an officer in uniform showing an I.D. card to the defendant; the
officer's use of a radio; ample time for the defendant to observe the officer; and a lack of
hesitance on the part of the defendant in walking back to the patrol car with the officer.
The only evidence that supported the defendant's theory of defense was his own testimony
as to his subjective state of mind. The Tenth Circuit held that this was not enough, citing
United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hagen, 470 F.2d
110 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); and Beck v. United States, 305
F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1962). But see Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
where the court held:
[Iln criminal cases the defendant is entitled to have presented instructions
relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the
evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent,
or of doubtful credibility. He is entitled to have such instructions even
though the sole testimony in support of the defense is his own.
Id. at 617. See United States v. Indian Trailer Corp., 226 F.2d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 1955).
See also United States v. Garcia, 452 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1971), where the court recognized
that the phrase "any foundation in the evidence" did not necessarily mean
that a requested charge encompass, in the trial judge's eyes, a believable or
sensible defense . . . .We hold that where the defendant's proposed charge
presents, when properly framed, a valid defense, and where there has been
some evidence relevant to that defense adduced at trial, then the trial judge
may not refuse to charge on that defense.
Id. at 423.
'" No. 75-1636 (10th Cir., Apr. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
-7 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
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administrative function, 8' the Tenth Circuit held that judicial
review was nonetheless appropriate "to insure compliance with
that section in order to protect a prisoner's statutory right to
credit." ' 9 Although the federal courts have varied the jurisdic-
tional bases utilized for entertaining such motions,9 0 the Tenth
Circuit has recognized the proper avenue for relief as 28 U.S.C. §
2255.91 Noting that the defendant's motion was properly filed
with the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that it was error
to dismiss the motion for a lack of jurisdiction.
The issue on appeal in United States v. Marines22 was
whether the sentencing court gave improper consideration to a
felony charge, which had been dismissed as part of a plea bargain,
in imposing sentence for a misdemeanor charge based upon the
" In rationalizing the computation of sentencing as an administrative function, the
D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Lewis, 447 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stated that "[tihe
mandate and operative scheme implicit in the statute provides that the available credit
shall be applied after whatever sentence is imposed and not before sentence. Thus, the
court must first impose sentence before any 'credit' may be realized." Id. at 1265. See
Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1973); Bostick v. United States, 409 F.2d 5 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 890 (1969); Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968).
Due to the administrative character of the "Motion for Jail Time," most circuits have
held that the district court may refuse to entertain the motion where the appellant has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Pace v. Clark, 453 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Morgan, 425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d
386 (10th Cir. 1966).
' No. 75-1636 at 3. See United States v. Morgan, 425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970).
29o The Tenth Circuit recognized that federal courts have treated motions seeking
credit for time spent in state custody as falling under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) (addresses
the power of a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970); 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) (addresses the jurisdiction of federal district courts to entertain
actions "to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty"); and FED. R. CRiM.
P. 35 (a motion for reduction of sentence must be made within 120 days after the sentence
has been imposed). No. 75-1636 at 3. For an example of court discretion exercised in
treating these motions, see Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968), where the
Ninth Circuit held that justice required it to treat the appellant's "Motion for Jail Time"
as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in lieu of his actual petition under
FED. R. CalM. P. 35 where the motion was made five years after the sentence had been
imposed.
No. 75-1636 at 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 states, in part: "A prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming. . . that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to . .. correct the sentence." See Davis v.
Willingham, 415 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1969). For other circuits that have recognized 28
U.S.C. § 2255 as a proper avenue for relief, see Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th
Cir. 1970); Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969); Lee v. United States, 400
F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968); Bryans v. Blackwell, 387 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1967).
-7 535 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1976).
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same set of facts. In concluding that the appellant's claim was
nonmeritorious, the Tenth Circuit recalled its consideration of a
similar issue in United States v. Majors:
29 3
[T]he dismissed indictment and the charge contained in it are
within the kind of information which a court may properly consider
in passing sentence. The plea bargain and the indictment dismissal
resulting from it did not and, indeed, could not, deprive the judge
of the right and probably the duty of giving consideration to it.2'
2. Prisoner's Rights
In Robinson v. McCune25 the appellant, while serving two
concurrent five-year felony sentences at a federal penitentiary,
was sentenced to two one-year misdemeanor sentences to run
concurrently with each other, but consecutively "to any sentence
now serving. '29 6 The issue arose as to whether the defendant
should have been transferred, at his request, to a lesser custody
institution for the service of his misdemeanor sentences following
the completion of his service of the felony sentences.27 Prison
authorities chose to aggregate the defendant's sentences whereby
he was to serve one sentence for all purposes, including place of
confinement. 28 The fact that one sentence was for a felony and
the other for a misdemeanor was disregarded.
The Tenth Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 4161 requires ag-
gregation of sentences for purposes of sentence computation. 299
However, the court also acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. § 4083 had
been amended in 1959 to permit incarceration at a penitentiary
only if the offense was punishable by a sentence in excess of one
year.300 In reversing the trial court with respect to the issue of
-3 490 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975). See Overview,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 52 DEN. L.J. 133, 159-61 (1975).
114 535 F.2d at 554.
" 536 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 1976).
' Id. at 1341.
The appellant claimed that he was being unlawfully confined in the penitentiary,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (1970), to serve sentences imposed for misdemeanor
convictions. This provision provides, in part: "A sentence for an offense punishable by
imprisonment for one year or less shall not be served in a penitentiary without the consent
of the defendant."
"1 536 F.2d at 1341.
2- 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970) provides, in part: "When two or more consecutive sent-
ences are to be served, the aggregate of the several sentences shall be the basis upon which
the [good time allowance] shall be computed."
536 F.2d at 1342.
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place of confinement, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the
practice of aggregating consecutive misdemeanor sentences with
prior unexpired felony sentences for purposes of determining
place of confinement is not only unauthorized under § 4161, but
also does substantial violence to the clear legislative intent ex-
pressed in § 4083."3 °0 In accordance with this interpretation, the
court held that Robinson could not be "compelled to serve the
misdemeanor sentences at a penitentiary, in the absence of his
consent." 0
2
In United States v. Williams303 the limits imposed on a fed-
eral prisoner's right to privacy were challenged where the defen-
dant filed a motion to suppress evidence that was seized as the
result of a rectal search that had been performed prior to releasing
the defendant to a Deputy Marshal.30 The Tenth Circuit con-
firmed the trial court's overruling of the defendant's motion, not-
ing that the authority for the search was based upon 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4041 and 4042 which grant authority to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons to promulgate policies and procedures for the
treatment of inmates.305 In defining the court's scope of review in
these matters, the Tenth Circuit stated that "judicial review will
be granted only upon a showing that prison officials have exer-
cised their discretionary powers in such a manner as to constitute
I' ld. See also Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4 (1923); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
536 F.2d at 1392. See Dorssart v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ga. 1967);
United States v. Lomas, 60 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
No. 75-1401 (10th Cir., Apr. 23, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
'' The defendant was to be placed in the custody of a deputy United States marshal
for the purpose of transporting the defendant to a trial wherein he was to appear as a
witness. Prior to the defendant's release, permission was granted by the warden to conduct
the challenged rectal search wherein a plastic container, containing a piece of hacksaw
blade, an emery cord, two screwdrivers, and a small piece of metal, was discovered.
I The Tenth Circuit recognized that pursuant to these statutory provisions, "prison
authorities at the various institutions are authorized to formulate policies and procedures
necessary to meet the particular needs of the respective institutions." No. 75-1401 at 5.
The following policy statement was issued by the Warden of Leavenworth in March 1974:
Every inmate will be searched thoroughly with a magnetometer to detect any
contraband hidden in body cavities. A more thorough rectal examination will
normally only be necessary in those cases when a positive reading is received
from the magnetometer search, or when a Deputy U.S. Marshal or the Chief
Correctional Supervisor or his designee determines the inmate is a serious
escape risk or is extremely dangerous.
Id. There was evidence that the correctional supervisor at Leavenworth considered the
defendant to be a serious escape risk. Id.
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clear abuse or caprice." 06 The appellant failed to make such a
showing.
V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a)
Three separate cases, United States v. Katz,' 7 United States
v. Ratley,30 8 and United States v. Pauldino,30 1 presented the issue
of whether, because of the method of their appointments, special
attorneys appointed under section 515(a) 310 possessed proper au-
thorization to appear before grand juries. Appellant Ratley con-
tended that "the letters commissioning the attorneys were impro-
per in that they did not 'specifically direct' 31' the attorneys' activ-
ities and were not issued by the United States Attorney General
himself. '312 Recognizing that recent decisions of other circuits
had specifically rejected these arguments, the Tenth Circuit held
Id. See Rivera v. Toft, 477 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1973); Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d
292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973); Black v. Warden, United States Peniten-
tiary, 467 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1972); Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Perez v. Turner, 462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 944 (1972).
- 535 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1976).
3" No. 75-1403 (10th Cir., Apr. 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
3" No. 75-1336 (10th Cir., Mar. 17, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
i,' Section 515(a) provides that:
The Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of Justice, or
any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law, may,
when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any legal pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings .. .which
United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, whether or not
he is a resident of the district in which the proceeding is brought.
31, No. 75-1403 at 3. See In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1975) (broad authority to
Strike Force attorney under commission signed by Assistant Attorney General). The
Second Circuit states: "The 'specifically directed' phrase of § 515(a) should not be so
niggardly construed as to interfere with the federal government's ability to efficiently
administer its criminal laws." 522 F.2d at 64.
312 No. 75-1403 at 3.
3 DiGirlomo v. United States, 520 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975); Infelice v. United States, 528 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1975). See United States v. Agrusa, 520 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1975), wherein the court
held that under § 515(a) the Attorney General could delegate his authority to subordinate
officers of the Department of Justice. In United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362 (8th Cir.
1975), the Eighth Circuit rejected the position of the Second Circuit in Persico "that the
power of the Attorney General to authorize special attorneys to appear before grand juries
is limited to situations where there is a special reason to limit the role of the local district
attorney and where that reason has been made explicit by the Attorney General." 520 F.2d
at 368 n.11 (citing Persico, 522 F.2d at 60).
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that the special attorneys in each case" 4 had proper authority to
appear before the grand juries. 15
B. 18 US.C. § 1952
In United States v. Villano316 appellants Villano and Smal-
done appealed their convictions under section 19521'1 on the
ground that the evidence adduced at trial was of a local gambling
business patronized sporadically by one nonresidentl 8 and, thus,
under the reasoning of Rewis v. United States,"' their activities
did not constitute a federal offense.32 0 In upholding the convic-
tions, the Tenth Circuit determined that the evidence supported
the convictions based upon (1) an interpretation of the statute, 32 '
5, No. 75-1336 at 4; No. 75-1403 at 3; 535 F.2d at 595-96.
3, See note 314 supra.
31 529 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
, 529 F.2d at 1052. The Travel Act provisions in question provide that:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility
in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to-
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any
unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling ....
18 U.S.C. § 1952.
- The appellants' employees, Colgan and Amato, over the telephone in Denver,
Colorado, accepted bets for appellants' .illegal gambling operation. The evidence of inter-
state telephone calls came from one Ferris, a resident of Valentine, Nebraska, who testi-
fied that he placed bets by calling three Denver telephone numbers and by using a code
number. Ferris' testimony was corroborated by telephone company records. United States
v. Villano, 529 F.2d at 1050-51.
31 401 U.S. 808 (1971). The Tenth Circuit gave the following summary of the Rewis
case:
In Rewis there was a lottery or numbers operation in Florida near the
Georgia line. Two defendants were Florida residents and there was no proof
that they crossed state lines in connection with operation of their lottery.
Two other defendants were Georgia residents who traveled to the Florida
location to place bets.
529 F.2d at 1052.
' 529 F.2d at 1052.
3' The court stated:
From the terms of the statute itself we feel that the evidence supports the
convictions. There was proof to sustain an inference that the defendants
caused or aided and abetted the use by Colgan and Amato of interstate
telephone facilities in furnishing line information, accepting bets and arrang-
ing payoffs with Ferris.
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(2) an examination of its legislative history, 32 2 and (3) an analysis
of the Rewis opinion. 32 The court stated that a plausible argu-
ment for reversal might have been made on the basis of United
States v. Altobello324 and United States v. McCormick, 321 but held
the two cases inapplicable here because of the repeated use of an
interstate facility by the nonresident witness which produced a
substantial volume of gambling on his part.
32 6
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2042
United States v. 17,400 Dollars in Currency 327 presented the
Tenth Circuit with a unique claim to monies given to a
"cooperating individual, 3 28 Nocenti, by his principals and used
to set up an illegal narcotics transaction.3 29 After his principals
were arrested and subsequently convicted, Nocenti filed a claim
for the money which he had turned over to the Bureau of Narcot-
ics and Dangerous Drugs.
330
' Id. The Tenth Circuit cited the reasoning and conclusion of the Supreme Court in
Rewis for the proposition that, based on its legislative history, the Travel Act was aimed
at organized crime and persons residing in one state while operating illegal gambling in
another state. The Act does not apply to illegal activity solely because that activity is
patronized by out-of-state customers. Id. (citing United States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. at 811-
12). See note 319 supra. The court further summarized the Act's legislative history to the
effect that Congress intended "use [of] any facility" to apply to interstate telephone
calls. United States v. Villano, 533 F.2d at 1052-53 n.6.
" The Tenth Circuit distinguished Rewis, noting that the Supreme Court's decision
focused on the interstate activity of others. 529 F.2d at 1053. In Villano it was "the
defendants [who] situated their agents where they carried on transactions using tele-
phones, receiving local and interstate calls." Id. (emphasis in original). See also United
States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987, 992 n.6 (6th Cir. 1976).
324 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971) (incidental involvement of interstate facilities).
3- 442 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d at 992;
United States v. LaFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975); United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wechs-
ler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
3 United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d at 1053-54. The Fourth Circuit, for purposes of
satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of the Act, examines whether there has been any
use of an interstate facility in furtherance of one of the illegal activities defined in the Act.
See United States v. LaFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975); United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970); and United States v.
Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
32 524 F.2d 1105 (10th Cir. 1975). The case is an offshoot of the criminal prosecution
reported in United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 915 (1974).
321 524 F.2d at 1105. The court's decision indicates that Nocenti was operating with
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The majority of the court held that the money must be sur-
rendered to Nocenti because of the agency relationships involved:
Nocenti, as agent of two principals who were involved in a serious
crime, was no longer required to account for the money,33' and
Nocenti, as an informer, was not an agent of the United States.
3 32
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Doyle argued that, through-
out the transaction, which was for the purpose of arresting and
convicting Nocenti's two "principals," Smaldone and Merkow-
itz,33 Nocenti was really acting on behalf of the United States
Government, not on behalf of Smaldone and Merkowitz or on his
own behalf.3 3 Thus, in concluding that Nocenti was acting as a
government agent and that, therefore, "the government has a
better right [to the money] than Nocenti, ''1 3 Judge Doyle indi-
cated that 28 U.S.C. § 2042336 should govern how the money is
treated: Nocenti should have been required to prove independent
good title; were he not able to do so, the money would be inherited
by the United States Treasury.n? Judge Doyle further stated:
3' Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 412(2)(b) (1958)).
33 The majority found no case "where the government has formally or informally
asserted that an informer was a lawful agent of the United States or has accepted responsi-
bility for the actions of an informer as his principal." 524 F.2d at 1106. It argued, by
analogy, that the Government has consistently refused to accept responsibility for the
actions of informers in entrapment cases. Id. See United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). But see 524 F.2d at 1107 (Doyle, J., dissent-
ing) (wherein it is argued that the entrapment cases recognize an agency, imputing the
acts of the informant to the Government).
524 F.2d at 1107. According to Judge Doyle, the evidence indicated that Nocenti
journeyed to Peru with the money for one purpose-to bring back some cocaine that could
be used to arrest and convict Smaldone and Merkowitz. Id.
334 Id.
I Id. at 1108.
3m This section provides:
No money deposited shall be withdrawn except by order of court.
In every case in which the right to withdraw money deposited in court
has been adjudicated or is not in dispute and such money has remained so
deposited for at least five years unclaimed by the person entitled thereto,
such court shall cause such money to be deposited in the Treasury in the
name and to the credit of the United States. Any claimant entitled to any
such money may, on petition to the court and upon notice to the United
States attorney and full proof of the right thereto, obtain an order directing
payment to him.
28 U.S.C. § 2042 (1970).
"I It is Judge Doyle's position that Nocenti, as a government informer, should have
been compensated in accordance with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970), "which [under 21 U.S.C. § 886(a)]
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"The really objectionable aspect to me is that the court is lending
its aid to one who has no legal right to the award but, more
important, the court is going to the assistance of a wrongdoer-a
converter."
3 1
D. 18 U.S.C. § 2518
The appellant in United States v. Russo 39 alleged error in the
trial court's failure to suppress wiretap evidence 34 arguing that,
under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, 3 ' the wiretap orders and applications
therefor were deficient.342 In an opinion written by Judge McWil-
liams, the Tenth Circuit held that, based on an analysis of the
wiretap applications34 3 and United States v. Kahn, 344 the evidence
was sufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause which would
authorizes the Attorney General to pay an informer such sum or sums of money as he may
deem appropriate." 524 F.2d at 1109.
13 524 F.2d at 1109.
339 527 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976). Defendant Russo
was convicted of conspiring to carry on prostitution and bribery in Kansas [violation of
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3512, -3513, and -3901 (1970)] through the use of interstate facilities
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970). Id. at 1053.
Russo's telephone conversations with a co-conspirator, Lowman, were intercepted
by wiretaps placed on the telephones at the two massage parlors operated by Lowman.
Id. at 1054. The court's opinion indicated that there were five tapes of Russo's calls to
the target telephone which were introduced into evidence at his trial. Id. at 1057-58.
I" Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
2518 (1970).
312 The application for a wiretap and the order authorizing the same must include
"the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications
are to be intercepted .... " 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(IV) (1970) (emphasis added). It was
Russo's position on appeal that, since he was not so identified, the wiretaps should have
been suppressed. 527 F.2d at 1054.
113 The first application for the wiretap named Lowman and "others as yet unknown."
527 F.2d at 1054. Russo's name was mentioned in the FBI agent's affidavit in support of
the application.
The first application for extension of the wiretap did not include the appellant's name
although Russo's name was again mentioned in the affidavit supporting the application
for the second extension. The court's decision indicates that phone calls from one "Tony"
(later identified as Russo) were intercepted after the first order was granted and between
the first and second extensions. Id. at 1054-55.
3' 415 U.S. 143 (1974). The Tenth Circuit in Russo stated:
The rule that we glean from Kahn is that if the Government "knows,"
i.e., has "probable cause" to believe, that a particular person is committing
an offense for which the wiretap is sought, and also "knows" that such
individual is likely to use the target telephone in furtherance of such criminal
activity, then, and only then, need the application and order for a wiretap
identify such person by name.
527 F.2d at 1056.
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have necessitated the identification of appellant Russo in the
wiretap applications and order.34 In addition, the court con-





DENYING A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY
TO CALL A WITNESS WHO WILL INVOKE HIS FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
During the most recent survey period the Tenth Circuit de-
cided two cases' which involved the attempt by criminal defen-
dants to raise inferences favorable to their cases by calling wit-
nesses who would assert the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 2 The defendants in each case were prosecuted
on charges related to the illegal distribution of drugs and in their
defense sought to call as witnesses individuals who had been pres-
ent at the alleged drug sales. In each case, the Tenth Circuit
"1 527 F.2d at 1056. The court based its finding of no probable cause on a peculiar
factual aspect of the case, i.e., that Russo's name, although mentioned in the application
affidavits, was brought into the matter purely by double hearsay (an informant told the
FBI that Lowman had told him (informant) that Russo was a conduit for his (Lowman's)
protection money to the police). Id. at 1054. The court determined that this hearsay was
insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause. Id. Compare United States v. Dono-
van, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
36 527 F.2d at 1057-58. Even though conversations by Russo were intercepted before
the first and second wiretap extension applications and orders, the Tenth Circuit also
determined that their content was innocuous, e.g., that the conversations did not give any
evidence of prostitution, bribery, or interstate travel. Id. at 1057.
1 United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 979 (1976); United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485
(10th Cir. 1975).
2 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states, "No person . . .




affirmed the refusal of the district court to allow defense counsel
to cause the witnesses to invoke their fifth amendment privilege
in the presence of the jury.
Two constitutional issues were raised by the defendants on
appeal. Both defendants argued that the nature of a witness' fifth
amendment right required that the witness be compelled to in-
voke his privilege on the stand in the presence of the jury.' In
addition, one of the defendants argued that the action of the trial
court denied him his sixth amendment right to compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' The Tenth Circuit did
not directly address either constitutional issue. Instead, it de-
cided both cases on the basis of an evidentiary rationale used by
other circuits in factually analogous situations.5
This paper will discuss the fifth and sixth amendment issues
which the Tenth Circuit did not confront, and evaluate the
soundness of the evidentiary rationale used by the Tenth Circuit
in deciding the cases.
I. FACTS
A. United States v. Martin
Maurice Duke Martin was tried and convicted of two sepa-
rate counts of distributing heroin.6 The Government's primary
witness was an undercover agent for the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) who testified that he purchased heroin from
Martin on two different occasions.7 The only other person present
at the alleged sales was an informant who had originally intro-
duced the DEA agent to Martin.' At the defendant's first trial the
informant was subpoenaed by the defendant; the informant took
the stand in front of the jury but refused to testify on the grounds
Brief for Appellant at 8-10, United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975);
Brief for Appellant at 11-13, United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976)
(Not for Routine Publication).
United States v. Eitel, No. 75-1537 at 7.
See text accompanying notes 57-74 infra.
Martin was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
A second DEA agent testified that he had observed the other agent make contact
with Martin on both occasions, but that he did not see the sale take place. 526 F.2d at
486. Therefore, the jury based its decision almost entirely on the testimony of the one
agent.
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that under the fifth amendment he could not be compelled to
incriminate himself.' The trial ended with a hung jury.0
At his second trial Martin again caused a subpoena to be
served on the informant. The informant appeared at the trial, but
informed defense counsel that he would again refuse to testify.
Martin's attorney nevertheless attempted to put the informant on
the stand." The trial court refused to allow the witness to be
called, and later gave a neutralizing instruction admonishing the
jury to draw no inferences from the fact that the informant had
not appeared as a witness.
2
On appeal Martin argued that the trial court committed re-
versible error in refusing to allow him to call the informant. 3 He
maintained that a witness, in contrast to a defendant, had no
constitutional right not to take the stand. 4 Martin argued that a
witness' testimonial privilege against self-incrimination could not
be triggered until a question was put to the witness after he had
been sworn and placed before the jury."
B. United States v. Eitel
Jeffrey Eitel was indicted and convicted of distributing and




2 The trial court gave the following instruction:
There has been testimony in this case about an informant named Samuel
Hudson. As a result of a hearing held outside the presence of the jury, the
Court has determined that Mr. Hudson is not available to be called as a
witness by either side in this case.
The jury may not draw any inference from the fact that Samuel Hudson
did not appear as a witness in this case.
Id.
Id Id. at 487.
", Brief for Appellant at 8-10, United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975).
I d.
Eitel was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). At
Eitel's trial a DEA agent testified that he went to a certain Denver residence to negotiate
a purchase of methamphetamine. Eitel arrived a short time later and produced a sample.
The agent then demanded to see the entire quantity of methamphetamine before making
the purchase. At this point Eitel and Marcel Targa, who had been present throughout the
transaction, left the room. According to the agent, they returned accompanied by Owen
Plyler, were shown the purchase money, and again departed. Eitel, Targa, and Plyler soon
returned and, according to the agent's testimony, Targa gave the agent several packets
containing what was later identified as methamphetamine. No. 75-1537 at 3-4.
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Eitel attempted to call Owen Plyler, who was present at the
alleged sale, as a witness. 7 Out of the presence of the jury, the
court questioned Plyler concerning his intent to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege and allowed Eitel's counsel to ask Plyler
specific questions. Plyler asserted his testimonial privilege to
each question."8 After determining that Plyler had a legitimate
right to invoke the privilege and being assured that he would
stand on his privilege, the court refused to allow Plyler to be
examined in the jury's presence."
On appeal Eitel, like Martin, argued that a witness' privilege
against self-incrimination involves a limited option of refusal to
testify and not a prohibition against all inquiry. He asserted as
error the trial court's refusal to allow Plyler to be called as a
witness. 0 In addition, Eitel argued that the trial court's refusal
denied him his sixth amendment right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor."'
II. HOLDING
A. United States v. Martin
The Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed the issue raised by
Martin concerning the boundaries of a witness' fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court limited its sub-
stantive discussion to distinguishing United States v. Namet2
and United States v. Coppola3 from Martin. Both Namet and
Coppola were relied upon by the defense as supportive of the
proposition that a person can invoke the fifth amendment privi-
lege only in the presence of the jury after being called as a witness
and being placed under oath. 4 In addition, the court relied on
11 On cross-examination the undercover agent admitted that he had stated in the
complaint affidavit filed three months after the alleged transaction that it was Owen
Plyler, and not Eitel, who produced the original sample of methamphetamine. Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Charges arising out of the incident were still pending against Plyler but would be
dismissed if Plyler satisfactorily completed a treatment program he was then undergoing.
Id. at 4 n.1.
0 Brief for Appellant at 11-13, No. 75-1537 (10th Cir., Jan. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
* No. 75-1537 at 7.
373 U.S. 179 (1963).
23 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 Namet and Coppola involved attempts by prosecutors to raise inferences adverse
to a defendant by calling witnesses who then invoked their fifth amendment right in front
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decisions from other circuits sustaining a trial court's refusal to
allow a defense witness to be called in similar circumstances. 5
The Tenth Circuit disposed of Namet by distinguishing it
factually." Without discussing the explicit language in Coppola
that lent support to Martin's argument,27 the court observed that
both Coppola and Namet really stood for the evidentiary proposi-
tion that the prosecution should not be allowed to ask questions
certain to produce a claim of privilege and with it an atmosphere
of guilt." The court reasoned that both Coppola and Namet ac-
tually stood for the proposition that a defendant should not be
allowed to use the same tactic to produce an atmosphere of inno-
cence.
B. United States v. Eitel
In the Eitel decision, the court did not attempt to define the
scope of a witness' fifth amendment right nor did the court dis-
cuss the issue raised by Eitel concerning his sixth amendment
right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.29
of the jury. In Namet, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim
that reversible error occurred when a prosecutor was allowed to call witnesses who then
invoked their testimonial privilege. The Court stated several reasons for its holding: First,
the prosecutor honestly believed the witnesses did not have a legitimate right to claim the
privilege and therefore no prosecutorial misconduct was involved; second, the witnesses
gave considerable nonprivileged testimony that corroborated the Government's case; fi-
nally, the few claims of privilege did not add critical weight to the Government's case but
at most constituted cumulative support for inferences already well established by the
nonprivileged portion of the testimony of the witnesses. 373 U.S. at 186-89.
In Coppola, the Tenth Circuit read Namet as supportive of the proposition "that the
privilege is not a prohibition against inquiry and cannot be effectively raised before the
question is asked and is applicable only to particular questions." 479 F.2d at 1160. Never-
theless, the court in Coppola found that reversible error had occurred, holding that the
conduct of the Government fell within that part of the Namet opinion prohibiting the
conscious efforts by a prosecutor to raise inferences adverse to the defendant from a
witness' claiming the self-incrimination privilege.
" United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); Bowles v. United States,
439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
" After briefly reiterating the facts and holding of Namet, the court stated: "In thus
holding the Court observed that no constitutional issues were involved, only a claim of
'evidentiary trial error.' This observation is equally applicable to the present case. Namet,
then, is clearly distinguishable on the facts." 526 F.2d at 487.
See note 24 supra.
526 F.2d at 487.
The only reference in the opinion indicating the court had given any consideration
to Eitel's sixth amendment claim occurred in a footnote. Therein the Tenth Circuit indi-
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Instead, the court again relied on authorities in other circuits that
had confronted similar factual situations. 0 Specifically, the court
adopted the evidentiary rationale stated by the majority opinion
in Bowles v. United States:3'
It is well settled that the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences
from the decision of a witness to exercise his constitutional privilege
whether those inferences be favorable to the prosecution or the de-
fense. The rule is grounded not only in the constitutional notion that
guilt may not be inferred from the exercise of the Fifth Amendment
privilege but also in the danger that a witness' invoking the Fifth
Amendment in the presence of the jury will have a disproportionate
impact on their deliberations. The jury may think it high courtroom
drama of probative significance when a witness "takes the Fifth."
In reality the probative value of the event is almost entirely under-
cut by the absence of any requirement that the witness justify his
fear of incrimination and by the fact that it is a form of evidence
not subject to cross-examination.2
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Boundaries of a Witness' Fifth Amendment Privilege
There is considerable authority for the proposition relied on
by both Martin and Eitel that a witness' fifth amendment privi-
lege, unlike that of a defendant, does not give a witness the right
to refuse to be called to the stand.3 According to this notion, the
privilege of the witness, as opposed to that of a defendant, is
merely an option of refusal and not a prohibition against all in-
cated that it had examined the dissenting opinions in Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d
536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971), and United States v. Beye, 445
F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971), but found the majority opinions more convincing. No. 75-1537
at 7 n.2. For a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinion in those two cases, see
text accompanying notes 57-65 and 75-79 infra.
11 United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Beye,
445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971). In addition to the cases cited in Martin, the court in Eitel
relied on United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971).
31 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
3'2 439 F.2d at 541 (citations omitted). Significantly, the Tenth Circuit did not articu-
late a rule absolutely proscribing a trial court from ever allowing a witness to be called
by the defense in this kind of situation. However, while leaving the ultimate decision to
the sound discretion of the trial court, the Tenth Circuit gave no indication of the factors
a lower court should consider in making its decision.
33 See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvIDNCE § 136 (1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2268
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); and authorities cited in note 34 infra.
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quiry. Thus, the privilege requires that questions normally be put
to a witness on the stand while he is under oath. 4
The reason for requiring that witnesses actually submit to
questioning before asserting the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination arises from the nature of the privilege
itself. The privilege is available only if a particular response falls
within the narrow scope of the privilege's protection. 35 Because
the judge, and not the witness, is the ultimate arbiter of this
question, a decision on the propriety of allowing the witness to
assert the privilege cannot be made until the question has been
put to the witness and he has stated the basis for his refusal to
answer.
31
If one accepts this rationale, it does not necessarily follow
that a witness should be required to assert his privilege before the
jury. If the purpose of requiring the witness to take the stand is
to insure that the privilege is not improperly used, that goal can
be accomplished in an in camera hearing out of the jury's pres-
ence. This is precisely the procedure suggested by several courts
that have faced the problem in situations similar to that found
in Martin and Eitel. 37 It is also the procedure followed by the trial
11 The cases articulating this rule tend to fall into three factually distinct categories.
First, there is a group of cases involving criminal trials where the rule is stated as dictum.
See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 424 U.S. 648 (1976);
United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971); People v. Hannon, 50 Misc. 2d
297, 270 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1962). Second, there are cases involving witnesses called before a
grand jury or other investigative body with subpoena powers. See, e.g., Hutcheson v.
United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); United States v. Cefalu, 338 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1964).
Finally, there are cases in which a prosecutor has called a witness and the witness has
stood on his fifth amendment privilege before the jury. United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d
1153 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965); Marcello v.
United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952); Commonwealth v. Donatelli, 202 Pa. Super.
565, 198 A.2d 338 (1964). The precedential value of the last two groups of cases is weakened
by the factual differences between these situations and the situations found in Eitel and
Martin. Moreover, when analyzed in terms of the rule's rationale, discussed in the text
accompanying notes 35-39 infra, the unqualified statement of the rule found in these cases
becomes highly suspect.
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvIDENCE § 136 (1972).
Id. In addition to making certain that the witness has a legitimate right to invoke
the privilege, requiring the witness to take the stand and plead his fifth amendment
privilege while under oath after specific questions have been put to him arguably serves
the additional purpose of testing the witness' resolve to stand on the privilege.
37 United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Beye,
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court in Eitel, and implicitly approved by the Tenth Circuit."
Absent an in camera hearing similar to the one held by the
trial court in Eitel,35 where the witness' privilege is actually put
to the test, the rule and its rationale should control. The trial
court in Martin arguably erred to the extent that it failed to
conduct a hearing of this sort.
B. A Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory
Process
The sixth amendment guarantees to every criminal defen-
dant the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses to testify
at his trial." This right was made applicable to state criminal
proceedings through the fourteenth amendment in Washington v.
Texas. 4
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "few
rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses in his own behalf." 2 However, the right is not absolute.
In Chambers v. Mississippi43 the Court made it explicitly clear
that "in exercising this right the accused must comply with es-
tablished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both
fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and inno-
cence."44 More recently, in United States v. Nobles,45 the Court
445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
No. 75-1537 at 9.
" See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
" The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states in part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" 388 U.S. 14 (1967). For further discussion of this case, see notes 66-68 infra.
1 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (citations omitted).
'3 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers the defendant sought to introduce the testimony
of three persons to whom another, McDonald, had confessed to having committed the
murder for which Chambers was being tried. The trial court excluded the evidence as
hearsay. The Supreme Court reversed and noted that, in this situation, the hearsay bore
the assurances of trustworthiness and also fell within the traditional exception for declara-
tions against interest. The Court then went on to say: "That testimony also was critical
to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affect-
ing the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied me-
chanistically to defeat the ends of justice." Id. at 302.
I /d.
422 U.S. 225 (1975). In Nobles the defendant attempted to impeach the credibility
of a government witness by using statements obtained from the witness by a defense
investigator. When defense counsel indicated he did not intend to produce the investiga-
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reaffirmed this qualifying language, noting that "[tihe Sixth
Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free
from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system . . .,.
Implicit in the holdings of these cases is the recognition that the
Supreme Court has accorded to the rules of evidence and also to
discretionary evidentiary rulings a constitutional dimension cap-
able of overriding an express constitutional guarantee.
Only two circuit court decisions have directly addressed the
sixth amendment issue raised by Eitel in a factually analogous
context.4 Neither case was cited by the Tenth Circuit. In Myers
v. Frye"5 the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that
he should be allowed to have a witness invoke the fifth amend-
ment before the jury. The court held that "[t]he Sixth Amend-
ment does not operate to prevent a state from adopting any limi-
tations on defense evidence in criminal trials, but only prevents
the adoption of broad arbitrary limitations." 9 The court saw the
refusal to allow the defendant to call the witness as neither broad
nor arbitrary." In United States v. Roberts5 the Ninth Circuit
said that the sixth amendment right "must be considered in light
of its purpose, namely, to produce testimony."" Since the wit-
ness' refusal to testify would not be testimonial in the literal sense
of that word, calling a witness who would refuse to testify did not
fulfill that purpose.53
tor's complete report, the trial court ruled that the investigator could not testify concern-
ing his interviews with the witness. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding
that the disclosure condition was improper. The Supreme Court then reversed the court
of appeals. In the decision, the Court rejected the defendant's sixth amendment claim,
and held that the evidentiary ruling was within the trial court's discretion in order to
assure that the jury would hear the full testimony from the investigator rather than only
a truncated portion favorable to the defendant. Id. at 240-41.
' Id. at 241.
17 United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113
(1975); Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968). For other courts that have spoken to
the scope of the right in other contexts, see Wisconsin ex rel. Monsoor v. Gagnon, 497 F.2d
1126 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. De Stefano, 476 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1973). Several
other circuit courts have implicitly rejected Eitel's sixth amendment argument. See note
30 supra.
' 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968).
11 Id. at 21.
'- Id.
503 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975).




Other circuits that have faced the kind of situation presented
by Eitel and Martin have side-stepped the sixth amendment
issue entirely.54 Rather than confront the difficult constitutional
question posed by this kind of situation, they have relied on a
purely evidentiary rationale, refusing to acknowledge that the
rationale itself had constitutional dimensions. 5
C. The Evidentiary Rationale
The reasoning adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Martin and
Eitel accurately reflects the approach to this problem taken by
the courts generally. The focus is not on the defendant's sixth
amendment right, nor on the extent of a witness' fifth amend-
ment privilege; rather, the primary concern is with the eviden-
tiary ramifications of allowing inferences to be drawn by a jury
from the assertion by a witness of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
This evidentiary rationale was succinctly stated in that por-
tion of the majority opinion in Bowles v. United States5 quoted
by the Tenth Circuit in Eitel.57 This evidentiary concern seems
to involve three elements: the "constitutional notion" that guilt
should not be inferred from the exercise of the fifth amendment
privilege; the inability to subject the evidence to cross-
examination; 5 and the potential danger of a jury giving undue
probative significance to a witness' pleading the fifth amend-
ment.
The first element, the "constitutional notion" referred to by
the majority in Bowles, really has no application to a witness, as
opposed to a defendant, asserting the fifth amendment privi-
lege. 9 Since the witness is not on trial, his constitutional right to
remain silent is not endangered by requiring him to take the
stand or by allowing the jury to draw inferences from his silence.60
4 See note 30 supra.
'1 See note 26 supra.
- 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
s See text accompanying note 31 supra.
For an excellent analysis of the majority opinion in Bowles, see Comment, An
Extension of the Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination, 52 B.U.L. Rlv. 149
(1972).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 157.
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Similarly, the inability to subject this kind of evidence to
direct cross-examination should not be accorded undue weight."
In the first place, the prosecutor will be able to appeal to the
jurors' natural skepticism of any attempt on the part of the ac-
cused to place the blame on another. 2 He will also be able to
impeach the silent witness by raising inferences concerning the
possibility of undue influence or ulterior motives . 3 In addition,
in the context of a criminal proceeding it does not necessarily
follow that the Government's right to cross-examine should be
deemed paramount to the defendant's right to compulsory pro-
cess. 4 Where the two rights cannot be accommodated in the con-
text of a criminal trial involving a defendant clothed with the
traditional protections of an accused, the balance arguably falls
in favor of permitting the defendant to raise the inference for
whatever value it might possess. 5
The third element, which involves a combined concern with
the unreliability of the inferences and potential prejudice to the
prosecutor, would seem to be the crux of the rationale. Since the
courts have allowed this evidentiary concern to effectively over-
ride the defendant's sixth amendment right to present witnesses
in his own behalf, a careful analysis of this aspect of the rationale
is necessary.
In Washington v. Texas,66 the Supreme Court held that if a
defense witness' testimony is relevant and material, it should be
admitted. 7 Unless the evidence can be excluded for some legiti-
6, Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 545 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
:2 439 F.2d at 545 n.13.
63 Id.
64 United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., dissent-
ing).
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 121 at 256 n.77 (1972).
66 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
67 Washington involved the attempt of a defendant to call as a witness another indi-
vidual who had already been convicted of the same crime. Texas statutes proscribed this
practice. TEx. REv. CODE ANN. art. 82 (1925) (repealed 1967); TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN.
art. 711 (1925) (repealed 1965). The Court formulated the issue of the case to be "whether
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right under any circumstances to put
his witnesses on the stand, as well as the right to compel their attendance in court." 388
U.S. at 19. After noting that the right to offer the testimony of witnesses is the right to
present a defense and is therefore a fundamental element of due process of law, Chief
Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
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mate reason, refusing to admit relevant and material evidence
violates a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to compul-
sory process."
In order for evidence to be considered relevant and material
for the purposes of admissibility it does not have be be completely
free from alternative interpretations; it is only necessary that the
evidence tend to increase the likelihood of the defendant's guilt
or innocence. 9 The inferences to be drawn from a witness' plead-
ing the fifth amendment clearly meet this test.7 0 Consequently,
if a court refuses to allow an accused to call a witness solely
because it believes the inferences to be drawn by the jury from
that evidence are unreliable or ambiguous, in the sense that more
than one logical inference follows from the invocation of the privi-
lege, the court would be disallowing relevant and material testi-
mony in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right.
We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State
arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had person-
ally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material
to the defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit
the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of
witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use. The judgment of convic-
tion must be reversed.
Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).
The Court also stated in a footnote that: "Nothing in this opinion should be construed
as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination
..... "Id. at 23 n.21. At least one court has interpreted this to mean that if the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right directly conflicts with a witness' fifth amendment right, the
former must give way to the latter. In other words, a witness cannot be forced to incrimi-
nate himself because his testimony would be relevant and material to the defendant's
defense. Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Neb. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 482
F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973).
11 See notes 43-45 and 67 supra.
'9 C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185 (1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 38
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1940). See Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908), where
the Court stated:
The competency of a collateral fact to be used as the basis of legitimate
argument is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it
may afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry, or to assist, though remotely,
to a determination probably founded in truth.
Id. at 451 (citing Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 164 (1892)).
10 The probative value of such inferences has generally been conceded. See United
States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959); Comment, Exercise of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination by Witnesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the
Accused, 33 U. CI. L. REv. 151, 159 (1965).
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The issue of relevancy and materiality was effectively con-
ceded by the Bowles majority in their formulation of the problem.
The primary concern of the majority was not that the inferences
were lacking in probative value, but that the jury might accord
these very logical inferences undue weight.7 Thus, the court's real
concern was with the potential prejudicial effect to the prosecu-
torial function in allowing the evidence. This concern with preju-
dice, as distinguished from unreliability, arguably saves the ra-
tionale from the constitutional dilemma posed by Washington.7 2
If the potential for prejudice is significant, this danger protects a
court that excludes the evidence from the charge of arbitrariness
condemned in Washington.73 However, even if the court disallows
the evidence on this basis, it is according greater weight to the
possibility of prejudice to the prosecutor than to the defendant's
constitutional right to present relevant and material evidence in
his defense. This result can only be justified if the danger of
prejudice is very great, and a court should indulge in a very care-
ful consideration of the comparative constitutional values in-
volved.
The courts have not dealt with the difficult tension that ex-
ists between an evidentiary concern with potential prejudice to
the prosecutor and the defendant's constitutional right to present
evidence in his defense. Instead, the Bowles court and its progeny
have approached and resolved the problem by analogizing to pre-
cedents dealing with a fundamentally different situation-
prosecutorial attempts to raise inferences adverse to a defendant
by having a government witness stand on his fifth amendment
rights in the presence of the jury.7"
D. The Prosecutorial Precedents
A fundamental weakness in the majority's analysis in
Bowles, as adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Martin and Eitel, is
the reliance upon precedents involving prosecutorial attempts to
"' See text accompanying note 32 supra.
72 See note 67 supra.
13 See note 67 supra.
1, Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963); United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d
1153 (10th Cir. 1973); Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1964); Billeci v.




use this kind of evidence.75 Chief Justice Bazelon rightly pointed
out in his dissent in Bowles that the reasoning of these cases did
not necessarily apply to a situation in which it is the defense, and
not the prosecutor, that is attempting to raise the inferences." In
this situation the defendant is merely attempting to use the
other's refusal to testify as corroboration for other evidence pre-
sented in his defense." When the prosecutor uses this tactic it is
equivalent to an outright denial of the defendant's fifth amend-
ment right to remain silent because it is equivalent to using the
defendant's own silence as an element of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. 8 By contrast, when an accused suggests by inference
that another person is culpable, no equivalent right residing in
the prosecutor is impinged, unless the threat of prejudice is
deemed sufficiently great to trigger the due process protections
discussed earlier.
79
The two situations are simply not analogous. But rather than
abandon the analogy with all its inappropriate analytical bag-
gage, the courts have steadfastly refused to engage the difficult
constitutional and evidentiary questions that lurk beneath its
simple symmetry.
71 See note 74 supra.
76 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995
(1971). Judge Bazelon stated: "The position of a defendant asserting his Sixth Amend-
ment right to bring witnesses before the jury is not analogous to that of a prosecutor
attempting to insinuate that a defendant is guilty because his confederates refuse to
answer incriminating questions." 439 F.2d at 545 n.11.
7 Id.
79 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra. In People v. Dikeman, 555 P.2d 519
(Colo. 1976), the Colorado Supreme Court faced essentially the same situation that the
Tenth Circuit confronted in Martin and Eitel. The defendant sought to call a witness who
had originally been charged with first degree assault arising out of the same shooting that
led to the defendant's indictment. However, prior to the trial, the charges against the
witness were dismissed for lack of probable cause. The defendant maintained that it was
the witness who had in fact committed the assault.
Knowing that the witness would stand on his fifth amendment right, and over the
objection of the prosecutor, the trial court permitted the defendant to call the witness and
cause him to invoke his testimonial privilege before the jury. The jury subsequently
acquitted the defendant.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court. Following the established ap-
proach, the court analogized to precedents involving a prosecutor's attempt to use this
kind of evidence. According to the court, consistency required that the defendant and
prosecutor be treated alike. Without articulating it in these precise terms, the underlying
rationale seemed to involve the recognition of something akin to a right of due process
residing in the prosecutor.
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CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Martin and Eitel are most
susceptible to criticism for their failure squarely to confront the
fifth and sixth amendment issues raised by these appellants. By
relying on decisions that had in turn relied on and analogized to
precedents involving a prosecutor's attempt to raise inferences
adverse to a defendant, the court compounded its error.
A defendant's attempt to raise inferences in his own favor by
calling a witness he knows will stand on his fifth amendment
privilege does involve an evidentiary problem. Accordingly, it was
not entirely inappropriate for the court to focus on this eviden-
tiary concern. However, the question of the probative and preju-
dicial value of inferences to be drawn by a jury from a witness'
assertion of the fifth amendment privilege has unique constitu-
tional dimensions which do not come into play when a prosecutor
uses the same tactic.
To the extent that this kind of evidence is offered by a defen-
dant for the purposes of showing the existence of possibilities
other than the defendant's guilt, it is relevant and material to the
defense. Absent a compelling right of constitutional dimensions
residing in the prosecutor that would justify the exclusion of this
admittedly probative evidence, the defendant's sixth amendment
right should control, and the evidence should be allowed. In order
to exclude the evidence the court must, at the very minimum,
find that the potential prejudice to the prosecutorial function
outweighs the defendant's constitutional right to use the evidence
in his defense. This difficult constitutional balancing poses a crit-
ical issue that the Tenth Circuit completely failed to address.
Viewed in this light, the court's result in Martin and Eitel
becomes questionable. Allowing the speculative danger of preju-
dice to the prosecutor to take precedence over a defendant's con-
stitutional right arguably recasts the traditional balance of ad-
vantage in a criminal proceeding. Giving the benefit of any doubt
to the prosecutor arguably tips the scales of justice in a manner




FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE'
A. Rule 13, Counterclaims in Interpleader Actions
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Division'
was an interpleader action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 in which
one of the defendants asserted a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff, Liberty Bank. Liberty had sold an oil drilling rig in which
appellee Hazel Bailey held a security interest subject to Liberty's
prior security interest. The sale was held to retire the debt of the
owner of the rig. Liberty had no experience in the sale of such
equipment and thus received far less than the value of the rig.
The receipts of the sale were sufficient to pay off the debt to
Liberty and the sale expenses but little more. Liberty filed suit
in interpleader and deposited the remaining funds for distribu-
tion to the remaining creditors. Mrs. Bailey filed a counterclaim
alleging that she had a security interest in the rig and that the
sale was not properly conducted. 3 The trial court found for Mrs.
Bailey in the amount of her security interest, $19,000, plus attor-
ney's fees.
Liberty maintained on appeal that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to entertain the counterclaim under the Tenth Circuit rule
barring consideration of any issue other than entitlement to the
sum deposited in an interpleader action. Liberty relied on the
proposition that it was a mere disinterested stakeholder and thus
not an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rule 13.'
In earlier cases, the Tenth Circuit had held that an inter-
pleader claimant could not maintain a counterclaim against a
disinterested stakeholder.' It has been pointed out that the Tenth
I All references to rules in this section are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
' Mrs. Bailey's claim was based on the OKLAHOMA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
504 (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-504 (1963)) which requires that such sales be carried
out in a "commercially reasonable manner."
' Rule 13 allows the filing of either compulsory or permissive counterclaims against
"opposing parties."
In First Nat'l Bank v. Johnson County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 331 F.2d 325, 327
(10th Cir. 1964), the court, in dictum, stated that a disinterested stakeholder was not an
opposing party and the district court thus had no jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim.
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Circuit stood alone in this interpretation of Rule 13(a) .6
Applying the "logical relation" test7 between the claim and
counterclaim, the court held that Mrs. Bailey's counterclaim was
compulsory.8 She therefore risked losing her claim altogether if it
could not be maintained in the present action. Since there are no
policy considerations against allowing such counterclaims and
since Rule 13 does not bar the maintenance of compulsory coun-
terclaims in interpleader actions, the court held that there was
no good reason to disallow the counterclaim in this case.' In so
holding, the court expressly overruled its earlier decisions insofar
as they barred the interposition of compulsory counterclaims in
interpleader actions.'" Apparently, though, permissive counter-
claims, i.e., those arising out of independent transactions, are
still barred in the Tenth Circuit.
B. Rule 15, Amendments to Pleadings
In R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.1 defendant-appellant
Ralston Purina appealed from a judgment in an implied warranty
action brought under the Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code,"
seeking reversal on the issue of damages. Appellant claimed that
the lower court erred in allowing appellee to amend its complaint
on remand, 13 thereby allowing plaintiff-appellee to redefine its
damages claims and greatly increase the amount with the result
In Erie Bank v. United States Dist. Court, 362 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1966), the court adopted
the dictum of First Nat'l Bank and made it the rule in the Tenth Circuit. In Knoll v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967),
the court upheld the earlier holdings. However, Knoll was based on a transaction which
was independent of that giving rise to the interpleader action, i.e., a permissive counter-
claim.
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1715, at 448 (1972).
See Pipeliners Local 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1974). The test is
met when the original claims and counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occur-
rence and logically relate because of their common origin. Id.
540 F.2d at 1379.
Id. at 1380.
lo Id. at 1381. The court specifically overruled First Nat'l Bank, Erie Bank, and Knoll,
supra note 5, to the extent they disallowed compulsory counterclaims. Id.
11 525 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 WYo. STAT. §§ 34-2-314, -315 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
11 The case had been before the circuit court before in R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina,
No. 73-1627 (10th Cir., Apr. 17, 1974) (not for Routine Publication). Defendant had been
adjudged liable for breach of implied warranty, but the cause was remanded on the issue
of damages because the trial judge had failed to give any instructions on the matter of
damages.
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that the verdict on retrial was more than twice that originally
awarded. 4 The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion either in allowing the particular amendments or in
doing so after remand. 5
The court went on to explain that Rule 15(a) "contemplates
allowing amendments freely when justice requires." Two factors
were cited as determining whether an amendment should be al-
lowed: (1) Whether it will cause delay and (2) whether the adver-
sary will suffer prejudice. The timing of the offer of an amend-
ment, i.e., following remand, does not of itself require denial of
leave to amend. In the case at bar, the court noted that the
amendments did not raise substantially different issues, nor did
they complicate the proceeding." There was thus no error in al-
lowing the requested amendments. 9
In Dell v. Heard"5 the Tenth Circuit addressed a problem
arising under Rule 15(b).21 Plaintiff-appellant argued that the
election of parties defense used by appellee was not properly
raised in appellee's answer. But since appellant had not objected
to the election defense as later amplified by appellee, the court
held that the issue was tried by the implied consent of the par-
ties."2
In New v. Utility Equipment Co. International3 the court
reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend the plain-
tiff's complaint since leave to amend should be "freely given
when justice so requires ' 24 and where no prejudice to the opposing
party will result.
25
1, 525 F.2d at 751. Under the new complaint, damages of $262,000 were awarded as




1 Id. at 752. The court pointed out that the issues of future profit losses and diminu-
tion of the value of property were present in the first trial. Id.
19 Id.
- 532 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Rule 15(b) provides: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings."
532 F.2d at 1332.
No. 75-1565 (10th Cir., Apr. 22, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
v Id. at 4.
2 Id.
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The court went on to hold that the statute of limitations did
not bar the amended claim since, under Rule 15(c), it related
back. 2 The proper test for determining whether an amendment
should be allowed to relate back was held to be whether the
opposing party had notice of the underlying fact situation and
whether substantial prejudice would result.
27
These amendment decisions indicate a continuing willing-
ness to construe Rule 15 liberally so long as no one is unduly
prejudiced by such construction.
C. Class Actions
1. Rule 23
In Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.21 defendant Safeway was
accused of discriminatory employment practices. 29 Plaintiff Tay-
lor sought relief both individually and as a class representative
30
but the district court narrowed the class claim. 3' At issue was
whether Taylor met the prerequisites for a class action under Rule
23(a) .32
The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court determination that
Taylor did not meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3)
as defined in White v. Gates Rubber Co.:3 The plaintiff must
"demonstrate that other members of the class he purports to
" Rule 15(c) states: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading."
" No. 75-1565 at 4.
, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
Safeway was charged with violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16, and with violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
" Taylor sought to represent the class of those "Negro persons who are employed,
have been employed, or might have been in the past or will in the future be employed by
Safeway .. .in its various wholesale, retail, and distribution centers throughout ...
Colorado." 524 F.2d at 266.
1' The class was narrowed to include only "Negroes employed at the frozen food
warehouse in the Denver distribution center." Id. at 266-67.
, Under Rule 23(a), one or more members of a class may sue or be sued on behalf of
a class only if:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.
u 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
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represent [actual, not hypothetical complainants] have suffered
the same [or similar] grievances of which he complains." 3' After
summarily rejecting Taylor's claim that Title VII claims are not
subject to Rule 23, the court noted that there has been a failure
by the courts to give subsection (a)(3) a commonly accepted
meaning and that it is difficult to interpret (a)(3) in such a way
as not to be duplicative of subsection (a)(4) .1 The court then
accepted the White rationale that since (a)(3) was included as a
prerequisite it must have an independent meaning (that meaning
being that class action plaintiffs must at least establish that
"there is in fact a class needing representation") and that any
inquiry into typicality requires a comparison of the claims or
defenses of the representative with the claims or defenses of the
class.36
In the case at bar, the court upheld the trial court finding
that Taylor failed to show the existence of any discriminatory
practices outside the warehouse in which he was employed and
concluded that the trial court had no alternative but to limit the
class accordingly. 7 The court also rejected Taylor's contention
that his "across the board" attack of Safeway's employment
practices was sufficient to sustain the class claim, especially since
that argument, too, would render subsection (a)(3) superfluous.3
In Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc.31 the court reversed a
lower court finding that the plaintiffs were not representative of
the class involved. 0 The lower court's reliance on the facts that
one plaintiff was not indigent nor a resident of the local Navajo
reservation and that another lived out of state (but within fifty
31 524 F.2d at 269 (quoting White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo.
1971)).
u 524 F.2d at 269-70. In fact, both (a)(3) and (a)(4) were derived from a single phrase
in the original Rule 23: "one or more [representatives], as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all .... " Id.
-u 524 F.2d at 270 (quoting White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo.
1971)).
31 524 F.2d at 270.
11 Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that it would be "unrealistic" for a court to compare
plaintiff's claims and defenses with the hypothetical claims of a hypothetical class. Id. at
270-71.
3' 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975).
Relief was sought on behalf of "all persons of Navajo Indian descent who live in or
near the City of Farmington, New Mexico or frequent that city such as that might be
expected to seek emergency care in San Juan Hospital." Id. at 1183.
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miles) was deemed misplaced since the plaintiffs did not purport
to represent only indigent reservation residents.4
Then, in apparent contradiction to Taylor, the court noted
that subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) are often seen as duplicative,
completely ignoring the White rationale.42 However, the issue was
resolvable without this dicta since under the facts the plaintiffs
were indeed found to have met the typicality requirement; the
court held that all that was neccessary was that the claims of the
plaintiffs and of the other class members be based on the same
legal or remedial theory, thus in effect reverting to the White
test. 3
The court also reversed the district court's denial of a perma-
nent injunction because of noncompliance with Rule 65(a)(2)."
The lower court had consolidated the permanent injunction issue
with a preliminary injunction hearing without the appropriate
court order thus depriving the parties of proper notice.
In Hernandez v. Gray15 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district
court dismissal of a class action on the ground that a class action
may not be maintained by a putative representative who is not a
member of the class. Plaintiffs failed to establish a case or contro-
versy against the defendant because they had voluntarily left
their jobs for reasons unrelated to the present claim of discrimina-
tion.
In Royal Resources Corp. v. Bottger (In re King Resources
Co. Securities Litigation)" the court considered the question of
the propriety of a class certification in a complicated securities
case in which 16,000 individuals with diverse interests consti-
tuted the class. In spite of the chance of such great expense to
the defendants as to constitute irreparable harm, the court dis-
missed the appeal as premature since the trial court had yet to
Id. at 1188-89. See purported class note 40 supra.
528 F.2d at 1189 (citing 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.06-2 (1971)). See text
accompanying note 35 supra.
11 528 F.2d at 1189. Requiring that the claims of the class and its representatives be
based on the same legal theory differs very little from requiring a comparison of the claims
of the representatives with the claims of the class and finding a class in fact needing
representation.
11 Id. at 1186. Rule 65(a)(2) authorizes the consolidation of a preliminary injunction
hearing with a trial on the merits by court order but provides that the subsection is to be
so construed "as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury."
-s 530 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1976).
46 525 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1975).
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seek to create subclasses and was presently narrowing the
issues."
In Ryan v. Shea"8 the district court had held that "because
the class [was] formed pursuant to [Rule 23(b)(2) rather than
(b)(3)] no notice to the members of the class [was] required."'"
Since there was no objection to this ruling at the trial level, the
Tenth Circuit did not directly address the question, but did note
that district courts in the circuit have ruled that prejudgment
notice is not required when the action is brought under 23(b)(2).10
2. Other Rules as They Affect Class Actions
In Phillips v. Clark (In re Four Seasons Securities Laws
Litigation)5' plaintiff-appellant was an absent class member
who sought to be relieved of the class action judgment by filing a
motion under Rule 60(b).1s Appellant claimed he had new infor-
mation of which he was unaware at the time judgment was en-
tered. The court rejected his claim, holding that appellant was
represented by the actual parties of the class, thus making their
knowledge of the information imputable to him as well.
53
The court also held that appellant did not become a "party"
for purposes of 60(b) since he took no action, upon adequate
notice, to identify himself with the court proceedings. 4 It was
stated that the fact absent classmembers are bound by a judg-
11 Id. at 213. The court did not expressly rely on Rule 23(c)(4), but that rule provides
that a class action may be brought in respect to particular issues or that a class may be
divided into subclasses, with each subclass treated as a class subject to the other provi-
sions of Rule 23.
525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975).
, Id. at 275. Rule 23(b)(2) allows class actions where the opposing party has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making final injunc-
tive relief or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Rule
23(b)(3) allows class actions where the questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and where a class
action is superior to other available methods for resolving the controversy. Rule 23(c)(2)
expressly requires notice only in actions maintained under 23(b)(3) and does not mention
notice in regard to (b)(2) actions.
50 525 F.2d at 275.
51 525 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
52 Rule 60(b) allows motions by a party or his legal representative for relief from a
final judgment on several grounds, the relevant ones here being based on lack of knowl-
edge.
" 525 F.2d at 502.
Id. at 504.
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ment does not in itself make such members "parties" for 60(b)
purposes. 5
In Burdick Contractors, Inc. v. Nelson56 the court stated the
rule that a class action where there has been adequate notice and
representation bars individual suits arising from the same trans-
actions, but upheld the separate claims in the present case on the
particular facts.
Hellerstein v. Mr. Steak, Inc. 57 presented the question of the
appealability of an interlocutory order granting class action sta-
tus. Defendant-appellant relied on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin8
for the proposition that such orders are "final decisions" within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus appealable. The Tenth
Circuit distinguished Eisen on the ground that in that case the
Supreme Court was influenced by a burdensome notice require-
ment in granting final order status, a factor not present in the
case at bar. 9 This keeps the Tenth Circuit in line with the pre-
vailing view that such orders are not appealable unless they
sound a "death knell" to the entire case or place an undue burden
on the parties. 0
D. Rule 54: Judgments and Third-Party Practice
United Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.6 arose
from Hartford's denial of coverage under a banker's blanket bond
issued to the United Bank of Pueblo for a cash letter stolen while
being transported to the United Bank of Denver. Hartford had
filed a third-party complaint against the Denver bank which was
severed from the original complaint for purposes of the trial. Ten
months after judgment had been entered against Hartford in the
original action, the Pueblo bank moved for entry of final judg-
ment under Rule 54(b)2 The motion was granted and Hartford
appealed.
Id.
, No. 75-1315 (10th Cir., Mar. 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
'T 531 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1976).
417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen III).
531 F.2d at 473.
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) (Eisen I).
" 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976).
, Rule 54(b) allows entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims
or parties where there are multiple claims or parties only upon express determination that
there is no just reason for delay.
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The Tenth Circuit noted that there is no precise test for
determining what constitutes "just cause for delay" but stated
the general rule that the determination rests on a balancing test,
weighing the policy of preventing "piecemeal appeals" against
the hardship or injustice that might be inflicted on a litigant by
further delay . 3 On balance, the most important factor in the
court's view was that the as yet unlitigated action between Hart-
ford and the Denver bank would be facilitated by entry of final
judgment in the principal claim since the second action depended
on that claim. 4 It was thus concluded that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in granting the motion. 5
E. Rule 56: Summary Judgment
In Taylor v. Branch66 the court, reversing the lower court's
grant of summary judgment for defendant, reiterated the rule
that summary judgment should be granted only when the moving
party has established the absence of any genuine issue as to a
material fact. 7 But the court had to consider two other questions
in regard to Rule 56 as well. The first was whether a plaintiff
waives the right to challenge such a motion by failing to file
opposing affidavits or other evidence. Ordinarily, a plaintiff may
not rest on his pleadings in opposing a motion for summary judg-
ment, 8 but the court held that this case fell within a recognized
exception: A plaintiff may rest on his pleadings where the evi-
dence supporting the motion fails to show the absence of a genu-
ine issue as to any material fact.69 The second issue was whether
a formal hearing is required. The court held that a formal hearing
may be avoided by adoption of a local rule,70 thus adopting the
" 529 F.2d at 492.
*, Id. at 493. In fact, the court noted that final judgment was beneficial because if
Hartford's liability were to be reversed on appeal, the whole third-party action would be
moot. Id.
' Id.
" No. 75-1072 (10th Cir., Oct. 20, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
7 Id. at 3 (citing Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d
168 (10th Cir. 1974); James v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1972)).
" No. 75-1072 at 5.
Id. at 5 (citing Sterner Aero AB v. Page AirMotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974); Riggs v. British Commonwealth Corp., 459 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1972)).
70 No. 75-1072 at 6. The court cited Rule 78, which reads as follows:
Unless local conditions make it impracticable, each district court shall
establish regular times and places, at intervals sufficiently frequent for the
1977
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view of the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.7 However,
the court indicated that absent a local rule, a formal hearing
might be required," but since there was no evidence to show
whether the district court had such a rule, the lower court's action
was assumed proper in this regard.7"
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. In Rem-In Personam Jurisdiction
In the past year the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals twice
recognized the fine distinction between in rem7' and in personam
proceedings.75 Both cases involved an Oklahoma statute7" which
controls jurisdiction in trust cases.
In Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. v. Metcalf State Bank77
revenue bondholders sued the trustee pursuant to a mortgage
indenture relating to the bond issue. Defendant Metcalf and the
bond issuer Claremore sued in state court in 1972 for liquidation
of the trust property. When the plaintiff bondholders subse-
quently sued alleging breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by
the co-trustees, the federal district court dismissed their com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction.
prompt dispatch of business, at which motions requiring notice and hearing
may be heard and disposed of; but the judge at any time or place and on
such notice, if any, as he considers reasonable may make orders for the
advancement, conduct, and hearing of actions.
To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order
for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon
brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.
71 See Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. Howard, 459
F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1972); Season-All Indus., Inc. v. Turkiye Sise Ve Cam Fabrikalari, A.S.,
425 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1970); Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 985 (1964).
72 No. 75-1072 at 6 (citing Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964)).
7 No. 75-1072 at 6.
7 [J]urisdiction . . . could be asserted in rem or quasi in rem by basing
the court's ability to proceed on its power over local property or status rela-
tionships, rather than the presence of defendant himself . . . . [Hiowever,
the property or status had to be present within the borders of the court's
geographic domain.
4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070, by 266 (1969). See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
" See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
7S OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.23 (1971).
77 525 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1975).
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In Buck v. Hales s the alleged discretionary income benefici-
aries sued the co-trustees of the trust for wrongful payment under
the terms of a will. The plaintiffs requested the imposition of a
constructive trust on certain mineral interests and the forfeiture
of certain rights of other beneficiaries. Again, the federal district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In both cases the Tenth Circuit saw the nature of the pro-
ceeding as dispositive of the concurrent jurisdiction dilemma.
Precedent supported the rule of exclusive jurisdiction for the
court which first had possession of the trust property when con-
current in rem proceedings were filed in different courts.7" For the
Tenth Circuit, the key issue was whether the designation of a
proceeding as in rem by this Oklahoma statute0 was conclusive
in a federal action.
In Southwestern Bank the Tenth Circuit, applying the Erie
doctrine,"' held that the state statute's designation was not bind-
ing on the federal court. It found that the federal action existed
independently of the state statute and that the statute was
"really designed to place jurisdiction over the described causes of
action in a particular state court." 2 Ignoring the state statute's
designation of the action as in rem, the Tenth Circuit concen-
trated on three factors: (1) The lack of interference with the trust
property; (2) the breach of duty allegations not being brought in
the state suit; and (3) the relief requested being money damages.1
3
7N 536 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).
71 Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456
(1939); Kline v. Beuke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145
(10th Cir. 1970); Swanson v. Bates, 170 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948); Milam v. Sol Newman
Co., 205 F. Supp. 649 (D.C. Ala. 1962).
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.23(A) (1971) provides: "The district court shall have
original jurisdiction . . . in its discretion to supervise the administration of trusts; and
all actions hereunder are declared to be proceedings in rem."
" [T]he jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the dedendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now . . . due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).




Regardless of this statute's designation of trust administration
actions as in rem, the Tenth Circuit found the presence of these
three factors to indicate an in personam proceeding totally dis-
tinct from the state action.
In Buck the court reemphasized that the determinative fac-
tors identified in the analogous Southwestern Bank case 4 were
the remedy requested and the degree of interference with the
trust property which constituted the basis of the state court ac-
tions. In contrast with the plaintiff's complaint in Southwestern
Bank, the appellants in Buck had requested relief that, if
granted, would have greatly interfered with the state court's con-
tinuing supervision of the trust's administration. To have given
the appellants this relief would have directly contradicted the
state court's continuing directions to the trustee.5
The appellants also argued a second ground for their claim
of in personam jurisdiction in the federal court, namely, that the
assets they sought were no longer in the state court's possession,
but had already been distributed. This argument was summarily
rejected because "the actual handling of the trust property by the
fiduciaries" was a matter of administration within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state. 6
In Guarantee Reserve Life v. World Market Centers7 the
Tenth Circuit faced a similar jurisdictional conflict in an inter-
pleader action. Both the decedent's wife and the receiver for
World Market Centers, the decedent's employer, claimed the pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy on the decedent's life. Before the
filing of the interpleader action in federal court, the receiver al-
leged exclusive summary jurisdiction in the Texas Bankruptcy
" 536 F.2d at 1331-32.
, Id. at 1331. W.T. Hales died testate in 1938. The state court had construed various
terms of the trust since 1943. The trustees had been directed to follow a certain course of
action with respect to the trust property. The co-trustees had been given further adminis-
tration instructions in the ensuing years. The most recent judgment of the state court
construing the trust was entered March 26, 1975.
11 Id. at 1332 (quoting Kittredge v. Stevens, 126 F.2d 263, 267 (1st Cir. 1942)). The
Kittredge court cited Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939), as holding that
"where the 'contentions are solely as to administration' a federal court has no jurisdiction
over the suit even though the complainant may not be asking the court to grant relief
which would immediately affect a res within the custody of a state court." 126 F.2d at
267.
'" No. 74-1881 (10th Cir., Nov. 10, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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Court based on World Market Centers' possession of the policy.
Precedent clearly determined that an interpleader action is
an in personam proceeding and that the second concurrent action
is subject to the binding effects of the prior decision under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."5 The Tenth Cir-
cuit avoided the conceptual difficulties inherent in the applica-
tion of the "constructive possession" 9 doctrine by the Texas
Bankruptcy Court. Instead, the Tenth Circuit found that an in-
terpleader action begins with the filing of the insurance proceeds
with the clerk of the federal district court. The adverse nature of
the insurance company's possession of the proceeds and its
commencement of the interpleader action against the receiver
and the decedent's wife was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
federal court." The court then affirmed the district court's find-
ing on the merits that the receiver's evidence did not overcome
the decedent's wife's indicia of ownership.
B. Statutory Jurisdiction
In Cooper v. United States' a former inmate of Leavenworth
Penitentiary sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages
for an intentional injury caused by a fellow inmate. Citing United
States v. Denko,92 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Prison
Industries Fund93 provision was the exclusive remedy for such
actions. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the
"intentional" aspect of the tortfeasor-inmate's act removed the
action from the exclusive coverage of work related accidents en-
's See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
" Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966) (quoting Thompson v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940) (bankruptcy courts "have summary jurisdiction to
adjudicate controversies relating to property over which they have actual or constructive
possession"); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 431 (1924) (where the
rights of trustees to property adversely claimed were in issue, Congress could grant juris-
diction over the person who has possession of the property)).
" No. 74-1881 at 9. See In re Herz Impacting Corp., 349 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (insurer resisted claims of control by daughter and the bankruptcy trustee). This
type of interest, the heart of classic interpleaded cases, is, in effect, an adverse claim to
control of the fund.
91 No. 75-1461 (10th Cir., Dec. 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
-2 385 U.S. 149 (1966). See also Granade v. United States, 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1966);
Nobles v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Ga. 1963).
0 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970) (accident compensation for inmates).
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compassed by the Prison Industries Fund. Intentional injuries
were found to be distinguishable from accidental ones only within
the class of self-inflicted injuries .
4
In Melendez v. Singer-Friden Corp.95 the plaintiff alleged
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19646 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Injunctive relief was specifi-
cally requested only under the Title VII claim. On the Title VII
claim, the defendants obtained summary judgment because the
plaintiff filed too late and no equitable consideration justified the
tolling of the statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit, on review,
held that an appeal of the interlocutory order dismissing the
claim was properly granted. Relying on analogous precedent, 7 the
Tenth Circuit found that the posture and scope of the injunctive
relief requested was sufficiently curtailed by the partial summary
judgment to warrant its appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1).1s
In Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co.9 an unlawful job
discharge case, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the "two letter" proce-
dure of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).9 0 On May 30, 1973, the plaintiff received a letter from
the EEOC advising him that if he wanted to sue he should ask
9, 28 C.F.R. § 301.9 (1976). The federal prison regulations provide:
Injuries sustained by inmate workers willfully or with intent to injure some-
one else, or injuries suffered in any activity not directly related to their work
assignment are not compensable, and no claim for compensation for such
injuries will be considered. Any injury resulting from willful violation of rules
and regulations may prevent award of compensation.
529 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1976).
, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1970), as amended by Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-608, § 3(1), 88 Stat. 1972.
11 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 461 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir. 1972)
(summary judgment in trademark case denying injunctive relief appealable as an interlo-
cutory order); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972) (in request for injunctive relief
from police surveillance, the court's refusal to recognize a class considerably narrowed the
scope of any possible injunctive relief in the event plaintiffs prevailed on the merits and
thus was appealable as a denial of the relief requested); Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedito,
441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971) (order dismissing certain defendants in civil rights action
against whom injunction sought was appealable).
1' 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970) provides: "Jurisdiction will lie when . . . interlocu-
tory orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court .... "
" 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970).
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for a "right-to-sue" letter and that he would have ninety days
from the time he received that letter to bring suit. The right-to-
sue letter was requested and issued on December 6, 1973, and
Williams brought suit on March 6, 1974. Judgment was entered
for the defendant and both parties raised issues on appeal. South-
ern Union requested review of the jurisdiction of the trial court
on the ground that Williams' suit was brought too late.
Southern Union contended that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) the jurisdiction of a United States district court, in
a private enforcement action, was limited to a period of 270 days
from the date of the complaint's filing with the Commission. In
the alternative, Southern Union contended that Williams' failure
to bring suit within ninety days after receiving the initial letter
notifying him of the Commission's fruitless conciliation efforts
barred his action. 10
The Tenth Circuit cited the recent Eighth Circuit case, Tuft
v. McDonnell,"2 where that court faced the same jurisdictional
argument as that advanced by Southern Union. There, the
Eighth Circuit held that the 180-day period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f) is not a deadline for issuance of notice to a complaining party
by the Commission. 103 Relying upon precedent and the statute's
legislative history, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Commis-
sion could still bring suit after the 180-day period expired. 04 The
administrative proceeding was not finished until a decision was
made regarding the filing of suit. Only after this decision was the
aggrieved party entitled to be notified of his right to sue privately.
The Eighth Circuit found that the two-letter procedure com-
plied with the statute and, consequently, that the aggrieved
party's right to sue did not begin until he had received the right-
to-sue letter.0 5 The first letter in the two-letter sequence was
merely notice to the aggrieved party of the Commission's failure
at conciliation and not necessarily the end of the administrative
process. The issuance of the formal right-to-sue letter signaled
the termination of the administrative process.' °" Since the Com-
"' 529 F.2d at 486.
102 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1052 (1976).
" 517 F.2d at 1305-09.
104 Id.
I Id. at 1309.
'u Id. at 1307-09.
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mission had not exhausted its administrative remedies under
Title VII at the time of the first letter, there was no basis for
construing this letter as the statutory notice initiating the ninety-
day limitation period. The Tenth Circuit adopted the Eighth
Circuit's entire rationale and held that the trial court was correct
in asserting its subject matter jurisdiction. 7
C. Federal Tort Claims Act
The Tenth Circuit reviewed various tort actions against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act'° and its juris-
dictional counterpart. 109 These claims are of greater interest for
their applications of respective state law than for their jurisdic-
tional import. In the prior year, allegations of medical malprac-
tice," breach of duty from landowner to entrant,"' and federal
employee liability"' were asserted as grounds for federal tort
claims.
More informative than the jurisdictional aspects of Hartzell
v. United States"' was the Tenth Circuit's application of the
doctrine of Mile High Fence."' In 1971 the Colorado Supreme
Court replaced the traditional common law status classifications
of entrants upon another's land with the more flexible
"foreseeability and reasonable care" standard for landowners."'
Prior to Hartzell, the Tenth Circuit had applied this doctrine only
once, in 1972.116
"0 529 F.2d at 487.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
,0 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970) (United States as defendant).
,, Casias v. United States, No. 75-1595 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
" Tracey v. United States, No. 74-1633 (10th Cir., Oct. 17, 1975) (Not for Routine
Publication).
"I Turner v. United States, No. 75-1457 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication); Tunder v. United States, 522 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 75-1603 (10th Cir., Aug. 9, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
' Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
" The court in Mile High Fence stated:
It becomes obvious from an in depth analysis of the various sections and
comments of the Restatement, that status, particularly that of licensee or
invitee, is not the controlling determinant of liability. Again it is the foresee-
ability of harm from the failure by the possessor to carry on his activities with
reasonable care for the safety of the entrants which determines liability.
Id. at 547, 489 P.2d at 314.
"' Smith v. Mill Creek Court, Inc., 457 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1972).
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In Hartzell the plaintiff alleged that failure to remove dan-
gerous conditions or to warn spectators of them at an Air Force
Academy football game was unreasonable conduct. Citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court found that "reasonable
care on the part of the possessor. . . does not ordinarily require
precautions, or even a warning against dangers which are known
to the visitor, or so obvious to him.""' The Tenth Circuit has, in
this opinion and the 1972 Smith opinion, taken an approach that
is consistent with the applicability as well as the tenor of the
doctrine of Mile High Fence. "8
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the application of the res
ipsa loquitor doctrine in two suits against the United States. In
Udseth v. United States"9 the trial court refused to apply the
minority rule that the instructor pilot of a dual control aircraft is
responsible for the plane's operation. 20 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, stating that New Mexico law forbade the application of
res ipsa loquitor in the absence of any evidence as to who was in
control of the plane.'
In Federal Insurance Co. v. United States' the court allowed
the plaintiff to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor where a tank
exploded at the electroplating facility at Tinker Air Force Base,
Oklahoma. Even though the plaintiff could not prove which of
three possible theories accounted for the explosion, the district
court held that the identification of the precise instrumentality
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1964). For further discussion of the
importance and impact of the growing trend away from the traditional common law status
classifications, see Comment, Premise Liability: Foreseeable Emergence of the Com-
munity Standard, 51 DEN. L.J. 145 (1974).
"I The applicability of the Mile High Fence doctrine regardless of the plaintiff's
status seems to be the general tenor of the Tenth Circuit. The applicability of Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), was not extended beyond
the class of invitees in two subsequent cases. Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson, 16 Cal. App.
3d 881, 94 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1971); Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d
20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). See also Comment, supra note 117.
"' 530 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1976).
' For a discussion of the minority rule, see Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc.,
259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961).
' 530 F.2d at 862. There was no New Mexico case directly on point; consequently,
the views of the resident district judge were persuasive and ordinarily accepted. Stevens
v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir. 1975). The trial court had held the presumption
that the pilot in command was in exclusive control as not permissible.
1- 538 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1976).
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was sufficient for the doctrine's application. On the basis of this
precise identification, the lack of any defects in the tank's compo-
nent parts, and the fact that tanks do not usually explode in the
absence of negligence, the Tenth Circuit held that negligence on
the part of the Government was a reasonable inference.12
Michael A. Maxwell
John L. Ruppert
CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS IN DETERMINATION
OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CHAPTER XI
PROCEEDINGS:
Stipe v. Mullendore, 527 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1975)
By CHARLES P. LEDER*
In Stipe v. Mullendore' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether a trial court had erred in not awarding attor-
neys' fees pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement in a Chapter
XI bankruptcy proceeding and whether a $365,000 award of attor-
neys' fees was reasonable. The attorneys in this action were re-
tained "to collect all or as much as possible of the proceeds of life
insurance policies having a combined face value of $15 million."2
Because their clients were confronted with both secured and un-
secured creditors having claims exceeding $8 million, the attor-
neys filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy petition on behalf of their
clients and entered into a contingent fee agreement whereby the
attorneys "would receive 20% of the amount recovered from an
2 The difficult issue for the court was the possibility that the heater was not in "the
exclusive control" of the Government since it consisted of component parts. Citing Carter
Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okla. 209, 232 P. 419 (1924), the test is, when
there are several instrumentalities involved, some of which are under the control of the
defendant and others not, could the accident reasonably have occurred because of defects
in the instrumentality supplied by another?
* Associate, Berenbaum, Weinberger & Susman, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1973, Uni-
versity of Colorado; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
(In re Mullendore) 527 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 Id. at 1033.
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action against the insurance companies" and another claimant of
the proceeds.
3
A successful arrangement was reached satisfying the credi-
tors of the clients. In addition, the attorneys successfully negoti-
ated a settlement of their clients' claims against the insurance
companies. Under the terms of this settlement, the clients re-
ceived $5 million and the other claimant $3 million. After com-
pleting the Chapter XI arrangement and obtaining $5 million for
their clients, the attorneys filed an amended application with the
bankruptcy court "for an allowance of $1 million for attorneys'
fees. The request was based on 20% of the $5 million insurance
recovery and the 6,168 hours expended by [the] attorneys."'
This request was challenged by the clients, who by this time had
retained other counsel, and a hearing was held to determine the
proper fee. At the hearing the trial judge "indicated the contin-
gent fee contract would not be considered in arriving at a fee" and
instead made an allowance on a quantum meruit basis. The trial
court awarded $365,000 as the reasonable attorneys' fee and this
decision was appealed.
After finding that the attorneys were entitled to compensa-




The clients asserted that the attorneys should not be compensated because of their
failure to comply with General Order 44, which was abrogated by the Supreme Court on
October 1, 1973. 527 F.2d at 1035 & n.7. The Tenth Circuit held that this Order did not
cover debtors who, as in this case, were not in possession; the court thus reached a decision
similar to that reached by the Sixth Circuit in Cle-Ware Indus., Inc. v. Sokolsky, 493 F.2d
863 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974). But see In re Hydrocarbon Chem., Inc.,
411 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969). The Tenth Circuit stated:
In a Chapter XI proceeding, there are areas where counsel for a debtor not
in possession legitimately should function. To the extent that the work of
such counsel benefits the estate, compensation is normally allowed on proper
petition. Consequently, we hold that failure to comply with General Order
44 does not prevent [the attorneys] from receiving compensation.
527 F.2d at 1035-36 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1036 n.9.
The clients further argued that the attorneys in this case had failed to comply with
section 62(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1970), requiring a prior court
ruling regarding retention of counsel. However, the Tenth Circuit found no merit in the
contention. 527 F.2d at 1036. Finally, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the clients' conten-
tion that section 324 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 724 (1970), required disallowance
of fees. This section requires a bankruptcy petition to disclose the executory contracts of
the debtor. The Tenth Circuit found that compliance with the section would have allowed
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whether the fees should have been awarded pursuant to the con-
tingent fee agreement. In making its determination, the court did
not specifically decide whether contingent fee agreements were
permissible in a bankruptcy action; instead, the court's opinion
focused on whether the attorneys' fees awarded were reasonable.
The court analyzed sections 60(d) and 64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act 7 which allow an attorney compensation "only to the extent
of a reasonable amount to be determined by the court."8 In the
opinion of the Tenth Circuit, the Act prescribes "a single test in
determining the amount of attorneys' fees; that test is reasona-
bleness. '
The trial court had discretion in the awarding of attorneys'
fees and the Tenth Circuit refused to interfere with that discre-
tion because there was no showing that the "allowance was
plainly wrong or an abuse of discretion."'" However, the court did
set forth some of the factors it felt should be considered in a
determination of whether fees awarded by a bankruptcy court are
reasonable.
One factor to be considered by a trial court in an award of
attorneys' fees is a contingent fee agreement. The court specifi-
cally stated that the contingent fee agreement "might have had
some evidentiary value";" however, failure to consider such an
agreement is not reversible error because the ultimate determina-
tion of fees does not depend upon the agreement between the
client and the lawyer. Rather, the ultimate test is reasonable-
ness; hence, unreasonable fees are excessive and cannot be
awarded to an attorney.
court review of the fee contract early in the proceeding but could "find no compelling logic
or legal requirement for disallowing all compensation because the executory contract,
disregarded by the trial court, was not disclosed pursuant to § 724." 527 F.2d at 1037.
11 U.S.C. §§ 96(d), 104(a) (1970).
Id. § 96(d).
527 F.2d at 1038.
Id. (quoting Behringer v. Lybrand & Morgan, 270 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1959)).
II 527 F.2d at 1038.
I2 d. The court held that failure to consider the contingent fee arrangement would
be harmless error under Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inasmuch as the
ultimate test of the fee was reasonableness as determined by the trial court. Id.
" See Bankruptcy Act § 60(d), 11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (1970), which provides attorneys'
fees shall be allowed "only to the extent of a reasonable amount to be determined by the
court, and the excess may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit of the estate."
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As a result, the utility to the lawyer of a contingent fee agree-
ment is reduced. The historical and practical reasons for the use
of contingent fees disappear if the successful conclusion of an
action will not produce that which motivated the lawyer to accept
an otherwise undesirable case-namely, the "res out of which the
fee can be paid."" Under the court's ruling in Mullendore, the
trial court when computing reasonable fees may consider a con-
tingent fee agreement for whatever evidentiary value the agree-
ment may have, but it is not bound by the terms of that agree-
ment. Therefore, because the ultimate determination of the fee
rests with the court and is not based on the terms of the contin-
gent fee agreement, a lawyer in a bankruptcy proceeding, or any
other proceeding allowing only awards of a reasonable fee, will
find a contingent fee agreement of little practical value.
Even though the computation of a reasonable fee in a bank-
ruptcy proceeeding rests with the trial court, the Tenth Circuit
pointed out other traditional factors that should guide a court in
making the award. The court stated that the amount of the award
in Mullendore indicated that the trial court had considered:
[T]he contingent aspect of the [attorneys'] employment as it re-
lated to the results obtained; the size of the estate; the time and
labor involved; the results actually obtained; the novelty and com-
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILnTY (1975) states as Ethical Consideration
2-20 the following:
Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly ac-
cepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical
bases of their acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of circum-
stances, provide the only practical means by which one having a claim
against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of
a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution
of the claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid. Although a
lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily
improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a
case, to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client
who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrange-
ment. Because of the human relationships involved and the unique character
of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases
are rarely justified. In administrative agency proceedings contingent fee con-
tracts should be governed by the same consideration as in other civil cases.
Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal
cases, largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not
produce a res with which to pay the fee.
Id. at 7C (footnotes omitted).
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plexity of the legal problems involved; the opposition encountered;
the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys involved; and
the debtors' ability to pay.5
An analysis of the award given by the trial court satisfied the
Tenth Circuit that there had been no abuse of discretion in the
awarding of fees. The Tenth Circuit relied upon the judgment of
the trial court "to [give] credit where credit was due and to
avoid payment for duplicative services."'"
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPARTIALITY
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
December 5, 1974 marked the revision of a federal statute
addressing standards for disqualification of judges, 28 U.S.C. §
455.' Subsection (a) of the revised section 455 states: "Any jus-
tice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
527 F.2d at 1040. See Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B), which provides that:
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordi-
nary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee
is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
ABA, supra note 14, at 12C (footnote omitted).
'e 527 F.2d at 1040.
Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609.
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impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' This new statute,
according to legislative history, 3 is intended to conform with
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.4 Canon 3C(1) envi-
sions that a judge should disqualify himself any time his conduct
would lead a reasonable man, knowing all the circumstances, to
conclude that there exists an appearance of either impropriety or
lack of impartiality.5 The dictates of the new statute are, how-
ever, more forceful than those of the Code; the statute substitutes
a command, "shall disqualify himself," for the recommendation
of the Code, "should disqualify himself."6 Thus section 455(a)
requires disqualification any time there is an appearance of im-
propriety or lack of impartiality.7
On July 14, 1976, the Tenth Circuit, acting upon a petition
for a writ of mandamus' filed by the Justice Department, disqual-
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6351, 6353. See 120 CONG. REC. H10,729 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1974) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier); 119 CONG. REC. 33029 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Burdick). See also
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 407 F. Supp. 324, 326-27
(E.D. Va.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d
357 (4th Cir. 1976).
ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 3C(1) (1975).
1 Id. Canon 3C(I) states in part: "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . . 'See E.
THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973). The Reporter states:
Any conduct that would lead a reasonable man knowing all the circumstan-
ces to the conclusion that the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" is a basis for the judge's disqualification. Thus, an impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety . . . that would reasonably lead one to
question the judge's impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within
the scope of the general standard, as does participation by the judge in the
proceeding if he thereby creates the appearance of a lack of impartiality.
Id. at 60-61. See also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts,
86 HARV. L. REv. 736, 745 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification of Judges].
Compare text accompanying note 2 supra with Canon 3C(1), supra note 5.
See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 8, 14-16, 60-61. See also United States v. Brown,
539 F.2d 467, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1976).
1 Not all United States courts of appeals permit the use of the writ of mandamus to
review the refusal of a judge to disqualify himself. However, the Tenth Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit recognize the validity of such a procedure and the trend is toward a more
liberal availability of the writ. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051-
52 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d
655, 657 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Occidental Petroleum Corp.
v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 56-57 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963). See
1977
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ified Chief Judge Willis Ritter of the United States District Court
for the District of Utah.' The Justice Department alleged that the
behavior of Judge Ritter at the pretrial proceedings demonstrated
actual bias or an appearance of bias in favor of the defense attor-
neys and, in turn, against the Government's attorneys and the
Government.' 0 The Tenth Circuit held that the impartiality of
Judge Ritter, in light of the total facts and circumstances, might
reasonably be questioned."
This Comment will analyze the interpretation and applica-
tion of section 455(a) by the Tenth Circuit as reflected in its
opinion in United States v. Ritter.
I. BACKGROUND
Common law originally held that a judge could be disquali-
fied only for "interest," defining it as a direct pecuniary interest.'2
At the time of the establishment of the American court system,
pecuniary interest still was recognized as the only basis for dis-
qualification.'3
In the United States, the first federal disqualification-for-
interest statute was enacted in 1792" and subsequently was
amended to cover both specified relationships and "substantial"
interests.'5 The 1948 version of section 455 stated:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel,
is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with
any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion,
for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.' e
also 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3553, at
386-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER]; Note, Disqualification
of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1440 n.45 (1966); Com-
ment, Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 US.C. § 455, 71
MIH. L. REV. 538, 548 n.42 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification for Interest].
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976).
540 F.2d at 461.
Id. at 462, 464.
1 Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947); Note,
Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Sta-
tus, and the Oregon Experience, 48 ORE. L. REV. 311, 321-22 (1969).
Frank, supra note 13, at 611-12.
" Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278-79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455
(Supp. IV 1974)).
*5 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3541, at 343.
* 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (amended 1974).
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The "of counsel" phrase was literally construed; it was held to be
applicable in situations where the judge had been an attorney for
one of the parties in the same proceeding now before him.'7 Au-
thorities were in conflict as to whether "substantial" interest re-
ferred only to a pecuniary interest or whether it could be applied
to "substantial" interest in the outcome of a case." The "material
witness" clause was construed as limiting disqualification to situ-
ations where the judge was actually called as a witness and the
testimony sought was relevant to the proceeding. 9 Disqualifica-
tion under the final clause, "so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial," was within the discretion of the judge in
question; and appellate courts rarely overturned the decision of
a trial judge who failed to disqualify himself.2 0
A second basis for disqualification of federal judges was cre-
ated in 1911 with the enactment of a statute which provided that
a judge could be disqualified for bias or prejudice." This statute
was replaced in 1970 by the similar, current section 144.2 Section
144 states in part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.Y
In order to create a legally sufficient affidavit, certain procedural
and factual standards must be satisfied. Foremost among these
"1 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 919 (1974). See Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 550.
1 See Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 553, 555. Compare United States
v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966), with Adams
v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1962).
" Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 557-58. See, e.g., United States v. Re,
372 F.2d 641, 645 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967); United States v. Gilboy,
162 F. Supp. 384, 400-01 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 559; Disqualification of Judges, supra
note 5, at 738-39. See, e.g., Shadid v. Oklahoma City, 494 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 834
(1970).
2" Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
144 (1970)).
- 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
" Id.
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is that the affidavit must state specific facts which support the
allegations of bias and prejudice. 4
Some courts and commentators have advocated applying an
"appearance" standard when interpreting this statute.15 How-
ever, most courts have strictly interpreted not only the procedural
and factual requirements, but also the phrase "personal bias or
prejudice," holding that the bias must be derived from a source
that is extrajudicial in nature." The term "party," as contained
in the statute, has been construed as requiring that the bias be
directed at a litigant; thus, bias directed at the attorney for the
litigant would not suffice. 7
The recent revision of section 455 provided the third ground
for disqualification: Where there exists an appearance of impro-
priety or lack of impartiality. 8 Disqualification on this basis has
been such a rare phenomenon in the past that section 455(a)
reflects a new trend in judicial disqualification.29 Since the revi-
sion of this section was intended to codify Canon 3C(1) of the
Code,30 the notes of the Reporter to the Code should be viewed
as an authoritative source in interpreting the new statute.' The
14 Id. Other relevant standards are: (1) That the affidavit must be certified by a
counsel of record, stating that it is made in good faith; (2) it must be filed in accordance
with certain time requirements; and (3) there is a limit of one filing per litigant per case.
Id.
25 See Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias-The Standard
Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 763-69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Disqualification Under Section 1441. See also Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State
Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v.
Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973), prohibition & mandamus denied sub nom.
Luongo v. United States Court of Appeals, 415 U.S. 911 (1974); United States v. Moore,
405 F. Supp. 771, 773 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
" United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1966). See WRIoHr, MILLER,
& COOPER, supra note 8, §§ 3542, 3551, at 345-47, 374; Disqualification Under Section 144,
supra note 25, at 756-58.
11 See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 504-05 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 522-23 (D.S.C. 1975).
See also Disqualification Under Section 144, supra note 25, at 756-58.
" See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
20 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3549, at 369. But see, Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Moore, 405 F. Supp. 771, 773 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); United
States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 1957).
31 See note 3 supra.
31 See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
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Reporter explicitly adopted the "appearance" standard by stat-
ing that the appearance of impropriety or a lack of impartiality
falls within the general standard of Canon 3C(1).12 Section 455(a)
establishes an objective standard, which requires the judge to
disqualify himself if there exists a reasonable factual basis which
casts doubt upon his impartiality.3 With this background in
mind, the opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Ritter can be analyzed.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Judge Ritter was serving as the trial judge in a criminal
antitrust action.34 At the arraignment on November 24, 1975,
Judge Ritter granted motions for bills of particulars for some of
the defendants and stated that he would grant similar requests
for the other defendants upon the filing of the appropriate mo-
tions. The judge granted these further motions at a January 16,
1976 hearing. At the same time, and over the objections of the
Government's attorneys, he entertained and granted additional
defendants' motions for further bills of particulars.
35
Prior to the January 16 hearing, the Government's attorneys
learned that six "anti-Ritter" resolutions had been considered by
the Utah State Bar Association. The attorney for one of the defen-
dants, Mr. Christensen, served as president of this association
during the period in which these resolutions received considera-
tion .3
Based on a connection between the bar association proceed-
ings and the behavior of Judge Ritter at the January 16 hearing,
the Government's attorneys filed an affidavit requesting the
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351, 6356.
3' See note 5 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6351, 6354-55. The legislative history states that section 455(a) functions as
a "catch-all" provision, the purpose of which is to promote public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. Id. The concept of "public confidence" has become the focal
point for advocates of liberal disqualification. See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 8; Miller,
Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 69, 74 (1970); 7 CuM. L. REv. 185, 191-92 (1976).
" 540 F.2d at 460.
" Id.
" Id. At the state bar meeting, Mr. Christensen delivered the recommendation of the
bar association's Board of Commissioners, which advised the membership on the disposi-
tion of the resolutions. Two of the resolutions were approved on a secret ballot. Id. at 460-
61.
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judge to disqualify himself. They alleged that this connection
resulted in actual bias or an appearance of bias. 7 Judge Ritter
denied the disqualification motion 38 on the grounds that the affi-
davit failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of sections 144
and 455(a), and that the alleged facts were insufficient to support
a motion to disqualify.
39
In response, the Government's attorneys filed with the Tenth
Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging: (1) That Mr.
Christensen served as Judge Ritter's attorney during considera-
tion of the "anti-Ritter" resolutions by the Utah State Bar Asso-
ciation, and that such a relationship constituted "actual bias";
(2) that the conduct of Judge Ritter at the January hearings
reflected "actual bias" in favor of Mr. Christensen and, in turn,
against the Government's attorneys and the Government; and (3)
that the total facts created an "appearance of bias."4
III. ALLEGATIONS OF ACTUAL BIAS
A. A Finding of Fact
The first issue presented by the Government's attorneys re-
quired the Tenth Circuit to determine whether Mr. Christensen
functioned as Judge Ritter's attorney in the proceedings con-
ducted by the Utah State Bar Association. The Government's
attorneys, basing their affidavit upon section 144, contended that
"actual bias" resulted from the relationship of Mr. Christensen
and Judge Ritter.4 The Tenth Circuit disposed of this contention
on a finding of fact. The court held that the record did not demon-
strate advocacy by Mr. Christensen on behalf of Judge Ritter but
rather that the attorney performed his official duties as President
of the Utah State Bar Association in a fair and impartial man-
ner.
42
In disposing of this issue, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
cases cited by the Government's attorneys-Rapp v. Van Dusen43
and Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler.44 In Rapp, a federal district court
11 Id. at 461.
38 Id.
11 Petitioner's Brief for Mandamus at 8.
,0 540 F.2d at 461.
1 Id. at 461, 462-63.
11 Id. at 463.
' 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965).
4 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
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judge was disqualified from a civil action where, upon a petition
for a writ of mandamus to the Third Circuit, it was found that
counsel for the defense had also represented the judge in the same
proceeding.5 In contrast, Mr. Christensen in Ritter did not func-
tion in the same proceeding as counsel for both defendant and
Judge Ritter.
In Texaco, Inc., the Tenth Circuit granted a petition for a
writ of mandamus which requested the disqualification of a fed-
eral district court judge from a civil action. It was found that one
of the plaintiff's attorneys had represented the judge in another
civil action that was pending at the same time, and in the same
court, as the proceeding in question." In contrast to the situation
in Texaco, Inc., the proceedings of the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion were not a civil action that was pending before the federal
district court in Utah. Thus, the first allegation of the Govern-
ment's attorneys was unsupported by precedent.
B. Adverse Rulings and an Insufficient Factual Basis
The Tenth Circuit viewed the second issue of "actual bias"
as based on two alleged grounds: (1) Judge Ritter's January 16
rulings on the motions of the defendants for bills of particulars
and (2) Judge Ritter's "caustic and overbearing" behavior toward
the Government's attorneys. 7 The court disposed of the first
ground on a finding of fact by noting that the granting of the
defendants' motions at the January 16 hearing had no connection
with the proceedings before the Utah State Bar Association. 8
Judge Ritter had announced his intention to grant these motions
on November 24, 1975, and the opinion established that the
"anti-Ritter" resolutions first came to the attention of the judge
about January 3, 1976.11
As to the second ground, the Tenth Circuit conceded that
Judge Ritter's behavior toward the Government's attorneys was
indeed "caustic and overbearing."' 0 However, the court noted
,1 350 F.2d at 808-10. The plaintiffs motion requesting disqualification was based on
the pre-1974 section 455. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
,6 354 F.2d at 656-57. Defendant's motion requesting disqualification was based on
the pre-1974 section 455. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
,1 540 F.2d at 463.
I Id.




that such behavior does not invariably demonstrate bias or preju-
dice against a party. The court concluded by commenting on the
weakness of the factual basis presented within the petition of the
Government's attorneys." As noted, specific facts are required to
uphold a section 144 motion to disqualify.12 Holding that the
Government's attorneys failed to establish actual bias by the alle-
gations contained in the first two contentions, the Tenth Circuit
directed its attention to the final issue-whether there existed an
appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality sufficient to
support a section 455(a) motion to disqualify.
IV. SECTION 455(a): APPEARANCE OF BIAS
A. Elements
When dealing with a section 455(a) motion to disqualify, it
is critical to determine what elements are necessary to establish
an appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality. Four issues
must be addressed. First, what are the procedural requirements?
Second, must the judge's alleged disqualifying behavior be for or
against a party, or may it be for or against an attorney? Third,
must the disqualifying behavior have an extrajudicial source, or
may the source be judicial in nature? Finally, what factual basis
is necessary to support a motion for disqualification?
1. Procedural Requirements
In rejecting the Government's affidavit requesting his dis-
qualification under sections 144 and 455(a), Judge Ritter found
the affidavit technically defective, under both statutes, because
it failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 144.51 As
section 455(a) is wholly unrelated to section 144, the requirements
for section 144 should not control.
54
51 Id.
52 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
- Petitioner's Brief for Mandamus at 8.
54 Even though section 455 has no procedural requirements, the affidavit of actual
bias or prejudice could serve as one procedural vehicle for filing a section 455 motion to
disqualify. WRIGHT, MILLER, & CooPERa, supra note 8, §§ 3541, 3550, at 343-44, 372. See
Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 102 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
See also Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias Under 28 U.S.C. Section 144
and Revised Section 455, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 139, 153-54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Disqualification Under Revised Section 4551.
Even assuming that section 144 could substantively affect section 455, such effect
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Aside from noting Judge Ritter's rejection of the affidavit for
a failure to satisfy "technical requirements,"55 the Tenth Circuit
omitted any direct consideration of procedural requirements.
However, the court recognized that section 144 prescribes the
procedure for filing a motion for disqualification based on actual
bias, whereas it failed to make a similar observation concerning
section 455(a) as to an appearance of bias." One could view the
Tenth Circuit's silence on this issue as a refusal to impose upon
section 455(a) the procedural requirements associated with sec-
tion 144.
2. May the Disqualifying Behavior Be Directed at an
Attorney? May the Disqualifying Behavior Have a Judicial
Source?
The second and third issues are closely related and may be
disposed of concurrently. In Davis v. Board of School Commis-
sioners of Mobile County,57 the Fifth Circuit construed sections
144 and 455(a) in pari materia. The court, therefore, held that the
construction of section 144 applied to section 455(a)-in essence,
that the disqualifying conduct of a judge must be directed at a
party rather than an attorney, and that the source of the conduct
must be extrajudicial in nature.58 The Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
tion is open to question.59 In section 144 the concepts of party, as
opposed to attorney, and the extrajudicial source, as opposed to
the judicial source, derive from the terms "party" and "personal"
should be restricted to section 455(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) states in
part: "He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. ... Thus, the interpretations of section
144 could govern the substantive law applications of section 455(b)(1) because both deal
with the same grounds, i.e., "actual bias." However, as these grounds are wholly un-
related to section 455(a), section 144 provisions should not apply. WRIGHT, MILLER, &
CooPFR, supra note 8, § 3542, at 345-46.
540 F.2d at 461.
Id. at 461-62.
57 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
517 F.2d at 1052.
" It should be noted that the case law cited by the Fifth Circuit in support of its
contention involved only the interpretation and application of section 144. Id. at 1050-51.
See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 81 (7th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Wilson v.
Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1973); Giebe v. Pence, 431 F.2d 942, 943 (9th Cir.
1970); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 101 (8th Cir. 1968).
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contained within that statute. 0 Section 455(a) contains no simi-
lar language."
On these issues, the Tenth Circuit refrained from direct con-
sideration of the question of extrajudicial/judicial source. How-
ever, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
attorney/party issue, and held that the disqualifying behavior
may be directed either for or against an attorney.6" In support of
such a conclusion, the court noted that the language of section
455(a) permitted flexibility in determining whether disqualifica-
tion is warranted in a particular situation.13 Such a finding was
necessary as the Tenth Circuit apparently viewed the major prob-
lem as favoritism toward Mr. Christensen. On the possibility that
favoritism existed, the court was willing to impute bias.64
3. Factual Basis/Reasonable Basis
a. Introduction
The legislative history of section 455(a) indicates that a
"reasonable factual basis," or "reasonable basis," must be estab-
lished when attempting to disqualify a judge.65 A fear has been
expressed that such a "reasonable basis" concept would be used
to impose a narrow construction upon the new provision.6 In
Davis, the Fifth Circuit adopted the "reasonable factual basis"
standard. There, the court noted that the standard was designed
to eliminate a subjective "in the opinion of the judge" test. 7 In
Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State Bar,"6 the
Fifth Circuit indicated that a "reasonable factual basis" consis-
" See WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3542, at 346-48; Disqualification
Under Section 144, supra note 25, at 756, 758. See also United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1966); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497,
522-23 (D.S.C. 1975).
Compare text accompanying note 23 supra with text accompanying note 2 supra.
62 The Ritter court stated "for bias in favor of or against an attorney can certainly
result in bias toward the party. Thus, if a judge is biased in favor of an attorney, his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned in relationship to the party." 540 F.2d at 462.
"Id.
' See note 62 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6351, 6355.
U Comment, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. REV.
109, 132 (1974).
7 517 F.2d at 1052.
6s 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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ted of facts sufficient to raise a reasonable inference, in the con-
text of the issues presented in a particular situation, of a lack of
impartiality on the part of a judge."
In Ritter, the Tenth Circuit failed to acknowledge the
"reasonable factual basis" standard. The court twice noted that
there was a dearth of facts supporting the petition of the Govern-
ment's attorneys,70 but emphasized that "circumstances" are
important.7 The court noted that section 144 requires facts suffi-
cient to prove actual personal bias, but stressed that section
455(a) provides a broader, more flexible ground for disqualifica-
tion.72
Had the court then discussed why an appearance of impar-
tiality is essential, there would be little reason for criticizing the
import of this decision. However, the court digressed into a dis-
cussion of a prior line of cases in which Judge Ritter had been
disqualified." The Tenth Circuit failed to cite any authority hold-
ing that the consideration of such unrelated, prior cases was ap-
propriate for determining the factual basis necessary to support
a section 455(a) motion to disqualify. It is unfortunate that the
court failed to elaborate upon the proper balance of facts and
circumstances necessary to support such a motion.
b. The appearance of impartiality: from whose
perspective?
Another pertinent issue in determining whether a sufficient
"reasonable basis" exists for disqualifying a judge is from whose
perspective-the judge's or the litigants'-should the matter be
viewed? By emphasizing the concept of "reasonable factual
$ 524 F.2d at 103-04. Parrish has been misconstrued as requiring, to support a section
455(a) motion to disqualify, facts which would convince a reasonable man that a bias
exists. See United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 506 n.30 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
540 F.2d at 462-63.
'Id. at 462. See also United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 51 n.5 (10th Cir. 1976);
Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 385 F. Supp. 711, 714 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" 540 F.2d at 461-62.
7 Id. at 464. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); United States v.
Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960); United States
v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958). Judge Ritter has
run afoul of the Tenth Circuit on occasions more recent than those cited in the opinion.
See, e.g., Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Peterson, 456 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1972).
"1 One student note views the distinction as being between the perspectives of the
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basis," many decisions have viewed the motion to disqualify from
the perspective of the challenged judge, thus imposing a narrow
construction upon section 455(a).1 Other courts and commenta-
tors have urged that when applying an "appearance" standard,
the proper perspective is that of the challenging litigant. Such an
interpretation is said to be more in keeping with the spirit of the
new provision. 6 The language of the revised statute" indicates by
its plain meaning that the emphasis should be upon the judge's
impartiality being reasonably questioned and not upon whether
his partiality is reasonably likely to exist. 8
The Tenth Circuit in Ritter captured the spirit of the new
provision. Avoiding all mention of a "reasonable factual basis"
concept, the court instead chose to emphasize that Congress re-
vised section 455(a) to conform with the Code and, furthermore,
that litigants have a right to expect impartiality in a federal
district court.7 9
CONCLUSION
In interpreting section 455(a), the Tenth Circuit applied a
liberal disqualification policy. 0 In doing so, it aligned itself with
uninvolved observer and the litigant. See Disqualification Under Revised Section 455,
supra note 54, at 148-49.
"5 See, e.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103-04 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d
1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Mavis v. Commercial Car-
riers, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 55, 61-62 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc.,
403 F. Supp. 367, 373-74 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 1975); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F.
Supp. 1275, 1277-79 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041,
1044-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
7 See, e.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 109 (5th Cir.
1975) (Tuttle & Goldberg, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also J.
MAcKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JusTIcE 240 (1974).
" See text accompanying note 2 supra.
7' See note 76 supra. In answering the question of whether a judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," one must focus upon whether, considering all the facts
and circumstances, the litigant might reasonably doubt the judge's impartiality, not upon
whether the litigant has factually established that the judge is actually partial. See H.R.
REp. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6351, 6354-55. See also Note, Judicial Ethics-Recusal of Judges-The Need for Reform,
77 W. VA. L. REv. 763, 773 (1975).
T, 540 F.2d at 462, 464.
SO In Ritter, the Tenth Circuit, to an uncertain degree, qualified its liberal disqualifi-
cation approach by noting that a criminal prosecution was involved. Id. at 464. Unfortu-
nately, the court refrained from elaborating upon the significance of this element. Section
455(a) fails to distinguish between a civil action and a criminal prosecution. See text
VOL. 54
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
those who view the appearance of impartiality from the perspec-
tive of the challenging litigant. Thus, the court committed itself
to the following propositions: (1) that a section 455(a) motion to
disqualify need not satisfy the strict "technical" requirements of
section 144; (2) that the disqualifying behavior of a judge may be
directed at an attorney as well as at a party; and (3) that circum-
stances can be as dispositive as facts in determining whether
there exists an appearance of impropriety or lack of impartial-
ity.8 '
The opinion of the court draws criticism on two aspects.
First, the court should have amplified its reasoning as to why a
section 455(a) motion to disqualify need not satisfy the
"technical" requirements of a section 144 motion to disqualify.
Second, the court should have elaborated upon the proper bal-
ance of facts and circumstances necessary to support a section
455(a) motion to disqualify.
However, the Tenth Circuit should be commended for cap-
turing the spirit of the new provision. The opinion in United
States v. Ritter should be regarded as the forerunner of a progres-
sive trend in the area of judicial disqualification.
Brian A. Magoon
accompanying note 2 supra. Hopefully, the Tenth Circuit meant only that a criminal
prosecution is one additional factor to be considered when a petition for a writ of manda-
mus has been sought. There is no support for a holding that bases the application of a
liberal disqualification policy solely upon whether the proceeding in question is a criminal
prosecution. See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 60-61. See also H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351-57.
11 540 F.2d at 461-62.

LABOR LAW
This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey will cover all major
labor law decisions with the exception of those cases decided
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' which are included
in the constitutional law section of the Survey. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's most significant decision in the area of labor law, Dartt v.
Shell Oil Co., 2 involved the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 19671 and is discussed in the case comment following the
overview.
OVERVIEW
I. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT'-NATONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 5
A. Unfair Labor Practices
In NLRB v. Dover Corp., I a supervisor threatened three em-
ployees with discharge if they continued their union activities
during an organizational campaign. No discharges actually oc-
curred, and the company's attorney gave oral assurances to the
employees that the threats were not authorized by the company.
In addition, an officer of the company had a notice posted stating
that supervisors are forbidden by law from threatening discharges
because of union activities. Thereafter, the same supervisor was
involved in a similar incident. Finding violations of section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,7 the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) entered a remedial order and petitioned
the court of appeals for enforcement.
Although the supervisor did not have the power to hire or
fire, the Tenth Circuit found in the record "credible and substan-
tial proof on which the Board could rely ' 8 and held that the
employer is responsible for the coercive statements of the supervi-
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. II 1972).
2 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970).
Id. §§ 141-197 (1970).
Id. §§ 151-168 (1970).
No. 74-1577 (10th Cir., Apr. 12, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
No. 74-1577 at 10. The court deferred to the NLRB credibility findings, stating that
such findings are "peculiarily [sic] within the province of the hearing office and the
Board and are ordinarily entitled to acceptance on review." Id. at 8.
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sor "when employees would have just cause to believe that he was
acting for and on behalf of the company."9 Even though the union
had lost a certification election which occurred after the viola-
tions but prior to the court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ordered
enforcement of the remedial order, noting that such orders have
been enforced when needed "for [their] future effect."10
In Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. NLRB," the Tenth Circuit
declined to set aside NLRB orders arising from the discharge of
an employee for violating an overly broad no-distribution rule.
The NLRB found that the rule prohibiting employees from
"distributing. . .handbills or literature of any type on company
property during working hours"'" violated section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act 3 and that the discharge of an em-
ployee for distributing union literature on company property dur-
ing his nonworking hours violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act." In sustaining the Board's findings, the court noted that no
exceptions to the rule were provided for and that employees could
interpret the rule as prohibiting distributions on their own time
in nonwork areas; 5 absent proof of unusual justifying circumstan-
ces, such a rule violates the Act."
The NLRB also had found that four separate incidents of
questioning employees regarding union attitudes during the or-
ganizational drive were unlawful interrogations. 7 While noting
that an employer is not prohibited from disseminating its views
on the virtues of organization," the Tenth Circuit sustained the
Board's findings as being supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole and granted enforcement of the Board's
order. 9 In sustaining the Board's findings the court noted that the
Id. at 10 (citing Furr's, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562, 566 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967)).
"0 No. 74-1577 at 14-15 (citing NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25 (1970)).
530 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 140.
, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
" Id. § 158(a)(1), (3). See 530 F.2d at 139.
, 530 F.2d at 141. The rule prohibited distribution during "working hours" which
here was essentially 24 hours a day. Id. at 142 n.7.
11 Id. at 141 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 796, 803-04
(1945)).
,7 530 F.2d at 144.
" 530 F.2d at 143 & n.9. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
" The court examined the company's entire course of conduct and held that
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discussions with the employees were "out of the ordinary" and
that the employer neither stated the purpose for the questions nor
gave any assurance against reprisal.20
In NLRB v. Lake Shore, Inc.21 two employees were dis-
charged for engaging in protected union activity. They later voted
under challenge in a certification election where their votes were
determinative. The NLRB ordered their reinstatement and certi-
fied the union as the exclusive bargaining representative.2 2 Desir-
ing to challenge the Board's reinstatement order and resulting
certification, the employer refused to bargain with the union;
whereupon the Board ordered it to do so after finding violations
of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 1
The validity of the bargaining order depended on whether the
Board had properly ordered reinstatement.
The employer contended that there was insufficient evidence
to support the Board's findings, specifically alleging that there
was no showing of knowledge by it that the fired employees were
union organizers and that there was no showing of discriminatory
motive. The Tenth Circuit sustained the Board's decision, find-
ing that the circumstances of the case were sufficient to raise the
necessary inferences.24 The court stated that at the very least this
case fell within Judge Lewis' statement in Rocky Mountain Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. NLRB: "The discharge of qualified workers who
are also active unionists '. . . is a circumstance of suspicion which
may give rise to justified inference of violative discrimination'; in
such case 'the issue must ...be determined by the degree of
significance to be given to the employer's explanation of the rea-
son for the discharge.' "25 The administrative law judge's opinion,
which was adopted by the Board, found unpersuasive the em-
ployer's explanation that the firings were economically moti-
vated. Finding that this case was one that depended on the credi-
"[wihile the proof is not strong, we feel it supports the Board's inferences. ... 530
F.2d at 144.
Id.
2, No. 75-1716 (10th Cir., June 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
I ld. at 4.
' Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 6.
5Id. at 6-7, as quoted in American Sanitary Products Co. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 53, 56
(10th Cir. 1967); Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 204 (10th Cir. 1967).
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bility of witnesses, the court honored the Board's choice between
conflicting testimony."
In NLRB v. P.A.F. Equipment Co." an employer's refusal to
bargain with the certified bargaining representative was found by
the NLRB to be an unfair labor practice.2 The company claimed
that its refusal to bargain was justified because it had been de-
nied due process of law when its challenge of the NLRB election 9
was dismissed by the Regional Director without a hearing and
when its request for Board review was denied. The court affirmed
the NLRB's authority to determine whether an election should be
held" and ruled that the Board's refusal to grant a hearing on this
"nonlitigable issue" was not a denial of due process.3 '
In NLRB v. Auto Crane Co. 32 a wage increase and a thrift
plan were unilaterally implemented by the employer while a
collective bargaining agreement was in force. After a union re-
quest for negotiation was refused by the company, the NLRB
ordered the company to bargain. 33 The Tenth Circuit refused en-
forcement on the ground that the agreement contained an effec-
tive waiver of the statutory right to bargain .34 The court held that
the language of the waiver- was sufficiently clear to deny this
No. 75-1716 at 9.
-7 528 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1970).
The challenge, based upon marginal participation in the organizational campaign
by supervisors, was raised by the company before the certification election. The charge
was filed four and one-half months before the election and the court observed that this
interval afforded ample time in which to offset the activity of the supervisors. The vote
in favor of the union was 83 to 40. 528 F.2d at 287.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). See NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206, 226
(1940).
1' 528 F.2d at 287.
32 536 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1976).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
536 F.2d at 312. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The contractual waiver provision and
the issues involved were the same as those considered in NLRB v. Southern Materials Co.,
447 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1971).
The provision stated in part:
[The Company and the Union, for the life of this Agreement, each volun-
tarily and unqualifiedly waive [sic] the right and each agrees that the other
shall not be obligated to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or
matter referred to, or covered in this Agreement, or with respect to any
matter or subject not specifically referred to or covered in this Agreement,
even though such subjects or matters may not have been within the knowl-
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particular remedy to the union"e and that, although the company
had no right to unilaterally change a term of the contract, it did
have the right to refuse to negotiate the change. 7
In a brief dissent, Judge Doyle stated that the company's
unilateral act changed the terms of the contract and that the old
agreement was no longer operative. Consequently, the union was
not bound by its waiver of bargaining rights and could lawfully
demand, and the company could not refuse, to bargain pursuant
to section 8(a)(5).
In NLRB v. Glaziers & Glassworkers Local 558 3 the union
picketed a construction site to protest the nonunion status of the
general contractor. When a sub-contractor's union employees re-
fused to cross the picket line and the sub-contractor indicated
that nonunion employees would be hired to complete the job, a
union representative implied that physical violence and destruc-
tion of property would result. The union contended that these
statements merely reflected actual conditions in labor disputes
and did not constitute coercion. 0 The NLRB held that these were
threats of prohibited activity4 and ordered the union to cease and
desist. The court found substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding of fact and ordered enforcement.2
B. Damages
In Fleming Building Co. v. Northeastern Oklahoma Building
& Construction Trades Council4 3 a company appealed a judgment
denying its claim for damages under section 303.44 The Tenth
Circuit agreed with the company that the standard of proof in
edge or contemplation of either or both parties at the time they negotiated
or signed this Agreement.
536 F.2d at 312 (emphasis supplied by the court).
3' The NLRB order was based solely on section 8(a)(5), addressing refusal to bargain.
The court pointed out that "[tihe Union by the clear waiver of the right to bargain has
traded that remedy for other contractual or legal remedies as it may do." 536 F.2d at 312.
37 Id.
11 Id. (Doyle, J., dissenting).
.39 No. 75-1819 (10th Cir., June 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
40 Id. at 3-4.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970).
No. 75-1819 at 5-6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acker Indus., Inc., 460 F.2d 649 (10th Cir.
1972).
43 532 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
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section 303 actions arising from unlawful strike activity should be
a preponderance of the evidence and not the "clear proof" 5 stan-
dard applied by the trial court. However, it held that this error
was harmless because, even under the less rigorous standard, the
damages alleged by the company were speculative and uncer-
tain."
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 12
v. A-1 Electric Service, Inc. 7 the court decided that, in a section
30148 suit to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, general contract law should apply to the measure of
damages. 9 The appropriate measure was held here to be that
amount which the company would have been required to pay to
the various union funds had it not violated the hiring hall and
union shop provisions of the agreement.
50
In fixing a cutoff date for measurement of damages, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the suggestion of the trial court that dam-
ages should be the amount owed the union as of the date the
union withdrew its members from employment with the com-
pany; such a result "would tend to weaken the enforceability of
collective bargaining agreements and allow the breaching party
to disregard the agreement and suffer only a minimal penalty."
'51
It also rejected a union proposal that the cutoff date should be
either the time of filing the complaint or the start of the trial
because both would encourage delayed filings to increase recover-
ies. Instead, the court settled on the end of the contractual year
as the most reasonable cutoff date for the measurement of dam-
ages.5 2
,1 The "clear proof" standard was drawn from the language of section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970). The Tenth Circuit cited Ramsey v. Mine Workers,
401 U.S. 302, 310 (1971), as implying that the preponderance of the evidence standard
should apply in all civil actions against labor unions except suits brought under section
6. 532 F.2d at 164.
11 532 F.2d at 165.
47 535 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 94 (1976).
- 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
,1 535 F.2d at 3.
Id. (citing Interstate United Corp. v. White, 388 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cir. 1967)). See
also 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs §§ 992, 1002 (1964).
11 535 F.2d at 3.




In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 2-124 v. American
Oil Co. " the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court dismissal of a
union suit to compel arbitration of a grievance arising from the
compulsory disability retirement of an employee. Although one
clause in the collective bargaining agreement provided that
"disputes concerning disciplinary action resulting in loss of pay"
were arbitrable,54 another clause, expressly excluding disputes
concerning the status of employees under the company retire-
ment plan, was given effect. The court declined to equate the
employee's retirement with discharge, thus not invoking the ac-
knowledged "national policy that doubts are to be resolved in
favor of arbitrability.'"'s
In Reid Burton Construction, Inc. v. Carpenters District
Council56 the court considered arbitrability of both a company
claim for damages arising from a union's alleged violation of the
no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and the
issue of whether the union's assertion of arbitrability was barred
by alleged "evasive" and "dilatory" pleading and procedural tac-
tics in the suit. The trial court, finding that both issues were
arbitrable, had dismissed the company's damage claim.
In deciding that the damage claim based on the no-strike
clause should be submitted to arbitration, the Tenth Circuit used
a two-part test:
(1) Whether the grievance and arbitration provisions were wholly
employee and union initiated or could be initiated by either the
employees or the employer, and
(2) whether disputes over the violation of no-strike clauses were
intended by the parties to be subject to grievance and arbitration
proceduress?
Although the language of the agreement was somewhat ambigu-
ous, 5 the court interpreted it as allowing either party to initiate
53 528 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
584-85 (1960).
535 F.2d 598 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976).
'7 535 F.2d at 601. The test was distilled from the holdings in two Supreme Court
cases: Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Atkinson v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
535 F.2d at 602.
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grievance procedures for the application or interpretation of its
terms. The provisions were also read as broad enough to include
arbitration of disputes concerning the no-strike clause.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, however, with the lower court's
holding that, where the issue litigated in a section 30111 action is
held to be arbitrable, equitable defenses to arbitration must also
be decided by the arbitrator. The trial court had relied on
Operating Engineers Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc."° in which
the issue of laches, arising from the failure of one party to pro-
perly make a dispute known to the other, was held to be a proper
subject for arbitration. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Flair
Builders, limiting its applicability to those situations in which
the equitable defense to arbitration arises from the misconduct
of a party outside the court proceeding and where the scope of the
arbitration clause is broad enough to support a finding that the
parties intended such a dispute to be arbitrable."' The court
found not only that the requisite intent was not present in the
case at bar but that:
Indeed, even had the parties so intended, we would conclude that
such an agreement would clearly exceed the proper subject matter
of a collective bargaining agreement and would not be enforceable
in court; it would be improper for the prospective parties of a lawsuit
to attempt by contract to bind the exercise of a court's inherent
judicial function .z
The case was remanded for determination of whether this equita-
ble defense, arising solely during the course of the trial, bars
arbitration of the underlying dispute.6 3 If so, the lower court,
under its section 301 jurisdiction, would be able to decide the
dispute on its merits.
Redstone Workers Association v. Mid-Continent Coal &
Coke Co. 64 involved payments made by trustees of a welfare trust
fund created under a collective bargaining agreement. In response
to an Association challenge of expenditures for employee trans-
portation, the trial court certified questions as to the validity of
29 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
'o 406 U.S. 487 (1972).
535 F.2d at 603.
" Id. at 604.
63 Id.
11 No. 75-1257 (10th Cir., Dec. 22, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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the expenditures under the agreement, their legality under sec-
tion 186,65 and an accounting to an arbitrator. Before the arbitra-
tor had ruled, the parties entered into a new agreement on em-
ployee transportation. The lower court dismissed the Associa-
tion's claims for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on
the grounds of lack of a case or controversy and mootness and,
although adopting the arbitrator's finding that the payments
were violative of section 186, held that liability for the illegal
expenditures must be determined under state law.66 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court decision with the exception of the
certification of the question of legality which went beyond the
permissible scope of an arbitrator's authority to resolve questions
of interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, 7 but ruled
this was harmless error in light of the ultimate dismissal. 8
The union in Local 2-477, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
v. Continental Oil Co."0 sought to enforce7" an arbitration award.
Two grievances, both arising from overtime outside of job classifi-
cations, were processed through the collective bargaining agree-
ment's grievance procedures to the point of submission to an
arbitrator. However, only one grievance was actually submitted,
and on motion by the union, made over written protest but with-
out appearance by the company, the arbitrator agreed to consoli-
date the two grievances. The Tenth Circuit held that the arbitra-
tor had no authority to consider a grievance added unilaterally
by a party or the arbitrator7 and, therefore, agreed to order en-
forcement of only that part of the arbitrator's award dealing with
the properly submitted grievance.7"
The scope of an arbitrator's authority was also considered in
Campo Machining Co. v. Local 1926, International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers.73 One provision in the collec-
29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
" No. 75-1257 at 5.
" See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974).
" No. 75-1257 at 6-7.
, 524 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
o See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
" 524 F.2d at 1050. An issue not submitted to an arbitrator cannot be the subject of
an arbitration award. Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508
F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
11 524 F.2d at 1051.
" 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976).
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tive bargaining agreement called for discharge, demotion, or dis-
cipline of an employee only with "good and sufficient cause."'"
Another authorized the company to make "reasonable" shop
rules if they were not in conflict with other provisions of the
agreement." An employee was discharged under a rule calling for
discharge for leaving the plant during the workshift without per-
mission. One employee left after an argument with his foreman
over tools which were needed but not readily available. Pursuant
to the agreement's arbitration clause, the resulting grievance was
submitted to an arbitrator. Considering the particular circum-
stances surrounding the discharge, the arbitrator decided that,
although the rule was reasonable, the employee's violation did
not constitute "good and sufficient cause" for a discharge and
ordered a lesser penalty." The company sought to have the award
set aside under section 30177 and was granted summary judgment
by the trial court. The Tenth Circuit stated that when an arbitra-
tor merely "interprets and applies the collective bargaining
agreement and his award is rooted in the agreement, the arbitra-
tor's decision on the merits is final and not reviewable." 5 Finding
that the arbitrator confined himself to interpreting and applying
the collective bargaining agreement, the court held that the arbi-
trator was within his authority and reversed and remanded the
case for an order enforcing his award.7"
II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT8
The Tenth Circuit considered the equal pay for equal work s'
and the overtime 2 sections of the FLSA in Brennan v. South
Davis Community Hospital.' The Secretary of Labor claimed
that female aides and maids had been paid less than male order-
" Id. at 331.
75 Id.
" The arbitrator ordered the employee's reinstatement with back pay, subject to the
company's right to suspend him for no more than one month from the date of the rule's
violation. Id. at 332.
" 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
" 536 F.2d at 332 (footnote omitted) (relying on United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
1, 536 F.2d at 334.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970) (hereinafter cited as FLSA).
Id. § 206(d)(1).
" Id. § 207.
538 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1976).
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lies and janitors for equivalent work. The court noted that only
"substantial equality of skill, effort, and responsibility as to the
jobs actually performed" 84 need be proven to sustain the Secre-
tary's charge 5 and rejected the hospital's contention that order-
lies performed "extra tasks"" which aides did not. The court
examined the "extra tasks" and concluded that both aides and
orderlies were engaged primarily in basic patient care and that
"[djifferences in the kind of effort expended but not significant
in amount or degree will not support a wage differential.""
Likewise, the "extra tasks" argument was rejected in the
case of the maids and janitors. Both were found to be involved in
general cleaning activities, and the additional tasks8 required of
janitors, which tasks involved greater physical exertion, were too
insubstantial to justify unequal wages.89
A hospital's claim that an x-ray technician came within the
"professional capacity" exception" to the FLSA's overtime provi-
sions6 ' was denied. The court of appeals accepted the lower
court's finding that the technician's work was not sufficiently
intellectual and varied in character to bring him within the ex-
ception 92
In Dunlop v. Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agriculture &
Mechanical Colleges" the Secretary of Labor, appealing an ad-
verse district court judgment, sought to recover overtime on be-
half of a security guard and the cafeteria cooks of a junior college.
Id. at 861 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp.,
503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975)).
m 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
" These tasks included weighing bedridden patients, setting up traction, cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, using the autoclave, and carrying heavy items. 538 F.2d at 861.
Id. at 862.
Janitors filled a soft drink machine, carried garbage cans, and removed snow. The
evidence showed that these activities took little time and that maids performed some tasks
that janitors did not, such as cleaning bathrooms and stripping and making beds. Id. at
863-64.
Id. at 864.
" 29 U.S.C. § 213(1) (1970).
" Id. § 207.
" 29 U.S.C. § 213 provides that the definition of "professional capacity" will be found
in regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. The court deferred to the appropri-
ate regulation, 29 C.F.R. 541.3 (1975), which defines a professional as one who consistently
uses his discretion and judgment in work that is not routine, but is predominantly intellec-
tual and varied in character. 538 F.2d at 865.
" No. 75-1188 (10th Cir., Dec. 15, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
1977
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The Tenth Circuit held that the cafeteria did not come within the
exemption provided for retail or service food establishments94 and
awarded the overtime.
The court also reversed the district court's judgment that the
Secretary could not recover overtime pay on behalf of a college
security guard who had worked at a State Athletic Association-
sponsored basketball tournament on campus but who was paid
from gate receipts rather than directly from the college. He was
held to be furthering the interests of the school by helping to
provide "for the safety of the participants and spectators."95 The
guard's contract did not specify an hourly rate. However, for the
purpose of determining an hourly wage for the computation of the
overtime compensation due, his salary was divided by the agreed
weekly work hours."A
In Dunlop v. Gray-Goto, Inc.,97 another case arising from the
failure to pay overtime, the court held that fringe benefits in the
form of paid vacations, bonuses, and insurance" may not be set
off against overtime compensation due under the FLSA. A pri-
vate agreement between the employer and employees as to the
substitution of these benefits for the right to collect overtime pay
was held not to be an effective waiver "of a right so charged or
colored with public interest."9 The company's bookkeeping sys-
tem, which showed employees as receiving overtime pay when
they had actually received their regular rate of pay for all hours
worked, was in violation of the FLSA's recordkeeping provi-
sions,'0 notwithstanding the company's "good faith" defense. 0'
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(18) (1970).
" No. 75-1188 at 9. In so holding, the court relied on the legislative history of the Act,
amendments to the Act, the administrative regulations (29 C.F.R. 779.316 (1975)), and
Hodgson v. Duke Univ., 460 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1972).
" No. 75-1188 at 11. See Triple "AAA" Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1967).
V7 528 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 These benefits are excluded from the calculation of an employee's "regular rate of
pay" under section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(1)-(2), (4) (1970).
11 528 F.2d at 795 (citation omitted) (quoting Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697
(1945)).
'® 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (1975).
"' The time cards accurately reflected the hours worked, but the figures were manip-
ulated when transcribed onto payroll cards. The company president testified that he had
been told "that was the way the records were supposed to be kept .... " 528 F.2d at 795.
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The case was remanded for a determination of whether the viola-
tions were "willful" under section 255.10'
Nancy A. Hopf
TIME LIMITATIONS FOR FILING UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., I the Tenth Circuit of Appeals gave
an expansive interpretation of the procedural requirements of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,2 an interpreta-
tion contrary to that previously given in this circuit.3 The ADEA
was enacted in 1967,' with the stated purpose of promoting the
employment of older persons based on their ability and experi-
ence by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age.5
Plaintiff Dartt was within the class protected by the Act and
" 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1970).
539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'g 10 F.E.P. Cases 844 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ADEA]. The procedural require-
ments for the Act are in section 626(d) which reads in pertinent part:
No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until
the individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an
intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed-
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful prac-
tice occurred .. . .
Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Burgett v. Cudahy Co.,
316 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973). Both of these cases held that section 626(d)(1) was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of suit under the ADEA.
For a general discussion of the ADEA, see Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 A Critique, 19 N.Y.L.F. 309 (1973); Freed & Dowell, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 196 (1972); Gillan, The
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act Revisited, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 761
(1976); Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and
Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227 (1974); Comment, Procedural Aspects of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. PIr. L. REv. 914 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). The Act forbids discrimination against persons who are
at least forty years of age but less than sixty-five. Id. § 631.
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claimed she had been discharged because of her age. She had
failed, however, to file a notice of intent to sue within 180 days
from her discharge, as is required by section 626(d)(1) of the
ADEA. The defendant-employer moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted this
motion.' The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the ADEA's
notice requirement is not jurisdictional but is a procedural condi-
tion precedent to suit.' By classifying the notice requirement as
procedural rather than jurisdictional, the court made it possible
for plaintiffs in ADEA cases to file notice after the 180-day period
and then bring suit, provided there were equitable factors justify-
ing the delay. To reach this result, the court analogized the 180-
day period during which notice must be filed to a statute of limi-
tations.' Traditionally, statutes of limitations have been subject
to tolling9 and estoppel.' 0 Had the court viewed the 180-day pe-
riod as jurisdictional, the district court would have lost all juris-
diction after expiration of this period and would have been unable
to use equity on the plaintiff's behalf to preserve her right of
action."
I. FACTS
Shell maintained that its reason for terminating Mrs. Dartt
on July 31, 1973, was that a reorganization in its credit card
department had left her without work." Mrs. Dartt was then
fifty-one years of age. Believing she had been discharged because
of her age, she sought the assistance of an attorney who told her
that she should instead contact the United States Department of
Labor. As a result of this advice, Mrs. Dartt met on August 9,
1973, with the Assistant Area Director of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor, Mr. Speer.'3 He interviewed
her regarding the discharge, filled out the Department's com-
plaint form, and told Mrs. Dartt that he would investigate the
10 F.E.P. Cases at 851.
539 F.2d at 1260.
Cases holding, in other circumstances, that a statute of limitations may be tolled
include: American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
* 3 POMEROY'S EQurrY JURISPRUDEN E § 917 (5th ed. 1941).
I d. § 812.
6 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 7364 (2d ed. 1970).




alleged discrimination. When she inquired how long the investi-
gation would take, Speer responded that it might take a year. 4
Speer advised Shell of Mrs. Dartt's complaint and attempted
conciliation. After several meetings, Speer concluded that his
efforts at conciliation were unsuccessful and then adopted an
investigative posture. At this juncture Shell agreed to prepare
statistical information on its hiring and promotion practices to
facilitate this investigation. 5
On March 5, 1974, Speer, having not yet received the re-
quested information from Shell, advised Mrs. Dartt by letter that
there would be some delay in completing the investigation. This
letter discussed Mrs. Dartt's private right to sue, and enclosed a
pamphlet concerning the provisions of the ADEA, specifically
pointing out the time limitations precedent to filing one's own
lawsuit."' Plaintiff testified that Speer's letter and the pamphlet
constituted her first actual notice of both her right to bring a
private action and the 180-day notice requirement. Upon receipt
of this letter, Mrs. Dartt immediately retained private counsel.
On March 14, 1974, 216 days after the alleged discriminatory
discharge, Mrs. Dartt's attorney gave notice to the Department
of Labor of her intention to file a private action for violation of
the ADEA. 17
II. FINDINGS OF THE COURT
The district court rejected Mrs. Dartt's contention that the
180-day filing period was directory rather than jurisdictional as
being "neither supported by authority nor reason."'" As for plain-
tiff's contention that she had given sufficient notice of her intent
to sue by orally informing the Department that she had been
discharged because of her age, the court found the mandate of
section 626(d)(1) required something more: "[T]he mere regis-
tration of a complaint of age discrimination with the local wage
and hour division of the Department of Labor cannot be held by




'7 On May 16, 1974, Speer notified Mrs. Dartt's counsel that the Department's efforts
had proved unsuccessful, and that she was free to take whatever action she wished. Mrs.
Dartt filed a class action on May 21, 1974. 539 F.2d at 1258.
'1 10 F.E.P. Cases at 846.
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626(d)."' s5 Plaintiff's final argument to the district court was that
the 180-day period was tolled when she filed her complaint, be-
cause the Department failed to advise her of her right to sue until
the 180-day period had expired. On this issue, the court held that
Mrs. Dartt had presumptive and constructive knowledge of the
provisions of the ADEA, and refused to toll the 180-day filing
period. 0
On review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court
that Mrs. Dartt's complaint to the Department did not constitute
notice as required by section 626(d)(1). 21 However, as to the re-
maining two issues on appeal, whether the 180-day filing period
was a jurisdictional prerequisite in the sense that it could never
be extended, and if not, whether the facts of the case warranted
equitable modification, the court of appeals reversed the district
court.
2
The court, while admitting that there was ample authority
to support the trial court's conclusion that compliance with sec-
tion 626(d) was a "'jurisdictional prerequisite' to any private
action under the ADEA," nevertheless reversed the district court
and found that failure to comply was not an absolute bar to
bringing an ADEA private action;2 3 however, as seen by the court
of appeals, the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the
filing of a private action which cannot be waived, but which
should be subject to possible tolling and estoppel.24 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on the legislative history of the
ADEA and cases giving a liberal reading to a similar notice re-
quirement in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25
1" Id. at 848. For a case holding that oral notice would suffice, see Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
10 The district court based its finding that plaintiff had presumptive notice on the
axiom that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes. 10 F.E.P.
Cases at 848. Although Mrs. Dartt had testified that she had never seen any posted notices
regarding the ADEA, the court also charged her with constructive knowledge, based on
posted notices at Shell "which would lead a reasonable person to know or to inquire into
his legal rights under the ADEA." Id. at 848-49. Such notices are required to be posted
by 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970).
21 539 F.2d at 1259.
Id. at 1260-62.
Id. at 1259.
24 Id. at 1260-61.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. 11 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Title
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Although the court expressed its reliance on the legislative
history of the Act to support its holding, it did not discuss por-
tions of that history which it considered pertinent." Interestingly,
other cases which have used the Act's legislative history have held
that the notice requirement is mandatory, i.e., of a jurisdictional
nature. 7 These courts have placed great weight on the changes
made in the procedural aspects of the bill between the time it was
introduced and the time it was enacted."8 The ADEA as originally
proposed contained enforcement proceedings similar to those
under Title VII.11 The bill as adopted, however, rejected these
procedural proposals, incorporating instead the enforcement
techniques of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.30 The oppo-
nents of the bill as proposed claimed it would cause the same
delays "which plague so many of our agencies, such as the EEOC
The procedures for filing civil suit under Title VH are similar to those under the
ADEA. Proceedings under Title VII are initiated by the aggrieved party's filing of a charge
of unlawful employment practices with the Commission. The charge must be filed within
180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Within 180 days of the filing of such charge, if
no civil action has been filed by the Commission or the Attorney General of the United
States, and no conciliation agreement has been entered into, the aggrieved party should
receive a "right to sue" letter. The aggrieved party must file a civil action within 90 days
of the receipt of such letter or lose the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), -5(f). For
articles discussing Title VII, see Casey & Slaywood, Procedural Aspects of Title VII
Litigation: Pitfalls for the Unwary Attorney, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 87 (1975); Dotsey, Equal
Employment Opportunity-A Brief History and the New Federal Approach Through
Affirmative Action, 8 FORUM 100 (1972); Employment Discrimination: A Title VII
Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540 (1974); The Second Decade of Title VII: Refinement of
the Remedies, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 433 (1975). For the legislative history of the ADEA,
see S. REp. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
" The court reached its conclusion after "examining the cases and the legislative
history" under the ADEA. 539 F.2d at 1259.
" Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D.
Kan. 1973).
" Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Vasquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (D.P.R. 1975).
S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
658.
, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970). Section 626(e) of the ADEA makes applicable 29
U.S.C. § 255 (1970), the statute of limitations contained in the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1970). Under section 255(a) an action must be brought within
two years from the time the cause of action accrues. Therefore, there are two time limita-
tions built into the ADEA: Notice of intent to sue must be given within 180 days of the
discriminatory act, and, once such notice has been given, an action must be brought
within two years of the discriminatory act.
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and the NLRB . . . . By utilizing the courts rather than
[administrative bodies] as the forum to hear cases arising under
the law, these delays may be largely avoided.'
On appeal, Mrs. Dartt argued that these changes in proce-
dures under the ADEA supported the conclusion that failure to
give notice within the 180-day period did not necessarily divest
the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Especially in light of the
expressed congressional concern for a speedy determination of the
rights of older workers, Mrs. Dartt urged, it would be more in
keeping with the intent of the ADEA to construe the 180-day
period as directory in nature.2
In adopting plaintiff's interpretation of the legislative history
and her argument that section 626(d)(1) should be construed as
directory, the court of appeals relied on cases which had given
similar time limitations in Title VII a liberal reading. For exam-
ple, Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc.3" compared the
Title VII requirement for the filing of a charge of discrimination
within 180 days of the alleged discrimination to a statute of limi-
tations. It found equitable modifications such as tolling and es-
toppel applicable. 4 Although Reeb and Dartt in essence reached
the same conclusion, the facts in each case were significantly
different. In Reeb, the plaintiff had been deceived by the em-
ployer into believing that her termination was the result of a
limitation of funds. It was only after the statutory time period for
filing a charge of discrimination had passed that the plaintiff
discovered her position had subsequently been refilled by an al-
legedly less qualified male. The court in Reeb held: "[T]he
ninety day period did not begin to run in the present case until
the facts that would support a charge of discrimination under
Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person
with reasonable prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to
" Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
31 Brief for Appellant at 9-12, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the use of legislative action on proposed amendments to a bill as an
extrinsic aid in statutory construction, see 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48.18 (4th ed. 1973).




the plaintiff."3 Thus, the equitable modification fashioned in
Reeb was based on the wrong of the employer. As will be seen, in
every case, except Dartt, in which the time limitations of the
ADEA have been tolled, the decision has been based on a wrong
done by the employer.
3
1
III. OTHER JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 626(d)(1)
While litigation under the ADEA has been limited, increased
public awareness of the Act and its prohibitions has led to an
increase in the number of suits filed under the Act. 7 In the years
immediately after the ADEA was passed, the trend was to find
the procedural requirements of the Act to be jurisdictional, i.e.,
mandatory in nature. 38 However, recently there has been a move-
ment, albeit tentative, in the direction of construing the proce-
dural requirements more liberally. 3
The first case to interpret section 626(d)(1) was Cochran v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Co.4" In considering the effect to be given
the requirement that notice of intent to sue be filed within 180
days, the court found that use of the word "shall" in the statute
indicated that the requirement was mandatory rather than direc-
3 Id. at 931. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
4(a), 86 Stat. 104, amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970) by extending the time for filing
charges with EEOC from ninety to one hundred and eighty days after the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful act.
"' See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
7 Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods
Div., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th
Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Woodburn v. LTV Aero-
space Corp., 531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976); Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th
Cir. 1975); Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Powell v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Brohl v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936
(M.D. Fla. 1976); Hughes v. Beaunit Corp., 12 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,092 (E.D.
Tenn. May 19, 1976); Mizuguchi v. Molokai Elec. Co., 411 F. Supp. 590 (D. Hawaii 1976);
Raynor v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burgett v. Cudahy
Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973); Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973);
Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
" Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 12 F.E.P. Cases 1494 (D.N.J. 1976); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F
Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975);
Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
11 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
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tory."1 In Cochran it was argued that because of the humanitarian
and remedial purposes of the Act, liberal construction was pro-
per.4" This argument, which was accepted in Dartt,43 was rejected
by Cochran as being addressed to the wrong instrumentality of
government."
The leading case for the proposition that section 626(d)(1) is
a jurisdictional requirement to maintenance of suit under the
ADEA is Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.45 Powell
distinguished the more liberal judicial interpretations of Title
VII's time limitations because of the different placement, within
the statutes, of the time limitations." Under Title VII, the re-
quirement of filing a charge of discrimination is found in a differ-
ent subsection than the subsection limiting the institution of
legal actions; the ADEA time limitation for the filing of notice,
however, is found in the same subsection which limits the filing
of legal actions." The Powell court argued that this indicated a
congressional intent to make compliance with the notice require-
ment in the ADEA jurisdictional."
Within the Tenth Circuit, both the court of appeals and a
district court had previously interpreted the time limitation of
section 626(d)(1). In Burgett v. Cudahy Co.4" the United States
District Court for Kansas found, as did the Dartt district court,
that the purposes for requiring filing of notice of intent to sue
prior to commencement of a private action were two-fold: First,
" The form of the verb used is often considered in determining whether a statutory
provision is mandatory or directory. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 32, § 57.03. For a discus-
sion on the importance of the distinction between mandatory and directory, see 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 32, § 57.01.
42 376 F. Supp. at 303.
539 F.2d at 1260.
" "The argument that the legislation is remedial and humanitarian and should be
construed so as not to deny relief in this case is addressed to the wrong instrumentality of
the government. Congress, not we, should decide this." 376 F. Supp. at 303.
494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974). The district court in Dartt cited Powell for this
proposition. 10 F.E.P. Cases at 847.
" 494 F.2d at 488.
47 The limitation in Title VII that charges must be filed within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II 1972), while the procedures
for filing a civil action under Title VII are found in section 2000e-5(f)(1). The 180-day
notice requirement in the ADEA is found in the section dealing with procedures for
bringing a private action, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
494 F.2d at 488.
361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
VOL. 54
LABOR LAW
the Secretary of Labor would be put on notice of possible viola-
tions of the Act, and the claims could be investigated in order to
determine whether agency action should be taken; second, the
alleged discriminator would be put on notice that a complaint
had been filed and could voluntarily rectify any discriminatory
practice. 0 The court in Burgett concluded that to serve these
purposes and effectuate the legislative intent, filing of notice of
intent to sue should be construed as jurisdictional.5
In Law v. United Air Lines, Inc.,5" the Tenth Circuit dealt
with an issue similar to that raised in Burgett. In a per curiam
opinion, the court adopted the trial court's holding that the lodg-
ing of notice of intent to file a civil action was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to plaintiff's cause of action, and declared itself to be
"in accord with Powell."" In Dartt, the court of appeals at-
tempted to harmonize its apparent rejection of Powell with its
holding in Law. 54 The court emphasized that in Law tolling was
not an issue because notice had been filed more than five years
after the alleged discrimination.5
Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,"6 a Fifth Circuit case decided
only a few weeks before Dartt, took a different view of section
626(d)(1). The plaintiff in that case had made an oral complaint
to the Department of Labor and was told to file a letter of intent
to sue; he had a letter prepared but became ill and was hospital-
ized, and the letter was never mailed. 7 The Fifth Circuit found
that it could not waive a limitation period established by Con-
gress and upheld the judgment against plaintiff, holding that this
claim was barred by failure to file timely notice of intent to sue."
Notwithstanding Hays, there has been some movement re-
cently to give a liberal interpretation to the procedural require-
ments of the ADEA when possible. Although the issue often is
whether the time limitations in section 626(d)(1) are subject to
Id. at 621; Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d at 1261.
361 F. Supp. at 621-22.
52 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 171.
'4 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
" 539 F.2d at 1261 n.3. "The Court in Powell simply was not faced with a situation
where the equities dictated a tolling. Neither were we in Law." Id.




equitable modifications, some cases have avoided this question
and have given a tardy plaintiff relief. A case relaxing the stric-
tures of section 626(d)(1) without tolling was Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp." The facts of this case were very similar to those in
Dartt. The plaintiff had failed to file notice of intent to sue within
the 180-day period, but had communicated orally with the De-
partment of Labor regarding her allegedly discriminatory dis-
charge. 0 The court held that although written notice was prefera-
ble, it was not required, and oral notice to the Department of
Labor within 180 days was sufficient notice.' The finding that
oral notice was sufficient has largely been avoided by other
courts,62 as it was by the district court in Dartt.
6 3
Methods other than the one employed in Woodford have also
been used to avoid a strict interpretation of the time requirement
of the ADEA, without actually tolling the requirement. In Moses
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,64 the court determined that the date
from which the 180-day period begins to run is the administrative
termination date, rather than the date on which the complainant
actually stops working. Moses' notice of intent to sue had been
given within 180 days of her administrative termination, but not
within 180 days of the date she actually stopped working.65 By
this construction of the date from which the 180-day period be-
gins to run, Moses did not have to deal with the issue of untimely
filing of notice. In Smith v. Schlitz Brewing Co.,6" a New Jersey
district court was also able to avoid tolling the time limitation by
finding that plaintiff's prompt filing of a complaint letter and
copies of correspondence with the Department of Labor fulfilled
the purposes which section 626(d)(1) was intended to serve, even
though plaintiff never specifically stated an intent to file suit.
Interestingly, this same approach was urged upon the court of
appeals in Dartt by the Department of Labor in its amicus curiae
369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
' Id. at 913-14.
6, Id. at 915. The issues of timeliness and tolling were not raised; instead, the court
only considered what constituted notice.
" See text accompanying note 66 infra.
"[ Woodford] disregards the clear mandate of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) . 10 F.E.P.
Cases at 847.
525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 94-95.
" 12 F.E.P. Cases 1494 (D.N.J. 1976).
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brief; however, the Dartt court did not select this route but in-
stead tolled the time limitation. 7
Cases prior to Dartt in which the time limitation of section
626(d)(1) was subject to equitable modification found some
wrong by the employer which made the employee unable to assert
his or her rights within the proper time. For example, the equita-
ble remedy of tolling in Bishop v. Jelleff Associates" was based
on the failure of the complainants' employer to post the required
ADEA notices. In reaching its decision, the court also considered
the relative "newness" of the Act, the plaintiffs' general lack of
sophistication, and their representation to the Department of
Labor that large numbers of elderly employees were being dis-
charged by the defendant employer.69 Similarly, Skoglund v.
Singer Co.70 found that section 626(d)(1) could be subject to equi-
table modifications. In holding that plaintiff's claim (that
defendant-employer had failed to post the required notices), if
proved, would be sufficient to toll the 180-day notice require-
ment, the court said: "Defendant should not benefit to plaintiff's
detriment by its failure to fulfill the responsibilities laid upon it
by Congress. It is basic to our system of justice that one should
not benefit from a wrong done to another."'"
A situation where a defendant was not allowed to benefit
from its own wrong was found in McGinley v. Burroughs Corp.7"
There, under facts similar to those in Reeb,73 the time limitations
11 The Secretary of Labor, as amicus curiae, argued that a result similar to Smith
should have been reached: "The lower court erred in dismissing this case for lack of a
timely notice of intent to sue, since the basic purposes contemplated by such notice were
fully satisfied by plaintiffs complaint to the Labor Department as a result of which
defendant was promptly notified of the asserted ADEA violation and given an opportunity
to settle it." Amicus Curiae brief by the Secretary of Labor at 15, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co.,
539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976). This argument was rejected. 539 F.2d at 1259.
398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974). Bishop has been distinguished by courts not
wishing to allow an employer's failure to post the required notices to excuse a tardy
plaintiff. See Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Hiscott v. General
Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Brohl v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Fla.
1976).
' 398 F. Supp. at 593.
7o 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975).
7' Id. at 804. At the hearing before the federal district court to determine if the
employer had failed to post the required notices as the plaintiff claimed, the notices were
found to have been properly posted and plaintiff's claim was barred, as there were no
circumstances to justify tolling. 13 F.E.P. Cases 253 (D.N.H. 1975).
72 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
71 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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of the ADEA were tolled where the plaintiff's failure to file within
the allotted time period was the result of the defendant's willfully
concealing the circumstances from which the plaintiff could have
ascertained the discrimination.74
The contrast between cases which had previously tolled the
time limitations and Dartt may be readily seen. In Dartt, the
court's decision to toll was based on factors other than the em-
ployer's wrong, because there was no wrong on the part of Shell
which prevented Dartt from asserting her claim within the proper
time. The court based its decision on the Department of Labor's
failure to advise Mrs. Dartt of the 180-day requirement.75 Mr.
Speer's usual custom was to advise complainants of this require-
ment, although there was no such statutory requirement.76 Fur-
ther, Shell's delay in providing information to assist the Wage
and Hour Division in its investigation was viewed by the court as
indirectly contributing to the Division's failure to notify Mrs.
Dartt of the time limitations before they expired.77 This finding
was made in spite of an affidavit indicating that Shell's delay was
due solely to the volume of the data requested.7" Finally, even
though Shell had posted the informational notices given it by the
Wage and Hour Division, the court found these official notices
"completely inadequate to inform Dartt as to the 180-day notice
requirement."79
CONCLUSION
The equitable conclusion reached in Dartt that the time limi-
tations of the ADEA may be tolled is not without precedent.'" But
the application of these equitable principles to the facts of Dartt
could, for all practical purposes, eliminate the 180-day require-
ment for notice of intent to sue. In previous cases, tolling occurred
407 F. Supp. at 909-10.
539 F.2d at 1262.
79 Id.
77 Id.
1, "The studies which Mr. Speer had requested were quite voluminous, and Mr. Speer
was aware that it would take several months to complete the compilation of the requested
data." Affidavit of Shell's manager of employee relations, attached to Shell's Response
to the Brief of the Amicus Curiae, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d at 1262.
McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Skoglund v. Singer




because of the inequitable conduct of the defendant, thereby giv-
ing effect to the maxim that one should not benefit from a wrong
done to another. The court in Dartt strained to find some wrong-
ful act on the part of Shell which could justify the application of
equity to this case, but the best it could do was to conclude that
Shell's failure to provide the Wage and Hour Division with re-
quested data contributed, in an indirect manner, to the Division's
failure to notify Mrs. Dartt of her right to sue prior to the running
of the 180-day period.8' Another "wrong" which the court cited
was the inadequacy of Shell's posted notices. However, these are
not "wrongs" which can fairly be said to be the fault of Shell, or
which should justify the equitable modification here fashioned.
There were, undoubtedly, circumstances which contributed to
Mrs. Dartt's tardy filing of notice of intent to sue. In her initial
contact with an attorney regarding her complaint, she received no
advice on how to maintain suit under the ADEA, but was merely
told to contact the Department of Labor. Had Mrs. Dartt re-
ceived more thorough legal advice at this point, the problem with
section 626(d)(1) might never have arisen. It may also have been
that the notices posted by Shell were inadequate to inform her of
her rights and duties under the ADEA. But again, this was no
fault of Shell's. The printed notice was furnished Shell by the
Department of Labor, and a reading of section 627 of the ADEA
which requires the posting of such notices can only lead to the
conclusion that the Department of Labor deemed these notices
"appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]."
It seems that the court determined that Mrs. Dartt's efforts
to present her cause, though thwarted by a series of circumstan-
ces (none of which was her employer's fault), were nonetheless
diligent and therefore deserving of the court's power to fashion
equitable modifications. This decision is in clear contravention of
the statute, and while admittedly the requirements of the statute
may be tolled, the factors necessary to support the maxims of
equity are not present in the facts of Dartt.5 3
1 See text accompanying note 71 supra for a discussion of one court's determination
of the effect of wrong-doing by the employer.
11 "Every employer, employment agency and labor organization shall post and keep
posted in conspicuous places upon its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by
the Secretary setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970).
0 1 PomERoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 363 (3d ed. 1905).
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Mrs. Dartt was allowed by the court to sue Shell although she
failed to meet the statutory requirements to maintain suit, and
even though the cause of her failure did not lie with Shell. It
seems less than a truly equitable remedy to penalize the employer
in such a situation. Perhaps such circumstances could be avoided
in the future by requiring the Department of Labor to notify
complainants of the 180-day requirement, or requiring the De-
partment of Labor to prepare ADEA notices for employers to post
which set out more specifically the rights and duties under the
ADEA.
As suggested in the opinion of the court which first had occa-
sion to interpret this section of the ADEA, decisions which serve
to change or modify statutory requirements are more properly a
legislative function left to Congress."4 However, in light of the
conflict between the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit," a final
decision by the United States Supreme Court might make clear
the question of whether section 626(d) is jurisdictional and if not,
under what circumstances equitable modifications might apply.
Cathleen Osborn Brandt
' Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971). See note
44 supra.
In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976), the court stated
that it could not waive a limitation period established by Congress, while Dartt found that
it could waive such limitation.
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OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit decided relatively few significant cases in
the area of lands and natural resources during the past term. This
overview will examine cases decided involving the substantive
areas of public lands, condemnation, water and water quality,
interstate land sales, and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969.'
I. PUBLIC LANDS
One decision involving the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior to revoke grazing licenses issued under the Taylor Graz-
ing Act,2 Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton,3 is commented on
separately.' The other two cases of note dealing with public lands
involved a trust established pursuant to a federal land grant to
New Mexico and the administration of the federal coal prospect-
ing and leasing program on the public lands.
A. Trust Lands
In United States v. New Mexico5 the state appealed a sum-
mary judgment order entered by the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico in favor of the United States,
twenty-eight individual miners, and the United Mine Workers of
America, plaintiff-intervenors. The United States sought to en-
force the terms of a grant of 100,000 acres of federal lands to the
state in trust for the maintenance of "a miners' hospital."' The
42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-4347 (1970).
2 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970).
531 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1976).
The case comment on Diamond Ring Ranch follows this overview.
536 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1325. Fifty thousand acres were granted to the Territory of New Mexico by
the Ferguson Act for a "miners' hospital." Act of June 21, 1898, ch. 489, 30 Stat. 484. An
additional 50,000 acres were granted by the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act for
"miners' hospitals for disabled miners." Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557. That
Act imposed a trust upon the lands for the purposes designated and provided that:
Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value
directly or indirectly derived therefrom, for any object other than that for
which such particular lands, or the lands from which such money or thing
of value shall have been derived, were granted or confirmed, or in any man-
ner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust.
Id. § 10.
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state, in its constitution, had accepted the conditions imposed on
the land grant trusts7 and, in accepting the lands, stated that
they would be "exclusively used for the purpose" for which they
were granted.8 Pursuant to the grant, the state had established
and maintained the Miners' Hospital of New Mexico at Raton as
a general purpose hospital with a separate board of trustees and
separate trust account.' In 1968 the state reorganized the admin-
istration of its health care facilities. This led to a closing of the
special revenue trust account for the Miners' Hospital, a commin-
gling of revenues with the income received from other state facili-
ties, and a downgrading of the hospital from a general purpose to
an "intermediate care" facility, requiring that Miners' patients
in need of surgical or other special treatments be served by other
state facilities with payment for such outside care being charged
to the income from the Miners' trust funds.'0
The United States sought and obtained a determination that
the state had breached the trust provisions governing the land
grants. The district court ordered the state to upgrade the Min-
ers' Hospital and maintain it as a general purpose facility, to
cease the commingling of trust funds and spend them only for
Miners', and to restore certain funds spent for outside care to the
trust." The court refused to apply the cy pres rationale proposed
by the state'" and disallowed a setoff for administrative costs
claimed by the state for the operation of Miners'. Except for the
disallowance of a setoff, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court decision.' 3
N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 9.
Id. art. XIV, § 2.
536 F.2d at 1326.
,0 Id. Under the state hospital certification and licensing framework, a general pur-
pose hospital provides a full range of medical services, including surgical and maternity
care, while an "intermediate care facility" provides only basic health care to in-patients
without full-time physician supervision, but does not provide surgical or other special
treatment services. See also 45 C.F.R. § 234.130(d)(3) (1976).
536 F.2d at 1326.
,2 Id. The cy pres doctrine is an equity function that will, "when a charity is originally
or later becomes impossible, inexpedient, or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute an-
other charitable object which is believed to approach the original purpose as closely as
possible." G.G. BoGmrr & G.T. BoGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 431 (2d ed.
1964). It does not appear that a cy pres approach has ever been used in the past in dealing
with trusts created by federal land grants to the states, and it appears from the facts here
that its rejection was appropriate in this case. Maintenance of the Miners' Hospital had
not become clearly impossible, inexpedient, or impracticable.
11 The state had argued that it should be allowed to offset against the funds to be
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The affirmation was based essentially upon the proposition
that the trust provisions of the Enabling Act should be strictly
and literally construed. The Tenth Circuit relied upon three prior
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Act, Lassen
v. Arizona Highway Department," Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v.
Arizona,'5 and Ervien v. United States." While each to some ex-
tent indicated that the trust provisions of the Act should be
strictly construed, none would have necessarily called for the
holding here. Lassen and Alamo both involved interpretations of
the Act's provisions for and restrictions on state disposition of the
trust lands. Lassen indicated that the reason for a literal ap-
proach to the language of the Act was to insure "that the grants
provide the most substantial support possible to the beneficiaries
and that only those beneficiaries profit from the trust.""
Only Ervien directly dealt with proper utilization by the
state of the proceeds derived from trust lands. That case declared
that a New Mexico statute authorizing the use of three percent
of the income from trust land funds for advertisement to attract
settlers to the state was invalid as a breach of trust. The Court
stated: "There is in the Enabling Act a specific enumeration of
the purposes for which the lands were granted and the enumera-
tion is necessarily exclusive of any other purpose.""
On the basis of these strict interpretation approaches that
arose in what are arguably somewhat dissimilar situations, the
Tenth Circuit rejected New Mexico's argument that its use of the
funds was valid and was in furtherance of the general intent
behind the grant: attending to the health needs of disabled min-
ers. The court, looking at the express words of the Act, held that
returned to the Miners' revenue trusts the portion of the administrative costs incurred by
the state in operating Miners' during the period of centralized administration. Because it
concluded that the breach of trust involved was not motivated by bad faith and was of a
"technical nature," the Tenth Circuit ordered a modification of the district court judg-
ment insofar as it disallowed the setoff. 536 F.2d at 1329-30.
1 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
Is 424 U.S. 295 (1976).
251 U.S. 41 (1919).
'; 385 U.S. at 467. In support of its decision in United States v. New Mexico, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized language in Lassen to the effect that "Itihe Enabling Act
unequivocally demands both that the trust receive the full value of any lands transferred
from it and that any funds received be employed only for the purposes for which the land
was given." 536 F.2d at 1327 (quoting 385 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added by Tenth Circuit)).
" 251 U.S. at 47.
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the purpose of the trust was the establishment and maintenance
of a "miners' hospital" and that providing for the health needs
of miners in other facilities was not within the express purposes
of the trust so as to allow the trust fund to be charged for the cost
of such treatment. 19
This very narrow reading of the "purpose" of this trust land
grant may raise some serious questions for state officials seeking
some flexibility in the administration of various land grant
trusts.2" Does this mean, for example, that income funds derived
from lands granted in trust to be used for "schools and asylums
for the deaf, dumb, and the blind"'" could not be expended in a
community-based treatment and rehabilitation program?
The decision here also calls into question the continuing va-
lidity of cases dealing with grants to New Mexico of about 500,000
acres for "the establishment of permanent water reservoirs for
irrigating purposes. ' 22 The New Mexico Supreme Court has up-
held the validity of statutes making appropriations from the trust
funds arising from these lands for purposes which go beyond the
"establishment of permanent water reservoirs." It has been that
court's view that, "so long as the legislative and administrative
policy is within the fundamental purpose and the reasonable
meaning of the limitation," 23 the trust funds could be used for
such things as construction and maintenance of ditches and can-
als not connected with a permanent reservoir, construction of
flood control projects with incidental irrigation benefits, and joint
contractual arrangements with Arizona and the United States for
surveys of available ground water resources. 2 This broad inter-
" 536 F.2d at 1327.
" The extent and administration of federal grants of land in trust to the states are
discussed in U.S. PUBUc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION STAFF, LAND GRANTS TO STATES
(1970).
1' Grants of between 30,000 to 200,000 acres have been made to the states of Arizona,
Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming for such a specifically enumerated purpose.
Id. at 27-33.
2 This grant was contained in the Ferguson Act, ch. 489, § 6, 30 Stat. 484 (1898) and
was imposed with the same trust provisions applicable to the Miners' Hospital by the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 10, 36 Stat. 557 (1910). See note 6 supra.
'" State v. Ulibarri, 34 N.M. 184, 279 P. 509 (1929).
2, Id. See State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm'n v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d
622 (1963), for an example of the tensions many states have experienced in dealing with
a strict construction approach to trust lands. Compare Bryant v. Board of Examiners, 130
Mont. 512, 305 P.2d 340 (1956), in which a sharply divided court held that expenditure of
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pretation of the purpose of a grant seems now to have been specif-
ically rejected by the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit decision is also significant for the degree
to which it scrutinized the adequacy of the facility in question.
New Mexico asserted that it should be allowed to continue oper-
ating the Miners' Hospital as a limited care facility so long as the
needs of miners were being met. The district court ordered the
state to upgrade the facility so as to be eligible for licensing and
certification as a full service, general purpose hospital. 5 The
Tenth Circuit, after an examination of the semantics involved in
the congressional use of the word "hospital," concluded that Con-
gress intended the hospital established pursuant to the grant to
be a full service facility that provided surgical care, and so af-
firmed the lower court order."6
This is the only reported case in which it appears that a
federal court has interjected itself so far into the actual manage-
ment or operation of a state facility established pursuant to the
provisions of a federal land grant. The authority for the judicial
supervision exercised by the Tenth Circuit apparently was prem-
ised on the fact that "as trustee, New Mexico has the primary
responsibility for administering Miners' Hospital, but the United
States also 'has a continuing interest in the administration' of the
trusts created by the Enabling Act."2 The court here extended a
continuing interest in the administration of the trusts themselves
to a continuing interest in the quality and operation of the facili-
ties established pursuant to the trusts. Whether the United
States might now be able to secure federal judicial examination
trust funds for needed remodeling of the state capitol was not a permitted purpose under
Montana's Enabling Act grant of lands for the "erection" of a capitol building, with State
ex rel. Morgan v. State Bd. of Examiners, 131 Mont. 188, 309 P.2d 336 (1957), in which a
sharply divided court overruled Bryant after a short life of only several months.
' 536 F.2d at 1327.
" Id. at 1327-29. This conclusion was buttressed by a reference to the fact that the
hospital established after the initial grant of 50,000 acres in 1898 (see note 6 supra)
provided surgical care, thus evidencing New Mexico's original interpretation of the grant.
"By granting an additional 50,000 acres for the same trust purpose [in the New Mexico-
Arizona Enabling Act] Congress impliedly consented to New Mexico's interpretation of
the Ferguson Act." Id. at 1329. It is arguable whether Congress' implied consent to New
Mexico's original interpretation is equivalent to an expression of Congress' intent suffi-
cient to bind New Mexico's present action.
27 536 F.2d at 1328 (quoting Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295
(1976)).
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of the quality and operation of common schools, universities, and
penitentiaries established throughout the country under similar
land grant provisions is now open to question. It has been argued
that New Mexico's administration of its grazing program on trust
lands constitutes a breach of trust because of the low fees received
and the severe over-grazing that is allowed. 8 This Tenth Circuit
decision would seem to provide the doctrinal basis for close judi-
cial investigation of such an argument.
B. Coal Leasing
Hunter v. Morton 9 was an appeal from a summary judgment
in favor of the defendant, Secretary of the Interior, entered by the
United States District Court for the District of Utah. The appel-
lants had filed three applications for coal prospecting permits
with the Bureau of Land Management Land Office in Salt Lake
City. In 1968 the Land Office Manager rejected one of the appli-
cations entirely and a portion of the acreage in the other two
applications. The appellants were informed that they had thirty
days in which to post the bond required for issuance of permits
upon the non-rejected acreage and in which to appeal the rejec-
tions. While appealing the rejection decision, 30 the applicants de-
layed in obtaining permits upon the non-rejected acreage, appar-
ently intending to take this step after appeals were completed.
Before administrative review was exhausted, the Secretary of the
Interior issued an order suspending the coal prospecting permit
system until further notice and calling for rejection of all pending
permit applications .
3
On the basis of this order, appellants' appeals were dismissed
and their applications were rejected. The Department also re-
fused to issue permits for the acreage initially approved. 32 The
appellants then sought to compel issuance of permits on the ini-
tially approved acreage through a mandamus proceeding. In this
2 Comment, Administration of Grazing Leases of State Lands in New Mexico: A
Breach of Trust, 15 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 581 (1975).
- 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976).
Appeal from the decision of the Land Office Manager was taken to the Director of
the Bureau of Land Management. The Director's approval was then appealed to the Board
of Land Appeals. The appeals procedure is now somewhat modified and is controlled by
43 C.F.R. §§ 4.400-4.415 (1976).
31 Int. Dep't Order No. 2952, 38 Fed. Reg. 4682 (1973).
32 529 F.2d at 647-48.
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appeal from the district court summary judgment, the appellants
pressed four arguments: First, that they had a vested interest in
the permits by reason of the initial Land Office approval of some
of the applied for acreage, and that that interest could not be
defeated by the subsequent order of the Secretary; second, that
the order had become part of the administrative proceedings on
the applications, thus bringing into play all the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act;3 third, that the doctrine of estop-
pel should prevent rejection of their applications with respect to
the initially approved acreage; 34 and fourth, that the Secretary's
order was invalid because of a failure to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.15 All four arguments were re-
jected.
" Appellants apparently contended that the effect of the order in terminating their
administrative appeal and rejecting their applications should make the order reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970), notwithstanding its
otherwise exempt status as a general statement of policy concerning federal property. Id.
§ 553. This argument was summarily rejected by the court. 529 F.2d at 649.
", 529 F.2d at 649. The court, while noting that it did not contend that the estoppel
doctrine "can never be applied as to public lands," held that there was no factual basis
for invocation of the doctrine in this case. Id. For an example of the operation of estoppel
arguments in the public lands context, compare United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406
(9th Cir. 1975) (estoppel against Bureau of Land Management) with Union Oil Co. v.
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit has rejected an assertion of
estoppel against actions of the Secretary of Interior in the past. United States v. Ohio Oil
Co., 163 F.2d 633 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 833 (1947).
11 The argument that the Secretary's order was invalid for failure to file an environ-
mental impact statement pursuant to section 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), has
been considered several times. Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Duvels,
Inc. v. Frizzel, No. C-75-175 (D. Utah, June 6, 1976); Albrechtson v. Morton, No. C-392-
73 (D. Utah, Mar. 30, 1976); Goodwin v. Andrus, No. C-5105 (D. Colo., Nov. 25, 1975);
American Nuclear Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb. 26, 1975). The Secretary's
order recited that:
I have determined that the issuance of this order is not such a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment as to
require the preparation of an environmental impact statement under Section
102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(c)).
Order No. 2952, 38 Fed. Reg. 4682, 4683 (1973).
The argument has been successful in both Albrechtson v. Morton, No. C-392-73 (D.
Utah, Mar. 30, 1976), and American Nuclear Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb.
26, 1975). The ruling in American Nuclear was left standing upon appeal. American
Nuclear Corp. v. Kleppe, No. 75-1708 (10th Cir., Feb. 3, 1977) (Not for Routine Publica-
tion). District Judge Ritter, who decided Albrechtson, reached a contrary conclusion
several months later in Duvels, Inc. v. Frizzel, No. C-75-175 (D. Utah, June 6, 1976). The
noncompliance argument was analyzed and rejected in Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235
(D.C. Cir. 1976), in which the court unaccountably cited both Albrechtson and American
1977
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In rejecting appellants' contention that they had acquired a
vested right to the acreage applied for, the Tenth Circuit relied
on the well established rule that no protectable property interest
is created by a mere application or offer for a lease upon public
lands." Extension of this principle to an application for a pros-
pecting permit as opposed to a lease seems consistent with the
underlying rationale for the principle. The issuance of a prospect-
ing permit, like the decision to lease, is discretionary with the
Department,37 and no rights should vest until that discretion has
been fully exercised.
No direct consideration was given to the issue of whether the
approval of some of the acreage in the appellants' applications
might have created some vested right beyond the mere hope of
vesting created by an application. Although the appellants
argued that this approval gave them a better status than that of
a mere applicant, there does not appear to be any authority to
support such a contention. However, the rationale for not recog-
nizing vested rights breaks down after approval has been given.
After approval of some of the applied for acreage, no further
discretion could have been exercised by any officer of the Interior
Department. All that remained was for the applicant to post the
required bond and file forms within thirty days. 8 The Tenth Cir-
cuit appears to have held that the appellants' failure to act with
regard to the approved acreage within the allowed thirty days, in
effect, terminated the initial approval and relegated appellants
to a "mere applicant" status. 9 A more difficult case might have
arisen had the Secretary's order been issued during that thirty-
day response period.
II. CONDEMNATION
United States v. 20.53 Acres of Land" involved the taking by
the United States of several parcels of land near Downs, Kansas,
Nuclear in support of its decision. The argument appears to have been rejected here
because it was not properly developed at trial. 529 F.2d at 649.
11 McTiernan v. Franklin, 508 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1975); Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d
200 (10th Cir. 1971); Schraier v. Hickel, 419 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Duesing v. Udall,
350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1966). Cf. American Nuclear
Corp. v. Morton, No. C-74-42 (D. Wyo., Feb. 26, 1975).
30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
529 F.2d at 647.
"Id. at 648.
0 527 F.2d 1000 (10th Cir. 1976).
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for development of the Glen Elder Dam and Reservoir. Some of
the land adjoined Downs' sewage treatment plant and the taking
necessitated a relocation of the effluent outfall pipe. An original
award of $220,000 to the city was reversed on an earlier appeal
because of an erroneous finding that the whole facility was being
taken.'
Upon rehearing, the city was awarded $28,997 for potential
future operating costs of a chlorination plant the United States
built in connection with the reservoir project.4" The plant was
required because of Kansas health regulations pertaining to dis-
charges into recreational waters. Compensation was awarded on
the basis that the city might at some future time have to take over
operation of the chlorination facility. Rather than reverse merely
on the speculative nature of the award, the Tenth Circuit adopted
an approach used by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals4 3 and held
that, since the need for the chlorination plant arose because of
state regulations rather than federal requirements, there was no
compensable claim for the added treatment costs."
In opinions in two consolidated cases involving condemna-
tion of a pipeline easement from the Texas Panhandle to Red
Oak, Oklahoma,45 the Tenth Circuit found that the findings of the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma complied
with the requirements of United States v. Merz4" as to what must
be disclosed about the valuation procedure used to determine
compensation. After a detailed review of the record, the court
concluded that the compensation awards were supported by sub-
stantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. In both opinions
the court concluded that under Oklahoma iaw the proper mea-
" United States v. 20.53 Acres of Land, More or Less, 478 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973).
42 527 F.2d at 1001.
" City of Eufaula v. United States, 313 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1963). See also United
States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, More or Less, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1025 (1966); City of Milford, 190 Ct. Cl. 941 (1970).
" 527 F.2d at 1001.
Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. A Right of Way 80 Feet in Width, Nos. 74-1534, -1535,
-1536, and -1537 (10th Cir., Oct. 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Arkansas La.
Gas Co. v. A Right of Way 80 Feet in Width, Nos. 75-1157 and -1158 (10th Cir., Feb. 20,
1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" 376 U.S. 192 (1964). The Merz requirements are that a commission in an eminent
domain proceeding must specify the basis for its value findings and must indicate the
general route it followed in determining such value. Id. at 198-99.
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sure of damages when a portion of a tract is taken is the difference
between the market value of the entire tract before taking and the
market value of the tract remaining.47 To arrive at this measure,
expert testimony as to specific types of damage to the remaining
portions was considered. This was held to be proper under Okla-
homa law as evidence of depreciation in market value48 and the
awards were affirmed.
III. WATER AND WATER QUALITY
A significant Indian water rights decision, New Mexico v.
Aamodt," is commented upon separately in this issue.50 Also of
significance are two decisions of the Tenth Circuit dealing with
regulations on effluents from petroleum refining point sources5
promulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 5 pursuant to authorization in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.13 Both opinions arose
in suits brought by the American Petroleum Institute and ten
private companies involved in petroleum refining and related ac-
tivities. One resolved the purely procedural issue of proper forum,
while the other reached the validity of the regulations themselves.
A. The Proper Forum
At issue in American Petroleum Institute v. Train54 was
whether jurisdiction to review the challenged regulations5 pro-
perly lay with the district court or the court of appeals. Suit had
been brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado and had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 6
"' McInturff v. Oklahoma Nat. Gas Transmission Co., 475 P.2d 160 (Okla. 1970);
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Emerson, 377 P.2d 565 (Okla. 1962).
11 See State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Bowles, 472 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970) (evidence
of gross sales before and after change in access road); State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v.
Robb, 454 P.2d 313 (Okla. 1969).
4' 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1157 (1977).
A case comment on Aamodt follows this overview.
40 C.F.R. §§ 419.10-.56 (1976).
52 Administrative notice of Apr. 30, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 16560 (1974), as corrected by
Notice of Sept. 4, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 32614 (1974), as amended by Notice of May 9, 1975,
40 Fed. Reg. 21939 (1975).
13 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
" 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 See note 51 supra.
*4 526 F.2d at 1344.
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The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 provide that review of actions of the Administrator under
authority of section 30151 is to be in the court of appeals." Review
of actions taken under authority of section 30411 is not specifically
provided for in the Act and, therefore, would be in the district
court. Since both sections were relied upon by the Administrator
in promulgation of the regulations,60 proper jurisdiction was at
issue. Appellants argued that section 301 was improperly relied
upon by the Administrator and that thus review in the court of
appeals was improper.6 '
The Tenth Circuit, following the approach to this issue that
had been taken in the Second,6" Third, 3 Fourth, 4 and Seventh"
Circuits and has been subsequently followed in the District of
Columbia Circuit 6 with respect to similar promulgations for var-
ious industries, refused to consider the issue of the Administra-
tor's statutory authority in connection with the jurisdictional
issue. Whether or not statutory authority under section 301 ex-
isted, that section was claimed as a basis in part for the regula-
tions. That being the case, review by the court of appeals was the
only proper procedure. 8 The Supreme Court has confirmed this
reasoning in its recent affirmance of the Fourth Circuit du Pont
case.6
9
5' 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 1369(b)(1)(E).
5, Id. § 1314.
40 C.F.R. § 401.10 (1976).
' 526 F.2d at 1345.
62 Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) (phosphates).
e American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975) (iron and steel
manufacturing).
64 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train (du Pont I), 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977) (inorganic chemicals).
63 American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1975) (meat products).
66 American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (potato process-
ing industry).
6, 526 F.2d at 1345, 1346. A contrary result was obtained in the Eighth Circuit where,
in an opinion rejected by the Tenth Circuit, it was held that, since the Administrator had
no authority to issue the challenged regulations under section 301, the court of appeals
had no jurisdiction to review. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975) (corn
wet milling).
526 F.2d at 1345-46.
6 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977), afl'g 528 F.2d 1136
(4th Cir. 1975), 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).
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B. The Merits
The same plaintiffs who asserted the jurisdictional issue in
American Petroleum Institute v. Train0 concurrently filed a peti-
tion for direct review of EPA action with the court of appeals.
Thus, in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,7 the Tenth Cir-
cuit reached and decided the merits of the Administrator's ef-
fluent regulations for petroleum refining point sources. 72 Space
limitations do not permit an exhaustive examination of the issues
involved. The essential issue, however, was whether the EPA has
statutory authority to impose effluent limitations on existing
sources by regulation or whether EPA may merely promulgate
guidelines for existing sources, leaving the imposition of regula-
tions to state permit authorities. Resolution of this issue involved
an interpretation of the scope and interrelationship of EPA au-
thority under sections 3017 and 304 7 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972. 71 Both sections were cited
by the Administrator as authority for the regulations, and the
regulations impose "effluent limitations guidelines. '76 The issue
arose because section 304 seems to authorize the EPA only to
publish "regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations
... .,7Appellants argued that "guidelines" could not impose
binding requirements but rather should only serve as guidance for
state permit authorities. EPA, on the other hand, relied on sec-
tion 301, which calls for the definition of control technologies by
the Administrator and for the establishment of effluent limita-
tions."
70 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.
71 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976).
72 See notes 51-52 supra.
13 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975).
74 Id. § 1314.
7 Id. §§ 1251-1376.
76 40 C.F.R. § 401.10 (1976). This is the statement of scope and purpose for all of
EPA's Subchapter N, Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-460 (1976),
which currently set water pollution control standards for some forty various industry
groups and subgroups including the petroleum refining group considered here. The joint
promulgation of "guidelines" and "regulations" arose in part from the timetable imposed
upon EPA by the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d
692 (D.C. Cir. 1975), after the Administrator failed to meet the one-year requirement for
publication of guidelines imposed by section 304(b) of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp.
V 1975).
- 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. V 1975).
11 Id. § 1311(b), (e).
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The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Senior Judge Breiten-
stein, held that, while section 301 did not clearly place the re-
sponsibility for establishment of effluent limitations at either the
federal or state level and did not refer to "regulations" as such,
since the control technologies are to be established by the Admin-
istrator, it is reasonable that he establish the limitations gener-
ally applicable to any category." It was also noted 0 that the au-
thority of the Administrator to impose section 301 limitations by
regulations could be derived from section 501(a) which authorizes
him "to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out
his functions under this chapter."'8 This reasoning parallels that
employed by several other circuits in upholding the validity of
effluent limitation regulations pertaining to other industry
groups. 2 The opinion is particularly similar to Judge Breiten-
stein's (sitting by designation on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals) in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,8 which
considered the validity of EPA effluent regulations for inorganic
chemicals manufacturing. 4 Both the Fourth Circuit case and the
Tenth Circuit case held that the EPA regulations are presump-
tively binding nationwide and the burden of convincing a state
permit issuer that the general limitations should not apply to a
particular situation is on the permit applicant. 5 A recent decision
of the Supreme Court on the issue of EPA authority has estab-
lished the validity of the Tenth Circuit's decision here.8
The Tenth Circuit also, in accord with du Pont,87 rejected an
attack on the validity of the regulations insofar as they imposed
limitations in the form of single numbers rather than a range of
" 540 F.2d at 1030.
Id. at 1032.
33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. V 1975).
12 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); American Frozen Food
Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train,
537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
1975); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). Contra, CPC Int'l Inc.
v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977).
40 C.F.R. §§ 415.10-.632 (1976).
ft 541 F.2d 1018, 1028; 540 F.2d at 1030.
11 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965 (1977), aff'g 528 F.2d 1136
(4th Cir. 1975), 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).
" 541 F.2d at 1029. Accord, Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620,
630 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044-45
(3d Cir. 1975).
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numbers. This was held to be a valid exercise of general rulemak-
ing in accord with congressional use of the words "best" technol-
ogy. s8 It was also indicated that the use of single numbers would
be tempered by the variance provisions allowed by the Act, 9
which provisions were also upheld by the court. 0 The court fur-
ther upheld the validity of all of the 1977 step limitations except
for those relating to storm runoff,9" but invalidated all of the 1983
step limitations because the record revealed no sound basis for
them.92 The analysis of the validity of the various regulations is
essentially the same as that employed in du Pont. The Supreme
Court's decision in that case has provided some resolution of the
imprecise language of the Act and guidance for the Administrator
and for the circuits in their tasks of implementation and review
of standards established under the Act.
IV. INTERSTATE LAND SALES
In McCown v. Heidler93 the Tenth Circuit held that officers
and directors of a corporate developer could be individually liable
for violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.9
Plaintiffs brought private actions alleging claims under the civil
liabilities section of the Act 95 against the officers and directors of
the apparently defunct corporations which had developed and
sold to the plaintiffs lots in a resort subdivision in Oklahoma. The
defendants, alleging that the Act did not extend liability to
"controlling persons" of a development corporation, sought and
were granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs in the
district court. The Tenth Circuit, while recognizing the possibil-
U 540 F.2d at 1030-31. Section 301(b) of the Act calls for application of the "best
practicable control technology currently available" (BPT) by July 1, 1977 (the 1977 step)
and for application of the "best available technology economically achievable" (BAT) by
July 1, 1983 (the 1983 step). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. II 1972).
1g 540 F.2d at 1031. The variance provisions are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12, .22,
.32, .42, .52 (1976).
" 540 F.2d at 1032-33. The propriety of variance procedures is examined at some
length in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976).
540 F.2d at 1033-38.
o2 Id. at 1038.
" 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970).
"1 Id. § 1709. This section provides a private right of action for untrue statements of
a material fact or omissions of a material fact in connection with subdivision sales against
a developer or his agent.
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ity of a strict reading of the definition of "developer," 96 held nev-
ertheless that the remedial, consumer-oriented purposes of the
Act justified extending liability to the officers and directors. 7 The
court noted that liability could be alternatively premised on the
guilt of the officers and directors in aiding and abetting the con-
duct of the miscreant corporations. The court found the situation
analogous to the civil liability of an aider or abettor in the securi-
ties fraud context.9 8
This is the first reported instance in which the Act has been
clearly held to cover officers and directors. The court cites several
cases in general support of its holding, but while all involved suits
which included officers or directors as defendants, each involved
only preliminary matters and not the direct issue here. It has
been held that liability under the Act does not extend to a succes-
sor corporation to the actual developer. 0 The decision is well
supported on policy grounds, especially in view of the Act's paral-
96 Id. § 1701(4) provides that " 'developer' means any person who, directly or indi-
rectly, sells or leases, or offers to sell or lease, or advertises for sale or lease any lots in a
subdivision." It would seem that the definition of agent to include "any person who
represents, or acts for or on behalf of, a developer in selling," id. § 1701(5), could be
construed to include the officers and directors of a corporate developer.
'7 In the words of the court:
The "developer" of a land sale plan is usually a corporate entity which, in a
fraudulent scheme as here alleged, ends up defunct and offers no reserve for
recovery to those persons defrauded; so, too, the end selling agent, when the
development collapses financially, is often long gone or cannot respond pecu-
niarily .... The basic protection of the Act, to be meaningful, must be
leveled against the fraudulent planners and profit makers for otherwise the
Act would be pragmatically barren. No legislative enactment should be ren-
dered ineffective to attain its purpose if such a construction can be avoided.
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 [1943] ....
527 F.2d at 207. For a discussion of the rationale supporting a liberal interpretation of the
Act see Note, S. 275-The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RuT. L. REv. 714
(1967).
' 527 F.2d at 207. See Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirmed denial
of certification as class action); Siebert v. Great Northern Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510 (5th Cir.
1974) (affirmed denial of preliminary injunction and certification as class action); Adol-
phus v. Zebelman, 486 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973) (action by minority stockholders to enjoin
sales); United States v. Del Rio Springs, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 226 (D. Ariz. 1975) (prelimi-
nary motion); United States v. Pocono Int'l Corp., 378 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(preliminary motion).
" Zachery v. Treasure Lake, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Cf. Bettis v.
Lakeland, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (recognizing potential for liability of
successor corporation).
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lels with the Securities Act of 1933101 which have been specifically
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 02 It is troubling
that the original version of the Act contained a "controlling per-
sons" provision 0 3 which for some reason was not carried forward
into the final legislation. There is no express exclusion of officers
and directors, and, if it is concluded that Congress intended to
leave determination of the precise scope of "developer" to judicial
determination, the Tenth Circuit's position certainly adds to the
effectiveness of the Act.
V. APPLICABILITY OF NEPA
Several cases decided this term considered the necessity of
filing an environmental impact statement (EIS), pursuant to
section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969.104 In Sanborn v. Brinegar'5 the Tenth Circuit upheld an
administrative determination that an EIS was not required. The
Kansas Highway Commission had prepared an extensive Nega-
tive Declaration for three highway projects in Wichita, Kansas,
involving $2,000,000 in alterations on 1.94 miles of roadway. The
report of the state commission examined potential impacts and
concluded that there would be no significant environmental im-
pact from the project. The Federal Highway Administration ac-
cepted this determination, thus relieving the need for an EIS, and
authorized federal funding for the project. The major dispute
centered around the following conclusion in the Negative Decla-
ration: "Since the predicted noise burden for the project area is
the same whether or not the proposed improvements are com-
pleted, the project will not have an adverse environmental impact
on the neighborhood."'' 0 The court determined that these find-
ings were supported by the record and held that the exception
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976). See also L.
RATNER, INTERSTATE LAND SALES 13 (1970).
1 S. 275, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4)(iii) (1967). The conference committee report
on the final version of the Act makes no reference to the definitional sections. CONF. REP.
No. 1785, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2873,
3066-67.
,01 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
Sanborn v. Brinegar, No. 74-1836 (10th Cir., May 17, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
I" Id. at 9.
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granted by the Highway Administration should be upheld, 107 even
though the projected noise levels would be above those levels at
which an EIS is required by Department of Transportation regu-
lations.0 8
In another case involving NEPA, Wyoming v. Hathaway,0°
the Tenth Circuit held that the Environmental Protection
Agency was not required to file an EIS in connection with an
order suspending and cancelling the registration of three predator
control poisons."10 The trial court had found that the order consti-
tuted major federal action significantly affecting the environ-
ment,"' and, this being the case, the EPA was required to con-
sider all possible alternatives and approaches and to file an EIS
pursuant to NEPA."' The Tenth Circuit considered the two re-
lated issues of whether a formal EIS was required"' and whether
there had been substantial compliance with NEPA in the adop-
tion of the order,'" and found in favor of the EPA on both issues.
The court noted the fact that the EPA was not in existence
at the time NEPA became law."5 Reasoning that the entire func-
tion of the EPA is improving the quality of the environment, the
court held that it would be pointless to require the EPA to pre-
pare an impact statement in connection with its own activities.
"If EPA fails to give ample environmental consideration to its
orders, its failure in this regard can be corrected when the order
is judicially reviewed, but collateral review such as was sought
here was never contemplated and is not to be allowed.""' As a
" Id. at 12.
See 23 C.F.R. §§ 771.10(e), 772.2(i) (1976).
' 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).
P.R. Notice 72-2, Mar. 9, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 5718 (1972). The poisons involved were
strychnine, sodium fluoroacetate, and sodium cyanide, used extensively in coyote control
programs. The cancellation was based in part on their toxicity and in part on the indis-
criminate pattern of their use. Id.
1" 525 F.2d at 67.
1 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
S 525 F.2d at 71-72.
' Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 71 n.4.
.. 525 F.2d at 72 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Aldrin-Dieldrin II),
510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension
II), 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Aldrin-Dieldrin
I), 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
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basis for denying collateral review, the court pointed to the fact
that the relevant statute allows a registrant to file objections and
obtain a public hearing within thirty days after notice of a cancel-
lation.' '7 Additionally any person who will be adversely affected
by a cancellation order may petition, within sixty days of the
entry of an order, for judicial review in the court of appeals."8 As
pointed out by Judge Seth in dissent, these remedies were not
particularly availing to the plaintiffs here, who, as consumers of
the economic poisons rather than registrants, had no right to seek
a public hearing on the order and would have had no administra-
tive record to present to a circuit court for review." 9
The determination that the EPA is not required to prepare
and file an impact statement in connection with its own actions
has been reached before by this court,'2 ° and by other circuits.'2 '
In each instance it has been held that strict compliance with
NEPA is not needed in connection with EPA regulatory actions.
However, each case, while excusing strict compliance, has turned
on the extensiveness of the public hearing process engaged in by
the EPA in connection with the challenged action. In Anaconda
Co. v. Ruckelshaus'2 2 the EPA had provided a public hearing
process in connection with the challenged regulations. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension 11)123 the
court viewed the extensive public hearings held by the EPA as the
functional equivalent of an impact statement procedure. In
117 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970). The appellants here (individual users, associations of
users, and the State of Wyoming) were consumers, not registrants who could have sought
hearings on the order.
IS Id. § 135b(d).
525 F.2d at 73 (Seth, J., dissenting).
"o Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1305 (10th Cir. 1973).
121 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA (DDT Suspension II), 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974) (extensive analysis of legislative history of NEPA); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA,
481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). All of these decisions other
than Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973), involved
actions under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970).
Such actions have subsequently been statutorily exempted from NEPA by the Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 7(c)(1), 88
Stat. 246, 259. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
122 482 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1973).
12 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA'24 the court, while holding that strict
NEPA compliance was not required, vacated the challenged ac-
tions because the hearing procedures had not supplied adequate
input from interested parties.
It is the court's treatment of the substantial compliance ele-
ment that is the most troubling here. While prior cases have
excused strict compliance, all have considered the need for some
public airing of the environmental issues involved. The opportun-
ity for public awareness of and input toward federal decisionmak-
ing on environmental issues has been a key element of EIS proce-
dures. -'25 Indeed a sensitivity toward the need for public hearings
is mandated by the Impact Statement Guidelines of the Council
on Environmental Quality'26 and the EPA Regulations on Prepa-
ration of Environmental Impact Statements.'27 As noted by the
court,'28 the Administrator's decision to cancel the poison regis-
trations in question was based upon consideration of detailed
petitions submitted by various conservation groups and upon a
private report prepared under the sponsorship of the Department
of Interior and the Council on Environmental Quality (the Cain
Report).' 29 The Cain Report contains a detailed and extensive
examination of current predator control problems and practices
around the country. No public hearings were held in connection
with the preparation of the report, but nearly 400 persons were
contacted in an effort to gain input.30 Only a few of those con-
tacted or responding represented livestock associations, but it
does appear that the views of the Wyoming Woolgrowers Associa-
tion, one of the appellants here, were received and considered. 3'
While it is apparent that in relying on the Cain Report the Ad-
ministrator was presented with serious and well-considered rec-
.2 481 F.2d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1973).
,25 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 271 (1974).
" 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (1976).
" Id. § 6.400.
525 F.2d at 68-69.
2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PREDATOR CONTROL, INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY, UNIV. OF MICH., PREDATOR CONTROL-1971 (1972). The Advisory Committee was
chaired by Stanley A. Cain and the committee's report is, therefore, referred to, both in
general usage and by the court, as the Cain Report.
"' Cain & Kadlec, Foreward to ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PREDATOR CONTROL, INSTITUTE
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNIV. OF MICH., PREDATOR CONTROL-1971 (1972).
"' Id. at 107-08.
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ommendations, the question remains whether federal decision-
making should be based on information sifted through a private
data evaluation process or rather should be based on the responsi-
ble official's own independent analysis of the relevant informa-
tion after direct exposure to the competing public concerns.
John H. Evans
WATER LAW: PUEBLO INDIANS' WATER RIGHTS
New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
This suit' was brought under a New Mexico statute providing
for adjudication of water rights. 2 New Mexico instituted the pro-
ceeding for a determination of water rights in the Nambe-
Pojoaque River system. The parties to the suit were the United
States, New Mexico, approximately 900 private landowners, and
the Pueblos of San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambe, and Tesuque.
Appeal was made to the Tenth Circuit from the New Mexico
District Court's decision that the Pueblos' water rights are sub-
ject to the New Mexico appropriation system.
The majority, Judge Breitenstein joined by Judge Hill, held
that the Pueblos are not subject to the state system.3 The Pueb-
los' rights were held to be superior to all competing claims, except
non-Indians claiming by adverse possession prior to 1858 and
possibly others in situations not before the court in this suit.4
The dissenter, Judge Barrett, would have held that the Pueb-
los are governed by the appropriation system for their uses exist-
ing prior to 1933.1 Uses beginning after 1933 would have been held
independent of the state system.'
I New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. New
Mexico v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1157 (1977).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-4-4 (1953).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Uncertainty as to the Pueblos' water rights arose for two
reasons. First, the Pueblos have a unique history as non-nomadic,
agricultural people whose titles and rights to their lands were
recognized by the Spanish and Mexican governments and by the
United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.7 Second, the
effect of the Acts of June 7, 1924 s and May 31, 19331 are unclear.
These Acts gave compensation for lands and appurtenant waters
lost to non-Indians during a period when the Pueblos' lands were
thought to be freely 'alienable.
The Pueblos are historically sedentary, agricultural groups
with highly organized social structures. The Spanish conquista-
dores entered the Area in the 1540's and Spain ruled the Pueblos
until 1821. In 1821 Mexico won independence from Spain. Mexico
ruled the Pueblos until 1848, when the territory they occupied
was ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi-
dalgo."' Treaty Articles VIII and IX guaranteed United States
protection of rights recognized by the previous sovereigns.
In 1851 the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834" was
extended to cover the Indians on the lands acquired from Mex-
ico.' 2 These Acts made buying or settling on Indian lands an
offense. 3 In 1858 the Pueblos' titles to their lands were formally
confirmed by Congress. 4 Plenary federal jurisdiction over the
Indians was later guaranteed in the New Mexico Enabling Act of
19101 and the New Mexico Constitution."
Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
Ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636.
Ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108.
0 Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
" Act of Feb. 27, 1851, ch. 14, § 7, 9 Stat. 574, which provided: "That all the laws
now in force, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, or such provisions
of the same as may be applicable, shall be, and the same are hereby, extended over the
Indian tribes in Territories of New Mexico and Utah."
11 The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, § 11, 4 Stat. 729, provided
in part: "That if any person shall make a settlement on any lands belonging, secured, or
granted by treaty with the United States to any Indian tribe, or shall survey or shall
attempt to survey such lands, or designate any of the boundaries by marking trees, or
otherwise, such offender shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand dollars."
" Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374. This confirmation specifically included
the land claims of the Pueblos of Tesuque, San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, and Nambe.
15 Ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, which provided "that until the title of such Indian or
Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the
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But in 1876 the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Joseph7 held that the Pueblos were not "Indians"
within the meaning of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. This
supported territorial court decisions that non-Indians could settle
on the Pueblos' lands. Joseph was qualified in 1913,11 and specifi-
cally overruled in 1926.11 However, prior to the reversal of Joseph,
about 3,000 adverse claims against the Pueblo lands were initi-
ated.20
In 1924 Congress created a board with authority to settle
these claims and determine compensation due the Pueblos for the
lands and appurtenant waters quieted in the non-Indian claim-
ants."' The board concluded that compensation for the lands lost
should be approximately $35 per acre, the appraised value being
$100 per acre.22 The 1933 Congress appropriated about $75 per
acre, $40 in excess of the board's suggestion. 3 The reasons for the
different rates are not made clear in the legislative history. 24 How-
disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States .... "
1, N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 2. The language in the constitution is the same as that in
the Enabling Act, supra note 15.
17 94 U.S. 614 (1876). The Joseph case was a prosecution under the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act. The defendant was accused of building and settling on 10 acres of Pueblo
land. The Pueblos were held not to be "Indians" and their lands not to be protected by
the Act, so the defendant was found not guilty.
'" United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). This was a prosecution for the
introduction of liquor into the Santa Clara Pueblo in violation of an 1897 Act making it
an offense to bring liquor into "Indian country." Act of Jan. 30, 1897, ch. 109, 29 Stat.
506. The Court found the defendant guilty and said that Joseph "cannot be regarded as
holding that these Indians or their lands are beyond the range of Congressional power
under the Constitution." 231 U.S. at 49.
" United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926). Candelaria, similar to Joseph,
was a prosecution for fencing and settlement of Pueblo lands. The Court considered the
Pueblos to be "plainly within [the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act] spirit and, in our
opinion, fairly within its words, 'any tribe of Indians.' " 271 U.S. at 441. The defendant
was found guilty.
H.R. REP. No. 787, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1924).
2 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636.
2' SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 71ST CONG., 2D SESS., SURVEY OF THE CONDITIONS
OF INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES, part 20, 10828 (1932).
Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108.
"[it is impossible to tell from [the 1933 Act] how much is being awarded for ...
excluded lands, how much for change in valuation basis, and how much for alleged loss
of water rights." Letter from Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior, to Edgar
Howard, Chairman of House Comm. on Indian Affairs (April 12, 1932), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 820, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1932).
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ever, Winters v. United States25 may have been an influence. 21
Winters held that water rights, prior and paramount to any sub-
sequent state-created rights, were reserved by the United States
for the Indians at the same time lands were reserved. It is possible
that the larger appropriation was intended to compensate for the
extinguishment of supposed Winters reserved rights.
II. THE Aamodt DECISIONS
A. The Majority
The majority considered two possible sources for the Pueblos'
water rights: Winters doctrine of reserved rights and aboriginal
rights as recognized by Spain and Mexico.27
The Winters doctrine was first stated in 1908, in a case in-
volving the water rights of a Montana Indian reservation.,' Non-
Indians were enjoined from building a dam which would interfere
with the flow of water to the reservation. The Winters Court
reasoned that when Congress created the reservation by treaty or
agreement, it must have impliedly reserved enough water to irri-
gate and make valuable the otherwise worthless, arid reserved
lands.29 The reserved water was exempted from the state appro-
priation system. 0 Reserved water rights have also been recog-
nized for Indian reservations created by Executive Order,3' and
other federal reservations of land such as national parks, forests,
wildlife refuges, recreation areas, 32 and national monuments.
3
Each reservation includes enough water to accomplish the pur-
pose of the reserved land.3
4
25 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1113-14.
Id. at 1106.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). For the development of the Winters
doctrine, see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United
States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334
(9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), 330 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1964); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
207 U.S. at 577.
= Id.
" Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963). This was a suit to determine the
rights of the respective states to the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries.
.1 Id. at 601.
'1 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). The Court found here that when
Devil's Hole was declared a National Monument water rights had been reserved to pre-
serve a unique species of fish living only in Devil's Hole.
" See generally Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-the Winters Doctrine Updated, 6
1977
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The Act of Dec. 22, 1858,' 5 which confirmed the Pueblos'
titles provided that it "shall only be construed as a relinquish-
ment of all title and claim of the United States to any of said
lands."3 Such a relinquishment is not equivalent to a reserva-
tion,37 so the United States made no reservation of land for the
Pueblos. The majority reasoned that no water rights could have
been reserved by the United States for the Pueblos, since no land
was reserved. The Winters doctrine was thus "not technically
applicable."38
Having rejected the Winters doctrine theory, the majority
apparently adopted the aboriginal rights theory. Aboriginal rights
arise from actual, exclusive, and continuous use and occupancy
"for a long time."39 Once the rights are established, they are good
against all except the sovereign. 0 Such rights can only be extin-
guished by "plain and unambiguous" action." The aboriginal
rights may be "recognized" by Congress and are then good
against the sovereign.42 Although the concept is usually applied
to land title, aboriginal rights have also been discussed for lake-
fishing rights,43 minerals," timber,4" and tidelands.4" The doctrine
GONZAGA L. REv. 215 (1971); Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it Grew: Federal
Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REv. 639; Veeder, Indian Prior
and Paramount Rights Versus State Rights, 51 N.D.L. REv. 107 (1974); Veeder, Winters
Doctrine Rights-Keystone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conserva-
tion and Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REv. 149 (1965); Comment, Application of the Winters
Doctrine: Quantification of the Madison Formation, 21 S.D.L. REv. 144 (1976). State
water rights have also been defeated through federal legislation such as reclamation pro-
ject acts. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
11 Ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374.
" Id.
" New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1111.
3 Id.
Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 491 (1967); Sac and Fox
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 315 F.2d 896, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1963). "A long time" has been
defined as 50 years or long enough to make the area "domestic." United States v. Seminole
Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 387 (1967); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Res. v.
United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 193 (1966). For a discussion of the colonial attitude toward
aboriginal rights, see Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
, Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
" Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 492 (1967).
,2 Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972),
supplemented 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). Pyramid Lake recognized that the area was
the aboriginal home of the Paiutes but emphasized the reserved rights.
" United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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has not previously been applied to water rights. Aboriginal land
rights were established for the New Mexico Pueblos in United
States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso.4 7 This case also held that the
1924 and 1933 Land Claims Settlement Acts did not extinguish
those rights.
4 1
The majority found that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo"5
recognized the Pueblos' rights in its promise to protect all rights
recognized by the previous sovereigns.'" The aboriginal rights
would not be subject to the state appropriation system because
the United States never relinquished its plenary control.' The
majority did not further define the Pueblos' rights, that being a
matter for interpretation of the Spanish and Mexican laws from
which the aboriginal rights derive. 5 However, the court did de-
cide the relative priorities of the Pueblos and three groups of non-
Indian claimants.
The first group consisted of non-Indians claiming adverse
rights prior to the 1858 congressional recognition of the Pueblos'
titles. This group may have some valid claims because the 1858
Act also recognized any adverse claims against the Pueblos. The
laws of Spain and Mexico were held to be determinative of the
priority of adverse claims arising before 1858.51
The second group consisted of non-Indians claiming rights
after 1858 but not depending on the 1924 and 1933 Acts. The court
recognized the possibility of such claims but did not have a spe-
cific case before it. So no determination of priority for this group
was made. 4
The third group consisted of non-Indians claiming under the
1924 and 1933 Acts. This group was held to have rights secondary
to the Pueblos because the 1933 Act55 provided that it was not to
1 Oneida Tribe of Indians v. United States, 165 Ct. C1. 487, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
946 (1964).
:6 Heckman v. Sutter, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902).
7 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. C1. 1975).
Id. at 1388.
" Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
537 F.2d at 1111.
Id. at 1112.
52 This interpretation is to be made by the district court on remand.
537 F.2d at 1112.
I /d.
Ch. 45, § 9, 48 Stat. 108.
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be construed to "deprive any of the Pueblo Indians of a prior right
to the use of water."56 The words "prior right" suggested to the
majority that Congress had determined the nature of the Pueblos'
rights to be generally superior. Any rights claimed under the 1924
and 1933 Acts must be secondary, because otherwise they would
interfere with the prior rights recognized by Congress. 7 The ma-
jority found that Congress did not impliedly relinquish its plenary
control of the Pueblos through the Acts of 1924 and 1933.
Although the majority termed the Winter reserved rights
doctrine "not technically applicable"58 to the Pueblos' rights, the
opinion suggested 9 that the Pueblos' rights may be quantified by
the "practicably irrigable acres" standard defined in Arizona v.
California,' a reserved rights case. The majority also referred to
another reserved rights case, Cappaert v. United States"' saying
that a balancing of competing economic interests is not required
in determining federally reserved rights.2 Under that doctrine,
economic hardship to the non-Indians would not be considered in
the decision of the Pueblos' priorities. 3 So the majority refused
to classify the Pueblos' rights as Winters doctrine reserved rights,
but nonetheless applied the Winters doctrine cases to supply
standards for quantifying the Pueblos' rights.
Thus the majority, declining to define fully the nature of the
Pueblos' rights, did decide that the state has no jurisdiction and
that Congress understood the Pueblos to have priority over the
non-Indians taking under the 1924 and 1933 Acts.
B. The Dissent
The dissent differed from the majority in saying that Con-
5' 537 F.2d at 1112.
Id.
" Id. at 1111.
"' Id. at 1113.
373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). See Kiechel & Burke, Federal-State Relations in Water
Resources Adjudication and Administration; Integration of Reserved Rights with Appro-
priative Rights, 18 RoCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 531 (1973); Note, A Proposal for the Quanti-
fication of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1974); Comment, The
McCarran Amendment-A Method of Clarifying the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 7
LAND & WATER L. REv. 587 (1972).
" 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
537 F.2d at 1113.
It is possible that aboriginal rights also do not involve a balancing of economic
interests. The cases on aboriginal rights do not discuss this point.
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gress intended to relinquish its plenary control of the Pueblos and
chose to do so through implication in the 1933 Act. No express
relinquishment is found, but the dissent would read it into the
1933 Act.
The dissent defined the Pueblos' rights in terms of the 1933
Act. The extra money allotted in that Act was seen as compensa-
tion for a loss of the Pueblos' general priority. The priority had
to be relinquished if there was an actual loss of water rights, as
the dissent would have held." The 1933 Act settled priorities for
the Pueblo water rights as of that date as being subject to the
state appropriation system, on parity with the rights of non-
Indians who took title under the 1933 Act. New Pueblo uses would
not be subject to the state system and would have priority." The
reasoning for the priority of post-1933 new uses was not explained,
except that such new uses were not involved in the "compromise"
of the 1933 Act. 6
The dissent and the majority also disagreed on the extent to
which the Pueblos are subject to New Mexico's appropriation
system. However, both the dissent and the majority rejected the
district court's holding that the Pueblos are completely subject
to the state's water laws. Both opinions found that the Pueblos
have rights outside the state system, although neither opinion
relied on the reserved rights doctrine. The Pueblos' water rights
are thus a new category of federal water rights, neither created
by federal reservation nor subject to the state system.
III. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED
The Aamodt decision raised two issues that will need to be
resolved in the future: the nature of the Pueblos' aboriginal rights
and the system of quantification and priorities to be used in dis-
tributing the water.
In determining the nature of the Pueblos' rights, the case of
Los Angeles v. San Fernando7 is helpful. There the court exam-
537 F.2d at 1118-19.
I d. at 1120.
I ld.
,14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). This was a suit brought by
Los Angeles claiming prior rights, under the "pueblo rights doctrine," to the water of the
Upper Los Angeles River area. Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654
(1958), found that the "pueblo rights doctrine" applies to New Mexico. See also R. CLRK,
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ined the water rights system used in California during the Span-
ish and Mexican rule. It was found that water was generally to
be used in "common""6 but certain agricultural communities
called "pueblos" were given priority in custom, usage, and official
directives." These pueblos were not Indian communities. The
reasons for the priority were that the pueblos were the basic units
of settlement and development in the New World, and that the
pueblos' agricultural products were of highest importance. 0 The
Pueblos of New Mexico may have had a similar priority of water
rights. Their communities were also agricultural, provided suste-
nance, and were a first instance of permanent settlement. The
California pueblos enjoyed an expanding right, which grew as the
pueblos' municipal needs grew." The right was not measured by
irrigable acres, as federally reserved rights are," but was based on
both municipal and agricultural needs. 3 Thus the rights derived
from the Spanish and Mexican laws may be very different from
those derived from federal reservation.
When the nature of the Pueblos' rights has been decided, the
problem remains of formulating a workable distribution of the
water. Both the majority and the dissent spoke in terms of his-
toric uses which may be impossible to determine. The problem
is also made more difficult by the confusion of "use" and "right."
The Pueblos' rights may be limited to the quantity historically
used," may be expandable to meet growing needs, 5 or may be
unrelated to "uses" and depend only on the measurement of irrig-
NEW MEXICO WATER RESOURCES LAW 41-43 (1964); 1 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
RIGHTS 2590-93 (2d ed. 1912); 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 68-69 (3d
ed. 1911).
11 Recopilaci6n de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, Book 4, Title 17, Laws 5, 7
(Compiled 1680), quoted in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 537 P.2d
at 1275-76, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
I d.
,o Id. at 234, 237, 537 P.2d at 1276, 1278, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 27, 29.
Id. at 252, 537 P.2d at 1289, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
7 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 232, 537 P.2d at 1275, 123 Cal. Rptr.
at 26.
" See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1120.
See Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 232, 252, 537 P.2d at 1275, 1289,
123 Cal. Rptr. at 26, 40 (1975). Section 9 of the 1933 Act indicates that the Pueblos' rights
are not limited to irrigation, but are for "domestic, stock-water, and irrigation purposes."
Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, § 9, 48 Stat. 108.
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able acres.76 The relationship between "use" and "right" must be
more clearly defined so that some disposition of the available
waters may be made.
Hopefully, the rights of the Pueblos will not be dealt with as
aboriginal rights, "[w]hatever those rights may have been,""
until the water system is so critically overburdened that a real
quantification system is imposed. When such becomes the case,
the lawmakers may be tempted to follow the example of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act7" in handling the extin-
guishment and compensation of previously undefined aboriginal
rights.7" There the Native Alaskans had various real property
rights which had been recognized by the Russian sovereign. When
Alaska was sold to the United States, the treaty contained a
provision promising to protect those claims recognized by pre-
vious sovereigns.8" The development of Alaska proceeded a step
ahead of the definition of those aboriginal rights. In 1971 Congress
responded to the developers' desires to be unhampered by enor-
mous and valuable native claims covering 100% of the state by
passing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The Act pro-
vided that almost all aboriginal claims were thereby extin-
guished"' and would be compensated by money payments8 and
limited selection of land rights. This legislative solution of the
Alaskan aboriginal claims problem was certainly complete and
conclusive, but the effect on the Alaskans may not be favorable
in the long term.
7, See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1113; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
596, 600 (1963).
" New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1111.
7, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (Supp. IV 1974).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in [19711
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2192; S. REP. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.
REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2297; S. REP. No. 581, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Block, Alaskan Native Claims, 4 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 223 (1971); Crews, Clouds over Alaska-the Native Claims, 3 NAT. RE-
SOURCES LAW. 460 (1970).
Treaty with Russia, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No.
301.
3. 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (Supp. IV 1974).
.2 Id. § 1605.
- Id. § 1611.
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CONCLUSION
The Aamodt case was remanded for an analysis of the Span-
ish and Mexican origins of the Pueblos' rights. This determina-
tion is certainly needed, but the court has already decided the
priority relationships. A more consistent approach is called for
where the rights being adjudicated are so vital. The possibility of
an ultimate disposition of the Pueblos' aboriginal rights in the
manner of the disposition of the Native Alaskan rights should be
avoided. The justice of trading money for resources that cannot
be replaced by purchase is questionable. This is especially true
in the Pueblos' southwestern area, where the water supply is in-
adequate and the land is worthless without water rights.
Wendy J. Busch
GRAZING LANDS MANAGEMENT
Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d
1397 (10th Cir. 1976)
INTRODUCTION
In a case involving possibly far-reaching environmental con-
sequences, Judge Doyle for the Tenth Circuit considered the au-
thority of the Secretary of the Interior and his delegees with re-
spect to the sanction of revocation of a grazing license issued
pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act.' A case of first impression,
Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton' reached the Tenth Circuit
on appeal from the Wyoming District Court's review of the ad-
ministrative action.' Although the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act of 19761 (FLPMA) has mooted some aspects of the
Diamond Ring Ranch controversy, the opinion is still valuable for
its interpretation and review of the Secretary's discretion to re-
voke grazing licenses and as an example of the Tenth Circuit's
attitude toward environmental issues.
1 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970).
2 531 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1976).
1 Judge Doyle affirmed district court jurisdiction predicated on 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1970); see notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text infra.
4 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. IV 1976).
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. The Administrative Process and Review by the District
Court
The plaintiff, Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc., held a Section 3
grazing license5 under the Taylor Grazing Act. This license enti-
tled the Ranch to graze cattle on areas of the Horse Heaven
Pasture, located within the Lander Grazing District in Wyoming.
In addition, the Ranch owned land located within the Pasture
and held grazing rights under a permit on other state-owned
land.'
Diamond Ring Ranch first obtained a grazing license under
the Act in 1966; the license was renewed annually thereafter. The
1971 license, in effect at the time here concerned, provided that
the Ranch would abide by all rules and regulations' relating to
the license."
On June 15, 1971, the Ranch sprayed 5,000 acres of the Horse
Heaven Pasture, of which 3,600 acres were federally owned, with
herbicide 2,4D,1 in order to eradicate large amounts of sage-
brush.'" The spraying was subsidized by the Agricultural Stabili-
zation and Conservation Service (ASCS) upon the Ranch's repre-
sentation that only its private land had been sprayed." The
I Ten-year grazing permits and annual grazing licenses are issued by district range
managers, employees of the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior,
with the advice of a local stockmen's advisory board. Permit issuing procedures, permit-
tee qualifications, and other details are governed by the Federal Range Code, 43 C.F.R.
§§ 4100 to 4115.2-6 (1975).
Congress had ratified the Secretary's authority to issue yearly grazing licenses in
addition to the term permits provided for in the Act by routinely appropriating money
for improvements out of the revenues from the yearly license fees. Brooks v. Dewar, 313
U.S. 354 (1941). Under the National Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
the Secretary is now specifically allowed to issue permits for a period of less than ten years
under certain circumstances. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(b) (Supp. IV 1976).
The terms "permit" and "license," as hereinafter used, have the same meaning unless
distinguished by the context.
531 F.2d at 1399.
43 C.F.R. §§ 4100 to 4115.2-6 (1975), promulgated by authority of 43 U.S.C. § 315a
(1970).
531 F.2d at 1399.
2,4D, or Dow Esteron 99 Concentrate, is a growth inducer which causes a dramatic
increase in a plant's growth rate, leading to the plant's death. For a discussion of the
problems with 2,4D, see Wisconsin v. Butz, 389 F. Supp. 1065, 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
531 F.2d at 1399-400.
The ASCS is a cost-sharing program administered by the Department of Agricul-
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Ranch failed to obtain the prior permission of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM)I2 before spraying the federal lands.
13
BLM personnel first discovered on July 28, 1971, that federal
land had been sprayed, and, after investigation, issued a notice
of violation to Diamond Ring Ranch." The notice alleged that
3,600 acres of public land had been sprayed, without requisite
permission, and that the Ranch's conduct amounted to a willful"3
violation of the regulations. The Department of Interior sought a
three-year suspension of the Ranch's license in Horse Heaven
Pasture and a twenty-five percent reduction of its grazing privi-
leges on other licensed lands as a penalty for the actions.
After a prolonged hearing, the hearing examiner found that,
although the Ranch's actions were willful," the herbicide was not
harmful to animals, no damage was done to wildlife, no suspen-
sion of grazing was necessary in order to protect the range, and,
in fact, the sprayed lands had actually been benefited.'" Accord-
ingly, the examiner suspended the imposition of a sanction, in
effect placing the Ranch on probation for one year.8
On appeal the Interior Board of Land Appeals reversed the
examiner's findings as to any beneficial effects of the spraying,
finding that some wildlife does use sagebrush for forage, and
ture to provide funds to private land owners carrying out conservation and forestry prac-
tices. 7 C.F.R. § 701.1 (1976).
The ASCS program is not applicable to "noncropland owned by the United States
• . . including, but not limited to, grazing lands administered by. . . the Bureau of Land
Management (including lands administered under the Taylor Grazing Act) ...... 7
C.F.R. § 701.8(b) (1976).
" "Cutting, burning, or removing vegetative cover" is allowed only after a permit is
issued by a BLM official. 43 C.F.R. § 4112.3-1(e) (1975).
" 531 F.2d at 1398.
" Id. at 1400.
lb 43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970) specifically provides a fine of not more than $500 as a
penalty for "willful" violations of the Act or the rules and regulations.
' 531 F.2d at 1400.
The hearing examiner's finding of willfulness was upheld by the Tenth Circuit after
a discussion of the applicable definition and the scope of review. 531 F.2d at 1404-06. The
issue of willfulness has been mooted by the FLPMA, which allows the Secretary to issue
a sanction for "any violation" of the regulations and conditions. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a)
(Supp. IV 1976).
" Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397
(10th Cir. 1976). The beneficial effects of 2,4D spraying include an increased growth of
forage and additional water in the soil, making it more resistant to erosion. Brief for
Appellee at 49-51.
l, 531 F.2d at 1400.
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noted that the BLM requires that all grazing be suspended for one
year after any chemical treatment of grazing lands. 20 The Board
also vacated the Ranch's probation and actually suspended its
grazing license for two years with respect to the acreage sprayed.,'
The district court, in reviewing the administrative record,
found that the Ranch's actions had not been willful, but rather
innocent and in good faith, and that, in any event, the maximum
sanction the agency may impose is a $500 fine.Y The Secretary
appealed the district court's ruling to the Tenth Circuit.
B. Appeal to the Tenth Circuit
1. Authority of the Secretary.
The first issue discussed by the Tenth Circuit was whether
the Taylor Grazing Act provides authority for the agency to sus-
pend, reduce, or revoke a permit or license for violation of the Act
or the regulations promulgated thereunder, or whether sanctions
are limited to the statutory $500 fine.
The court's upholding of the suspension, reduction, and revo-
cation power, while not finally determinative of the case,23 was
not merely gratuitous. The Secretary recognized that the case
could be decided simply on the traditional standard of review
grounds but invited the court to consider the issue of the extent
of the Secretary's authority, arguing that such a determination
was critical to the Secretary's continued ability to manage public
lands effectively .
2
Accepting the invitation, the court held that the Secretary
does possess such authority, and recognized that (1) broad regula-
tory power is granted to the Secretary by the Taylor Grazing
Act;25 (2) the legislative history of the Act indicates that the $500
2 12 Interior Bd. Land App. 358, 365-66 (1973).
21 531 F.2d at 1400.
22 Id.
" The court could have held merely that the agency's modification of the sanction
imposed by the hearing examiner was an abuse of discretion (as it did; see notes 37-56
and accompanying text infra) and never have reached the issue of whether the agency
actually has the authority to suspend a grazing permit or license.
' Brief for Appellant at 35.
" 531 F.2d at 1401-02. The Taylor Grazing Act requires the Secretary of the Interior
to "make provision for [the grazing districts'] protection, administration, regulation, and
improvement," and to
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
fine provision was not intended to eliminate possible administra-
tive sanctions but was aimed primarily at trespassers;26 (3) Con-
gress has impliedly ratified the Secretary's interpretaion of his
authority under the Act;2 and (4) a line of condemnation cases
holds that a permit or license, conferring no rights, is not a com-
pensable property interest under the fifth amendment's just com-
pensation clause.
2 8
Although the recent passage of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 now provides specific revocation author-
ity for the Secretary, 2  an examination of the Act's legislative
origins indicates that the revocation authority provision resulted
make such rules and regulations. . . and do any and all things necessary to
accomplish the purposes of [the Act] and to insure the objects of such
grazing districts, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve
the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary injury, to provide
for the orderly use, improvement, and development of the range ....
43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970).
Nevertheless, this discretion is not without limits. While a grazing permit remains
outstanding, the Federal Government may not interfere with it (as by aiding or encourag-
ing third parties to use the lands covered) and the Secretary has an obligation under the
Act to adequately safeguard permits issued thereunder. Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d
738 (10th Cir. 1949); see generally 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1970).
11 531 F.2d at 1402-03. The court relied heavily on excerpts from the Senate debate
of June 12, 1934, held shortly before passage of the Act, to support its holding that the
$500 fine was never intended to be an exclusive sanction, and suggested that such an
interpretation would be an "absurdity." 531 F.2d at 1402. While the language quoted by
the court, taken out of context, appears to support that conclusion, a careful reading of
the entire debate suggests that the fine was considered "all the power that is needed" and
"ample punishment." See 78 CONG. REc. 11139-47 (1934).
" 531 F.2d at 1403. In a number of cases at the administrative hearing level where
the violation involved a trespass, the agency reduced grazing privileges conferred by
existing permits or licenses. Eugene Miller, 67 Interior Dec. 116 (1960); Clarence S. Miller,
67 Interior Dec. 145 (1960); J. Leonard Neal, 66 Interior Dec. 215 (1959). These cases were
never reviewed in a judicial proceeding.
The court here specifically cited the passage of the Classification and Multiple Use
Act, 43 U.S.C. 6§ 1411-1418 (1970) and its legislative history, S. REP. No. 1506, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3755, 3756, as approv-
ing the agency's procedures for public lands management. 531 F.2d at 1403.
For an analysis of ratification of the Secretary's implied authority in the mineral
leasing context, see Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963).
" 531 F.2d at 1404. The court's attempt to analogize to the condemnation cases
overlooked the fact that the agency's power of revocation has been defined strictly within
the condemnation context. The power of the agency to revoke a permit or license in that
context was never seriously questioned. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488
(1973); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951);
United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951).
- 43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a) (Supp. IV 1976).
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from the same Interior Department interpretations of the Taylor
Grazing Act that the court relied on in its determination.
30
The FLPMA provides authority for the agency to "cancel or
suspend a grazing permit or lease for any violation of a grazing
regulation." 3' This provision appeared only in the House version 3
but generated no debate there,33 and it was incorporated into the
final bill by the Conference Committee.3 4 Basis for much of the
Act is found in the reports of the Public Land Law Review Com-
mission, which noted that the Interior Department regulations
35
provided for permit revocation .3  The FLPMA, as noted above,
specifically ratifies the Interior Department's interpretations of
its powers under the Taylor Grazing Act.
2. Agency Abuse of Discretion.
Finally, the court considered whether the Secretary's discre-
tion under the Taylor Grazing Act is so broad as to preclude
judicial review of the sanction imposed by the agency. After first
establishing that the agency's actions under the Taylor Grazing
Act are not within the limited class of nonreviewable agency ac-
tions,3 and affirming original jurisdiction in the district court,
38
the court proceeded to its review. Employing the "clearly erro-
neous" standard, 39 the court held that the agency's choice of sanc-
" See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
43 U.S.C.A. § 1752(a) (Supp. IV 1976) (emphasis added).
3, H.R. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976).
122 CONG. REc. H7581-655 (daily ed. July 22, 1976).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976).
43 C.F.R. § 9239.3-2 (1975).
3' 2 UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO, THE FORAGE RESOURCE (Study for the Public Land Law
Review Commission) 11-31 to 35 (1969).
" 531 F.2d at 1406. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970) excludes from judicial review only
those agency actions precluded by statute from judicial review or committed to agency
discretion by law. Courts interpret this section narrowly. Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061
(10th Cir. 1975); Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
There is no presumption against review absent a clear showing of legislative intent to
commit an agency's acts to its own discretion. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F.
Supp. 78 (D.C. Kan.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1973).
2' District court proceedings are contemplated by 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970). School Bd.
v. HEW, 475 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1973); Rettinger v. FTC, 392 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1968).
' "ITihe court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tion was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion, and reinstated the
hearing examiner's suspended sanction. 0
Although the agency's decision carries a presumption of reg-
ularity,4 the court relied on several cases to support the proposi-
tion that an arbitrary choice of remedies or abuse of discretion
must be set aside.42 The cited cases could, however, have been
distinguished.
One of the cited cases, Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States,4" was remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
not because of agency error, but because the intervening passage
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959"4
so changed the complexion of the case that a new agency adjudi-
cation was necessary. 5 The other cited cases, Camp v. Pitts" and
National Nutritional Foods Association v. Weinberger,47 were
remanded to the respective agencies for further consideration
because the "inadequacy of explanation frustrate[d] review."48
In none of these cases did the courts set aside agency actions
merely because, in their judgment, the agency "went quite far"4
in its imposition of a penalty.
In reversing the penalty imposed by the agency, both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit relied on evidence indicating
that no harm occurred as a result of the spraying; there was,
however, substantial evidence0 in the record to the contrary.5'
00 531 F.2d at 1407.
" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
02 531 F.2d at 1407.
,3 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
" The Court noted that "[t]his [failure to consider the impact of the new act] was,
of course, the District Court's, and not the Commission's, error." 371 U.S. at 172 n.22.
" 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
,7 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975).
00 National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975).
The court noted that even where a court uses the "arbitrary, capricious" standard,
"agency action will not be upheld where inadequacy of explanation frustrates review....
Where the agency's 'finding is not sustainable on the administrative record made, then
the .. .decision must be vacated and the matter remanded [to the agency] for further
consideration."' Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)).
4' 531 F.2d at 1407.
Substantial evidence is quantitatively less than the weight of the evidence, and,
therefore, an agency's finding may be supported by substantial evidence and still not be
the only finding possible in light of the evidence. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
11 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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Even though the examiner's probationary approach may have
been "reasonable, '52 and even though the Tenth Circuit agreed
with that approach, a court may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the agency unless it finds there has been a "clear error
of judgment." 53 Although the court used the talismanic phrase
"clearly erroneous,"54 in fact it merely substituted a penalty it
considered "much more in keeping with the underlying facts."55
The court reexamined and reweighed the evidence and drew its
own conclusion, substituting its judgment for that of the adminis-
trative agency."
II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
A. The Issue Raised by the National Wildlife Federation
The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) intervened as ami-
cus curiae because of its concern over the effect of the spraying
on range wildlife and the effect of the district court's ruling on the
agency's range management powers. The NWF contended that,
contrary to the examiner's findings, range wildlife was harmed by
the spraying because certain species use the sagebrush for for-
age.57 While the court did not reach the issue,5" the NWF argued
that, even if the Taylor Act did not authorize the agency to revoke
a permit, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 5 pro-
vides an alternate and independent source of authority. 0
B. The Environmental Impact Statement
NEPA is intended to formulate an approach to governmental
52 531 F.2d at 1407.
5' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
5 531 F.2d at 1407.
Id.
5' A reviewing court is directed to give proper respect to the ability of the administra-
tive agency to weigh evidence. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966).
" Brief for Amicus Curiae at 30-34. The species include sage grouse, antelope and
deer, the black-tailed jackrabbit, the sage sparrow, Brewer's sparrow, and sage thrasher.
' 531 F.2d at 1404.
5' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1970).
Section 2 of the Taylor Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315a (1970), requires the Secretary of the
Interior to protect the grazing districts. The NWF argued in its brief that NEPA requires
proper environmental safeguards to be taken, in light of the decision in Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.. 1971), which held that
agencies must seriously consider action to avoid environmental costs. Arguably in this
case such action would be license revocation.
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activity that will encourage the positive aspects of man's interac-
tion with his environment." To that end, Congress declared it to
be the "continuing responsibility" of the Federal Government to
use "all practicable means," among other things, to "preserve
important . . . natural aspects of our national heritage" and to
"enhance the quality of renewable resources." 2
To ensure implementation of this important national policy,
federal agencies are required to file an environmental impact
statement (EIS) whenever proposed activity would constitute
"major Federal [action] significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 63 Virtually all agencies are subject to
NEPA's EIS requirement," and full and good-faith compliance is
required 65
C. The EIS and Permitted Spraying
In noting that no real harm was shown from the Ranch's
actions,6 Judge Doyle overlooked the fact that other courts have
held that spraying with herbicides does have a significant effect
on the environment. Had the Ranch properly requested the BLM
to grant permission to spray, the BLM, on the basis of the prior
cases, would have first been required to file an EIS.67 In finding
61 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970).
2 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
11 The Statement must be detailed, setting forth the proposed action's environmental
impact, any adverse but unavoidable consequences, alternatives considered, the
"relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity" and a listing of "irreversible and irretrieva-
ble commitments of resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
" National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 156-57 (D. Kan.), afj'd, 455
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974), held that:
[NEPA's] purpose is to assure that, by following the procedures that it
prescribes, agencies will be fully aware of the impact of their decisions when
they make them. The procedures . . . are designed to secure the accomplish-
ment of the vital purpose of NEPA. That result can be achieved only if the
prescribed procedures are faithfully followed; grudging, pro forma compli-
ance will not do.
U 531 F.2d at 1407.
" Wisconsin v. Butz, 389 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (where only a general EIS
on use of herbicides in the "Eastern Region" had been filed, EIS required for spraying
forest areas with 2,4D); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (EIS required for
program of spraying water hyacinths with 2,4D); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Morton, No. 10113 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 15, 1974) (case dismissed when Department of
Interior agreed to prepare EIS before spraying herbicides on public lands in Roswell, New
Mexico).
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that "there [did] not appear to be much indication that the
particular spraying was seriously detrimental to the public
land," and that the issue was of "limited relevancy,""8 the court
has retreated from recent cases attempting to regulate the use of
herbicides because of concern for their long-term effects on the
environment. 9
D. The EIS and Agency Sanctions
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act70 codifies the
BLM's procedures relating to environmental planning and im-
pact, declaring as its policy that public lands be managed so as
to protect and preserve all aspects of the environment. 7' The
FLPMA places high importance on land use planning for public
lands,7" including federal rangelands administered under the
Taylor Act,73 where the planning vehicle is an "allotment man-
agement plan."74
A recent case, holding that no conflict could be found be-
tween the Taylor Grazing Act and NEPA to exempt the former
from EIS requirements, has ordered the BLM to file an EIS in
conjunction with its program of issuing grazing permits and licen-
ses,7" although the court did not go so far as to require an EIS for
each individual license or permit.76 The court did not, however,
consider whether an EIS would be required in connection with an
agency law-enforcement action such as is the case here, where a
possible sanction might significantly affect the environment.
a' 531 F.2d at 1400.
" See cases cited note 67 supra.
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. IV 1976).
I' d. § 1701(a)(8).
7 Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711-1714.
" Id. § 17 02(e).
7, Id. § 1702(k).
11 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 837-38
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mer., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
Congress has ratified the court's decision by stating that nothing in FLPMA is in-
tended to interfere with the BLM's EIS program as approved by the court. H.R. REP. No.
94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976). In addition, the provisions in the FLPMA declar-
ing that certain distributions and uses of range-improvement funds do not come under
EIS requirements "do not affect [NEPA's] applicability to other aspects of grazing
operation of BLM. ... Id.
7' 388 F. Supp. at 838. Cf. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776
(1976), rev'g Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed at
length in Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group v. Hills, 420 F. Supp. 582 (D. Colo. 1976).
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Such a question appears to have arisen only once, in Gifford-
Hill & Co. v. FTC." That court held that the FTC, while acting
in its enforcement capacity, is not subject to the requirements of
NEPA, even where its actions may have environmental conse-
quences.7" Although NEPA was not intended to repeal other stat-
utes by implication,7" cases excepting an agency from NEPA gen-
erally occur only when their policies are superior to those of
NEPA. 80
The Taylor Act's policies and those of the FLMPA, however,
are not in conflict with NEPA, but rather in harmony in their
concern for the protection of the environment.8 A consistent in-
terpretation of both statutes would require an agency, where more
than one alternative sanction exists, to examine the environmen-
tal ramifications of each.8"
Given the new statutory authority contained in the FLMPA
for permit revocation and suspensions and the new mandate for
intensive range management, the BLM should carefully examine
71 389 F. Supp. 167, 174-75, 176 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(on procedural grounds; the circuit court did not reach the merits of the case discussed in
note 78 infra).
" The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin an FTC antitrust adjudicatory
proceeding on the grounds that it had failed to file an EIS. The court found two categories
of federal actions covered by NEPA: (1) federal actions with direct impact on the environ-
ment and (2) actions by nonfederal parties requiring federal permission. The court held
this FTC adjudication fell into neither category.
" The policies of NEPA supplement those found in "existing authorizations of Fed-
eral agencies." 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1970). Accord, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,
694 (1973).
" In each case, the court took a "time is of the essence" approach: Flint Ridge Dev.
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976), rev'g Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520
F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975) (NEPA must yield to necessities of time limits imposed on the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclo-
sure Act of 1968); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973) (natural
gas shortage); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1154
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (Congressional declaration of deadline for agency action);
Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (price controls). See Note,
1975 DUKE L.J. 743.
" 43 U.S.C. § 315 and 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). "The Taylor Act is not purely environ-
mental since it is aimed at promoting the highest use of public lands; NEPA seeks to
protect the environment." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F.
Supp. 829, 838 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mer., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
913 (1976).
12 Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 743, 751-52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970) requires the study,
development, and description of "appropriate alternatives" when there are "unresolved
conflicts" concerning environmental impact.
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the environmental effects of permit revocation and formulate a
consistent policy for its use as a sanction. A programmatic EIS
covering its use appears to be indicated. Unfortunately, the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Diamond Ring that the revocation was
an abuse of discretion leaves the BLM without any indication as
to what type of violation would properly trigger a loss of grazing
privileges. Further judicial clarification of this issue is likely as
the BLM intensifies its efforts in the area of range management.




By ROBERT M. DORR,* DONALD M. DuFT,**
CHERYL L. HODGSON,*** AND SUE W. BRANCH****
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit this term considered a variety of cases
which involved intellectual property. Of particular interest to
franchisers and franchisees is the decision in Redd v. Shell Oil
Co.,' in which the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the
District Court for the District of Utah that Shell's restrictions on
the use of its trademark "Shell" for gasoline constituted an illegal
tying arrangement under the Sherman Act.2 Redd and Value
House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., I another trademark case worthy
of note, are discussed in greater detail below.
In CMI Corp. v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc.4 the Tenth
Circuit upheld an opinion of the District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma on the question of patent validity but re-
manded the case on the issue of patent infringement.5 Implicit in
the decision was a holding that the district court's factual find-
ings comparing the processes of the parties' method patents were
clearly erroneous.' The district court had given heavy evidentiary
weight to the appellant's advertising materials. Descriptions of
the process in these materials contradicted those presented at
trial; therefore, the district court had held appellant estopped to
deny those prior assertions.7 While the Tenth Circuit agreed that
those representations should be considered, it held that the prior
* Partner, Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado; B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engi-
neering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.
** Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
*** Associate, Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1972, Louisiana Tech Univer-
sity; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
**** A.B., 1964, Duke University; M.S.L.S., 1966, University of North Carolina;
J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
523 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1975).
534 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 878.
See id. at 883.
Id. at 876.
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statements did not form "a proper basis for an estoppel,"' and
furthermore that they could not "serve to controvert what is
clearly demonstrated to be the actual fact."'
Two appeals to the Tenth Circuit were related to copyright
and trademark activity but turned on other issues. In United
States v. Blanton" defendants' conviction for criminal infringe-
ment of copyrighted sound recordings was upheld after an appeal
based primarily on criminal procedure grounds." In Medco Prod-
ucts Co. v. Commissioner2 legal expenses incurred in asserting a
trademark were held not to be deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses, since their origin was capital in nature. 3
I. Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975)
During the past term, an important trademark case arose on
appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Utah. The district court had, by summary judgment, dramati-
cally extended the application of per se antitrust tying theories
from the field of "rent-a-name" franchises to the field of
"distributor" franchises. For only the second time in its history,
the United States Trademark Association filed an amicus curiae
brief. 5 The Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment of the
district court and limited antitrust tying violations strictly to the
prior precedent involving only "rent-a-name" franchises. 6 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 7
The facts were simple. Redd had entered into a sales contract
with Shell as a jobber, or distributor, of "Shell" gasoline manu-
factured by Shell. Redd was not restricted in distribution of gaso-
line from other companies or sources. The sales contract specifi-
Id. at 884.
Id. at 883.
" 531 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
531 F.2d at 444.
' 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975).
'+ Id. at 139.
" See 182 U.S.P.Q. 280 (D. Utah 1974).
IS 65 TRADEMARK REP. 511 (1975).
x Redd had relied on Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), for
its assertion that a trademark was a separate product for antitrust tying purposes. The
Chicken Delight situation involved a trademark franchiser whose primary product was its
name. In Redd the product involved was gasoline which was identified to its source of
origin by a trademark. 524 F.2d at 1057.
"7 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
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cally restricted Redd to use of the trademark "Shell" only on
gasoline acquired from Shell. Redd, however, purchased gasoline
at a significantly lower cost from another supplier and distributed
that gasoline as "Shell" gasoline. Upon acquiring knowledge of
Redd's substitution activities, Shell demanded that Redd cease
this practice. Redd immediately brought an action in federal dis-
trict court, alleging that Shell's restrictive provision violated per
se the antitrust laws based upon Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. IS
Shell countersued for trademark infringement.
The Tenth Circuit held that Redd was guilty of trademark
infringement and that Shell's activities did not constitute a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. This section is based on the trademark
infringement holding. A brief discussion of the history of trade-
mark law, in light of the facts of this particular case, ensues, and
a summary of the Chicken Delight standard and its respective
limits also is presented.
A. Evolution of Trademark "Value"
The United States Supreme Court in United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co. 10 recognized the role of trademarks in the
United States: "Its function is simply to designate the goods as
the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will
against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the
subject of property except in connection with an existing busi-
ness."
20
Earlier, the Supreme Court in Menendez v. Holt2' recognized
that the trademark owner need not be the manufacturer of the
goods on which the trademark is used.
The growth in the United States of the use of trademarks is
unsurpassed in commerce. As the United States Supreme Court
has recognized:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by sym-
bols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark
is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The
448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
248 U.S. 90 (1918).
Id. at 97.
21 128 U.S. 514, 520 (1888).
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owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of poten-
tial customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it
appears.2
Unfortunately, in early evolution, the common law of trade-
marks was adjudicated on a state-by-state basis, leading to non-
uniformity of protection for trademark owners. Trademark rights
were awarded only on a territory of use basis.23 This Balkanization
of trademark common law was substantially eliminated by the
passage of the Federal Lanham Act in 1946.24 Section 45 of that
Act incorporated, however, the common law concept of a trade-
mark: "The term trade-mark includes any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination tlereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others. '2 5 With the
passage of the Lanham Act, a trademark owner upon using a
mark in interstate commerce could for the first time register the
mark with the federal government and be accorded nationwide
protective rights in his mark-even in those territories not yet
entered.
One provision of the Lanham Act provided the impetus for
the growth of a new business tool-that of the franchise system.
Section 5 of the Lanham Act specifically provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may
be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to
the benefit of the registrant or applicant for registration, and such
use shall not affect the validity of such mark or its registration,
provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive the
public."
The phenomenal growth of franchise operations in American
business has been well documented.27 A significant portion of
these businesses involve trademark licensing franchise systems.
2
1
" Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
2 See 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26.1 (1973).
2 See id. § 26.13.
- 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
- Id. § 1055.
27 D. THOMPSON, FRANCHISE OPERATION AND ANTITRUST 26-40 (1971).
Pelton, Fisher, & Prestia, Tying and Trademark Franchising: A Look at the Devel-
oping Case Law, 3 AM. PAT. L.A.J. 254 (1976).
VOL. 54
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS
Such operations provide predictable quality for consumers, secu-
rity and guidance for franchisees, and may well provide for lower
failure rates than is common in nonfranchised businesses.29 Yet
attempts by franchisers to control various aspects of franchisee
activity have been criticized as being anticompetitive.'
B. Antitrust Tying Restrictions on Franchise Trademark Use
In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.31 the Ninth Circuit held
that the trademark owner (franchiser) had violated the antitrust
laws by requiring its franchisees to purchase certain supplies only
from the franchiser. The franchiser made no use of the mark and
merely licensed other people to use it. Such use of a trademark
has been termed a "rent-a-name" use. 32 In this case the franchise
operated as "Chicken Delight" and was required to buy mixes,
paper plates, napkins, cooking utensils, and the like from the
franchiser at significantly higher prices than such commodities
were priced from other sources. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The burgeoning business of franchising has made trade-mark licens-
ing a widespread'commercial practice and has resulted in the devel-
opment of a new rationale for trade-marks as representations of
product quality. This is particularly true in the case of a franchise
system set up not to distribute the trade-marked goods of the fran-
chisor, but, as here, to conduct a certain business under a common
trade-mark or trade name. Under such a type of franchise, the trade-
mark simply reflects the goodwill and quality standards of the enter-
prise which it identifies. As long as the system of operation of the
franchisees lives up to those quality standards and remains as repre-
sented by the mark so that the lublic is not misled, neither the
protection afforded the trade-mark by law nor the value of the trade-
mark to the licensee depends upon the source of the components.3
The purpose of this article is not to challenge the soundness
of the Chicken Delight case; however, its logic is specious. The
Ninth Circuit concluded: "Just as the patent or copyright fore-
closes competitors from offering the distinctive product on the
market, so the registered trade-mark presents a legal barrier
" D. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 33-34.
10 Id. at 55-123.
31 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
"2 McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58
CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (1970).
" 448 F.2d at 48-49 (footnotes omitted).
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against competition. ' 34 Yet a trademark differs markedly from a
patent or a copyright. Patents and copyrights are constitutionally
protected monopolies-no other person or company can manufac-
ture a patented or copyrighted article without infringement
thereof.35 Patents and copyrights present true barriers to competi-
tion. However, a trademark presents no such barrier and would,
rather, seem to enhance competition. The use of a trademark does
not prevent others from offering the same product but merely
prevents others from using a confusingly similar trademark to
offer their products. The value to the public, and hence the en-
hancement of competition, is the public's ability to identify
between the same competing products.
The soundness of the Chicken Delight holding notwithstand-
ing, the facts of the Shell case simply did not fall within the
teachings of Chicken Delight. In fact, Chicken Delight specifi-
cally limited itself to the case of a franchise system "set up not
to distribute the trademarked goods. ' 3 Chicken Delight, Inc. nei-
ther raised nor sold chickens but merely franchised a method of
doing business, which it tied to purchases of common items such
as paper products. The Chicken Delight decision specifically lim-
ited its findings of a tie-in to those situations "where the tied
product is not itself the product represented by the mark.
37
J. Thomas McCarthy, a recognized expert in the law of
trademarks, has distinguished between "rent-a-name" and
"distributing" franchises as follows: "In those franchises where
the franchisor manufactures nothing itself, but really is in the
business of selling a franchise package consisting primarily of the
trademark license, it appears correct to characterize the trade-
mark as a tying item and designated items as tied-in."38 Professor
McCarthy defines "distributing franchises" as having as their
"primary purpose. . . to provide the franchisor with a system for
marketing his wares, either at the wholesale or retail level.
39
3' Id. at 50.
Contra, Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 513 (1964) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting
in part). Judge Lumbard felt the economic power generated by a trademark was indistin-
guishable from that generated by a copyright or patent. His analysis is commented on in
Pelton, Fisher, & Prestia, supra note 28, at 262.
3' 448 F.2d at 48.
Id. at 52.




With regard to these types of distributing franchises, he states:
"The franchisee who is primarily a conduit through which prod-
ucts made by the franchisor flow to consumers is in a somewhat
different position. He can legitimately be required to deal exclu-
sively in his franchisor's line of products." 0 Perhaps on a proph-
etic note concerning the Redd case, McCarthy continues:
"Similarly, a gasoline refiner might properly require its own
brand of gas to be pumped from leased pumps and tanks bearing
its trademark, but cannot require a dealer to sell only a desig-
nated brand of tires, batteries, and accessories without violating
the prohibition against tying."'"
If the Tenth Circuit had upheld the district court's summary
judgment that Shell's acts constituted a per se tying relationship,
then the entire evolution of trademark law would have been ig-
nored. The amicus curiae brief of the United States Trademark
Association stated:
[T]he decision below will have an adverse impact on those systems
of distribution in which manufacturers sell products bearing their
trademarks through independent distributors. Many products are
thus distributed to retailers or to the public. Shell, for example,
distributes its gasoline and other petroleum products to its dealers
through jobbers such as Redd.
If Shell could be required to furnish its jobbers with standards
and specifications so that they can sell non-Shell gasoline under the
SHELL trademark, then other manufacturers would be obligated to
do likewise with the distributors of their branded merchandise. As
a result a distributor of branded merchandise, such as appliances,
automobiles, etc., would be free to sell under the brand name or
trademark products which were neither made nor selected by the
trademark owner. The trademark would then no longer identify
source but only quality, and any product which the user believes to
meet the quality could be sold thereunder. The resultant system
would be the functional equivalent of having no trademarks at all."2
Confusion and lack of business certainty result from a situation
in which distributors or even retailers sell, for example, "Ford"
cars not manufactured by Ford or "IBM" typewriters not made
by IBM. Fixing responsibility for repairs would be chaotic.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted).
12 65 TRADEMARK REP. 511, 523 (1975) (footnote omitted). Contra, A Review of Recent
Tenth Circuit Decisions, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 227, 239-41.
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C. The Tenth Circuit Holding In Redd Is Eminently Correct
The Tenth Circuit opinion in Redd carefully distinguished
between Redd's position as a jobber ("not doing business as Shell
Oil Company") 43 and that of a franchisee. Emphasizing that
trademark use in this case was permissive, the court concluded
that in such circumstances the trademark could not be held to be
a separate product for purposes of antitrust law.44 The court sin-
gled out the following facts: (1) The gasoline was sold as a trade-
marked product; (2) no one else in the market sold the Shell
trademark; and (3) Shell did not sell the trademark separately. 4'
For the court to extend the rule of the Chicken Delight situation
to such a "typical sale of a trademark product"46 would have been
unwarranted.
D. Conclusion
Had the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court, then the
Tenth Circuit would have condoned and approved Redd's acts of
unfair competition. Redd had sought to palm off cheaper gasoline
as gasoline coming from Shell; yet Redd was not paying Shell for
the privilege of using the "Shell" mark as is the situation in the
"rent-a-name" franchises. Redd was simply attempting to force
Shell, at virtually no profit to Shell, to maintain quality control
standards over any gasoline sold by Redd.
In truth, Redd had chosen to use an identical trademark,
"Shell," on an identical product, gasoline, in direct competition
with Shell. This is per se trademark infringement-per se unfair
competition. It flies in the face of our common law heritage and
the whole philosophy of the Lanham Act.
II. Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424 (10th
Cir. 1975)
In Value House the Tenth Circuit restated the relationship
between trademarks registered under the Lanham Act47 and al-
4 524 F.2d at 1056.
U Id. at 1057.
4Id.
," Id.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1127 (1970).
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leged infringing marks which were in use prior to that registra-
tion."
Plaintiff began using the name "The Value House" in Maine
in 1961 and was granted federal registration for that tradename
in October of 1969. Without knowledge of the plaintiff's use of the
name, defendant adopted on or about May 1, 1968, the name
"Value House" in connection with its retail business in New Mex-
ico and registered the mark under the New Mexico Trademark
Act49 on August 5, 1968.50
Plaintiff began to expand outside of Maine in 1969 and now
has business locations in Maine and six other eastern states.5'
After discovering defendant's use of a nearly identical name in a
similar business, plaintiff brought suit in federal district court for
trademark infringement, claiming under the Lanham Act a right
to exclusive use of the name throughout the United States. The
court dismissed plaintiff's complaint and granted defendant's
counterclaim by issuing an injunction restraining plaintiff from
using the name in New Mexico, western Texas, and southern
Colorado.5" The Tenth Circuit upheld both the ruling on infringe-
ment and the injunctive relief.1
3
The court of appeals rejected each of the plaintiff's argu-
ments after holding there was no error in the findings of fact of
the trial court.54 The Tenth Circuit held that, although plaintiff
had used the tradename first, the defendant did not have knowl-
edge of that prior use.55 Thus, since defendant's use preceded
plaintiff's registration, the constructive notice provision in sec-
tion 22 of the Lanham Act could not apply.5
The court also concluded that, although the Lanham Act
provides for registration with constructive notice and affords na-
tionwide protection, the remedies section of the statute limits a
" For a discussion of this limited area defense, see 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 23, §
26.18 (1973).
,' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-4-6 to -12 (1953).
523 F.2d at 427.
51 Id.




Id. at 429 (applying 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970)).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
defendant's liability to instances in which the defendant's use is
intended to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.57 Since there
had been no finding of actual confusion or even of any customers
in common, the Tenth Circuit held plaintiff had no basis for a
remedy.5 8 Defendant had also innocently adopted the use of the
mark prior to plaintiff's registration and was, therefore, entitled
to a prior use defense.5 9
The court rejected the plaintiff's common law infringement
claim on the grounds that the parties had established rights to
their widely separated markets. 0 In addition the preservation of
defendant's geographical market against any future expansion by
plaintiff was upheld."' Thus, under Value House, the owner of a
registered trademark may be permanently prevented from using
the name in the geographic area of an innocent user.2
' Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970).
523 F.2d at 429.
" Id. at 430. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) requires that such use must precede registration.
The court, therefore, also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the date of filing should
be the determining date. 523 F.2d at 430. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) provides that concurrent
registration may be granted only if prior use occurs before the filing date. Plaintiff argued
that the disparity between the operative dates in the two sections would produce the
anomalous result of an innocent user being able to preserve concurrent use though not
eligible for concurrent registration. The court limited its analysis to the plain meaning of
the statute. The two sections, however, are reconcilable. The key date for analysis of
defenses is the date of registration, which cuts off the prior use defense. But in a concur-
rent use proceeding neither party yet owns a registration. Some prior date would, there-
fore, logically be required.
0 523 F.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 432.
62 Id. Only after an abandonment by defendant or "other changed circumstances"
might the decree be reexamined. Id.
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By ROBERT E. OLSEN* AND WENDY H. LYNCH**
This section is concerned primarily with how recent decisions
of the Tenth Circuit have affected pleading and proof in securities
cases. Six cases are discussed. Of these, the most significant is
Holdsworth v. Strong, I one of the progeny of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,l which reexamined the elements of due diligence and
reliance in 10b-5 actions. The other cases considered dealt with
land sales as securities transactions, the awarding of attorney's
fees and implied section 15(c) civil actions, the defense of sover-
eign immunity, the determination of a "security" as a factual
question, and derivative actions for the recovery of short-swing
profits. If any trend is evidenced in these cases, it is that the
Tenth Circuit, perhaps unlike the Supreme Court, continues to
give expansive interpretations to the federal securities laws, find-
ing nontechnical, common law solutions to increasingly technical
statutory problems.
I. DUE DILIGENCE AND RELIANCE IN 10b-5 ACTIONS
On March 30, 1976, in the Ernst & Ernst decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that "scienter," which it defined as
the defendant's intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,3 must
be alleged and proved to establish liability under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule 10b- 51 promulgated
* Associate, Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw & Harring, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1966,
Harvard University; M.A., 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1975, University of
Denver.
* B.B.A., 1972, Pace University; J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 425 U.S. 185, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
425 U.S. at 193.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). Rule 10b-5 provides:
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thereunder. Among the many matters left unresolved by this
holding was the continued validity of the traditional defense of
lack of due diligence. The Tenth Circuit, in Holdsworth v.
Strong,' was the first court to consider that continued validity.
By analogy to the common law of torts, the court held that proof
of the plaintiff's failure to exercise due diligence did not bar re-
covery where intentional conduct on the part of the defendant
was required to be proved.
The trial court in Holdsworth concluded that the defendant
had intentionally defrauded the plaintiffs, within the meaning of
rule 10b-5, when he purchased their minority shares in a close
corporation.! Prior to the sale, plaintiff K. Jay Holdsworth and
the defendant, both founders of the corporation, had been direc-
tors, close personal friends, and business associates for more than
ten years. Both were lawyers, and plaintiff Holdsworth was also
an accountant. Plaintiffs sold their stock without first examining
the books and records of the corporation. The defendant's mis-
representations concerning the financial condition of the corpora-
tion were major elements of the fraud."
The defendant's principal argument on appeal was that, be-
cause of Holdsworth's status as a corporate insider, an attorney,
and an accountant, Holdsworth had a duty to ascertain the finan-
cial condition of the company prior to selling his stock. The defen-
dant also argued that the plaintiffs were not justified in relying
upon the defendant's misrepresentations.'
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
An initial opinion in the case was subsequently withdrawn, apparently as a result
of the intervening Ernst & Ernst decision.






The court considered the primary issue to be:
[W]hether in an intentional fraud case such as the instant one, the
victim is barred from relief if he does not exercise due care to avoid
being deceived, due diligence being generally defined as the require-
ment that an insider "must fulfill a duty of due care in seeking to
ascertain for himself the facts relevant to a transaction" before he
may claim reliance on a material misrepresentation or omission.'0
Because a private right of action under 10b-5 was judicially
implied" and not expressly permitted by statute, courts had to
define the elements of that action.'" Gradually, courts evolved
standards of conduct to which plaintiffs were required to con-
form,'3 and "[a]lthough a variety of rationales has been used, a
common doctrinal end has been reached: the plaintiff will not be
able to successfully maintain a private 10b-5 suit if his own care-
lessness has contributed to his loss."'
4
That the due diligence requirement was a judicial creation
helps to explain a lack of consistency in decisions considering it.
Several courts have described the due diligence requirement in
terms of the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentations or omissions.15 Other courts have explained
Id. at 692 (citation omitted).
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
,2 Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to
an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 561, 568 (1975); Note, The Due Diligence Require-
ment for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753, 761 [hereinafter cited as The
Due Diligence Requirement].
'" The Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 754. In Straub v. Vaisman &
Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623 (3d Cir., June 15,
1976), the court traced the development of the due diligence requirement, observing that
initially a defendant's failure to disclose facts, even if the facts were material, would not
result in a cause of action under rule 10b-5. Where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the facts, such knowledge would, in effect, destroy the requisite materiality. Some courts
took a further step and began to deny recovery in those cases where the plaintiff had
constructive knowledge of the information withheld by the defendant. In an effort to
prevent investor carelessness and to reduce the number of 10b-5 suits, plaintiffs' actions
were closely examined, often in terms of materiality and reliance, and each plaintiff was
required to show that he exercised due care or due diligence in the transaction. Id. at
90,109.
4 Wheeler, supra note 12, at 568.
" In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1973), the court noted that
"[tihe cases generally hold that before an insider may claim reliance on a material
misrepresentation or nondisclosure, he must fulfill a duty of due care in seeking to ascer-
tain for himself the facts relevant to a transaction." Accord City Nat'l Bank v. Vander-
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the requirement in terms of the defendant's duty to disclose' or
in terms of the materiality of the information;" while still others
have imposed a duty of due care without any particular explana-
tion or discussion of it."
In Holdsworth, the Tenth Circuit treated the plaintiff's due
diligence as a separate issue, i.e., as an affirmative defense, 9 and
compared it to the common law tort defense of contributory negli-
gence. 0 This comparison required that the court distinguish those
10b-5 cases in which the defendant's misrepresentation or nondis-
closure resulted merely from his negligence. Thus the court
noted: "[Wihile . . . contributory negligence is logically related
to negligence where the defendant is charged with negligent mis-
representation, . . . where he is charged with intent to defraud,
mere contributory negligence of plaintiff becomes trivial in com-
parison."' The court quoted, with approval, Dean Prosser's state-
ment that "where there is an intent to mislead . . . mere negli-
gence of the plaintiff is not a defense ....
As the Holdsworth court recognized, those circuits which
have most clearly required due diligence on the part of the plain-
tiff are generally those which have allowed a 10b-5 action based
upon the defendant's negligent conduct.13 Because Ernst & Ernst
boom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). See Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
11 In other words, where the plaintiff had ready access to the misrepresented or non-
disclosed information, the defendant may have had no duty to disclose. White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974). See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42
(7th Cir. 1963).
See Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 896 n.11 (D. Utah 1973).
" Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Wheeler, supra note 12, at 573.
" See The Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 760, wherein the author
urged that due diligence be treated as a separate element, stating, "its potential utility is
evident. The approach is also theoretically impeccable." Id.
Although tort concepts, particularly those of fraud and deceit, are not determina-
tive of 10b-5 actions, such concepts have often been utilized as an interpretive aid. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623, at 90,110 (3d Cir. June
15, 1976); Landy v. Federal Depository Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 169 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
, 545 F.2d at 694.
22 Id. (quoting W. PROSSEa, THE LAw OF TorTS 716 (4th ed. 1971)).
13 545 F.2d at 692; 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcurrms LAw: FRAuD § 8.4, at 652 (1975). See
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required that scienter now be proved, the continued validity of
those decisions became important. The Tenth Circuit reasoned:
Use of the tort analogy plainly demonstrates the inappropri-
ateness of due diligence in 10b-5 suits under the Ernst & Ernst
doctrine, for the due diligence standard as applied to 10b-5 suits is
about the same as the application of contributory negligence. Just
as contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort case
of fraud, similarly due diligence is totally inapposite in the context
of intentional conduct required to be proved under Rule 10b-5. 4
Although the defense of lack of due diligence was rejected
under the facts of Holdsworth, it is important to consider that in
Holdsworth there was "substantial evidence of intentional fraud
and deceit . "25 It is, therefore, unclear that the Tenth Circuit
has completely foreclosed the use of the defense of due diligence
in 10b-5 actions. The defense may still apply if, for example, the
defendant's misrepresentation or omission was the result of reck-
lessness,"0 or it may remain a valid defense if the defendant and
the plaintiff were both reckless, i.e., if the defendant's conduct
was something less than intentional while the plaintiff's conduct
was something more than merely negligent.
The Holdsworth court seemed to acknowledge these possibil-
ities when it stated: "The importance of Ernst & Ernst in the
present case is that it calls for scrutiny of the defense of due
diligence and prompts the question [of] whether it applies to
these facts even if it is applicable to more extreme
circumstances.'"7 Such extreme circumstances might well in-
Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974);
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S..30 (1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963);
Wheeler, supra note 12, at 581. But see Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d
100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), which applied a duty of due diligence
to intentional misrepresentations.
24 545 F.2d at 694. But see note 45 and accompanying text infra.
545 F.2d at 691.
Recklessness has been defined as conduct "in conscious disregard of, or indifference
to, the risk" that such conduct will be misleading. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 1~b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw.
U.L. REv. 423, 436 (1968). Generally, "[i]ntentional conduct (following the tort pattern)
comports a stricter scienter than reckless conduct. . . although the boundary line is not
easily discernible." BROMaERO, supra note 23, § 8.4, at 542.
545 F.2d at 693 (emphasis added).
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clude gross conduct by the plaintiff over an extended period of
time.28 Thus, the court observed: "If contributory fault of plaintiff
is to cancel out wanton or intentional fraud, it ought to be gross
conduct somewhat comparable to that of defendant. '2 In
Holdsworth, however, the plaintiffs' alleged lack of due diligence
consisted only of a failure to examine the books and records of the
corporation, which records "failed to accurately reflect the condi-
''30tion of the company....
Ernst & Ernst did not address the issue of whether reckless
behavior on the part of a defendant may be sufficient to impose
civil liability under 10b-5. The Supreme Court stated: "In certain
areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of inten-
tional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We
need not address here the question whether, in some circumstan-
ces, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 3' Since Ernst & Ernst, courts have taken note
of this unresolved issue. Some have assumed, for purposes of
argument, that recklessness suffices in a 10b-5 action.32 One court
has specifically interpreted Ernst & Ernst as holding that rule
10b-5 does not encompass negligence but does encompass those
" For example, in Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), the evidence revealed that, over a period of several
months, the plaintiff received from the defendant checks which were subsequently dis-
honored for insufficient funds. Although such an event normally required a customer's
trading account to be "frozen" for 90 days, the plaintiff continued to transact business
with the defendant customer and to accept his personal checks. In this action, the plaintiff
sought recovery for the last five dishonored checks. However, the court held the plaintiff
to the "objective standard of a reasonable investor exercising due care in light of all facts"
and concluded that the plaintiff's recovery was barred for failure to exercise due diligence
in spite of the fact that the defendant's misrepresentations were allegedly intentional. 434
F.2d at 103-04.
545 F.2d at 693.
Id. at 691.
425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
32 Carroll v. Bear, Steams & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Even were
we to assume arguendo, that recklessness is a sufficient predicate for 10b-5 liability, under
no stretch of the imagination would the plaintiff's allegations of failure to properly evalu-
ate and diligently research her portfolio and investment objectives amount to reckless-
ness."); Siclari v. Rio de Oro Mining Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,672, at 90,312 (S.D.N.Y., July 21, 1976) ("Even assuming ... that reckless
disregard for the truth can, under certain circumstances, satisfy the scienter requirement
[of Ernst & Ernst] . . .the allegations in the instant case do not rise to such recklessness.
Absent an allegation that the Mining Record had reason to know or suspect that the article
was untrue, recklessness does not exist.").
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actions intended to deceive or "so reckless as to be indistin-
guishable from deliberate fraud."33
In McLean v. Alexander,34 the Delaware District Court held
that an "accountant's 'knowing misconduct' short of actual in-
tent to defraud," was sufficient for 10b-5 liability.35 The McLean
court stated:
It necessarily follows that scienter for purposes of imposition of civil
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 encompasses knowing
or intentional misconduct. If the result were otherwise, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be more restrictive in substantive scope
than the substantive law of fraud. Reckless disregard for the truth
is also a cognizable basis for liability in common-law fraud actions.
There is no hint in Hochfelder that the court intended a radical
departure from accepted principles."
If, as the above cases appear to indicate, recklessness on the
part of a defendant may subject him to 10b-5 liability, a determi-
nation of whether Holdsworth precluded the use of the due dili-
gence defense under all circumstances is of critical importance.
3
1
When the Third Circuit considered the status of the due
diligence defense following the Ernst & Ernst decision," the court
noted that there are obvious benefits if parties are required to
Coleco Indus. v. Berman, [Aug. 25, 1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-16 (E.D.
Pa., Aug. 9, 1976) (digest of opinion).
1, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725 (D. Del., Aug. 13,
1976).
1 Confronted with the issue of recklessness, which the Supreme Court left unresolved
in Ernst & Ernst, the court ruled that scienter is present when an accountant either has
actual knowledge of material facts which he fails to disclose or recklessly disregards
material facts when rendering an audit opinion. Id. at 90,551-53.
Id. at 90,550.
See Wheeler, supra note 12, at 583:
If the Court decides that negligent conduct cannot support a damage award
under 10b-5. . .the logic of common law doctrine suggests that the due care
defense is either not available at all in this area of the law, or available only
in those cases where the defendant has acted with recklessness, that is, where
the defendant's conduct falls in the middle ground between a negligent and
an intentional violation of the rule.
In McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725
(D. Del., Aug. 13, 1976), the court reasoned: "There is, however, a wide spectrum of
prohibited behavior between negligence and specific intent to defraud. In that uncharted
land of knowing and reckless midconduct, defendant should be entitled to contest liability
by asserting a due diligence defense." Id. at 90,548.
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,623 (3d Cir., June 15, 1976).
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exercise care in securities transactions. 9 Rather than elect be-
tween two extremes-plaintiffs lack of diligence as either com-
pletely irrelevant or as a complete bar to recovery under all cir-
cumstances-the court chose a flexible approach: To encourage
investor caution, a plaintiff must act reasonably. 0 Factors con-
sidered by the Third Circuit in determining such reasonable con-
duct included the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 41 the
plaintiff's opportunity to detect the fraud; the sophistication of
the plaintiff; the existence of a long-standing business or personal
relationship; and the plaintiff's access to relevant information. 2
Given the language of the Holdsworth decision and the facts on
which it was based, it is conceivable that the Tenth Circuit may
also adopt such a flexible approach.
B. Reliance
Like due diligence, reliance by the plaintiff on the misrepre-
sentation or omission of the defendant has been judicially implied
as an element of 10b-5 actions. 4 Although several circuits have
not distinguished due diligence from reliance,44 the Tenth Circuit,
" Id. at 90,110.
Id.
" The Holdsworth court found either a "fiduciary" or "quasifiduciary" relationship
existing between Holdsworth and Strong. 545 F.2d at 697. It based this finding, however,
not on their relationship as minority and majority shareholders respectively, or on any
other fact commonly denoting such a relationship, but rather on their long business and
personal associations. Id. at 696-97. It is doubtful that the court intended to include every
more-than-casual relationship within the scope of a "fiduciary relationship," with the
consequent heightened burdens of disclosure on the so-called "fiduciary." Rather, it would
appear that the court was simply seeking to buttress its argument that a showing of due
diligence was not required in the case of intentional wrongdoing.
" Straub v. Vaisman & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,623, at 90,110 (3d Cir., June 15, 1976).
11 Commentators have agreed that this development results from the tendency of the
judiciary to analogize statutory torts to the common law torts of fraud and deceit. See
Stoll, Reliance as an Element in lOb-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REv. 169, 171 (1974); The Due
Diligence Requirement, supra note 12, at 758. As with due diligence, the fact that reliance
is a judicially created element probably explains the lack of clarity and uniformity in
decisions considering it. See note 45 infra; Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under
Rule lob-5, 32 U. Cm. L. Rav. 824, 824 (1965).
11 See note 15 supra. In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), the court concluded: "At some point in time after the
publication of a curative statement . . . stockholders should no longer be able to claim
reliance on the deceptive release. . . .This is but a requirement that stockholders too act
in good faith and with due diligence in purchasing and selling stock." 446 F.2d at 103. In




in Holdsworth, sought to treat them as separate concepts." In
Holdsworth, the plaintiffs' recovery was not barred by their fail-
ure to exercise due care or due diligence, but the court reasoned:
"We are not saying that once the plaintiff has proven scienter on
the part of the defendant that he has discharged his require-
ments. Plaintiff must show that he relied on the misrepresen-
tations and that the reliance was justifiable."" In other words,
reliance involves the question of whether the plaintiff was in fact
influenced by the untrue statements or omissions of the defen-
dant. However, whether the plaintiff was in fact influenced is
wholly irrelevant to whether the plaintiff should have been influ-
enced, i.e., whether the plaintiff exercised due care under the
circumstances."
With regard to misrepresentations, the question is whether a reasonable
investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation
and in the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to rely upon the
misrepresentation. With regard to nondisclosures, the issue becomes whether
a reasonable investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the nondis-
closure and in the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to receive
full disclosure from the party charged and would have acted differently had
the alleged nondisclosure not occurred.
422 F.2d at 230. In Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973),
the court stated that "plaintiff has not met his burden of proof as to causation because
his reliance was unreasonable in that he failed to make a careful and diligent effort to
inquire into and discover the true facts concerning the alleged fraud." Id. at 1056. But
see McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725
(D. Del., Aug. 13, 1976), which concluded that due diligence "imposes on the plaintiff the
duty to act with the caution expected of a reasonable person in his position. In short, due
diligence requires plaintiff to demonstrate that whatever actual reliance he claims is well-
founded." Id. at 90,547. This definition of due diligence contrasts with the test of reliance
found in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), i.e., "the misrepresen-
tation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in the
recipient's loss." Id. at 462.
11 Throughout its opinion, the court used, but failed to define, the term "justifiable
reliance." Frequently, it used the term synonomously with "materiality." E.g., 545 F.2d
at 695. However, it also observed that where the falsity of a misrepresentation should have
been "palpable," id. at 694, or that where a defendant's misrepresentations were
"obviously false," id. at 695,-in other words, where a plaintiff, in the words of the court,
has failed to exercise due diligence-no reliance could be justifiable. The court was not
entirely successful, therefore, in differentiating due diligence from reliance, or in demon-
strating that a showing of lack of due diligence has no application in those 1Ob-5 actions
alleging intentional midconduct.
" Id. at 694.
, Wheeler, supra note 12, at 592. When courts combine due diligence with the re-
quirement of reasonable reliance "the question of whether the plaintiff did, in fact,
rely-which properly is an element of causation-is confused with whether the plaintiff
should have relied-which properly is more a matter of policy." Id. at 593.
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The Tenth Circuit stressed the requirement that a plaintiff
must show a causal connection between the defendant's misre-
presentation or omission and the plaintiff's injury. If the causal
link is not proven, the defendant will escape liability. In the
court's opinion, "[tihe causal relationship provided by proof of
reliance or materiality sufficiently satisfied the need for [a] cau-
sal link." 8
The recent Supreme Court decision of Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States49 brought into question the continued validity of
the reliance requirement in 10b-5 actions. In Affiliated Ute, there
was no positive proof that the plaintiffs had relied on the defen-
dants' misconduct when deciding to sell their stock. Instead, the
Court created a presumption of reliance once materiality had
been established, stating:
[U]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a fail-
ure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision .... This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requi-
site element of causation in fact."
However, as noted by the court in Holdsworth, the deceit in
Affiliated Ute consisted of a nondisclosure. The weight of author-
ity since Affiliated Ute has been to invoke a presumption of reli-
ance in nondisclosure cases once materiality5 has been proved,
but, in misrepresentation cases, to require a showing of reliance
in fact.2 In Holdsworth the Tenth Circuit followed this trend.
545 F.2d at 695.
" 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
Id. at 153-54.
"Misrepresented or omitted facts become material, hence actionable under 10b-5,
when, considering the complaining parties as reasonable investors, the disclosure of the
undisclosed facts or candid revelation of misleading facts would affect their trading judg-
ment." Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971), and cert. denied sub. nom. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 405
U.S. 918 (1972).
" Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974);
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F.
Supp. 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Krendl & Krendl, Reviewing the Scienter Requirement in
IOb-5 Cases in the Tenth Circuit-Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), 53 DEN.
L.J. 261, 275 (1976); Stoll, supra note 43, at 181. Contra Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp.
782 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117
(E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Caesar's Palace SEC Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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The court expressly stated that reliance is still an element in 10b-
5 actions. In nondisclosure cases, reliance is not eliminated but,
because of the difficulty of proof in such cases, once materiality
is shown, reliance is presumed. In the words of the court:
In [a] nondisclosure situation, once causal connection is proven by
showing materiality, that is to say, whether a reasonable investor
would have considered the withheld facts important . . . the reli-
ance element is inferred.
Where, as here, there are affirmative misrepresentations, the
problem of proving reliance is not the same and reliance is the ap-
propriate and decisive way to prove the chain of causation.1
3
Although the Tenth Circuit in Holdsworth sought to clarify
the issues of due diligence and reliance and determine their ap-
propriateness in the securities context following the Ernst &
Ernst decision, the two concepts have still not been adequately
differentiated. Hopefully, there will be further refinement in fu-
ture securities cases, particularly when courts are faced with de-
termining whether due diligence is an appropriate defense in a
10b-5 action based on a defendant's reckless, as opposed to inten-
tional, misconduct.
II. LAND SALES AS SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
McCown v. Heidler54 illustrates how the federal courts have
moved away from the concept that the offer and sale of real
estate, without more, is not a securities transaction." Numerous
judicial and administrative opinions in recent years have de-
tected "securities" within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Se-
curities Act of 193311 in nonresidential condominium sales57 and
545 F.2d at 695 (citations omitted).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975). McCown also involved an interpretation of the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970 Supp. IV 1974),
which is not discussed in this section of the Survey but is addressed in the section on lands
and natural resources.
" See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973). Cf. SEC v.
Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (wherein the court noted that the Securities
Act "affects, not ordinary land sale contracts, but 'investment contracts' which evidence
primarily a right to participate in the proceeds of an income-producing venture, member-
ship in which is secured through entrusting an investor's capital to the management of
others.").
Is 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). Section 2(1) provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
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in resales of instruments relating to purchases of raw land."5
McCown, melding these lines of opinions, held that offers and
sales of lots in a real estate development raised the factual
question of whether the sales, regardless of the character of the
development as either residential or nonresidential,59 constituted
securities transactions where the lots were represented and sold
as "investments. ''760
Although the court acknowledged SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.'s"
definition of an "investment contract," it clearly relied for its
holding on SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.'s62 concept of an
"investment contract." In defining "investment contracts," and
hence "securities," Howey and Joiner employ somewhat different
tests.
In Joiner, the United States Supreme Court concluded that,
in defining a security, the test is "what character the instrument
is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distri-
bution, and the economic inducements held out to the pros-
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guaran-
tee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
11 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
" See, e.g., Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318
(D. Minn. 1972).
11 The court noted that in 1971 the majority of purchasers indicated that they ex-
pected to reside on their lots. 527 F.2d at 210. The potential effect of the decision was to
permit a class action, brought on behalf of all lot purchasers and not just those who
purchased for "investment," to proceed under the federal securities laws. Whether class
action certification should be granted under circumstances such as those in McCown,
where the expectation of each purchaser is critical to a determination of the status of each
sale as an "investment contract," is doubtful.
" The Tenth Circuit noted:
We agree that land, as such, is not a security and that a land purchase
contract, simply because the purchaser expects or hopes that the value of the
land purchased will increase, does not fall automatically within the confines
of the Securities Acts. However, we do not agree that land or its purchase
necessarily negates the application of the Securities Acts.
Id. at 208.
"1 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
42 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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pect." The Court noted: "In the enforcement of an act such as
this it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as
being what they were represented to be." 4 Under Joiner, there-
fore, the manner of offer may be sufficient to characterize the
offered item as an "investment contract" where it is widely of-
fered or dealt in."5
In the later Howey decision, the Supreme Court defined an
"investment contract" as "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party."6 Under the Howey test, a promoter's representa-
tions may be irrelevant unless such representations are consid-
ered as part of an overall scheme or where the manner of the offer
might lead an investor to expect profits solely from the efforts of
another. Under Howey, therefore, it is the nature of the transac-
tion as it is conducted in fact that is of primary importance.
Joiner and Howey may also be construed as separate, but
Id. at 352-53. The Court established essentially a two-pronged test of what consti-
tutes a security:
In the Securities Act the term "security" was defined to include by name or
description many documents in which there is common trading for specula-
tion or investment. Some, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are pretty much
standardized and the name alone carries well-settled meaning. Others are of
more variable character and were necessarily designated by more descriptive
terms, such as "transferable share," "investment contract," and "in general
any interest or instrument commonly known as a security." We cannot read
out of the statute these general descriptive designations merely because more
specific ones have been used to reach some kinds of documents. Instruments
may be included within any of these definitions, as matter of law, if on their
face they answer to the name or description. However, the reach of the Act
does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or
irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved
as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as
"investment contracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security.' " The proof here seems clear that these defendants' offers
brought their instruments within these terms.
Id. at 351.
" Id. at 353.
" See note 63 supra.
" 328 U.S. at 298-99. Since the McCown court did not rely on the Howey test, its
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's construction of the term "solely" in the Howey test is
dictum. 527 F.2d at 211. In other words, the Tenth Circuit has not adopted the standard
set forth in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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overlapping, tests. In fact, when the Howey Court defined an
"investment contract," it stated: "[S]uch a definition necessar-
ily underlies this Court's decision in Joiner."67 Courts often fail
to adequately differentiate the tests and instead utilize both
Howey and Joiner in reaching a decision.68
In either case, the apparent distinction between the two tests
may explain the recent tendency of courts to disregard formal
appearances and to inquire into the substance and economic real-
ity of a purported securities transaction. Recently, the Supreme
Court adopted such an approach in United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman.69 In Forman, the Court rejected a Joiner analysis
when it was confronted with the issue of whether shares of
"stock" in a nonprofit housing co-operative were securities as
defined by the securities acts. In holding that such shares of stock
were not encompassed by the acts, the Court contrasted the
Howey test, where "the investor is 'attracted solely by the pros-
pects of a return' on his investment," with those instances in
which "a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume
the item purchased-'to occupy the land or to develop it them-
selves,' "0 and concluded that the securities acts do not apply to
the latter instances.7
However, in McCown, it was obviously the alleged offering
of lots as "investments," and not the alleged investment of money
in a common enterprise with respect to which investors were to
exercise no efforts, that the Tenth Circuit found decisive. The
court was so impressed with the manner in which the lots were
touted as "investments" that it quoted nineteen instances of the
use of the word in the developers' promotional materials. Yet,
there should be no question that not every "investment" is a
security, no matter how many times the word may be used in
promotional literature. As one court has stated:
" 328 U.S. at 299.
" See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 91-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Olpin v.
Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1969); Chapman v. Rudd Paint &
Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1969).
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
Id. at 852-53. Although the Tenth Circuit, in McCown, recognized that many lots
were purchased for the purpose of acquiring a home site as opposed to merely an invest-
ment, the court dismissed this distinction by simply noting "the duality of this
'investment/ownership package.' " 527 F.2d at 211.
"1 421 U.S. at 853.
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The mere presence of a speculative motive on the part of the pur-
chaser or seller does not evidence the existence of an "investment
contract" within the meaning of the securities acts. In a sense any-
one who buys or sells . . . hopes to realize a profitable
"investment." But the expected return is not contingent upon the
continuing efforts of another.7"
To fix on the repeated use of the word "investment" as an indi-
cium of a securities offering is to reduce the sweep of the securities
laws to a question of semantics.
The Joiner test provides no objective standard for the deter-
mination of which representations constitute the offer of an
"investment contract," and, therefore, it promotes confusion.
The strength of the Howey test, however, is that it focuses on
what should be the key element of a securities transaction-the
separation of ownership and control in an enterprise. In reliance
on the Howey test, some property interests, although not literally
"securities" within the meaning of section 2(1)-e.g., limited
partnership units-have long been regarded as securities almost
as a matter of law.73 McCown, however, could reverse this trend
by making each such determination hinge on the subjective stan-
dards of the trier of fact. If the court in McCown was willing to
accept the promised development of common area facilities as
evidence that subdivision lots may have been offered and sold as
securities, another court will no doubt find the same evidentiary
support in assumed developer obligations to obtain zoning vari-
ances, to prepare and file a plat, to mark a property with bound-
ary stakes, or to take any other action more properly the subject
of real estate law than securities law.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND IMPLIED SECTION 15(c) CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Attorney's Fees
In Hail v. Heyman-Christiansen" the sole issue on appeal
was whether attorney's fees, as an added element of damages,
may be awarded to a successful plaintiff whose judgment is based
exclusively on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.75 The Tenth Circuit
" Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis added).
" See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.12[2] (1st ed.
1972) and cases cited therein.
536 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1976).
See notes 4 and 5 supra.
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in a per curiam opinion held that they may not be awarded,
dismissing as irrelevant the plaintiff's observation that the ap-
plicable Blue Sky Law"6 would have permitted recovery of attor-
ney's fees on a showing of facts substantially identical to those
alleged in the complaint.
The court relied on Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur" for the
proposition that attorney's fees are not recoverable in a 10b-5
action."8 Mitchell, in turn, is in line with the principles of equity
which have traditionally shaped the fashioning of remedies in
federal securities litigation.7" Thus, except where expressly au-
thorized by statute," the awarding of attorney's fees has typically
been restricted to class and deriviative actions,' usually brought
under sections 14 and 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 2 Only in such actions
have plaintiffs convincingly depicted the public interest as their
motivation in bringing suit.
3
Occasional cases have suggested broader possible bases for
the awarding of attorney's fees under the federal securities laws.
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(I)(b) (1953).
77 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
7, 446 F.2d at 106.
See generally Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Gilbert v.
Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
" Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970), permits the awarding of
attorney's fees where a claim or defense is without merit. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v.
Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 277 (10th Cir. 1957). Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)
(1970), permits the assessment of attorney's fees in actions alleging certain manipulations
in connection with exchange-registered securities. Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a) (1970), grants the trial court discretion to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff
successfully alleging misrepresentation in filings made pursuant to the Act or rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
" See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 515 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1975); Wechsler v.
Southeastern Properties, Inc., 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); Dillon v. Berg, 482 F.2d 1237
(3d Cir. 1973); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 657 (W.D. Okla.
1973).
,2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, p(b) (1970). Section 14 incorporates proxy requirements. Section
16(b) permits short-swing profits by corporate insiders to be recovered for the corporation.
,3 Thus, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the
court stated that the purpose of awarding counsel fees in securities cases was to encourage
the vigilance of private attorneys general to provide corporate therapy for the protection
of the public investor. The court in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384
F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425
U.S. 910 (1976) (the Second Circuit modified the district court's decision but affirmed on
the issue of attorney's fees), denied attorney's fees with the comment that the tenor of




A 1974 federal district court decision 4 denied counsel fees be-
cause the complaint neither sought a judgment financially bene-
fiting other investors nor presented "any overriding considera-
tions of justice." 5 The use of the disjunctive implied that such
considerations might well be unrelated to the public interest. A
1973 Second Circuit case8 denied an award of attorney's fees
unless "special circumstances" existed calling for the interven-
tion of a private attorney general. 7 While it is conceivable that
such "overriding considerations" or "special circumstances"
might be present in a 10b-5 action, no federal appellate court to
date in a reported decision has been pursuaded to recognize them.
B. Implied Section 15(c) Civil Actions
Hail suggested, but did not consider, several other issues.
The court noted that the plaintiff's complaint had raised two
additional claims for relief: "[Flailure to acquire reasonably cur-
rent information concerning the corporations whose stocks were
being sold (violating Rule 144 of the SEC, promulgated under
Section 15(c) of the [1934] Act); and . . . violation of Section 2
of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD by failing to obtain the
financial statement of plaintiff prior to recommending specula-
tive securities. '"88
Although the court's summary is confusing and somewhat
inaccurate, 9 it suggested that the plaintiff had purchased re-
stricted securities from the defendant broker-dealer in reliance
upon rule 144. One of the conditions of rule 144 is that there be
available adequate, current public information concerning the
issuer of the securities being sold.90 At least one administrative
" Smith v. Manusa, 385 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 535 F.2d 353 (6th
Cir. 1976).
' 385 F. Supp. at 454 and cases cited therein.
'n Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
'7 484 F.2d at 1267 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970)).
536 F.2d at 909 n.1.
" Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976), was not "promulgated under Section 15(c) of
the [1934] Act .... " Rather, it is a safe-harbor implementation of the exemption from
registration contained in section 4(1) of the 1933 Act. It permits restricted securities to
be sold under certain specified conditions without constituting the seller an "underwriter"
for purposes of section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. Rule 144 mandates no conduct and therefore
cannot be violated in the sense that rule 10b-5, for example, can.
" 17 C.F.R. 230.144(c)(2) (1976). Rule 144(c)(2) provides that, with respect to non-
reporting issuers, the public information requirement shall be deemed satisfied if essen-
tially all of the information specified in Rule 15c2-11 is publicly available.
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decision' has concluded that compliance with rule 15c2-1111 by a
broker-dealer selling restricted securities satisfies the above-
mentioned condition of rule 144. Apparently the complaint in
Hail had alleged that the broker-dealer, by violating one of the
section 15(c)(2) series of rules, had "violated" rule 144.
The more precise argument would have been that by violat-
ing rule 15c2-11 the broker-dealer had caused rule 144 to be un-
available to the seller and had thereby sold the restricted securi-
ties to the plaintiff in violation of the registration provisions of
the 1933 Act. 3 For such a violation, the remedy under section
12(1) would have been available to the plaintiff. 4 The complaint,
however, seemingly went beyond this analysis and suggested an
implied private right of action for violation of either section
15(c)(2) and the rules promulgated thereunder, or rule 144, said
implied private action being arguably independent of sections
10(b) and 12(1).11
The Tenth Circuit has not had an occasion to consider
whether section 15(c) creates a private right of action. Other
courts, however, generally in reliance on section 29 of the 1934
Act,"6 have implied such a civil action, at least with respect to
section 15(c)(1). Among the courts which have either acknowl-
edged or permitted a civil claim based on section 15 (c)(1) are the
Second and Seventh Circuits, and the United States District
Courts for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of California, and the
0
MBS Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,865
(May 23, 1972). But see George D.B. Bonbright & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,965 (July 18, 1972).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1976), promulgated under section 15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1970).
"s Jacobs, Persinger, & Parker, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,945 (June 13, 1972); preliminary note to rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1976).
"15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
Violations of the section 15(c)(1) series of rules are deemed violations of section
10(b) by virture of rule 10b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-3 (1976). The argument for an implied
private action founded on section 15(c)(1), however, does not rest on the application of
rule 10b-3.
,1 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). Section 29(b) provides that "[e]very contract made
in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every
contract . . . which involves the violation of. . .any provision of this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void .... 1"
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Northern District of Illinois. 7 Moreover, despite the first proviso
of section 29(b) 9 -which would appear to bar the bringing of a
suit under section 29(b) for avoidance of a contract with a broker-
dealer, where the contract or its performance results in a violation
of one of the section 15(c)(2) or (c)(3) series of rules-at least one
court has recognized an implied private right of action under
section 15(c)(2).1
While the implied section 15(c)(1) civil action seems clear,
the existence of a section 15(c)(2) civil right of action is less so.
To reach the latter result, the plaintiff must argue: (1) That the
proviso of section 29(b) bars only a suit based on a violation of a
rule under section 15(c)(2) (e.g., rule 15c2-11) but not one based
on a violation of section 15(c)(2) itself; (2) that section 29(b)
applies only to claims for rescission and not for damages; or (3)
that a section 15(c)(2) remedy exists irrespective of the rights
created by section 29(b). The first of these arguments, while liter-
ally correct, would tend to frustrate the legislative intent of im-
plementing the federal securities laws through rules and regula-
tions. The second, which also is not illogical, has received a gener-
ally negative judicial reception. 00 Only the third argument has
11 Iroquois Indus. Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47
(7th Cir. 1968); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa., 1972); Smachlo v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,148 (S.D.N.Y., June 15, 1971); Shulof v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,147 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 18, 1971); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1970): Maher v.
J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone
& Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D. Cal., Sept.
30, 1965); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also Lorenz v.
Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (assuming arguendo that a section 15(c)(1)
action will lie).
" "[P/rovided, (A) That no contract shall be void by reason of this subsection
because of any violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or
(3) of subsection (c) of Section 15 of this title .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
," Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), on the implication of statutory reme-
dies).
11 Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Maher v.
J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F




genuine appeal. There is no apparent reason why the statutory
prohibitions contained in sections 15(c)(2) and (c)(3), and the
rules promulgated thereunder, should be given effect only by an
enforcement action. Perhaps the intent of the drafters of the first
proviso of section 29(b) was simply to ensure the regularity of
trading markets by barring the innocent purchaser (or seller) of
a security from avoiding certain contracts with a broker-dealer
where the effect would be to restore an innocent seller (or pur-
chaser) to the status quo. Where such a consequence can be
avoided, the statutory tort theory should support an implied right
of action against the broker-dealer under sections 15(c)(2) and
(c) (3).,o1
Although the trial court in Hail did not find it necessary to
rule on the plaintiff's rule 144 claim, it might well have dismissed
it. Rule 144 may establish a norm of conduct against which the
actions of a broker-dealer might be measured. °0 It was promul-
gated, however, not primarily as a part of the SEC's regulation
of broker-dealers but rather as part of the SEC's continuing effort
to prevent leakage of unregistered securities into trading mar-
kets.'0 3 Thus the rule imposes no affirmative duty on broker-
dealers' 4 and, even if it protects the public in an abstract sense,
it creates no liability which cannot be enforced through existing
statutory means.0 5 Similarly, plaintiff's claim of violation of sec-
tion 2 of the N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice was properly dis-
missed by the trial court,'0 perhaps because the broker-dealer's
,0, See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1342-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
102 Cf. Lavin v. A.G. Becker & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,446 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 10, 1973); Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (alleged violation of N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice relevant to suggest what
duty the defendant had to the plaintiff under rule 10b-5); SEC Release No. 34-9420, 3 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 25,592 (Feb. 11, 1972) (N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice are written
norms of conduct).
" See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 73, § 4.01.
Contra Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
... Id. Cf. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972).
'I" See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966). The trial court dismissed the claim on the strength of Utah v. DuPont
Walston, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,812 (D. Utah,
Oct. 1, 1974), which in turn had relied on Colonial Realty Corp.
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failure to obtain a financial statement of its customer before rec-
ommending a speculative security for purchase may already
have been a violation of section 15(c)(2) and rule 15c2-5(a)(2)' s
promulgated thereunder.
IV. DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Green v. Utah, '08 in one of the few reported decisions on
point, tested the question of whether the eleventh amendment to
the United States Constitution"' bars the bringing of a suit in
federal court"" against a state under the federal securities laws.
Under the eleventh amendment, states, absent a judicially per-
ceived waiver-either express or implied-have been held im-
mune from suits of their own ditizens or those of other states, to
enforce federal statutory liabilities."' Only the Second, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits, however, have previously considered the ques-
tion in a federal securities context. On facts remarkably similar
to those of Green, the Sixth Circuit twice,"' and the Fourth Cir-
cuit once,"' have held that the eleventh amendment protects the
Commonwealths of Kentucky and Virginia respectively from suit.
The Second Circuit in Forman v. Community Services, Inc."'
found that the State of New York had waived its sovereign im-
munity by subsidizing a nonprofit cooperative apartment com-
pany which allegedly issued securities."5
07 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-5(a)(2) (1976). Rule 15c2-5(a)(2) imposes upon a broker-dealer
arranging credit in certain transactions the obligation to ascertain and document, includ-
ing the retention of a customer financial statement, that the transaction is suitable to the
customer's financial situation and needs.
539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976).
' The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
"I Federal district court jurisdiction is exclusive under the 1934 Act and concurrent
with the state courts under the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1970). There is
some equitable appeal to the argument of the plaintiff in Green that if the federal district
court were to dismiss her action under the 1934 Act for which federal jurisdiction is
exclusive, it would unfairly deny her a right of action altogether.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
"' Yeomans v. Kentucky, 514 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983
(1976); Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1976).
" Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973). See also MacKethan v. Virginia,
370 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Va. 1974).
1" 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
"1 500 F.2d at 1255-56.
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In Green a Utah industrial loan company depositor brought
suit under section 10(b) against the State of Utah and the Utah
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, among others, for gross
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in allegedly failing to
supervise and control adequately the loan company which was in
receivership at the time the action was commenced. Assuming
arguendo that the depositor's thrift-certificate passbooks, deben-
ture bonds, and thrift certificates were "securities" within the
meaning of section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act,"6 the Tenth Circuit
distinguished between regulatory and proprietary functions of a
state and held that, in the absence of a clear congressional intent
to subject states to suit, sovereign immunity protects the states
when they are engaged in regulatory functions pursuant to estab-
lished governmental powers."' The court did not find it necessary
to decide the corollary issue of whether the federal securities laws
manifest an intent to subject states to suit when engaged in pro-
prietary functions, nor did it seek to define what such proprietary
functions might include."8 The implication of the court's reason-
ing, however, was that proprietary functions include the raising
of capital through the issuance of securities, and that, when en-
gaged in such activities, states, state agencies, and political sub-
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). By somewhat sketchy analyses, the federal courts
have consistently held that evidences of indebtedness issued by industrial banks or in-
dustrial loan companies do not constitute securities exempt from 1933 Act registration by
having been "issued or guaranteed by any bank .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). Cf.
Commercial Credit Co. (SEC No-Action Letter), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 78,544 (Nov. 5, 1971) (nonnegotiable passbook accounts of industrial loan
company not exempt from registration under either section 3(a)(2) or section 3(a)(5) of
the 1933 Act).
"I This distinction, first articulated in Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y.
1842), and labelled the "proprietary-governmental" distinction, was employed by the
Eighth Circuit in Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), aff'd, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). In
the context of securities law the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasoning in Employees, re-
christening the distinction the "proprietary-regulatory" dichotomy. Brown v. Kentucky,
513 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1976); Yeomans v. Kentucky,
514 F.2d 993, 994 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1976). As a solution to the
problem, at least one author has suggested that the characterization of the state function
be made but one element in a multipronged test to determine whether immunity attaches
in a particular case. Note, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity,
1974 DUKE L.J. 925.
"' The court suggested, nevertheless, that intentional wrongdoing, like aiding and
abetting or any other active participation by a state, is insufficient to alter the general
rule. 539 F.2d at 1274.
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divisions enjoy no eleventh amendment protection."'
The waiver concept is a particularly arcane concept of consti-
tutional law.' 0 It is consistent, however, with the essential nature
of federalism as permitting the state and federal governments to
exercise power independently of each other. Nevertheless, one
wonders whether the Tenth Circuit, or any other federal appellate
court, would allow a state to be immune from civil suit in federal
court under the circumstances in which the state's regulatory
power was used, for example, for criminal purposes. The Tenth
"I Id. at 1272-73. State agencies and political subdivisions have generally been held
to enjoy no immunity under the eleventh amendment, regardless of the nature of the
functions they exercise, although some courts have indicated that this may involve ques-
tions of fact. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911); Wright v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1152-54 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Southern
Bridge Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948, 951 (E.D. La. 1970).
'I" The basic fiction is that, by ratifying the Constitution which has always included
the commerce clause, the thirteen original states in 1787 gave to Congress the power to
enact laws regulating commerce and thereby effectively waived immunity from suit
brought on violations of such laws, at least insofar as the intent of Congress to subject
the states to suit was clear. Such argument ignores the fact that the eleventh amendment
was not ratified by the required number of states until 1797. It is generally accepted that
all sections of the Constitution must be construed together with no one constitutional
guarantee enjoying a preference over any other. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); Linn Land Co. v. Udall, 255 F. Supp. 382 (D. Ore. 1966), rev'd on other grounds
sub nor. Udall v. Battle Mountain Co., 385 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
957 (1968). In construing the eleventh amendment and the commerce clause together, one
reasonable harmonization is that the framers of the Constitution gave to Congress the
power to enact laws regulating commerce, which power was modified by the right of the
states, under specified circumstances, to be immune from suit in federal court. Such
construction is supported by the analogous principle of state constitutional law that the
last in time of two conflicting constitutional provisions, or of a constitutional provision
and an amendment, is preferred. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by General Assembly, 171
Colo. 200, 467 P.2d 56 (1970); Sharpe v. State, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 904 (1969); City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
Under this doctrine of last change, the eleventh amendment would control. Instead, by
articulating the theory of waiver or implied consent, the courts have used illogic and a
patent legal fiction to reach a result more appropriately grounded on concepts of federal-
ism. Green illustrates this latter point. Instead of focusing on whether Utah, as a matter
of state law, had waived its sovereign immunity to suit in federal court, the court con-
cerned itself almost exclusively with whether Congress, as a matter of federal law, had
intended to subject the states to suit under the federal securities laws. See Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Tress., 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (question of waiver is a matter of state
law); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 311 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 377
U.S. 184 (1964). But see Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp., 423
F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970) (Congress must express an intent to override a state's immunity
in order to subject the state to suit by private individuals). By such reasoning, the implica-
tions of the statutory definition of "person" contained in the 1934 Act, for example,
become a major, and mistaken, issue.
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Circuit's distinction between regulatory and proprietary func-
tions assumes that governmental authority is, and can be, effec-
tively used at the state level to accomplish objectives consistent
with those of the federal securities laws. However, the enactment
of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,21 which included a
sweeping overhaul of federal law with respect to municipal securi-
ties, would seem to indicate some congressional dissatisfaction
with that assumption.
V. DETERMINATION OF A "SECURITY" AS A FACTUAL QUESTION
In United States v. Gibbs, In the Tenth Circuit concluded in
dictum that what constitutes a "security" is essentially a ques-
tion of fact to be submitted to the trier of fact, even in a civil case.
This result was contrary to its earlier holding in Ahrens v.
American-Canadian Beaver Co. 123 and to the literal approach of
Joiner. 12, It was consistent, however, with the implicit rejection
of the Joiner approach which culminated in United Housing Inc.
v. Forman. 125 Like McCown v. Heidler, 26 this development cre-
ates a problem because it fails to suggest which transactions out
of the general multitude of transactions should be regarded as
"securities" as a matter of fact thereby making available to plain-
tiffs the special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies af-
forded by the federal securities laws.'"
I Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
' No. 75-1568 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
428 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1970).
2 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). See note 63 supra.
Out of different considerations, perhaps, the right to submit to the jury the question of
whether an instrument or transaction is a "security" has generally been upheld in criminal
cases. United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972);
Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1961).
'- 421 U.S. 837 (1975). So many courts have adopted the "economic realities" test
set forth in Joiner, or a "substance versus form" test, with respect to devices not literally
within the definition of "security," that it comes as a surprise to find an occasional court
holding that a particular note, for example, is a "security" per se solely because a note is
defined as a security in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act or section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.
Compare, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (a "note" is a security) with Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
336 (1967) (in construing the meaning of "security," form should be disregarded for sub-
stance and the emphasis should be on economic reality) and United Hous. Foundation,
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
'v See Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 787 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (quoting Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967)).
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VI. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF SHORT-SWING
PROFITS
The court, in Morales v. Mapco, Inc.,2 8 held that section
16(b) of the 1934 Act"9 permitted a corporation to recover short-
swing profits where an insider acquired warrants to purchase
stock, voluntarily exercised the warrants (or otherwise acquired
the underlying stock) by paying cash of $9.00 per warrant more
than six months later, and sold the underlying stock within six
months after exercise. The court held that, until the warrants
were exercised by the payment of cash, the warrant holder had
no equity ownership in the corporation but, instead, had only a
right to purchase stock. The first date of exercise therefore trig-
gered the application of section 16(b). The court distinguished
cases concerned with the conversion of shares of one class of cor-
porate securities into those of another, and involuntary transac-
tions such as those resulting from mergers. The court also held
that the exercise of each warrant constituted a "purchase" within
the meaning of section 16(b) and that a showing of intent to
realize short-swing profits is not required under the terms of the
statute.
" 541 F.2d 233 (loth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).




During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered only
a limited number of cases involving federal taxation. Due to the
relatively Small number of cases and to make the survey of this
area as complete as possible most of these cases will be discussed.'
Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Commissioner
2
presented three issues concerning the taxation of insurance com-
panies: (1) Are unpaid premiums (including deferred premiums
and due and unpaid premiums) and the loading portions of these
premiums, assets of a life insurance company;3 (2) are unpaid
premiums, including their loading portions, to be included within
a life insurance company's underwriting income;' and, (3) are
purchased blocks of cancellable accident and health insurance
policies amortizable over their useful lives? 5
With respect to the first issue, the Tenth Circuit, contrary to
the decisions of four other circuits, held that unpaid premiums
This overview will deal only with cases involving federal tax questions; it will not
discuss those cases that may have arisen in a tax setting but were decided under principles
of other areas of the law. All citations to the Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 as amended; all citations to sections refer to sections of the Code.
2 525 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077
(1974), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 814 (1976).
1 In 1958 Standard did not include unpaid premiums in computing its assets under
section 805. In 1959 and 1961 Standard included in its assets only the net valuation
premium and excluded loading with respect to unpaid premiums. 525 F.2d at 787.
1 In 1958, 1959, and 1961, Standard claimed deductions for increases in loading in
computing gain from operations under section 809. Id. at 787-88.
1 Standard bought blocks of policies from other insurance companies. Id. at 788.
"Unpaid premiums" fall into two categories, namely, "deferred premiums" and "due
and unpaid premiums." Deferred premiums are those premiums on policies with install-
ment payments which become due after December 31 but prior to the policy's anniversary
date. Due and unpaid premiums are those premiums which are due but unpaid before the
end of the year. "Loading" is the amount added to the "net valuation premium" (the
amount necessary to provide the policy's benefits under applicable mortality tables) in
order to cover acquisition and management costs, operating expenses, commissions, prof-
its, and dividends. Together, the loading amount and the net valuation premium comprise
the "gross premium" or the amount charged the insured for carrying his particular risk.
527 F.2d at 787. These definitions were adopted by the Tax Court in Bankers Union Life
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 661, 663 (1974).
State and federal insurance regulations required Standard to compute most of its
policies' reserves as if all of the premiums on these policies were paid a year in advance,
although this is rarely true; reserves are treated as a liability to an insurance company
and figure into the computation of assets under section 805 and gain from operations under
section 809. I.R.C. §§ 805(a), 805(b)(4), 809(c)(2).
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are not to be included in the calculation of assets under section
805.6 The applicable Treasury regulation, to the extent that it
required these unpaid premuims to be treated as assets, was in-
validated by the Tenth Circuit.7 The reasoning underlying the
decisions of the other four circuits did not persuade the Tenth
Circuit because those cases were based upon the fiction that the
annual premiums were received in full and upon the simple desire
to achieve uniformity in accounting for reserves and unpaid
premiums.' The Tenth Circuit noted that the other circuits had
failed to distinguish the fact that, while reserves are required by
state law in order to protect policy holders, "income taxes are,
uniformly, owing on income actually earned. 9 The Tenth Circuit
held that unpaid premiums are not section 805(b)(4) assets be-
cause the insurance company has no enforceable right to them.
Nor does the insurance company have a right to due but unpaid
premiums; non-payment of premiums only causes the policy to
lapse. 10
With respect to the second issue, the Tenth Circuit held that
unpaid premiums were not includable in premium income under
section 809(c)(1) because premium income under that section
includes only those premiums to which an insurance company
has a legally enforceable right."
The Tenth Circuit, with respect to the third issue, agreed
with the Tax Court that purchased blocks of cancellable acci-
dent and health insurance policies may be amortized over their
I Among the cases holding that unpaid premiums must be included in assets under
section 805 are: Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1974); Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,
432 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1970); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d
842 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1969); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
399 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1118 (1969).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.805(a)(4)(ii) (1960). The pertinent part was inconsistent with the
underlying statute and therefore void. 525 F.2d at 789-90. United States v. Correll, 389
U.S. 299 (1967); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
525 F.2d at 789.
Id. (emphasis in original). '"Potential profitability' should not give rise to a tax."
Id.
525 F.2d at 790 & n.4.
Id. at 791. The court also invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1)(i) (1960) insofar
as it applied to unpaid premiums in which an insurance company has no legally enforce-
able right. 525 F.2d at 791.
"1 Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 807, 839 (1975).
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useful life if the record discloses facts from which a reasonable
estimate of useful life can be made,' 3 but held that in this case
there could be no amortization because the record did not disclose
sufficient facts from which such a reasonable estimate could be
made."
In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner,'5 the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed a Tax Court decision concerning the reasonableness
of compensation payments made by a closely held corporation to
an employee who was also a majority stockholder. In 1956 the
corporation and Mrs. Joscelyn, its majority stockholder and an
employee, entered into a contingent compensation agreement.'6
Pursuant to this agreement, the corporation (taxpayer) paid her
$67,187 in 1968, $88,457 in 1969, and $97,552 in 1970. The Tax
Court held that $50,000, $54,500, and $57,500 respectively were
reasonable and properly deductible under section 162(a)(1).' 7
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit
stated that the reasonableness of a given amount of compensation
is a question of fact to be determined by an examination of all
the evidence. Therefore, a trial court's decision on this question
will not be upset unless it is found to be clearly erroneous.' 8 Es-
chewing any rigid rules for making these determinations, the
Tenth Circuit outlined some of the factors to be considered, in-
cluding the fact that the compensation agreement was entered
into between a closely held corporation and its stockholders.'"
" 525 F.2d at 791.
" Id. at 791-92. Judge McWilliams dissented on the first two issues.
, 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1976).
" The agreement basically provided that Mrs. Joscelyn, who was president and gen-
eral manager and held 248 of the outstanding 250 shares of stock, would receive a salary
of $6,000 per year plus an annual bonus of 10% of the first $10,000 of net income, 20% of
the next $10,000, and 30% of the net income over $29,000. The years in question were 1968
through 1970. 528 F.2d at 178 & n.1.
" Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 564, aff'd, 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir.
1976). A fortiori, payments that exceed the reasonable level of compensation (most often
considered dividends in disguise) are not deductible. See, e.g., Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Com-
missioner, 503 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1974); Carole Accessories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32
T.C.M. (CCH) 1285 (1973).
" 528 F.2d at 179.
" Id. The factors listed by the Tenth Circuit were:
1. The employee's qualifications.
2. The nature, extent and scope of the employee's work.
3. The size and complexities of the business.
4. A comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income.
1977
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The Tenth Circuit did not discuss each of the factors it listed.
Instead, it focused upon the fact that the taxpayer had never
made a distribution or paid a dividend. It noted: "The non-
payment of a dividend in conjunction with a contingent scheme
for a controlling shareholder has frequently been recognized as an
indication that unreasonable and excessive compensation is being
paid."20
At the trial and on appeal, the corporation attempted to
justify the payments on the basis of the "reasonable when made,
reasonable when paid" rule. This rule states that if a contingent
compensation agreement is both reasonable when made and the
product of a free bargain between the employer and the employee,
then compensation will be reasonable when paid, although it is
in excess of what is normally considered a reasonable amount.2'
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, refused to apply this
rule, stating: "[Tihe premise of the regulation is a free bargain
made solely for the purpose of securing the services of the em-
ployee. 22 In Pepsi, there was no free bargain for two reasons: (1)
The bargain was between Mrs. Joscelyn as employee and herself
as the corporation's controlling shareholder; and (2) the bargain
was not made for the purpose of securing Mrs. Joscelyn's services,
since, as controlling stockholder, she would probably have pro-
vided the services without the agreement.23 With respect to the
5. The prevailing general economic conditions.
6. A comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders.
7. The prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in compa-
rable concerns.
8. The salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees.
9. In the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers the
amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous years.
This list of considerations originated in Magson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115
(6th Cir. 1949).
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit stated that "special scrutiny should be given to
compensation paid by a corporation whose stock is closely held." 528 F.2d at 179 (citing
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d
45 (10th Cir. 1967)).
" 528 F.2d at 183 (citing Pacific Grains, Inc. v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 603, 607 (9th
Cir. 1968); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 45, 48 (10th Cir. 1967); Logan Lumber
Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1966); Long Island Drug Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 111 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940)). The implication of
such an arrangement is that the profits are being distributed disguised as compensation.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) (1954) for the IRS's statement of the rule.




second reason the Tenth Circuit said: "A bonus contract that
might be reasonable if executed with an executive who is not a
controlling shareholder may be viewed as unreasonable if made
with a controlling shareholder, since incentive to the stockholder
to call forth his best effort would not be needed."
24
In Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner,5 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed a Tax Court decision"6 holding that the legal expenses
incurred by Medco in bringing a trademark infringement suit2
must be capitalized and could not be deducted as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under section 162. The court stated:
"The origin and character of the claim for which an expense was
incurred determines whether it is a deductible business ex-
pense. ' 2 The general rule is that any expense which produces
benefits lasting more than one year must be capitalized and can-
not be fully deducted in the year incurred.29 In Medco the expen-
ses were definitely business related but produced benefits that
would last more than one year. The expenses were "capital in
nature"; they were not incurred in the operation of the business,
and they were not ordinary and necessary in relation to the mar-
keting of electrical therapeutic equipment.3
The Tenth Circuit found support for its decision in section
177, under which a taxpayer may elect to treat expenses incurred
24 Id. at 182.
- 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975).
2S Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 509 (1974).
" Medco, an Oklahoma corporation, had been marketing electrical therapeutic
equipment under its trademark since 1955. In 1966 Medco learned that an Illinois corpora-
tion was marketing similar products under the name Medco. In a trademark infringement
suit, Medco was awarded $1,000 in damages. Medco Products Co. v. Medco Hosp. Supply
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Il. 1968).
" 523 F.2d at 138 (citing United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963)). The issue in
Gilmore was whether the expense was business or personal. However, in Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), the issue was whether fees incurred in an appraisal
action were capital expenditures or deductible business expenses under section 212. There,
the Supreme Court refused to adopt a "primary purpose" test (taxpayer's primary purpose
for incurring the expense determines deductibility) and affirmed the origin of the claim
test.
. 523 F.2d at 138.
" Id. at 139. See Commissioner v. Polk, 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1960); Okemah Nat'l
Bank v. Wiseman, 253 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1958); Hales-Mullaly v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d
509 (10th Cir. 1942). Similar results were reached in Georator Corp. v. United States, 485
F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973), and in Danskin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1964). Since legal expenses in a trademark action made the taxpayer's property more
secure they were capital, not ordinary and necessary, expenses. 523 F.2d at 139.
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in connection with trademarks and tradenames as deferred ex-
penses and pro rate them over a five-year period. The Treasury
regulation under section 177 includes legal fees; therefore, the
court reasoned, Congress did not intend such fees to be deducted
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Since Medco did
not elect section 177 the expenses must be capitalized. 3'
In Brown v. Commissioner, 32 the Tenth Circuit, following the
lead of the Second, 33 Sixth, 34 and Seventh 35 Circuits, declared that
payments in satisfaction of alleged but unproven liability under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 3 must be
treated as long term capital loss rather than an ordinary and
necessary business expense. Mr. Brown was employed by Western
Nuclear Inc. (Western) as vice president and treasurer. Between
January and May of 1966 he sold 3,000 shares of Western stock
in order to raise the cash needed to exercise employee stock pur-
chase options on 16,000 shares which he purchased within the
prohibited six-month period. Gain on the sale of the 3,000 shares
was reported as long term capital gain. In 1968 a shareholder
brought suit to recover the short swing profits. Mr. Brown did not
contest the suit but paid Western the full amount of recoverable
damages. Mr. Brown had no inside information; his only motive
for not fighting the suit was a desire to avoid adverse publicity
and embarrasment to himself and Western, and to prevent harm
to his business reputation.
3 7
The Tax Court, relying on three of its previous decisions, 38
5' 523 F.2d at 140.
529 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'g 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300 (1973).
Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 61 T.C. 1 (1973),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
" Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170 (1969),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev 'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). This section is designed to prevent the unfair use of
inside information by corporate directors and officers. It provides that any profit realized
by a director, officer, or beneficial owner on the purchase and sale or sale and purchase of
his company's stock within six months (commonly referred to as "short swing profits")
may be recovered in an action brought by the corporation or a shareholder on behalf of
the corporation.
3 The repayment was originally reported as a long term capital loss, but in an
amended return it was deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 529 F.2d
at 610-11.
Cummings v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 91, aff'd on rehearing, 61 T.C. 1 (1973), rev'd,
506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Anderson v. Commissioner,
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stated that the only issue was whether Mr. Brown made the re-
payment to protect his employment and his business reputation.
Finding this to be Brown's motive, the Tax Court held that the
payment was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense." The Tenth Circuit accepted the Tax Court opinion
as to Mr. Brown's motive but held that the tax benefit rule
40
applied, and, therefore, the repayment had to be treated as a long
term capital loss."
In Gardiner v. United States,2 Ms. Gardiner (taxpayer) had
bought depreciable property but failed to take the allowable de-
preciation deductions for 1964, 1965, and 1966; she did, however,
take deductions for later years. When the property was sold in
1971, the taxpayer did not reduce her basis by the amount of the
depreciation she could have deducted in 1964-66. The taxpayer
reported a loss on the sale, but the IRS reduced the property's
basis by the amount of depreciation that could have been claimed
and determined that the sale produced a gain. The taxpayer's
refund claim for the amounts she failed to deduct was disallowed
by the IRS because it was not timely filed.' 3 In a refund action
the trial court found for the government."
At trial and on appeal the taxpayer contended that the miti-
gation sections of the Code, sections 1311-1315, would allow the
56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973); William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C.
170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
" Brown v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300, 1302 (1973).
0 The rule was announced in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), and
United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969). Basically, the rule states that if a
taxpayer was taxed at lower than the ordinary income rate when the money was received,
he cannot be allowed to take a deduction against an ordinary income when the money is
repayed. It would be an unfair tax "windfall" if the taxpayer were allowed to fully deduct
the repayment.
" 529 F.2d at 612-13. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the tax benefit
rule should not apply because Brown was acting in separate capacities when he sold the
stock and when he repaid the profits. Section 16(b) liability focuses on both relationships
of stockholder and employee. 529 F.2d at 612-13. The court also rejected an argument
based upon bifurcating the transaction into a stock sale and a separate section 16(b)
problem. Mr. Brown sold stock in order to exercise the option; all the events in the
transaction must be considered together. 529 F.2d at 614.
,2 536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976).
,' Refund claims must be filed within three years from the time the return is filed, or
two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. I.R.C. § 6511(a).
" Gardiner v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Utah 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 903
(10th Cir. 1976).
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case to be reopened although the statute of limitations had run.
This argument was based principally on sections 1312(1) and
1312(7). Section 1312(1) applies when the IRS or a court requires
inclusion in gross income of an item that was erroneously in-
cluded in gross income in a prior year. The court found that the
failure to take allowable depreciation deductions did not consti-
tute an erroneous inclusion in a prior year and thus section
1312(1) was not applicable.45 Furthermore, the court stated:
The meaning of an item of gross income is, under Section 61 of
the 1954 Code, limited to specific items and does not include every-
thing that results in an increase in tax. It is restricted to positive
items and does not include negative elements such as deductions
(like depreciation), the omission of which results in increased
taxes."
Section 1312(7) permits a case to be reopened when, with
respect to transactions affecting basis, certain enumerated errors
have been made. The key word is "transaction"; if there is no
transaction, the section does not apply. The Tenth Circuit found
that the failure to take an allowable depreciation deduction did
not constitute a transaction for purposes of section 1312(7)"7 as
the word "transaction" means a business transaction in the ordi-
nary sense and not the failure to make an entry on the books.48
Furthermore, the failure to take the deduction was not an errro-
neous charge to the capital account of an item that should have
been deducted, and, therefore, section 1312(7)(c)(iii) did not
apply.49
Should a state court determine whether a transfer is a tax-
able event under federal law? This was the ultimate question
presented in Imel v. United States.50 The federal tax issue was
whether a transfer of appreciated property by a husband to his
former wife, pursuant to a divorce settlement, was a nontaxable
division of property between co-owners or a transaction giving rise
,1 536 F.2d at 906.
4 Id. (emphasis in original). The court viewed depreciation as a deduction from gross
income and not as an element in the calculation of gross income. Id.
1, 536 F.2d at 907. See also, United States v. Rushlight, 291 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1961);
Granger v. United States, 3 A.F.T.R.2d 59-319 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
536 F.2d at 907.
Id. at 907-08.
523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
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to taxable capital gains.' The Tenth Circuit, relying on a Colo-
rado Supreme Court case holding that under Colorado law the
wife has an interest in her husband's property which vests at the
time the divorce action is filed, decided that the transfer was a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.52 Determina-
tion of the federal issue in Imel depended upon the nature of the
wife's interest in jointly acquired property held in the husband's
name. This issue was decided by the Colorado Supreme Court.
5 3
On appeal the Tenth Circuit did not question the correctness of
the state court determination. The court's opinion focused on
the propriety of accepting the state court decision as controlling. 5
", See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1002.
2 Pursuant to COLO. App. R. 21.1, the federal district court certified questions of state
law to the Colorado Supreme Court. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1116 (D.
Colo. 1974). In In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo.
1, 517 P.2d 1331 (1974), the Colorado Supreme Court stated that "under Colorado law,
the transfer involved here was a recognition of a 'species of common ownership' of the
marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between co-owners." Id. at 8,
517 P.2d at 1334. The transfer was not made to release the husband from an independent
obligation to support the wife. Id. at 9, 517 P.2d at 1334.
The Tenth Circuit felt that the district court had not abused its discretion in asking
the Colorado Supreme Court to determine the issue of ownership under Colorado law. 523
F.2d at 857. The Supreme Court has recently stated that use of certification procedures
"rests in the sound discretion of the federal court." Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974). Furthermore, certification is "particularly appropriate" when the question is
novel or the law unsettled. Id. The Tenth Circuit did feel that it was improper for the
district court to ask the Colorado court whether the transfer was a taxable event for federal
income tax purposes. 523 F.2d at 857. The Colorado Supreme Court expressed a similar
feeling and declined to answer that question. In re Questions Submitted by the United
States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 8, 517 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1974). One author has concluded
that there was Colorado law for the district court to follow and, therefore, use of certifica-
tion procedures was improper. Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax Policy?,
47 U. COLO. L. Rxv. 533, 541 (1976).
' In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 517
P.2d 1331 (1974). The district court made its own analysis of Colorado law and reached
the same conclusion as the state court. Although the district court had difficulty defining
the exact nature of the wife's interest, it felt it was a "species of common ownership." 375
F. Supp. at 1115.
" For this reason the validity of the decision is not discussed. For a thorough analysis
of the wife's interest and the correctness of the state and district court opinions, see Note,
Federal Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of State Law,
52 DEN. L.J. 799 (1975); See also Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax
Policy?, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 533 (1976).
11 523 F.2d at 855. The Government argued that the wife's interest as defined by the
Colorado Supreme Court was not within the concept of common ownership for federal tax
purposes and that under United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), taxability of the
transaction should be determined with reference to the wife's right during the marriage
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In the leading case on taxation of marital property settlements,
United States v. Davis,5" the United States Supreme Court, with-
out the benefit of a state supreme court decision on point, applied
its own analysis of Delaware law and found the transfer taxable. 7
In Pulliam v. Commissioner,5" the Tenth Circuit, in a similar
situation, found that such transfers in Colorado were taxable."
However, a line of cases after Pulliam indicates that when a state
supreme court has determined the nature of the wife's interest in
marital property, a federal court should use that interpretation
in deciding whether a taxable transfer occurred. 0
In Collins v. Commissioner (Collins )," the Tenth Circuit
had found no significant differences between Colorado and Okla-
homa law and therefore relied on Pulliam to find a similar trans-
fer taxable in Oklahoma. Then, in Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Con-
and not upon divorce. The Tenth Circuit did not read Davis as determining when the
wife's interest had to vest before the division would be nontaxable. 523 F.2d at 856.
As a general rule, federal law determines which legal rights and interests shall be
taxed, whereas state law controls the creation of these interests and rights. Taxation,
however, does not depend upon labels placed on interests by state law. Instead, the courts
must look behind the labels to the "economic reality" of the situation and determine if
Congress sought to tax the particular transaction involved. 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 61.01-02, at 1-3 (1970). See also Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Moryan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). For an argument
that Congress did not intend to tax the type of transfer involved in Imel, see Note, Should
State Courts Determine Federal Tax Policy?, U. COLO. L. Rlv. 533, 548-51 (1976).
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
5 Referring to DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1531(a) (1953), the Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the
Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. The
wife has no interest-passive or active-over the management or disposition
of her husband's personal property. Her rights are not descendable, and she
must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the
marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as the court deems
"reasonable."
370 U.S. at 70.
329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964). The Tenth Circuit, using
its own interpretation of Colorado law, determined that the wife did not have a vested
interest in her husband's property and declared that a transfer pursuant to a divorce
decree was a taxable event. Id.
11 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit used its own analysis of Kansas law to find such
transfers taxable. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1974).
" In Davis, the Supreme Court stated that its decision "may permit different tax
treatment among the several States." 370 U.S. at 71. In Wiles the Tenth Circuit said,
"Davis requires us to follow Kansas law." 499 F.2d at 259.
El 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
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mission (Collins 11),61 a case dealing with the state capital gains
tax involved in the same transaction, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the wife's interest was a species of common
ownership; thus, the transfer was not taxable. The Supreme
Court, in a one paragraph per curiam opinion, 3 reversed Collins
I and remanded it for reconsideration in light of Collins 11.61 The
Collins III remand must have indicated to the Tenth Circuit that
the Supreme Court felt that the state's characterization of the
wife's interest, if available, should be controlling.
By declaring that the wife has an interest in her husband's
property which vests upon the filing of a divorce action, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court created federal income tax advantages for
some of the citizens of the state.6 5 Imel is based upon the general
rule that state court interpretations of state law control. It fails,
"446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
0 Collins v. Commissioner (Collins Il), 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
11 On remand, the Tenth Circuit followed the Oklahoma Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the law and found the transfer to be a nontaxable division of property between co-
owners. Collins v. Commissioner (Collins IV), 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Whether or not a taxpayer will find an "advantage" in Imel depends on his point
of view. The maxim "taxes postponed are taxes saved" is not a sufficient analysis of the
situation. When appreciated property is transferred to an ex-spouse pursuant to a divorce
settlement, the transferee may do one of two things: make a living transfer of the property
or keep it until death.
In a "division of property" jurisdiction, while the transferor would pay no income tax
on the transfer, his basis will be carried over to the transferee. On a subsequent sale, the
transferee would be obliged to pay tax on the total appreciation, including that which
occurred prior to the divorce. In a "taxable event" jurisdiction the transferor in effect
satisfies his marital obligations with appreciated property and must pay income tax on
the amount by which the fair market value on the date of the transfer exceeds his basis.
The transferee's basis in the property will be its fair market value on the date of the
transfer. On a subsequent sale the transferee spouse would be taxed only on the post-
divorce appreciation. Therefore, when the transferred property is subsequently sold the
transferee would seem to fare better in a "taxable event" state.
If the transferee makes an intervivos gift of the property, any gift tax due would be
based on the fair market value of the property on the date of the gift and the donee's basis
would be that of the donor, increased by any gift tax paid. Like the transferee who sells
the property, the transferee who gives it away (and the donee) fares better in a "taxable
event" jurisdiction because the burden of at least part of the appreciation is placed on
the transferor.
If the transferee holds the property until death, he will not pay income tax on the
appreciation regardless of the local rule. However, because of the new carryover basis rules
for inherited property, there could be different income tax consequences to the transferee's
heirs or legatees, depending on the local rule. This situation is analogous to those involving
gifts, mentioned above: The higher the transferee's basis, the lower the amount of income
tax due to appreciation when the heir disposes of the property. Apparently, the only people
who will benefit from Ime! are transferors.
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however, to consider the equally basic rule that, for federal tax
purposes, the state construction (or label) is not controlling, but
rather the true nature of the interest and the transaction must be
considered." However, once the Colorado Supreme Court deci-
sion was accepted by the Tenth Circuit as controlling, the result
in Imel easily followed.
In The J.E. & L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. v. United
States,7 the J.E. and L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. (Foundation),
a tax exempt charitable organization, challenged a district court
decision"8 denying relief in a suit for refund of taxes paid on in-
come produced by overriding royalty interests." Prior to 1969
such income was specifically excluded from taxation. This case,
however, involved the construction and application of the 1969
amendments.7 0
Prior to the amendments, a tax exempt corporation could, by
forming a subsidiary, indirectly engage in a business that would
" In tax cases the Supreme Court has frequently construed state law differently from
state courts, reflecting what the Court considered the "economic realities" of the situa-
tion. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S.
103 (1932). 10 J. MEaRTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 61.02, at 3 (1970).
The Tenth Circuit refused to apply the holding of In re Questions Submitted by the
United States District Court to a case dealing with the taxability of the wife under sections
71 and 215. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1975). The wife argued that
periodic payments, because of a pre-payment option, were really a tax free division of
property between co-owners as per the district and Colorado Supreme Court opinions in
Imel. The Tenth Circuit looked to the "true nature" of the payments and found them to
be in satisfaction of the husband's marital obligation, and not a division of property, even
though the payments "may be characterized by Colorado courts as a property settlement
... Id. at 469. In Imel, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Hayutin "on the facts" and
because it dealt with "different provisions of the Code." 523 F.2d at 856. For views on the
nature of a Colorado spouse's right to a division of property upon divorce, see Note,
Federal Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of State Law,
52 DEN. L.J. 794, 808-11 (1975); Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax
Policy?, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 540 (1976).
,7 533 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1976).
,1 J.E. & L.E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 673 (N. D.
Okla. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 The court stated: "Overriding royalty is a term used to determine the partition of
the lessee's interests in a mineral lease." 533 F.2d at 522.
In 1947 Mr. Mabee and his wife transferred oil and gas leases to the Mabee Petroleum
Corporation (Petroleum) which became a wholly owned subsidiary of the Foundation in
1948. Petroleum declared dividends in kind to the Foundation in the form of overriding
royalty interests in the leases. As a result Petroleum owned 20-30% and the Foundation
70-80% of the leasehold estate mineral interests. Id.
7o The part of the Code in issue was section 512. 533 F.2d at 522-23.
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otherwise produce taxable income. The subsidiary would operate
the business but pay all the income to the parent in the form of
rents or royalties which were not taxed to the exempt parent
corporation. According to the House and Senate Reports, the
purpose of the amendment was to stop this practice.7
On appeal, the Foundation argued that the exclusion of over-
riding royalties from taxation in subsection 512(b)(2) was not
changed by the addition of subsection 512(b)(15) because that
subsection refers only to "royalties." The Tenth Circuit found
that "royalties" in subsection 512(b)(15) included overriding roy-
alties and that the inclusion of "overriding royalties" in subsec-
tion 512(b)(2) was for clarification only and not intended as an
addition to the word royalties."
The court also rejected the argument that the Foundation's
overriding royalty income was not derived from the subsidiary
corporation as required by subsection 512(b)(15) because the in-
come was paid directly to the Foundation by the purchasers and
not to the subsidiary corporation. The Tenth Circuit stated that
it was the intent of Congress to make this type of income taxable
and that a "mechanical formality" cannot be used to avoid that
result .13
In United States v. Russell,7" the United States brought a
debt action against the surviving widow of T.C. Russell, seeking
payment of federal estate taxes previously assessed against Mr.
Russell's estate. The major portion of the taxable estate consisted
of joint tenancy property which passed to Mrs. Russell outside of
probate and was, therefore, unavailable for the payment of taxes.
The tax was assessed against the estate but not against Mrs.
Russell personally.75 The only issue considered by the Tenth Cir-
cuit was whether a general tax lien pursuant to section 6321 could
1, H.R. REP. No. 91-413, Part 1, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1969); S. REP. No. 91-522,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
72 533 F.2d at 523. The fact that the words "overriding royalties" were not added
parenthetically to subsection 512(b)(15) did not indicate intent to exclude them from the
purview of that subsection. Id.
7 533 F.2d at 524.
532 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1976).
7' This was the second time this case came before the Tenth Circuit; the original case
was United States v. Russell, 327 F. Supp. 632 (D. Kan. 1971), rev'd, 461 F.2d 605 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972).
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arise against Mrs. Russell personally if an assessment had not
been made as required by section 6322.76
Mrs. Russell argued that no lien could arise without an as-
sessment. The government contended that, since the estate was
properly assessed, a lien could arise against her because the trans-
fer provisions of section 6324(a)(2) made the surviving tenant
personally liable for the unpaid tax. The district court and the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the government. The jointly held prop-
erty was a part of the taxable estate; its value was included in
the assessment made against the estate even though the property
did not pass through probate and was not available to pay the
tax. In this situation a separate assessment against Mrs. Russell
was not required. Since the estate was properly assessed, the
transfer provisions did not impose any new obligation on Mrs.
Russell but merely facilitated the collection of an existing liabil-
ity.
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In Silver Bell Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,7 8 Silver Bell
Industries, Inc. (Silver Bell) owned mining claims which were
sold by the IRS to satisfy a lien for delinquent federal employ-
ment taxes. In the district court,79 Silver Bell challenged the va-
lidity of the sale on several grounds and raised essentially the
same issues on appeal. Agreeing with the district court, the Tenth
Circuit found no merit in Silver Bell's arguments.
Section 6335(d) provides that tax sales shall take place
within the county where the property is located, unless the Secre-
tary or his delegate issues a special order to the effect that the
sale shall take place elsewhere.80 The Tenth Circuit declared that
1, Section 6322 provides: "Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien
imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue
until the liability for the amount so assessed. . . is satisfied .... " (emphasis supplied).
" The court seemed to place some weight on the fact that Mrs. Russell was also
executrix of the estate, which was insolvent, and that she therefore took the property fully
aware of the outstanding tax debt due. The court more than once referred to the particular
facts and circumstances of the case and concluded with the remark: "We deem it advisa-
ble to caution the Government that our affirmance in this instance should not be relied
upon for a like result in the event of failure by the proper officials to effect the assessment
lacking here." 532 F.2d at 177.
" No. 74-1641 (10th Cir., Feb. 19, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 822 (1976).
" Silver Bell Indus. v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-5682 (D. Colo. 1974).
The properties were located in San Miguel County but sold at an auction in Denver.
The criteria for issuing a special order are stated in Treas. Reg. § 301.6335-1(c)(1) (1954).
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this section required strict compliance and that a sale is invalid
if the procedures are not followed." The burden of showing literal
compliance with statutes regulating land sales for taxes rests with
the claimant under the sale." Even though no special order was
produced and the testimony raised a serious question as to its
existence, the Tenth Circuit did not invalidate the sale. The
claimants under the sale produced deeds reciting that the lands
were "sold as provided by Section 6335 . . . and the regulations
promulgated thereunder . . . ." Such a recital is prima facie
proof of the facts stated therein.
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Silver Bell next argued that, prior to the filing of the lien, it
had paid all amounts due for the second quarter of 1971, and,
therefore, the seizure and sale for that period was invalid .8 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that, even if the payments had been
credited in the way Silver Bell had directed, there was still a
substantial sum due at the time of the sale. 5
In addition Silver Bell did not properly redeem the properties
from the government. Approximately three months after the sale,
Silver Bell paid the government enough to satisfy current liabili-
ties and all but about $3,000 of the total amount owed. This was
viewed by the IRS as an overpayment of taxes. The Tenth Circuit
held that, even if the payment was applied toward redemption,
it was insufficient to redeem all the properties and the IRS was
under no duty to apply selectively the credit to redeem some of
the parcels.8
Essentially, the regulation requires the sale to take place in the county where the property
is seized, unless it appears to the district director authorizing the seizure that substan-
tially higher bids may be obtained if the property is sold outside the county. Id.
No. 74-1641 at 5 (citing Thatcher v. Powell, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 119, 125 (1821)).
No. 74-1641 at 5 (citing McAndrews v. Belknap, 141 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1944)).
Section 6339(b). The Supreme Court has held that, in conjunction with a tax sale,
there is a rebuttable presumption that persons acting in public office have been duly
appointed and are acting with authority. Keely v. Saunders, 99 U.S. 441, 447 (1878). The
Tenth Circuit found that the presumption had not been overcome by Silver Bell. No. 74-
1641 at 8. Silver Bell also challenged the revenue officer's authority to select the method
of sale used, which was public sale under sealed bids pursuant to section 6335(e)(2), and
his authority to issue certificates of sale under section 6338(a). Because Silver Bell did
not establish lack of authority at trial, the proceedings were presumed regular. No. 74-
1641 at 8-9.
" Silver Bell made two payments in October, 1971, and directed that the payments
be applied to taxes owed for the second quarter, ending June 30, 1971. The IRS, however,
credited the payments toward third quarter liability. No. 74-1641 at 9.
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 11-13 n.10.
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Silver Bell did not effect a timely redemption under the re-
quirements of section 6337(b) by mailing personal checks to the
purchasers. The date of the sale was determined to be the date
of the publicly conducted auction, not the later date when the
offers to purchase were accepted by the Special Procedures Divi-
sion of the IRS. Silver Bell had mailed the checks within the
statutory 120-day period but they were not received until the
121st day. Section 7502(a)(1)87 does not apply to articles mailed
to private parties, and, therefore, the general rule that payments
to creditors are effective upon receipt applied, making the at-
tempted redemptions untimely.
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In Burns v. Commissioner,9 Mr. Burns received for services
rendered in 1966, 6,420 shares of Community National Life Insur-
ance Company (Community National). 0 During the same year,
Mr. Burns sold 4,200 shares and reported their value on his in-
come tax return at $33,520 and reported gain accordingly. The
Commissioner valued the shares at $71,542 and assessed a defi-
ciency. In a petition to redetermine the deficiency, Mr. Burns
argued that the shares could not be valued at market because
they were subject to restrictions on sale." The Tax Court found
that there were no restrictions on sale and upheld the deficiency.
On appeal Mr. Burns challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence behind the decision and contended that the Tax Court
erred as a matter of law in failing to make a specific finding of
the value of the shares on the dates received. The Tenth Circuit
stated that issues of valuation and the existence of sale restric-
tions were questions of fact and then applied the "not to be re-
versed unless clearly erroneous" standard. Although Rule 52 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to the Tax
Court, and Tax Court Rules do not require findings of fact and
conclusions of law, such findings and conclusions should be made
'7 This section provides that articles mailed to the IRS shall be considered delivered
on the date mailed.
" No. 74-1641 at 14-16.
" 36 A.F.T.R.2d 1 75-5341 (10th Cir. 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
0 Mr. Burns was in the business of arranging corporate mergers and acquisitions. He
received the Community National stock for helping Community National to acquire three
other insurance companies. Id. at 6236.
" The Commissioner's determination of market value was based upon comparable
sales of Community National stock. Id.
11 Burns v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 977 (1974).
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to permit adequate review." It was clear from the opinion that the
Tax Court had determined the value of the shares on the dates
received." Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that the record
supported the Tax Court finding that sale of the shares was not
restricted."
In Gates v. United States,"6 taxpayers brought an action to
obtain the refund of taxes, interest, and penalties paid for 1962
through 1968. Granting the government's motion for summary
judgment, the district court dismissed the action as to each tax
year. Taxpayers' appeals respecting 1962, 1963, and 1964 were
dismissed by the Tenth Circuit because their tax liability for
those years was fully adjudicated by the Tax Court" pursuant to
a petition to redetermine deficiencies."s The taxpayers' timely
refund claim for 1966 was dismissed because it failed to give the
government reasonable notice of the nature of the claim, a juris-
dictional prerequisite." To be sufficient the claim must thor-
oughly apprise the IRS of the grounds upon which recovery is
sought. '0 The claims for 1967 and 1968 were rejected on the same
0 Bums v. Commissioner, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5341 at 6236 (citing James Petroleum
Corp. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir. 1964)). The court recited the stan-
dard:
The basis for the decision however is not indicated in the findings or the
opinion, and this must appear. There is no way for us to determine whether
there is "substantial evidence" to support the findings if there are not find-
ings on the specific facts concerned. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §
7482, states that the Court of Appeals shall review the decisions of the Tax
Court in the same manner and to the same extent as the decisions of the
District Courts. This requires complete findings of fact to demonstrate the
basis for the decision.
36 A.F.T.R.2d at 6236-37 (citations omitted). Section 7459(b) requires the Tax Court to
include in the report on any proceeding "its [written] findings of fact or opinion or
memorandum opinion." Rule 151 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure re-
quires that briefs contain proposed findings of fact.
" See Bums v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 977, 979 (1974).
" Mr. Burns had testified that he orally agreed not to sell the shares without approval
and introduced a letter allegedly containing written restrictions. Neither the Tax Court
nor the Tenth Circuit found the letter convincing because Mr. Burns sold 65% of his
Community National stock in 1966 but argued that the letter prohibited him from selling
at all. Furthermore, in 1967 Mr. Burns had transferred a substantial number of shares
without mentioning any restrictions. 36 A.F.T.R.2d at 6237.
No. 75-1391 (10th Cir., Apr. 28, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Gates v. Commissioner, T.C. No. 5897-67 (Sept. 19, 1968).
" Final action by the Tax Court prohibits relitigation of the issues, for the years
involved, in a refund suit. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (1954).
' Herrington v. United States, 416 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1969). The refund claim for
1977
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grounds. The claim for 1965 was dismissed because the plaintiff
failed to respond at the hearing on the motion for summary judg-
ment to the government's affidavits that no refund claim for that
year could be discovered. The timely filing of a claim is jurisdic-
tional, and the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate disputed
jurisdictional facts.
In Woods v. Commissioner'0 1 Woods, an inmate at Leaven-
worth Prison, filed a suit in district court requesting that a three-
judge court be convened to declare section 107 unconstitutional.
This section provides the parsonage rental deduction. 02 The dis-
trict court dismissed the action on the ground that Woods lacked
standing.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not consider the standing
issue0 3 but went directly to the merits. The court considered the
issue in one paragraph and, relying on the principles of Waltz v.
Tax Commission,'4 found that the tax exemptions extended by
section 107 did not violate the Establishment Clause. Because
there were no grounds on which to base a claim of unconstitu-
tionality, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly
refused to convene a three-judge court. 10
Ward L. Van Scoyk
1966 (Form 843) stated the grounds for the refund: "$960.73 was illegally withheld after
the statue [sic] of limitations had run in addition to $721.04 previousely [sic] paid."
No. 75-1391 at 3-4.
I No. 75-1644 (10th Cir., Apr. 19, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 856 (1976).
I" Section 107 exempts from federal income taxation the rental value of living quar-
ters furnished to ministers of the gospel as part of their compensation, or that part of
their compensation used to rent or provide a home. Woods argued that the section violated
the Establishment Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
0 On the authority of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that taxpayer suits can be maintained in certain circumstances. The court noted,
however, that there was a serious question whether inmate Woods was a taxpayer in light
of certain statements he made in his pauper's affidavit, filed when the proceedings were
initiated. No. 75-1644 at 2.
1" 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Supreme Court stated, "There is no genuine nexus be-
tween tax exemption and establishment of religion." Id. at 680. Tax exemptions to
churches do not violate the first amendment. Id. See also, Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Swallow v. United States,
325 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 951 (1963).
'"I No. 75-1644 at 3. See generally Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Saiz v.
Goodwin, 450 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1971); Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1970); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).
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UPDATE TO Second Annual Tenth Circuit Survey
The Denver Law Journal's second annual Tenth Circuit
Survey reviewed decisions handed down by the Tenth Circuit
between September 1, 1974 and August 31, 1975. Four of these
decisions were subsequently reviewed by the United States Su-
preme Court. The Court's holdings are briefly summarized below.
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association,
426 U.S. 776 (1976). In Flint Ridge Development Co.' the Su-
preme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision of Scenic Rivers
Association v. Lynn2 in an 8-0 opinion by Justice Marshall. The
Court held that, although the National Environmental Policy
Act 3 (NEPA) requires the filing of an environmental impact
statement where practicable, an impact statement in this case
was inappropriate because it clearly conflicted with authority
held by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act.' Compliance with the NEPA requirement would necessitate
extending the thirty-day mandatory effective date after filing of
the statement of record. Such extension is within the Secretary's
power only when the disclosure is found inadequate.
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). In Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District,5 in a 6-3 opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision of United States v.
Akin.' The Court held that the McCarran Amendment7 did not
divest federal district courts of jurisdiction under section 1345 of
28 U.S.C.8 but gave consent to concurrent federal and state juris-
diction where federal water rights were at issue, including deter-
426 U.S. 776 (1976), rev'g 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975).
520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed in 53 DEN. L.J. 223 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970), which requires developers to disclose to the secretary
information needed by potential buyers concerning unimproved tracts of land to prevent
false and deceptive sales practices.
424 U.S. 800 (1976), rev'g 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
6 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed in 53 DEN. L.J. 225 (1976).
7 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), giving consent to join the United States as a defendant in
certain water rights adjudications.
I The statute provides for original jurisdiction in the district courts of all civil actions
brought by the United States unless otherwise provided by Congress.
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mination of water rights reserved for Indians, notwithstanding
the United States' fiduciary obligation to protect Indian rights.,
Moreover, the doctrine of abstention" was held inappropriate as
a ground for refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the federal court
since the doctrine applies only in special situations, none of which
were present in Akin.
However, the Court found other factors which clearly sup-
ported dismissal of the Government's suit and resolution of all its
water right claims by state court proceedings. Most significant
was the furtherance of the McCarran Amendment policy of en-
couraging unified adjudication of water rights for use of state
waters under state law, to avoid piecemeal litigation."
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
U.S. 1 (1976). In Train"2 the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit and held that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was without authority to regulate the discharge of radioac-
tive materials into navigable waterways.
3
Respondents had sought a declaration that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972's (FWPCA)
charged the EPA with controlling such discharges of radioactive
materials. Under the FWCPA it is illegal to discharge
"pollutants" into navigable waters without an EPA permit. The
act defines "pollutant" to include "radioactive materials." EPA
disclaimed any authority over radioactive discharges into naviga-
ble waterways in light of regulations, already issued by the At-
omic Energy Commission"' pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954,11 governing the discharge of such materials into waterways
by EPA licensees. In an 8-0 opinion by Justice Marshall, the
Court held that Congress had evinced no intent to diminish the
Atomic Energy Commission's control over discharges of source,
byproduct, and special nuclear materials, and, therefore, EPA's
424 U.S. 800, 809-12 (1976).
" The Court calls the doctrine "the exception, not the rule." Id. at 813.
Id. at 818.
2 426 U.S. 1 (1976), rev'g 507 F.2d 743 (1974).
' For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit opinion, see 53 DEN. L.J. 228 (1976).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV 1974).
Now succeeded in its regulatory capacity by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5841(f), 5842 (Supp. IV 1974).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
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authority to regulate "pollutants" under the FWPCA does not
extend to such materials. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit in relying
on the "plain meaning" of the statute to construe its meaning had
erred in excluding the FWPCA's legislative history.
Salone v. United States, 426 U.S. 917 (1976). In Salone 7 the
Tenth Circuit held that a federal employee filing a civil action
under the Civil Rights Act of 196411 is entitled only to judicial
review of an administrative denial of a claim of discrimination
and is not entitled to a trial de novo.19 During the pendency of
Salone's petition for a writ of certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court decided Chandler v. Roudebush, ° wherein a black
woman, like Salone, brought suit in federal court to challenge the
administrative denial of her discrimination claim. The Court held
in Roudebush that the plain meaning of the statute, reinforced
by the history of its 1972 amendments, compelled the conclusion
that federal employees have the same right to a trial de novo as
is enjoyed by a private sector or state government employee. In a
memorandum decision, Salone was vacated and the case re-
manded to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Roudebush.2'
W. Cecil Jones
" 511 F.2d 902 (1975), vacated mem., 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
See 53 DEN. L.J. 29 (1976).
425 U.S. 840 (1976).
21 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
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